













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THE  
H I S T O R Y  
OF  
ANCIENT GREECE,  
ITS COLONIES, AND CONQUESTS;

From the Earliest Accounts till the  
Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East,

INCLUDING THE HISTORY OF  
LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FINE ARTS.

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By JOHN GILLIES, LL. D. F. A. S.

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Εκ μὲν τοιγὰ τῆς ἀπάντων πρὸς ἀλλήλα συμπλοκῆς καὶ παραθεσεως,  
ἐπὶ δὲ ὁμοιοτήτος καὶ διαφορᾶς, μόνως αὖ τις ἐφίκοιτο καὶ δυνήθειν  
κατοπτρῶσαι, ἅμα καὶ τὸ χρησιμὸν καὶ τὸ τέρπνον ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας  
λαβεῖν.

POLYBIUS, l. i. c. v.

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# THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

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## CHAP. XXI.

*Consequences of the Athenian Misfortunes in Sicily.  
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—Tyrannical Government of the Four Hundred.  
—Battle of Eretria.—Democracy re-established  
in Athens.—Naval Success of the Athenians.—  
Triumphant Return of Alcibiades.—The Eleu-  
sinian Mysteries—and Plynteria.*

**I**N the populous and extensive kingdoms of modern Europe, the revolutions of public affairs seldom disturb the humble obscurity of private life; but the national transactions of Greece involved the interest of every family, and deeply affected the fortune and happiness of every individual.

CHAP.  
XXI.

Extent of  
the Athe-  
nian mis-  
fortunes  
in Sicily.

CHAP.  
XXI.

dual. Had the arms of the Athenians proved successful in Sicily, each citizen would have derived from that event an immediate accession of wealth, as well as of power, and have felt a proportional increase of honour and security. But their proud hopes perished for ever in the harbour of Syracuse. The succeeding disasters shook to the foundation the fabric of their empire. In one rash enterprise they lost their army, their fleet, the prudence of their experienced generals, and the flourishing vigour of their manly youth<sup>1</sup>—Irreparable disasters! which totally disabled them to resist the confederacy of Peloponnesus, reinforced by the resentment of a new and powerful enemy. While a Lacedæmonian army invested their city, they had reason to dread that a Syracusan fleet should assault the Piræus; that Athens must finally yield to these combined attacks, and her once prosperous citizens destroyed by the sword, or dragged into captivity, atone by their death or disgrace for the cruelties which they had recently inflicted on the wretched republics of Melos and Scioné.

The news  
brought to  
Athens.  
Olymp.  
xci. 4.  
A. C. 413.

The dreadful alternative of victory and defeat, renders it little surprising that the Athenians should have rejected intelligence, which they must have received with horror. The first messengers of such sad news were treated with contempt: but it was

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. l. vii. p. 557. Cicero goes farther. *Hic primum opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depressæque sunt: in hoc portu Atheniensem nobilitatis, imperij, gloriæ naufragium factum existimatur.* Cicer. in Verrem, v. 37.



impossible long <sup>2</sup> to with-hold belief from the miserable fugitives, whose squalid and dejected countenances too faithfully attested the public calamity. Such evidence could not be refused; the arrogance of incredulity was abashed, and the whole republic thrown into consternation, or seized with despair. The venerable members of the Areopagus expressed the majesty of silent sorrow; but the piercing cries of woe extended many a mile along the lofty walls which joined the Piræus to the city; and the licentious populace raged with unbridled fury against the diviners and orators, whose blind predictions, and ambitious harangues, had promoted an expedition eternally fatal to their country <sup>3</sup>.

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XXI.

The distress of the Athenians was too great to admit the comfort of sympathy; but had they been capable of receiving, they had little reason to expect, that melancholy consolation. The tidings so afflicting to *them* gave unspeakable joy to their neighbours; many feared, most hated, and all envied a people who had long usurped the dominion of Greece. The Athenian allies, or rather subjects, scattered over so many coasts and islands,

Combina-  
tion in  
Greece  
against  
Athens.

<sup>2</sup> The calamity was so great that the boldest imagination had never dared to conceive its existence. Their minds being thus unprepared, the Athenians, says Thucydides, disbelieved *καὶ τοὶ πᾶσι τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ἐργῆς διαπιστευοῦσι* even those soldiers who escaped from this melancholy business. The stories of Plutarch in Nicia, of Athenæus, &c. may be safely condemned as fictions, since they are inconsistent with Thucydides's narrative.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. l. viii. p. 558, & seqq.

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XXI.

prepared to assert their independence; the confederates of Sparta, among whom the Syracusans justly assumed the first rank, were unsatisfied with victory, and longed for revenge: even those communities, which had hitherto declined the danger of a doubtful contest, meanly solicited to become parties in a war, which they expected must finally terminate in the destruction of Athens<sup>4</sup>.

Abetted  
by the re-  
sentment  
of Persia.

Should all the efforts of such a powerful confederacy still prove insufficient to accomplish the ruin of the devoted city, there was yet another enemy behind, from whose strength and animosity the Athenians had every thing to fear. The long and peaceful reign of Artaxerxes king of Persia, expired four hundred and twenty-five years before the Christian æra. The two following years were remarkable for a rapid succession of kings, Xerxes, Sogdianus, Ochus; the last of whom assumed the name of Darius, to which historians have added the epithet of Nothus, the bastard, to distinguish this effeminate prince from his illustrious predecessor<sup>5</sup>. The first years of Darius Nothus were employed in confirming his disputed authority, and in watching the dangerous intrigues of his numerous kinsmen who aspired to the throne. When every rival was removed that could either disturb his quiet or offend his suspicion, the monarch sunk into an indolent security, and his voluptuous court was governed by the feeble ad-

<sup>4</sup> Thucydid. l. viii. p. 558, & seqq. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 348.

<sup>5</sup> Diodor. l. xii. p. 322. Ctesias, Persic. c. xlv. & seqq.

ministration of women and eunuchs <sup>6</sup>. But in the ninth year of his reign Darius was roused from his lethargy by the revolt of Egypt and Lydia. The defection of the latter threatened to tear from his dominion the valuable provinces of Asia Minor; a consequence which he determined to prevent by employing the bravery of Pharnabazus, and the policy of the crafty Tissaphernes, to govern respectively the northern and southern districts of that rich and fertile peninsula. The abilities of these generals not only quelled the rebellion in Lydia, but extended the arms of their master towards the shores of the Ægean, as well as of the Hellespont and Propontis; in direct opposition to the treaty which forty years before had been ratified between the Athenians, then in the height of their prosperity, and the unwarlike Artaxerxes. But the recent misfortunes of that ambitious people flattered the Persian commanders with the hope of restoring the whole Asiatic coast to the great king <sup>7</sup>, as well as of inflicting exemplary punishment on the proud city, which had resisted the power, dismembered the empire, and tarnished the glory of Persia.

C H A P.  
XXI.

The terror of such a formidable combination might have reduced the Athenians to despair; and our surprise that this consequence should not immediately follow, will be increased by the following reflection. Not to mention the immortal trophies

The Athenian allies prepare to revolt.

<sup>6</sup> Ctesias, c. xlvii.

<sup>7</sup> Thucyd. l. viii. p. 560. & Ctesias, Persic. c. li.



C H A P.  
XXI.

of Alexander, or the extensive ravages of Zingis Khan, Tamerlane, and the Tartar princes of their race; the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and other nations of modern Europe, have, with a handful of men, marched victorious over the effeminate or barbarous coasts of the eastern and western world. The hardy discipline of Europe easily prevailed over the unwarlike softness of India and the savage ignorance of America. But the rapid success of all these conquerors was owing to their military knowledge<sup>s</sup> and experience. By the superiority of their arms and of their discipline, the Romans subdued the nations of the earth. But the Athenians afford the only example of a people, who, by the virtues of the mind alone, acquired an extensive dominion over men equally improved with themselves in the arts of war and government. They possessed, or were believed to possess, superior courage and capacity to the nations around them; and this opinion, which should seem not intirely destitute of foundation, enabled them to maintain, by very feeble garrisons, an absolute authority in the islands of the Ægean, as well as in the cities of the Asiatic coast. Their disasters and disgrace in Sicily destroyed at once the real and the ideal supports of their power; the loss of one third of their citizens made it impossible to supply, with fresh recruits, the exhausted strength of their

<sup>s</sup> If that of the Tartars should be doubted, the reader may consult *Monf. de Guignes's Hist. des Huns*, and *Mr. Gibbon's* admirable description of the manners of the pastoral nations, v. ii.

garrisons in foreign parts; the terror of their fleet was no more; and their multiplied defeats, before the walls of Syracuse, had converted into contempt that admiration in which Athens had been long held by Greeks and Barbarians.

C H A P.  
XXI.

But in free governments there are many latent resources which public calamities alone can bring to light; and adversity, which, to individuals endowed with inborn vigour of mind, is the great school of virtue and of heroism, furnishes also to the enthusiasm of popular assemblies the noblest field for the display of national honour and magnanimity. Had the measures of the Athenians depended on one man, or even on a few, it is probable that the selfish timidity of a prince, and the cautious prudence of a council, would have sunk under the weight of misfortunes, too heavy for the unsupported strength of ordinary minds. But the first spark of generous ardour, which the love of virtue, of glory, and the republic, or even the meaner motives of ambition and vanity, excited in the assembled multitude, was diffused and increased by the natural contagion of sympathy; the patriotic flame was communicated to every breast; and the social warmth, reflected from such a variety of objects, became too intense to be resisted by the coldness of caution and the damps of despair.

Peculiar  
resources  
of free  
govern-  
ments.

With one mind and resolution the Athenians determined to brave the severity of fortune, and to withstand the assaults of the enemy. Nor did this noble design evaporate in useless speculation; the

Prudent  
and vigor-  
ous mea-  
sures of  
the Athe-  
nians.

C H A P.  
XXI.

wisest measures were adopted for reducing it to practice. The great work began, as national reformation ought always to begin, by regulating the finances, and lopping off every branch of superfluous expence. The clamour of turbulent demagogues was silenced; aged wisdom and experience were allowed calmly to direct the public councils; new levies were raised; the remainder of their fleet was equipped for sea; the motions of the colonies and tributary states were watched with an anxious solicitude, and every proper expedient was employed that might appease their animosity, or render it impotent<sup>9</sup>. Yet these measures, prudent and vigorous as they were, could not, probably, have suspended the fall of Athens, had not several concurring causes facilitated their operation. The weak, dilatory, and ineffectual proceedings of the Spartan confederacy; the temporising, equivocal, and capricious conduct of the Persian governors; above all, the intrigues and enterprising genius of Alcibiades, who, after involving his country in inextricable calamities, finally undertook its defence, and retarded, though he could not prevent, its destiny.

The Peloponnesians and Persians prepare to act against the Asiatic dependencies of Athens.

In the year following the unfortunate expedition into Sicily, the Spartans prepared a fleet of an hundred sail, of which twenty-five gallies were furnished by their own sea-ports; twenty-five by the Thebans; fifteen by the Corinthians; and the remainder by Locris, Phocis, Megara, and the

<sup>9</sup> Thucyd. l. viii. p. 559. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 349.



maritime cities on the coast of Peloponnesus. This armament was destined to encourage and support the revolt of the Asiatic subjects of the Athenians. The islands of Chios and Lesbos, as well as the city Erythræ on the continent, solicited the Spartans to join them with their naval force. Their request was enforced by Tissaphernes, who promised to pay the sailors, and to victual the ships. At the same time, an ambassador from Cyzicus, a populous town situate on an island of the Propontis, entreated the Lacedæmonian armament to sail to the safe and capacious harbours which had long formed the wealth and the ornament of that city, and to expel the Athenian garrisons, to which the Cyzicenes and their neighbours reluctantly submitted. The Persian Pharnabazus seconded their proposal; offered the same conditions with Tissaphernes; and so little harmony subsisted between the lieutenants of the great king, that each urged his particular demand with a total unconcern about the important interests of their common master<sup>10</sup>. The Lacedæmonians held many consultations among themselves, and with their allies; hesitated, deliberated, resolved, and changed their resolution; and at length were persuaded by Alcibiades to prefer the overture of Tissaphernes and the Ionians to that of the Hellespontines and Pharnabazus.

CHAP.  
XXI.Olymp.  
xcii. 1.  
A. C. 412.Dilatory  
measures  
of the con-  
federates.

The delay occasioned by this deliberation was the principal, but not the only cause, which hin-

The Athe-  
nians dis-  
cover and<sup>10</sup> Thucyd. p. 561 & 562.

dered

C H A P.  
XXI.

defeat the  
designs of  
the Corin-  
thians and  
the Chi-  
ans.  
Olymp.  
xcii. 1.  
A.C. 412.

dered the allies from acting expeditiously, at a time when expedition was of the utmost importance. A variety of private views diverted them from the general aim of the confederacy; and the season was far advanced before the Corinthians, who had been distinguished by excess of antipathy to Athens, were prepared to sail. They determined, from pride perhaps, as well as superstition, to celebrate<sup>11</sup>, before leaving their harbours, the Isthmian games, consecrated to Neptune, the third of the Grecian festivals in point of dignity and splendour. From this ceremony the Athenians, though enemies, were not excluded by the Corinthian magistrates; nor did they exclude themselves, though oppressed by the weight of past misfortunes, and totally occupied by the thoughts of providing against future evils. While their representatives shared the amusements of this sacred spectacle, they neglected not the commission recommended by their country. They secretly informed themselves of the plan and particular circumstances of the intended revolt, and learned the precise time fixed for the departure of the Corinthian fleet. In consequence of this important intelligence, the Athenians anticipated the designs of the rebels of Chios, and carried off seven ships as pledges of their fidelity. The Squadron which returned from this useful enterprise, intercepted the

<sup>11</sup> “ Πρὶν τὰ Ἰσθμια διαπρασσωσι.” The scholiast justly observes, the force of the “*ἄνα*,” “thoroughly, completely,” *i. e.* until they had celebrated the games, the complete number of days, appointed by antiquity. Vid. *Æ. Port.* ad loc. p. 563.

Corinthians as they sailed through the Saronic gulph; and having attacked and conquered them, pursued and blocked them up in their harbours<sup>12</sup>.

CHAP.  
XXI.

Meanwhile the Spartans and their allies sent to the Ionian coast such squadrons as were successively ready for sea, under the conduct of Alcibiades, Chalcideus, and Aftyochus. The first of these commanders sailed to the isle of Chios, which was distracted by contending factions. The Athenian partisans were surprised, and compelled to submit; and the city, which possessed forty gallies, and yielded in wealth and populousness to none of the neighbouring colonies, became an accession to the Peloponnesian confederacy. The strong and rich town of Miletus followed the example: Erythræ and Clazomené surrendered to Chalcideus; several places of less note were conquered by Aftyochus.

Successful  
opera-  
tions of  
the con-  
federates.

When the Athenians received the unwelcome intelligence of these events, they voted the expenditure of a thousand talents, which, in more prosperous times, they had deposited in the citadel, under the sanction of a decree of the senate and people, to reserve it for an occasion of the utmost danger. This seasonable supply enabled them to increase the fleet, which sailed, under Phrynichus and other leaders, to the isle of Lesbos. Having secured the fidelity of the Lesbians, who were ripe for rebellion, they endeavoured to recover their authority in Miletus, anciently regarded as the

Battle of  
Miletus.  
Olymp.  
xcii. 2.  
A. C. 412.

<sup>12</sup> Thucyd. p. 564.

capital



CHAP.  
XXI.

capital of the Ionic coast. A bloody battle was fought before the walls of that place, between the Athenians and Argives on one side, and the Peloponnesians, assisted by the troops of Tisaphernes and the revolted Milesians, on the other. The Athenian bravery defeated, on this occasion, the superior numbers of Greeks and Barbarians to whom they were opposed; but their Argive auxiliaries were repulsed by the gallant citizens of Miletus: so that, in both parts of the engagement, the Ionic race, commonly reckoned the less warlike, prevailed over their Dorian rivals and enemies. Elevated with the joy of victory, the Athenians prepared to assault the town, when they were alarmed by the approach of a fleet of fifty-five sail, which advanced in two divisions, the one commanded by the celebrated Hermocrates, the other by Theramenes the Spartan. Phrynichus prudently considered, that his own strength only amounted to forty-eight gallies, and refused to commit the last hope of the republic to the danger of an unequal combat. His firmness despised the clamours of the Athenian sailors, who insulted<sup>13</sup>, under the name of cowardice, the caution of their admiral; and he calmly retired with his whole force to the isle of Samos, where the popular faction having lately treated the nobles with shocking

The Athenian fleet retires.

<sup>13</sup> Like Fabius,

“Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem.”

ENNIUS apud Cic.

which Thucydides expresses with more vigour, “*εὖτε ποτε τῷ αἰσχροῦ οὐκ εἶς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἀλλ’ ὅλος διακινδυνύουσι*,” P. 574.

injustice

injustice and cruelty, too frequent in Grecian democracies, were ready to receive with open arms the patrons of that fierce and licentious form of government.

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XXI.

The retreat of the Athenian fleet acknowledged the naval superiority of the enemy; a superiority which was alone sufficient either to acquire or to maintain the submission of the neighbouring coasts and islands. In other respects too, the Peloponnesians enjoyed the most decisive advantages. Their gallies were victualled, their soldiers were paid by Tissaphernes, and they daily expected a reinforcement of an hundred and fifty Phœnician ships, which, it was said, had already reached Aspendus, a sea-port of Pamphylia. But, in this dangerous crisis, fortune seemed to respect the declining age of Athens, and, by a train of accidents, singular and almost incredible, enabled Alcibiades, so long the misfortune and the scourge, to become the defence and the saviour, of his country.

The Athenian affairs  
retrieved  
by Alcibiades.

During his long residence in Sparta, Alcibiades assumed the outward gravity of deportment, and conformed himself to the spare diet, and laborious exercises, which prevailed in that austere republic; but his character and his principles remained as licentious as ever. His intrigue with Timea, the spouse of king Agis, was discovered by an excess of female levity. The queen, vain of the attachment of so celebrated a character, familiarly gave the name of Alcibiades to her son Leotychides; a name which, first confined to the privacy of her female

His intrigues.

CHAP.  
XXI.

female companions, was soon spread abroad in the world. Alcibiades punished her folly by a most mortifying but well-merited declaration, boasting that he had solicited her favours from no other motive but that he might indulge the ambitious desire of giving a king to Sparta. The offence itself, and the shameless avowal, still more provoking than the offence, excited the keenest resentment in the breast of the injured husband<sup>14</sup>. The magistrates and generals of Sparta, jealous of the fame, and envious of the merit of a stranger, readily sympathised with the misfortune, and encouraged the revenge of Agis; and, as the horrid practice of assassination still disgraced the manners of Greece, orders were sent to Aftyochus, who commanded in chief the Peloponnesian forces in Asia, secretly to destroy Alcibiades, whose power defied those laws which in every Grecian republic condemned adulterers to death<sup>15</sup>. But the active and subtle Athenian had secured too faithful domestic intelligence in the principal families of Sparta to become the victim of this execrable design. With his usual address he eluded all the snares of Aftyochus: his safety, however, required perpetual vigilance and caution, and he determined to escape from a situation, which subjected him to such irksome constraint.

His conference with Tisaphernes.

Publicly banished from Athens, secretly persecuted by Sparta, he had recourse to the friendship

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch, ii. 49. in Alcibiad.

<sup>15</sup> Lyfias in defence of Euphiletus, &c. p. 419.



of Tissaphernes, who admired his accomplishments, and respected his abilities, which, though far superior in degree, were similar in kind to his own. Tissaphernes was of a temper the more readily to serve a friend, in proportion as he less needed his services. Alcibiades, therefore, carefully concealed from him the dangerous resentment of the Spartans. In the selfish breast of the Persian no attachment could be durable unless founded on interest; and Alcibiades, who had deeply studied his character, began to flatter his avarice, that he might ensure his protection. He informed him, that by allowing the Peloponnesian sailors a drachma, or seven-pence sterling, of daily pay, he treated them with an useless and even dangerous liberality: that the pay given by the Athenians, even in the most flourishing times, amounted only to three oboli; which proceeded, not from a disinclination to reward the skill and valour of their seamen, but from an experience, that if they received more than half a drachma each day, the superfluity would be squandered in such profligate pleasures as enfeebled and corrupted their minds and bodies, and rendered them equally incapable of activity and of discipline. Should the sailors prove dissatisfied with this equitable reduction, the Grecian character afforded an easy expedient for silencing their licentious clamours. It would be sufficient to bribe the naval commanders and a few mercenary orators, and the careless and improvident seamen would submit, without suspicion, the rate of their pay, as well as every other concern, to the influence and

autho-

CHAP. authority of those who were accustomed to govern  
XXI. them<sup>16</sup>.

Perfuades  
him to di-  
minish his  
fubfidies  
to the  
Pelopon-  
nefians.

Tiffaphernes heard this advice with the attention of an avaricious man to every propofal for faving his money; and fo true a judgment had Alcibiades formed of the Greeks, that Hermocrates the Syracufan was the only officer who difdained, meanly and perfidiously, to betray the intereft of the men under his command: yet through the influence of his colleagues, the plan of œconomy was univerfally adopted, and on a future occafion, Tiffaphernes boasted that Hermocrates, though more coy, was not lefs corruptible than others, and that the only reafon for which he undertook the patronage of the failors, was to compel his own reluctance to comply with the exorbitance of his demands. This reproach illuftrates the opinion entertained by foreign nations of Grecian virtue; but it is probably an afperſion on the fame of the illuftrious Syracufan.

Alienates  
him from  
the inte-  
reſt of  
Sparta.

The intrigues of Alcibiades had fown jealousy and diſtruſt in the Peloponneſian fleet: they had alienated the minds of the troops both from Tiffaphernes and their commanders: the Perſian was ready to forſake thoſe whom he had learned to deſpiſe; and Alcibiades profited of this diſpoſition to inſinuate that the alliance of the Lacedæmonians was equally expenſive and inconvenient for the great king and his lieutenants. “ That theſe haughty republicans were accuſtomed to take arms

<sup>16</sup> Thucyd. p. 584, & ſeqq.

to defend the liberties of Greece, a design totally inconsistent with the views of the Persian court. If the Asiatic Greeks and islanders aspired at independence, and hoped to deliver themselves from Athenian governors and garrisons, without submitting to pay tribute to Persia, they ought to carry on the war at their own expence, since they would alone reap the benefit of its success. But if Tissaphernes purposed to recover the ancient possessions of his master, he must beware of giving a decided superiority to either party, especially to the warlike Spartans. By an attention to preserve the balance even, between the hostile republics, he would force them to exhaust each other. Amidst their domestic contests an opportunity would soon arrive, when Darius, without danger or expence, might crush both, and vindicate his just hereditary claim to the dominion of all Asia."

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These artful representations produced almost an open breach between Tissaphernes and his confederates. The advantage which Athens would derive from this rupture might have paved the way for Alcibiades to return to his country: but he dreaded to encounter that popular fury, whose effects he had fatally experienced, and whose mad resentment no degree of merit could appease; he therefore applied secretly to Pisander, Theramenes, and other persons of distinction in the Athenian camp. To them he deplored the desperate state of public affairs, expatiated on his own credit with Tissaphernes, and insinuated that it might be yet possible to prevent the Phœnician fleet at Aspendus

Alcibiades, in order to pave the way for his return to Athens, conspires against the democracy.



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dus from failing to assist the enemy. Assuming gradually more boldness, as he perceived the success of his intrigues, he finally declared that the Athenians might obtain not merely the neutrality, but perhaps the assistance of Artaxerxes, should they consent to abolish their turbulent democracy, so odious to the Persians, and entrust the administration of government to men worthy to negotiate with so mighty a monarch.

This measure had been already in agitation both in the city and in the camp,

When the illustrious exile proposed this measure, it is uncertain whether he was acquainted with the secret cabals which had been already formed, both in the city and in the camp, for executing the design which he suggested. The misfortunes, occasioned by the giddy insolence of the multitude, had thrown the principal authority into the hands of the noble and wealthy, who, corrupted by the sweets of temporary power, were desirous of rendering it perpetual. Many prompted by ambition several moved by inconstancy, a few directed by a just sense of the incurable defects of democracy, were prepared to encounter every danger, that they might overturn the established constitution. In the third and most honourable class was Antiphon, a man of an exalted character, and endowed with extraordinary talents. The irresistible energy of his eloquence was suspected by the people. He appeared not in the courts of justice, nor in the assembly; but his artful and elaborate compositions often saved the lives of his friends. *He* was the invisible agent who governed all the motions of the conspiracy; and when compelled, after the ruin of his

his party, to stand trial for his life, he discovered an activity and force of mind that astonished the most discerning of his contemporaries<sup>17</sup>. Pisander, Theramenes, and the other leaders of the aristocratical party, warmly approved the views of Alcibiades. The Athenian soldiers likewise, though they detested the impiety, admired the valour, of the illustrious exile, and longed to see him restored to the service of his country. All ranks lamented the dangerous situation of Athens; many thought that their affairs must become desperate, should Tissaphernes command the Phœnician fleet to co-operate with that of Peloponnesus; and many rejoiced in the prospect of a Persian alliance, in consequence of which they would enter at once into the pay of that wealthy satrap<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> Thucyd. i. viii. p. 600. A few lines above, Thucydides describes the character of Antiphon with expressive energy: *αὐτὸν Ἀθηναίων τῶν κατ' ἑαυτὸν ἀρετῇ τε μέγας ὕψους, καὶ κρατίστως ἐνθυμηθῆναι γενόμενος, καὶ ἂ ἔγνω, εἶπεν*. "An Athenian, in virtue second to no man then living, endowed with the greatest vigour of thought, and the greatest power of expression," Plutarch in the very inaccurate and imperfect work, intitled, The Lives of the Ten Orators, tells us, that Antiphon was the first who wrote institutions of oratory; and that his pleadings were the most ancient that had come down to posterity. The character given by Plutarch of the writings of Antiphon agrees with the high commendation of Thucydides.

<sup>18</sup> What influence this consideration must have had, may be conjectured from the information of Andocides, Orat. iii. who says, that in the course of this war the Spartans received, from their Persian allies, subsidies to the amount of five thousand talents, about a million sterling. The sum is prodigious, considering the value of money in that age.

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XXI.Phryni-  
chus  
counter-  
plots Al-  
cibiades.

One man, the personal enemy of Alcibiades, alone opposed the general current. But this man was Phrynichus, whose prudent firmness as a commander we have already had occasion to remark. The courage with which he invited dangers many have equalled, but none ever surpassed the boldness with which he extricated himself from difficulties. When he perceived that his colleagues were deaf to every objection against recalling the friend of Tissaphernes, he secretly informed the Spartan admiral Aftyochus, of the intrigues which were carrying on to the disadvantage of his country. Daring as this treachery was, Phrynichus addressed a traitor not less perfidious than himself. Aftyochus was become the pensioner and creature of Tissaphernes, to whom he communicated the intelligence. The Persian again communicated it to his favourite Alcibiades, who complained in strong terms to the Athenians of the baseness and villany of Phrynichus. The latter exculpated himself with consummate address; but as the return of Alcibiades might prove fatal to his safety, he ventured, a second time, to write to Aftyochus, gently reproaching him with his breach of confidence, and explaining by what means he might surprise the whole Athenian fleet at Samos; an exploit that must for ever establish his fame and fortune. Aftyochus again betrayed the secret to Tissaphernes and Alcibiades; but before *their* letters could be conveyed to the Athenian camp, Phrynichus, who, by some unknown channel, was informed



informed of this second treachery, anticipated the dangerous discovery, by apprising the Athenians of the enemy's design to surprise their fleet. They had scarcely employed the proper means to counteract that purpose when messengers came from Alcibiades to announce the horrid perfidy of a wretch who had basely sacrificed to private resentment the last hope of his country. But the messengers arrived too late; the prior information of Phrynichus, as well as the bold and singular wickedness of his design, which no common degree of evidence was thought sufficient to prove, were sustained as arguments for his exculpation; and it was believed that Alcibiades had made use of a stratagem most infamous in itself, but not unexampled among the Greeks, for destroying a man whom he detested<sup>19</sup>.

The opposition of Phrynichus, though it retarded the designs of Alcibiades, prevented not the measures of Pisander and his associates for abolishing the democracy. The soldiers at Samos were induced, by the reasons above mentioned, to acquiesce in the resolution of their generals. But a more difficult task remained; to deprive the people of Athens of their liberty, which, since the expulsion of the family of Pisistratus, they had enjoyed an hundred years. Pisander headed the deputation which was sent from the camp to the city to effect this important revolution. He acquainted the extraordinary assembly, summoned on that oc-

Progress  
of the  
con-  
spiracy  
against the  
democra-  
tical  
govern-  
ment.

<sup>19</sup> Thucyd. p. 587—590.

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casion in the theatre of Bacchus, of the measures which had been adopted by their soldiers and fellow-citizens at Samos. The compact band<sup>20</sup> of conspirators warmly approved the example; but loud murmurs of discontent resounded in different quarters of that spacious theatre. Pisander asked the reason of this disapprobation. "Had his opponents any thing better to propose? If they had, let them come forward and explain the grounds of their dissent: but, above all, let them explain how they could save themselves, their families, and their country, unless they complied with the demand of Tissaphernes. The imperious voice of necessity was superior to law; and when the actual danger had ceased, they might re-establish their ancient constitution." The opponents of Pisander were unable or afraid to reply: and the assembly passed a decree, investing ten ambassadors with full powers to treat with the Persian satrap.

Negocia-  
tion with  
Tissa-  
phernes.  
Olymp.  
xcii. 1.  
A. C. 412.

Soon after the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet on the coast of Asia, the Spartan commanders had concluded, in the name of their republic, a treaty with Tissaphernes; in which it was stipulated, that the subsidies should be regularly paid by the king of Persia, and that the Peloponnesian forces should employ their utmost endeavours to recover, for

<sup>20</sup> Or rather bands, according to Thucydides. Pisander was at pains to gain over to his views *τας ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ εὐτυχῶς προτέρον ἐν τῇ πόλει ἦσαν ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς*. "The factions or juntas already formed in Athens, with a view to thrust themselves into the seats of judicature and the great offices of state." Thucyd. p. 592.

that

that monarch, the dominions of his ancestors, which had been long unjustly usurped, and cruelly insulted, by the Athenians. This treaty seemed so honourable to the great king, that his lieutenant could not venture openly to infringe it. It is possible, that in the interval between his intrigues with Alcibiades, and the arrival of the Athenian ambassadors at Magnesia, the place of his usual residence, Tissaphernes might receive fresh instructions from his court to make good his agreement with the Spartans. Perhaps the crafty satrap never entertained any serious thoughts of an alliance with the Athenians, although he sufficiently relished the advice given him by Alcibiades to weaken both parties. But whatever motive determined him, it is certain that he shewed a disinclination to enter into any negotiation with the Athenian ambassadors. Alarmed at the decay of his influence with the Persians, on which he had built the flattering hopes of returning to his country, Alcibiades employed all the resources of his genius to conceal his disgrace. By solicitations, intreaties, and the meanest compliances, he obtained an audience for his fellow-citizens. As the agent of Tissaphernes, he then proposed the conditions on which they might obtain the friendship of the great king. Several demands were made, demands most disgraceful to the name of Athens: to all of which the ambassadors submitted. They even agreed to surrender the whole coast of Ionia to its ancient sovereign. But when the artful Athenian (fearful lest they should, on any terms, admit the treaty which Tis-

Artifices  
of Alcibi-  
ades,



**C H A P.**  
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Isaphernes was resolved on no terms to grant) demanded that the Persian fleets should be allowed to sail, undisturbed, in the Grecian seas, the ambassadors, well knowing that should this condition be complied with, no treaty could hinder Greece from becoming a province of Persia, expressed their indignation in very unguarded language, and left the assembly in disgust. This imprudence enabled Alcibiades to affirm, with some appearance of truth, that their own anger and obstinacy, not the reluctance of Tissaphernes, had obstructed the negociation, which was precisely the issue of the affair most favourable to his views<sup>21</sup>.

The democracy overturned in Athens. Olymp. xcii. 2. A, C. 411.

His artifices succeeded, but were not attended with the consequences expected from them. The Athenians, both in the camp and city, perceived, by this transaction, that his credit with the Persians was less than he represented it; and the aristocratical faction were glad to get rid of a man, whose restless ambition rendered him a dangerous associate. They persisted, however, with great activity, in executing their purpose; of which Phrynichus, who had opposed them only from hatred of Alcibiades, became an active abettor. When persuasion was ineffectual, they had recourse to violence. Androcles, Hyperbolus<sup>22</sup>, and other licentious

<sup>21</sup> Thucydid. l. viii. p. 593.

<sup>22</sup> Thucydides paints his character in few words: Ὑπερβόλον γε τινα Ἀθηναίων, μυχθρὸν ἀνθρώπου ὠστρακισμένον ἔ διαδοιμῶς καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον, ἀλλὰ διαπονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχυρὴν τῆς πόλεως. "One Hyperbolus, a worthless fellow, and banished by the Ostracism, not from fear of his power and dignity, but on account of his extreme

licentious demagogues, were assassinated. The people of Athens, ignorant of the strength of the conspirators, and surprised to find in the number many whom they least suspected, were restrained by inactive timidity, or fluctuated in doubtful suspense. The cabal alone acted with union and with vigour; and difficult as it seemed to subvert the Athenian democracy, which had subsisted an hundred years with unexampled glory, yet this design was undertaken and accomplished by the enterprising activity of Pisander, the artful eloquence of Theramenes, the firm intrepidity of Phrynichus, and the superintending wisdom of Antiphon<sup>23</sup>.

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*He* it was who formed the plan, and regulated the mode of attack, which was carried on by his associates. In a deliberation concerning the means of retrieving the affairs of the public, Pisander proposed the electing of ten men, who should be charged with the important trust of preparing and digesting resolutions, to be on an appointed day laid before the assembly of the people. When the day arrived, the commissioners had but one resolution to propose: "That every citizen should be free to offer his opinion, however contrary to law, without fear of impeachment or trial;" a matter essential to the interests of the cabal, since by a strange contradiction in government, the Athe-

Government of  
the four  
hundred.

trime profligacy, and his being a disgrace to the city." The Ostracism was thought to be for ever disgraced by being applied to such an unworthy object, and thenceforth laid aside. See Plut. in Nicia, and Aristoph. in Pac. ver. 680.

<sup>23</sup> Thucydid. *ibid.* & Lyfias *advers.* Agorat.

nian

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nian orators and statesmen were liable to prosecution<sup>24</sup> before the ordinary courts of justice, for such speeches and decrees as had been approved and confirmed by the assembly. In consequence of this act of indemnity, Pisander and his party boldly declared, that neither the spirit nor the forms of the established constitution (which had recently subjected them to such a weight of misfortunes) suited the present dangerous and alarming crisis. That it was necessary to new-model the whole fabric of government; for which purpose five persons (whose names he read) ought to be appointed by the people, to choose an hundred others; each of whom should select three associates; and the four hundred thus chosen, men of dignity and opulence, who would serve their country without fee or reward, ought immediately to be invested with the majesty of the republic. They alone should conduct the administration untroubled, and assemble, as often as seemed proper, five thousand citizens, whom they judged most worthy of being consulted in the management of public affairs. This extraordinary proposal was accepted without opposition: the partisans of democracy dreaded the strength of the cabal; and the undiscerning multitude, dazzled by the imposing name of five thousand, a number far exceeding the ordinary assemblies of Athens, perceived not that they surrendered their liberties to the artifice of an ambitious faction<sup>25</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> By the γραφή παρανομίας. See Vol. I. Chap. xiii.

<sup>25</sup> Thucydid. & Lysias, ubi supra.



Their tyranny renders them odious.

But the conduct of the four hundred tyrants (for historians have justly adopted the language of Athenian resentment) soon opened the eyes and understanding of the most thoughtless. They abolished every vestige of ancient freedom; employed mercenary troops levied from the small islands of the Ægean, to overawe the multitude, and to intimidate, in some instances to destroy, their real or suspected enemies. Instead of seizing the opportunity of annoying the Peloponnesians, enraged at the treachery of Tissaphernes, and mutinous for want of pay and subsistence, they sent ambassadors to solicit peace from the Spartans on the most dishonourable terms. Their tyranny rendered them odious in the city, and their cowardice made them contemptible in the camp at Samos. Their cruelty and injustice were described, and exaggerated, by the fugitives who continually arrived in that island. The generous youth, employed in the sea and land service, were impatient of the indignities offered to their fellow-citizens. The same indignities might be inflicted on themselves, if they did not vindicate their freedom. These secret murmurs broke out into loud and licentious clamours, which were encouraged by the approbation of the Samians. Thrasylbulus and Thrasyllus, two officers of high merit and distinction, though not actually entrusted with a share in the principal command<sup>26</sup>, gave activity and boldness to

Their partisans at Samos destroyed by Thrasylbulus and Thrasyllus.

<sup>26</sup> Neither generals nor admirals; for Thrasylbulus only commanded a galley; and Thrasyllus served in the heavy-armed infantry,

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to the insurgents. The abettors of the new government were attacked by surprise: thirty of the most criminal were put to death, several others were banished, democracy was re-established in the camp, and the soldiers were bound by oath to maintain their hereditary government against the conspiracy of domestic foes, and to act with vigour and unanimity against the public enemy.

The former conducts Alcibiades to the Athenian camp.

Thrasybulus, who headed this successful and meritorious sedition, had a mind to conceive, a tongue to persuade, and a hand to execute, the most daring designs. He exhorted the soldiers not to despair of effecting in the capital the same revolution which they had produced in the camp. But should they fail in that design they ought no longer to obey a city which had neither wealth nor wisdom, neither supplies nor good counsel to send them. They were themselves more numerous than the subjects of the four hundred, and better provided in all things necessary for war. They possessed an island which had formerly contended with Athens for the command of the sea, and which, it was hoped, they might defend against every foe, foreign and domestic. But were they compelled to forsake it, they had still reason to expect that, with an hundred ships of war, and with so many brave men, they might acquire an establishment not less valuable elsewhere, in which they would enjoy, undisturbed, the inval-

fantry, whether as an officer, or in the ranks, the expression leaves uncertain. The scholiast, however, considers *οπλατευοντι* as synonymous with *τε οπλατικα αρχοντι*. Thucyd. p. 604.

able

able possession of liberty. Their most immediate concern was to recall Alcibiades, who had been deceived and disgraced by the tyrants, and who not only felt with peculiar sensibility, but could resent with becoming dignity, the wrongs of his country and his own. The advice of Thrasybulus was approved; soon after he sailed to Magnesia, and returned in company with Alcibiades.

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Near four years had elapsed since the eloquent son of Clinias had spoken in an Athenian assembly. Being presented by Thrasybulus to his fellow-citizens, he began by accusing his fortune, and lamenting his calamities. "Yet his banishment ought not to affect him with permanent sorrow, since it had furnished him with an opportunity to serve the cause of his country. This event, otherwise unfortunate, had procured him the acquaintance and friendship of Tisaphernes; who, moved by his entreaties, had withheld the stipulated pay from the Peloponnesian forces, and who, he doubted not, would continue his good offices to the Athenians, supply them with every thing requisite for maintaining the war, and even summon the Phœnician fleet to their assistance." These were magnificent but flattering promises. In making them, Alcibiades however did not consult merely the dictates of vanity. They raised his credit with the army, who immediately saluted him general<sup>27</sup>; they widened the breach between

He addresses his countrymen.

<sup>27</sup> Μετα των προτέρων—They associated him with the former commanders. But Thucydides immediately adds, και τα πράγματα πάντα αντιδιδαν, and referred every thing to his management, p. 609.



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XXI.His mes-  
sage to the  
tyrants.

Tissaphernes and the Spartans; and they struck terror (when his speech got abroad) into the tyrants of Athens, who had provoked the resentment of a man capable to subvert their usurpation.

Alcibiades left the care of the troops to his colleagues Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, and withdrew himself from the applauses of his admiring countrymen, on pretence of concerting with Tissaphernes the system of their future operations. But his principal motive was to shew himself to the Persian, in the new and illustrious character with which he was invested; for having raised his authority among the Athenians by his influence with the satrap, he expected to strengthen this influence by the support of that authority. Before he returned to the camp, ambassadors had been sent by the tyrants, to attempt a negociation with the partisans of democracy, who, inflamed by continual reports of the indignities and cruelties committed in Athens, prepared to sail thither to protect their friends and take vengeance on their enemies. Alcibiades judiciously opposed this rash resolution, which must have left the Hellespont, Ionia, and the islands, at the mercy of the hostile fleet. But he commanded the ambassadors to deliver to their masters a short but pithy message: "That they must divest themselves of their illegal power, and restore the ancient constitution. If they delayed obedience, he would sail to the Piræus, and deprive them of their authority and their lives<sup>28</sup>."

<sup>28</sup> Thucyd. *ibid.* & Plut. ii. 54. in Vit. Alcibiad.

When

When this message was reported at Athens, it added to the disorder and confusion in which that unhappy city was involved. The four hundred, who had acted with unanimity in usurping the government, soon disagreed about the administration, and split into factions, which persecuted each other as furiously as both had persecuted the people<sup>29</sup>. Theramenes and Aristocrates condemned and opposed the tyrannical measures of their colleagues. The perfidious Phrynichus was slain: both parties prepared for taking arms; and the horrors of a Corcyrean sedition were ready to be renewed in Athens, when the old men, the children, the women, and strangers, interposed for the safety of a city which had long been the ornament of Greece, the terror of Persia, and the admiration of the world<sup>30</sup>.

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Tumults  
in Athens.

Had the public enemy availed themselves of this opportunity to assault the Piræus, Athens could not have been saved from immediate destruction. But the Peloponnesian forces at Miletus, long clamorous and discontented, had broken out into open mutiny, when they heard of the recall of Alcibiades, and the hostile intentions of Tissaphernes. To the duplicity of the satrap, and the treachery of their own captains, they justly ascribed the want of pay and subsistence, and all the misfortunes which they felt or dreaded. Their resentment was violent and implacable. They destroyed the Persian fortifications in the neighbourhood of

Mutiny in  
the Peloponnesian  
camp.

<sup>29</sup> Lyfias adv. Agorat.

<sup>30</sup> Thucyd. p. 610.

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Miletus; they put the garrisons to the sword; their treacherous commander, Aftyochus, saved his life by flying to an altar; nor was the tumult appeased until the guilty were removed from their sight, and Myndarus, an officer of approved valour and fidelity, arrived from Sparta to assume the principal command<sup>31</sup>.

Amidst  
the tu-  
mults in  
Athens,  
the Pelo-  
ponnesian  
fleet ap-  
pears on  
the coast.

The dreadful consequences which must have resulted to the Athenians, if, during the fury of their sedition, the enemy had attacked them with a fleet of an hundred and fifty sail, may be conceived by the terror inspired by a much smaller Peloponnesian squadron of only forty-two vessels, commanded by the Spartan Hegesandridas. The friends of the constitution had assembled in the spacious theatre of Bacchus. Messengers passed between them and the partisans of Antiphon and Pisander, who had convened in a distant quarter of the city. The most important matters were in agitation, when the alarm was given that some Peloponnesian ships had been seen on the coast. Both assemblies were immediately dissolved. All ranks of men hastened to the Piræus; manned the vessels in the harbour; launched others; and prepared thirty-six for taking the sea. When Hegesandridas perceived the ardent opposition which he must encounter in attempting to land, he doubled the promontory of Sunium, and sailed towards the fertile island of Eubœa, from which, since the fortification of Decelia, the Athenians had derived

<sup>31</sup> Thucyd. p. 611.



far more plentiful supplies than from the desolated territory of Attica. To defend a country which formed their principal resource, they failed in pursuit of the enemy, and observed them next day near the shore of Eretria, the most considerable town in the island.

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The Eubœans, who had long watched an opportunity to revolt, supplied the Peloponnesian squadron with all necessaries in abundance; but instead of furnishing a market to the Athenians, they retired from the coast on their approach. The commanders were obliged to weaken their strength, by detaching several parties into the country to procure provisions; Hegesandridas seized this opportunity to attack them: most of the ships were taken; the crews swam to land; many were cruelly murdered by the Eretrians, from whom they expected protection; and such only survived as took refuge in the Athenian garrisons scattered over the island <sup>32</sup>.

Battle of  
Eretria.

The news of this misfortune were most alarming to the Athenians. Neither the invasion of Xerxes, nor even the defeat in Sicily, occasioned such terrible consternation. They dreaded the immediate defection of Eubœa; they had no more ships to launch; no means of resisting their multiplied enemies: the city was divided against the camp, and divided against itself. Yet the magnanimous firmness of Theramenes did not allow the friends of liberty to despair. He encouraged them

Demo-  
cracy re-  
established  
in Athens.  
Olymp.  
xcii. 2.  
A. C. 411.

<sup>32</sup> Thucyd. p. 622.

C H A P. to disburden the republic of its domestic foes, who  
 XXI. had summoned, or who were at least believed to  
 have summoned, the assistance of the Lacedæ-  
 monian fleet, that they might be enabled to enslave  
 their fellow-citizens. Antiphon, Pisander, and  
 others most obnoxious, seasonably escaped; the rest  
 submitted. A decree was passed, recalling Alci-  
 biades, and approving the conduct of the troops at  
 Samos. The sedition ceased. The democracy,  
 which had been interrupted four months, was re-  
 stored; and such are the resources of a free govern-  
 ment, that even this violent fermentation was not  
 unproductive of benefit to the state. The Athe-  
 nians completed whatever had been left imperfect  
 in former reformati<sup>33</sup>; and determined to de-  
 fend, to the last extremity, the ancient glory of the  
 republic.

The Athe-  
 nians vic-  
 torious at  
 sea.  
 Olymp.  
 xcii. 2.  
 A. C. 411.

By the imprudent or perfidious conduct of their  
 commanders, and the seditious spirit of their troops,  
 the Peloponnesians lost a seasonable opportunity to  
 terminate the war with equal advantage and honour;  
 and having neglected the prosperous current of  
 their fortune, they were compelled long and labori-  
 ously to strive against an unfavourable stream.

<sup>33</sup> The government was brought back to its original prin-  
 ciples, as established by Solon. Among other salutary regula-  
 tions, it was enacted, that no one should receive a salary for any  
 public magistracy. "And now," says Thucydides, "for the  
 first time, in the present age at least, the Athenians modelled  
 their government aright; and this enabled Athens again to raise  
 her head." Thucyd. p. 623. It is remarkable, that neither  
 Diodorus, Plutarch, nor any of the orators, make the least  
 mention of those salutary regulations, which, however, lasted  
 not long after the return of Alcibiades.

The doubtful Tisaphernes hesitated between the part of an open enemy, or a treacherous ally; the Spartans, who had formerly rejected the friendship, now courted the protection, of his rival Pharnabazus; to whose northern province they failed with the principal strength of their armament, leaving only a small squadron at Miletus, to defend their southern acquisitions. The Athenians, animated by the manly counsels of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the generous defenders of their freedom, proceeded northwards in pursuit of the enemy; and the important straits, which join the Euxine and Ægean seas, became, and long continued, the scene of conflict. In the twenty-first winter of the war, a year already distinguished by the dissolution and revival of their democracy, the Athenians prevailed in three successive engagements, the event of which became continually more decisive. In the first, which was fought in the narrow channel between Sestos and Abydos, the advantages were in some measure balanced, since Thrasybulus took twenty Peloponnesian ships, with the loss of fifteen of his own. But the glory remained entire to the Athenians, who repelled the enemy, and offered to renew the battle<sup>34</sup>. Not long afterwards, they intercepted a squadron of fourteen Rhodian vessels, near Cape Rhegium. The islanders defended themselves with their usual bravery. Myndarus beheld the engagement from the distance of eight miles, while he performed his morning devotions to Mi-

<sup>34</sup> Thucyd. l. viii. p. 626.



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nerva in the lofty temple of Ilium. Alarmed for the safety of his friends, he rushed from that sacred edifice, and hastened with great diligence to the shore, that he might launch his ships, and prevent, by speedy assistance, the capture or destruction of the Rhodians<sup>35</sup>. The principal Athenian squadron attacked him near the shore of Abydus. The engagement was fought from morning till night, and still continued doubtful, when the arrival of eighteen gallies, commanded by Alcibiades, turned the scale of victory. The escape of the Peloponnesians was favoured by the bravery of Pharnabazus, who, at the head of his Barbarian troops, had been an impatient spectator of the combat. He gallantly rode into the sea, encouraging his men with his voice, his arm, and his example. The Spartan admiral drew up the greatest part of his fleet along the shore, and prepared to resist the assailants; but the Athenians, satisfied with the advantages already obtained, sailed to Sestos, carrying with them a valuable prize, thirty Peloponnesian gallies, as well as fifteen of their own, which they had lost in the former engagement. Thrasylus was sent to Athens, that he might communicate the good news, and raise such supplies of men and money as could be expected from that exhausted city<sup>36</sup>.

Alcibiades  
surprises,  
and takes  
the whole

The Spartans yielded possession of the sea, which they hoped soon to recover, and retired to the friendly harbours of Cyzicus, to repair their shat-

<sup>35</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. i. Diodor. xiii. p. 354. <sup>36</sup> Id. *ibid.*

tered fleet; while the Athenians profited of the same of their victory, and the terror of their arms, to demand contributions from the numerous and wealthy towns in that neighbourhood. The several divisions returned to Sestos, having met with very indifferent success in their design; nor, without obtaining more decisive and important advantages, could they expect to intimidate such strongly fortified places as Byzantium, Selembria, Perinthus, on the European, or Lampfacus, Parium, Chalcedon, on the Asiatic, coast. It was determined therefore, chiefly by the advice of Alcibiades, to attack the enemy at Cyzicus; for which purpose they sailed, with eighty galleys, to the small island of Proconnesus, near the western extremity of the Propontis, and ten miles distant from the station of the Peloponnesian fleet. Alcibiades surprised sixty vessels in a dark and rainy morning, as they were manœuvring at a distance from the harbour, and skilfully intercepted their retreat. As the day cleared up, the rest sailed forth to their assistance; the action became general; the Athenians obtained a complete victory, and their valour was rewarded by the capture of the whole Peloponnesian fleet, except the Syracusan ships, which were burned, in the face of a victorious enemy, by the enterprising Hermocrates. The circumstances and consequences of this important action were related in few, but expressive words, to the Spartan senate, in a letter written by Hippocrates, the second in command, and intercepted by the Athenians: "All is lost;

C H A P.  
XXI.Pelopon-  
nesian  
fleet.

CHAP. our ships are taken; Myndarus is slain; the men  
XXI. want bread; we know not what to do<sup>37</sup>.”

The Athenians diligently improve their advantages.

Olymp. xcii. 3.

A. C. 410.

The fatal disaster at Cyzicus prevented the Peloponnesians from obstructing, during the following year, the designs of the enemy, who took possession of that wealthy sea-port, as well as of the strong city Perinthus; raised a large contribution on Selembria; and fortified Chrysopolis, a small town of Chalcedonia, only three miles distant from Byzantium. In this new fortress they placed a considerable body of troops; and guarded the neighbouring strait with a squadron of thirty sail, commanded by Theramenes and Eubulus, and destined to exact, as tribute, a tenth from all ships which sailed through the Bosphorus into the Euxine sea<sup>38</sup>. The Peloponnesians were assisted by Pharnabazus in equipping a new fleet; but were deprived of the wise counsels of Hermocrates, whose abilities were well fitted both to prepare and to employ the resources of war. The success of the Asiatic expedition had not corresponded to the sanguine hopes of his countrymen; the insolent populace accused the incapacity of their commanders; and a mandate was sent from Syracuse, depriving

<sup>37</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. i. & Plut. p. 60. in Alcibiad.

<sup>38</sup> It is well known, that Mahomet the Second obtained the same end, by fortifying two castles, one on the Asiatic, and another on the European side. That near to Chrysopolis is called by the modern Greeks Neocastron; but the name of the town itself is now changed to Scutari, a place deemed by the Turks one of the suburbs of Constantinople.

TOURNEFORTE, Lettre 15.

them



them of their office, and punishing them with banishment. The conduct of Hermocrates is worthy of admiration. Having called an assembly, he deplored his hard fortune, but recommended the most submissive obedience to the authority of the republic. He then exhorted the sailors to name temporary commanders, till the arrival of those who had been appointed by their country. But the assembly, especially the captains and pilots, tumultuously called out, "That he and his colleagues ought to continue in the command." Hermocrates then conjured them "not to rebel against the government. When they should return home, they would then enjoy a fair opportunity to do justice to their admirals, by recounting the battles which they had won, by enumerating the ships which they had taken, and by relating how their own courage, and the conduct of their commanders, had entitled them to the most honourable place in every engagement by sea and land." At the earnest and unanimous entreaty of the assembly, he consented, however, to retain his authority, till the arrival of his successors. His colleagues imitated the example; and soon after this memorable scene, Demarchus, Mysco, and Potamis, the admirals named by the state, took the command of the Syracusan forces. Yet the soldiers and sailors would not allow their beloved leaders to depart, before taking in their presence a solemn oath to revoke their unjust banishment, whenever they themselves returned to Syracuse. On Hermocrates in particular, the captains and pilots bestowed many

C II A P.  
XXI.Admir-  
able be-  
haviour of  
Hermo-  
crates the  
Syracusan.

CHAP.  
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distinguished tokens of their affection and respect, which his behaviour had justly merited; for every morning and evening he had called them together, communicated his designs, asked their opinion and advice, reviewed the past, and concerted the future, operations of the war; while his popular manners and condescending affability secured the love of those who respected his skill, his vigilance, and his courage<sup>39</sup>.

Thrasyl-  
lus, at first  
successful,  
is defeated  
in the bat-  
tle of E-  
phefus.  
Olymp.  
xvii. 4.  
A. C. 409.

Meanwhile Thrasyllus obtained at Athens the supplies which he had gone to solicit; supplies far more powerful than he had reason to expect. They consisted in a thousand heavy-armed men, an hundred horse, and fifty gallies, manned by five thousand experienced seamen. That the sailors might be usefully employed on every emergence at sea or land, they were provided with the small and light bucklers, the darts, swords, and javelins, appropriated to the Grecian targeteers, who, uniting strength and velocity, formed an intermediate and useful order between the archers and pikemen. With these forces, Thrasyllus sailed to Samos, hoping to render the twenty-third campaign not less glorious than the preceding; and ambitious to rival, by his victories in the central and southern parts of the Asiatic coast, the fame acquired by Alcibiades and Thrasylbulus in the north. His first operations were successful. He took Colophon, with several places of less note, in Ionia; penetrated into the heart of Lydia, burning the corn

<sup>39</sup> Xenoph. p. 431.

and villages; and returned to the shore, driving before him a numerous body of slaves, and other valuable booty. His courage was increased by the want of resistance on the part of Tissaphernes, whose province he had invaded; of the Peloponnesian forces at Miletus; and of the revolted colonies of Athens. He resolved, therefore, to attack the beautiful and flourishing city of Ephesus, which was then the principal ornament and defence of the Ionic coast. While his soldiers, in separate divisions, were making their approaches to the walls of that place, the enemy assembled from every quarter to defend the majesty of Ephesian Diana. A vigorous sally of the townsmen increased the strength of Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians, the latter of whom had been seasonably reinforced by a considerable squadron from Sicily. The Athenians were defeated, with the loss of three hundred men; and retiring from the field of battle, they sought refuge in their ships, and prepared to sail towards the Hellespont<sup>40</sup>.

During the voyage thither, they fell in with twenty Sicilian gallies, of which they took four, and pursued the rest to Ephesus. Having soon afterwards reached the Hellespont, they found the Athenian armament at Lampascus, where Alcibiades thought proper to muster the whole military and naval forces: but, on this occasion, the northern army gave a remarkable proof of pride or spirit. They, who had ever been victorious,

His soldiers regain their honour before the walls of Abydos.

<sup>40</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 434.

refused



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refused to rank with the soldiers of Thrasyllus, who had been so shamefully foiled before the walls of Ephesus. They submitted, however, though not without reluctance, to live in the same winter-quarters; from which they made a conjunct expedition against Abydus. Pharnabazus defended the place with a numerous body of Persian cavalry. The disgraced troops of Thrasyllus rejoiced in an opportunity to retrieve their honour. They attacked, repelled, and routed the enemy. Their victory decided the fate of Abydus, and their courage was approved by the army of Alcibiades, who embraced them as fellow-soldiers and friends.

Alcibiades  
takes By-  
zantium.  
His success  
by sea and  
land.  
Olymp.  
xciii. 1.  
A. C. 408.

For several years the measures of the Athenians had been almost uniformly successful; but the twenty-fourth campaign was distinguished by peculiar favours of fortune. The invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians prevented that island from sending any effectual assistance to their Peloponnesian allies. The dangerous revolt of the Medes withheld the Persian reinforcements, which were necessary to support the arms of Pharnabazus<sup>41</sup>. Both nations were repeatedly defeated by the Athenians, driven from their encampments and fortresses near the shore, and pursued into the inland country, which was plundered and desolated by the victors. The Athenians returned in triumph to attack the fortified cities, which still declined submission; an undertaking in which Alcibiades displayed the wonderful resources of his extraordinary genius.

<sup>41</sup> Diodorus, l. xiii.

By gradual approaches, by sudden assaults, by surprise, by treason, or by stratagem, he in a few months became master of Chalcedon, Selembria, and at last of Byzantium itself. His naval success was equally conspicuous. The Athenians again commanded the sea. The small squadrons fitted out by the enemy successively fell into their power; and these multiplied captures, which were made with little difficulty, accumulated the trophies of the well-fought battles which we have already described. It was computed by the partisans of Alcibiades, that, since assuming the command, he had taken or destroyed two hundred Syracusan and Peloponnesian galleys; and his superiority of naval strength enabled him to raise such contributions, both in the Euxine and Mediterranean, as abundantly supplied his fleet and army with every necessary article of subsistence and accommodation <sup>42</sup>.

While the Athenian arms were crowned with such glory abroad, the Attic territory was continually harassed by king Agis, and the Lacedæmonian troops posted at Decelia. Their bold and sudden incursions frequently threatened the safety of the city itself; the desolated lands afforded no advantage to the ruined proprietors; nor could the Athenians venture without their walls, to celebrate their accustomed festivals. Alcibiades, animated by his foreign victories, hoped to relieve the domestic sufferings of his country; and after an absence of many years, distinguished by such a

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His triumphant return to Athens. Olymp. xciii. 2. A. C. 407.

<sup>42</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. Diodor. l. xiii. Plut. in Alcibiad.

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variety of fortune, eagerly longed to revisit his native city, and to enjoy the rewards and honours usually bestowed by the Greeks on successful valour. This celebrated voyage, which several ancient historians studiously decorated with every circumstance of naval triumph<sup>43</sup>, was performed in the twenty-fifth summer of the war. Notwithstanding all his services, the cautious son of Clinias, instructed by adversity, declined to land in the Piræus, until he was informed that the assembly had repealed the decrees against him, formally revoked his banishment, and prolonged the term of his command. Even after this agreeable intelligence he was still unable to conquer his well-founded distrust of the variable and capricious humours of the people; nor would he approach the crowded shore, till he observed, in the midst of the multitude, his principal friends and relations inviting him by their voice and action. He then landed amidst the universal acclamations of the spectators, who, unattentive to the naval pomp, and regardless of the other commanders, fixed their eyes only on Alcibiades. Next day an extraordinary assembly was summoned, by order of the magistrates, that he might explain and justify his apparent misconduct, and receive the rewards due to his acknowledged merit. The public anticipated his apology, by contrasting the melancholy situation of affairs when Alcibiades assumed the command, with the actual condition of the republic. “ At the former

<sup>43</sup> Duris apud Plut. in Alcibiad.



period Athens yielded the command of the sea: the enemy were every where victorious; the state was oppressed by foreign war, torn by sedition, without resources, and without hope. The address and dexterity of Alcibiades were alone capable to have disunited the councils, to have weakened and afterwards repelled the efforts, of a powerful confederacy; his activity and courage could alone have animated the dejection of the citizens to pursue the measures of offensive war: his abilities, his virtue, and his fortune, could alone have rendered those measures successful."

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Before judges so favourably disposed to hear him, Alcibiades found no difficulty to make his defence; but it was difficult both for him and his friends to moderate the excessive transports of the people, who would have loaded their favourite with honours incompatible with the genius of a free republic, and which might, therefore, have proved dangerous to his future safety. He received, with pleasure, the crowns and garlands, with other accustomed pledges of public gratitude and admiration; but he respectfully declined the royal sceptre, expressing a firm resolution to maintain the hereditary freedom of his country<sup>44</sup>. Athens required not a king, but a general with undivided power, capable of restoring the ancient splendour of the commonwealth. To this illustrious rank, which had been filled by Themistocles and Cimon, the son of Clinias might justly aspire. He was

His reception there.

<sup>44</sup> Com. Isocrat. Orat. pro Alcibiad et Plut. in Alcibiad.

appointed

CHAPTER XXI. appointed commander in chief by sea and land<sup>45</sup>.  
 An hundred gallies were equipped, and transports were prepared for fifteen hundred heavy-armed men, with a proportional body of cavalry.

The Eleusinian mysteries. Several months<sup>46</sup> had passed in these preparations, when the Eleusinian festival approached; a time destined to commemorate and to diffuse the temporal and spiritual gifts of the goddesses Ceres, originally bestowed on the Athenians, and by them communicated to the rest of Greece<sup>47</sup>. Corn, wine, and oil, were the principal production of Attica; each of which had been introduced into that country by the propitious intervention of a divinity, whose festival was distinguished by appropriated honours. Minerva, who had given not only the olive, but what was regarded as far more valuable, her peculiar protection to the city of Athens, was rewarded with innumerable solemnities. Various also were the professions of gratitude expressed, in stated days of the spring and autumn, to the gene-

<sup>45</sup> Ἀνακτοῦς ἀπαντῶν ἡγεμῶν αυτοκράτωρ. "He was chosen absolute commander of all." Xenoph. p. 440.

<sup>46</sup> From the festivals Plynteria and Eleusinia, mentioned in the text, it appears that he arrived in July, and sailed in November.

<sup>47</sup> Meursius, apud Gronov. Thesaur. has collected all the passages in ancient writers respecting this festival. It is said to have been celebrated in the month Boedromion, which, according to Father Petaut, answers to our November. But as the Attic year was lunar, the months of that year could not exactly correspond to those of ours. In the computation of their months, the Greeks agreed not with other nations, nor even among themselves. Vid. Plut. in Vit. Romul. & Aristid.

rous author of the vine. The worship of Ceres returned, indeed, less frequently; but was partly, on that account, the more solemn and awful; and partly, because distinguished by the Eleusinian mysteries, those hidden treasures of wisdom and happiness, which were poured out on the initiated in the temple of Eleusis. Fourteen<sup>48</sup> centuries before the Christian æra, the goddess, it is said, communicated these invaluable rites to Eumolpus and Keryx, two virtuous men, who had received her in the form of an unknown traveller with pious hospitality<sup>49</sup>. Their descendants, the Eumolpidæ and Kerykes, continued the ministers and guardians of this memorable institution, which was finally abolished by the great Theodosius, after it had lasted eighteen hundred years<sup>50</sup>. The candidates for initiation were prepared by watching, abstinence, sacrifice, and prayer; and before revealing to them the divine secrets, the most awful silence was enjoined them. Yet enough transpired among the prophane vulgar to enable us still to collect, from impartial<sup>51</sup> and authentic testimony, that the mysteries

<sup>48</sup> Marb. Arund. Epoch. 14.

<sup>49</sup> Diodor. l. v. Isocrat. Panegy. Pollux, l. viii. c. ix.

<sup>50</sup> Zozim. Hist. l. iv.

<sup>51</sup> I say *impartial*, because Isocrates, the scholar of Socrates, cannot be supposed to exaggerate the merit of ceremonies, which his master is said to have despised. The passage is remarkable: "Though what I am going to relate may be disfigured by tradition and fable, the substance of it is not the less deserving of your regard. When Ceres travelled to Attica in quest of her daughter, she received the most hospitable treatment, and those particular good offices which are known to the initiated. The goddess was not



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steries of Ceres expressed by external signs the immortality of the human soul, and the rewards prepared in a future life for the virtuous servants of heaven. The secrecy enjoined by her ministers, so unworthy the truths which they taught, might justify the indifference of Socrates<sup>52</sup>, whose doctrines, not less divine, were inculcated with unre-served freedom. But the fate of Socrates may justify in its turn, the circumspection of the hiero-phants of Ceres.

Alcibiades  
conducts  
the Eleu-  
sinian pro-  
cession.

Besides the mysterious ceremonies of the temple, the worship of that bountiful goddess was celebrated by vocal and instrumental music, by public shows, and exhibitions, which continued during several days, and above all, by the pompous procession, which marched for ten miles along the sacred road leading from Athens to Eleusis<sup>53</sup>. This important part of the solemnity had formerly been inter-mitted, because the Athenians, after the loss of Decelia, were no longer masters of the road, and were compelled, contrary to established custom, to proceed by sea to the temple of Ceres. Alcibia-des determined to wipe off the stain of impiety

not ungrateful for such favours, but in return conferred on our ancestors the two most valuable presents which either heaven can bestow, or mankind can receive; the practice of agriculture, which delivered us from the fierce and precarious manner of life, common to us with wild animals; and the knowledge of those sacred mysteries which fortify the initiated against the terrors of death, and inspire them with the pleasing hopes of an happy immortality. See Panegyr. p. 24. & Euseb. Præpar. Evang. l. iii.

<sup>52</sup> Laert. in Diogene.

<sup>53</sup> Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxv. & Plut. in Alcibiad.

which

which had long adhered to his character, by renewing, in all its lustre, this venerable procession. He prepared to defend, by an armed force, the peaceful ministers and votaries of the gods, persuaded that the Spartans would either allow them to pass undisturbed, which must lessen the military fame of that people, or, if they attempted to interrupt the ceremony, must be exposed not only to the dangerous resistance of men animated by enthusiasm, but to the disgraceful charge of irreligion, and the general detestation of Greece. The priests, the heralds, and the whole body of the initiated, were apprised of his intention, and requested to hold themselves in readiness by the appointed day. Early in the morning the cavalry explored the adjoining country; the eminences were occupied by the light infantry and targeteers; and, after sufficient garrisons had been left to defend the Athenian walls and fortresses, the whole body of heavy-armed troops were drawn out to protect the Eleusinian procession, which marched along the usual road to the temple, and afterwards returned to Athens, without suffering any molestation from the Lacedæmonians; having united, on this occasion alone, all the splendour of war with the pomp of superstition<sup>54</sup>.

Soon after this meritorious enterprise, Alcibiades prepared to sail for Lesser Asia, accompanied by the affectionate admiration of his fellow-citizens, who flattered themselves that the abi-

His glory  
clouded  
by the in-  
auspicious  
return of  
the Plyn-  
teria.

<sup>54</sup> Plut. in Alcibiad.

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lities and fortune of their commander would speedily reduce Chios, Ephesus, Miletus, and the other revolted cities and islands. The general alacrity, however, was somewhat abated by the reflection, that the arrival of Alcibiades in Athens coincided with the anniversary of the Plynteria<sup>55</sup>, a day condemned to melancholy idleness, from a superstitious belief that nothing undertaken on that day could be brought to a prosperous conclusion. The celebrated Parthenon, whose remains still attest the magnificence of Pericles, was consecrated by the presence of a goddess, who realized the inspirations of Homer, as far as they were capable of being expressed by the genius of Phidias. Minerva, composed of gold and ivory, and twenty-six cubits high, was represented with the casque, the buckler, the lance, and all her usual emblems; and the warm fancy of the Athenians, enlivened and transported by the graceful majesty of her air and aspect, confounded the painful production of the statuary with the instantaneous creation of Jupiter. To confirm this useful illusion the crafty priests of the temple carefully washed and brightened the image, whose extraordinary lustre increased the veneration of the multitude. The Plynteria, during which this ceremony was performed, required uncommon secrecy and circumspection. The eyes and imagination of the vulgar might have become too

<sup>55</sup> Πλυντήριον, to wash; πλυντήρ, πλυντήριον; ; and in the plural neuter, "the ceremony of ablution."



familiar with their revered goddess, had they beheld her stripped of her accustomed ornaments, and observed every part of her form brightening into new beauty under the plastic hands of the priests. To prevent this dangerous consequence, the Plynteria was veiled in mystic obscurity; the doors of the temple were shut; that sacred edifice was surrounded on all sides to intercept the approach of indiscretion or profanity; and the return of Alcibiades, the favourite hope of his country, happening on the inauspicious day when Minerva hid her countenance, was believed by many to announce the dreadful calamities which soon afterwards befel the republic<sup>56</sup>.

<sup>56</sup> Xenoph. p. 438. & Plut. in Alcibiad.

## C H A P. XXII.

*Character of Lysander.—His Conference with Cyrus.—He defeats the Athenian Fleet.—Disgrace of Alcibiades.—Lysander succeeded by Callicratidas.—His Transactions with the Persians—with the Spartan Allies.—Battle of Arginussæ.—Trial of the Athenian Admirals.—Eteonicus checks a Mutiny of the Peloponnesian Troops.—Lysander resumes the Command.—Battle of Ægos Potamos.—Spartan Empire in Asia.—Siege and Surrender of Athens.—Humiliation of the Athenians.*

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Lysander takes the command of the Peloponnesian forces in the East. Olymp. xciii. 2. A. C. 407.

**W**HILE the superstitious multitude trembled at the imaginary anger of Minerva, men of reflection and experience dreaded the activity and valour of Lysander, who, during the residence of Alcibiades at Athens, had taken the command of the Peloponnesian forces in the East. The forms of the Spartan constitution required a rapid succession of generals; a circumstance, which, amidst the numerous inconveniences with which it was attended, enlarged the sphere of military competition, and multiplying the number of actors on the theatre of war, afforded an opportunity for the display of many illustrious characters, which must otherwise have remained in obscurity. In the rotation

tation of annual elections, offices of importance and dignity will often be entrusted to men unworthy to fill them; but in the vast variety of experiments, abilities of the most distinguished order (if any such exist in the community) must some time be called into exertion, honoured with confidence, and armed with authority.

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Such abilities the Spartans finally discovered in Lyfander; a shoot of the Herculean stock, but not descended from either of the royal branches. He had been educated with all the severity of Spartan discipline; and having spent his youth and his manhood in those honourable employments<sup>1</sup> which became the dignity of his birth, he approached the decline of life, when his superior merit recommended him to the chief command in a season of public danger. Years had added experience to his valour, and enlarged the resources, without abating the ardour, of his ambitious mind. In his transactions with the world, he had learned to soften the harsh asperity of his national manners; to gain by fraud what could not be effected by force; and, in his own figurative language, to “ eke out the lion’s with the fox’s skin<sup>2</sup>.” This mixed character admirably

His character.

<sup>1</sup> He had served in the army and navy; had been employed as ambassador in foreign states, &c. Plut. in Lyfander.

<sup>2</sup> This was said, in allusion to the lion’s skin of Hercules, to one who asked Lyfander, “ How he, who sprang from that hero, could condescend to conquer his enemies by fraud?” His character is diffusely described by Plutarch, t. iii. p. 4—15.



**C H A P.** suited the part which he was called to act. His enterprising courage was successfully exerted in the hostile operations against the Greeks; his subtle and insinuating address gave him an ascendant in every negotiation with the Persians; and the reunion of those various qualities enabled him, in a few years, finally to terminate the war, and to produce an important and permanent revolution in the affairs of Athens, of Sparta, and of Greece.

His conference with Cyrus. Olymp. xciii. 2. A. C. 407.

Since the decisive action at Cyzicus, the Peloponnesians, unable to resist the enemy, had been employed in preparing ships on the coast of their own peninsula, as well as in the harbours of their Persian and Grecian allies. The most considerable squadrons had been equipped in Cos, Rhodes, Miletus, and Ephesus; in the last of which the whole armament, amounting to ninety sail, was collected by Lyfander. But the assembling of such a force was a matter of little consequence, unless proper measures should be taken for holding it together, and for enabling it to act with vigour. It was necessary, above all, to secure pay for the seamen; for this purpose, Lyfander, accompanied by several Lacedæmonian ambassadors, repaired to Sardis, to congratulate the happy arrival of Cyrus, a generous and valiant youth of seventeen, who had been entrusted by his father Darius with the government of the inland parts of Lesser Asia; or, in the language of the Persian court, with the command of the numerous troops, who rendezvoused in the plains of Kaftolus,

Kastolus<sup>3</sup>. Lyfander complained to the young and magnanimous prince, “ of the perfidious duplicity of Tiffaphernes, by which the Athenians had been enabled to re-assume that ascendant in the East, which had formerly proved so dangerous and disgraceful to the Persian name. That satrap seemed, on one occasion indeed, to have discovered the fatal tendency of his measures; and had attempted to check the victorious career of those ambitious republicans, by seizing the person of Alcibiades<sup>4</sup>. Pharnabazus had more effectually served the cause of his master, by his active valour in the field; by detaining the Athenian ambassadors, who had been sent to surprise the unsuspecting generosity of Darius<sup>5</sup>; and by supplying the Peloponnesians, after the unfortunate engagement at Cyzicus, with the means of pre-

<sup>3</sup> This was the style of the letter, confirmed by the royal seal. *Καταπεμπω Κυρον καρανον των ες Κασωλον αθροιζομενων.* Xenoph. p. 438.

<sup>4</sup> This event, which happened in the twenty-first year of the war, is related by Xenophon, p. 429. It was omitted in the text, because Alcibiades soon effected his escape; and the treachery of Tiffaphernes only displayed his own worthlessness, without hurting his enemies.

<sup>5</sup> This dishonourable transaction was approved even by Cyrus, which shews the disregard of the Persians to the laws of nations. He begged Pharnabazus to put the Athenians in his hands; at least, not to set them at liberty, that their countrymen might be ignorant of the measures in agitation against them. But a remorse of conscience seized Pharnabazus, who had sworn, either to conduct the ambassadors to the great king, or to send them to the Ionian coast; in consequence of which, the Athenians were released. Xenoph. p. 438.

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paring a new fleet, and with the necessaries and conveniencies of life, while they were employed in this useful undertaking. But Tissaphernes was unwilling, and Pharnabazus was perhaps unable, to discharge the stipulated pay, without which the Grecian seamen and soldiers could not be kept together, or engaged to act with vigour against the common enemy." Cyrus replied, " That he had been commanded by his father to assist the Lacedæmonians, and to pay their troops with the most exact punctuality. That, for this purpose, he had carried with him five hundred talents (near an hundred thousand pounds sterling); and if such a sum should be found insufficient, he would willingly expend his private fortune, and even melt down and coin into money the golden throne on which he sat<sup>6</sup>."

The pay  
of the  
Grecian  
sailors,  
and com-  
plement  
of their  
ships.

This discourse gave extraordinary satisfaction to his Grecian auditors; and Lyfander endeavoured to avail himself of what, judging by his own character, he imagined might be nothing more than a sudden transport of generosity, by requesting that the seamen's pay might be raised from three oboli to an Attic drachma a day. Cyrus answered, " That, on this subject too, he had received express orders from his father<sup>7</sup>. That the pay should  
continue

<sup>6</sup> Καὶ τὸν θρόνον κατακοψέιν, ἐν ᾧ ἐκάθητο, οὐτὰ ἀργυρῶν καὶ χρυσῶν. Literally, "that he would cut in pieces the throne on which he sat," which was composed of silver and gold.

<sup>7</sup> Xenophon makes Cyrus answer with more art than truth, "ὁ δὲ καλῶς μὲν εἶπεν αὐτῆς, οὐ δυνατόν δὲ εἶναι παρ' αἱ βασιλεὺς



continue on the ancient footing, and the Peloponnesians regularly receive thirty minæ (above ninety pounds sterling) a month, for every ship which they fitted out." Lyfander acquiesced with some reluctance, determining to seize the first favourable opportunity to renew his petition. But this instructive conversation may enable us to discover an important matter of fact omitted by historians. As the military and naval officers of the Greeks were not distinguished above the common men by the excessive inequality of their appointments, we may compute, from the monthly sum of thirty minæ, distributed at the rate of three oboli of daily pay, that the complement of each ship amounted to about two hundred and forty sailors; so that a fleet of ninety sail employed twenty-one thousand and six hundred men.

Before Lyfander returned to Ephesus, he was invited by the Persian prince to a magnificent entertainment, at which, according to the custom of the age, the most serious matters were discussed amidst the freedom and intemperance of the table. This was a seasonable occasion for displaying the arts of insinuation and flattery, in which the Spartan was a complete master. He represented, without moderation, and without decency, the injustice and incapacity of Tissaphernes, who, as he was naturally the rival, might be suspected soon to be-

Lyfander is entertained at Sardis by the Persian prince.

Ἐπεστειλὼν αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν." Cyrus answered, "that *they* (Lyfander and the Lacedæmonian ambassadors) spoke very reasonably, but that *he* could not act otherwise than he was commanded by his father."

come

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His ad-  
dress in  
procuring  
an addi-  
tion to the  
seamen's  
pay.

come the personal enemy of Cyrus. He magnified the beauty, the strength, and the courage, of the young prince. His address in military exercises, and the extraordinary endowments of his mind (the fame of which had reached the most distant countries), were extolled with the most elaborate praise. It is not improbable that he might find a topic of panegyric in a quality of which Cyrus was not a little vain; the capacity of bearing, without intoxication, a greater quantity of liquor than any of his equals<sup>8</sup>; and he might possibly suggest, that of all the sons of Darius, Cyrus was the best qualified to succeed his father, to fill with dignity the Persian throne, and to emulate the glory of that illustrious hero whose name he bore, the immortal founder of the monarchy. But whatever were the topics of which he made use, it is certain that he excited the warmest emotions of friendship in the youthful breast of Cyrus, who drinking his health, after the Persian fashion, desired him to ask a boon, with full assurance that nothing should be denied him. Lyfander replied, with his usual address, "That he should ask what it would be no less useful for the prince to give, than for him to receive: the addition of an obolus a day to the pay of the mariners; an augmentation which, by inducing the Athenian crews to desert, would not only increase their own strength, but enfeeble the common enemy." Struck with the apparent disinterestedness of this specious proposal, Cyrus or-

<sup>8</sup> Plut. Sympos.

dered him immediately ten thousand Daricks (above five thousand pounds sterling); with which he returned to Ephesus, discharged the arrears due to his troops, gave them a month's pay in advance, raised their daily allowance, and seduced innumerable deserters from the Athenian fleet<sup>9</sup>.

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While Lyfander was usefully employed in manning his ships, and preparing them for action, Alcibiades attacked the small island of Andros. The resistance was more vigorous than he had reason to expect; and the immediate necessity of procuring pay and subsistence for the fleet, obliged him to leave his work imperfect. With a small squadron he failed to raise contributions on the Ionian or Carian coast<sup>10</sup>, committing the principal armament to Antiochus, a man totally unworthy of such an important trust<sup>11</sup>. Even the affectionate partiality of Alcibiades seems to have discerned the unworthiness of his favourite, since he gave him strict orders to continue, during his own absence, in the harbour of Samos, and by no means to risk an engagement. This injunction, as it could not prevent the rashness, might perhaps provoke the vain levity of the vice-admiral, who, after the depar-

Defeats  
the Athe-  
nian fleet  
in the ab-  
sence of  
Alcibia-  
des.  
Olymp.  
xciii. 2.  
A. C. 407.

<sup>9</sup> Plut. tom. iii. p. 7. Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 441. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 360.

<sup>10</sup> Xenophon says, "Alcibiades failed to Phocæa," which is in Ionia; Plutarch says, "to the coast of Caria."

<sup>11</sup> Diodorus gives his character in few words: "Ὁ δὲ Ἀντιόχος ὡν τῇ φύσει προχειρὸς, καὶ σπευδὼν διὰ ἑαυτοῦ τι πράξαι λαμπρὸν. Antiochus, naturally precipitate, and desirous, by himself, to perform some splendid exploit."



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ture of his friend, sailed towards Ephesus, approached the sterns of Lyfander's ships, and with the most licentious insults challenged him to battle. The prudent Spartan delayed the moment of attack, until the presumption of his enemies had thrown them into scattered disorder<sup>12</sup>. He then commanded the Peloponnesian squadrons to advance. His manœuvres were judicious, and executed with a prompt obedience. The battle was not obstinate, as the Athenians, who scarcely expected any resistance, much less assault, sunk at once from the insolence of temerity into the despondency of fear. They lost fifteen vessels, with a considerable part of their crews. The remainder retired disgracefully to Samos; while the Lacedæmonians profited of their victory by the taking of Eion and Delphinium. Though fortune thus favoured the prudence of Lyfander, he declined to venture a second engagement with the superior strength of Alcibiades, who, having resumed the command, employed every artifice and insult that might procure him an opportunity to restore the tarnished lustre of the Athenian fleet.

Alcibiades  
accused  
and dis-  
graced.

But such an opportunity he could never again find. The people of Athens, who expected to hear of nothing but victories and triumphs, were mortified to the last degree, when they received intelligence of such a shameful defeat. As they could not suspect the abilities, they distrusted the fidelity, of their commander. Their suspicions

<sup>12</sup> “*Δυσπαρμέναις ταῖς ναυσὶ.*” Xenoph. p. 441.

were

were increased and confirmed by the arrival of C H A P.  
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Thraſybulus<sup>13</sup>, who, whether actuated by a laudable zeal for the interest of the public service, or animated by a selfish jealousy of the fame and honours that had been so liberally heaped on a rival, formally impeached Alcibiades in the Athenian assembly. “ His misconduct had totally ruined the affairs of his country. A talent for low buffoonery was a sure recommendation to his favour. His friends were, partially, selected from the meanest and most abandoned of men, who possessed no other merit than that of being subservient to his passions. To such unworthy instruments the fleet of Athens was entrusted; while the commander in chief revelled in debauchery with the harlots of Abydos and Ionia, or raised exorbitant contributions on the dependent cities, that he might defray the expence of a fortress on the coast of Thrace, in the neighbourhood of Byzantium, which he had erected to shelter himself against the just vengeance of the republic.”

<sup>13</sup> Thraſybulus, we have seen, had a principal share in bringing about the recall of Alcibiades. Nor was the latter ungrateful to his benefactor. When the Athenians committed to him their whole military and naval force, “ *ἅπασας τὰς δυνάμεις*,” and allowed him to name his own colleagues, or rather substitutes, he named Thraſybulus and Adimantus. Diod. l. xiii. p. 368. Considering this interchange of good offices between Alcibiades and Thraſybulus, it is remarkable that no Greek writer assigns any reason for the animosity that soon afterwards broke out between them. Plutarch says, that Thraſybulus was the bitterest of Alcibiades’s enemies, and imputes his accusation of him to enmity, not to patriotism.

Were

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Ten commanders appointed in his stead.

Were it necessary to prove by examples the deceitful emptiness of popular favour, this subject might be copiously illustrated from the history of the Athenians. The same man, whom a few months before they found it impossible sufficiently to reward, was actually exposed to the rage of disappointment and the fury of revenge. They regretted the loss of every moment which intervened between the rapid progress of their resentment, and the execution of their vengeance. In the same assembly, and on the same day, Alcibiades was accused, and almost unanimously condemned; and, that the affairs of the republic might not again suffer by the abuse of undivided power, ten commanders were substituted in his room; among whom were Thrasyllus, Leon, Diomedon, whose approved valour, and love of liberty, justly recommended them to public honours; Conon, a character as yet but little known, but destined, in a future period, to eclipse the fame of his contemporaries; and Pericles, who inherited the name, the merit, and the bad fortune, of his illustrious father. The new generals immediately sailed to Samos; and Alcibiades sought refuge in his Thracian fortress<sup>14</sup>.

Callicratidas sent to command the Peloponnesian fleet.  
Olymp. xciii. 3.  
A. C. 406.

They had scarcely assumed the command, when an important alteration took place in the Peloponnesian fleet. Lyfander's year had expired, and Callicratidas, a Spartan of a very opposite character, was sent to succeed him. The active, ambi-

<sup>14</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. sub fin. Diodor. xiii. 67—74.

tious,



tious, and intriguing temper of the former had employed as much assiduous and systematic policy during the short term of his precarious power, as if his authority had never been to end. Though endowed with uncommon vigour of mind, and with consummate prudence (if prudence can belong to a character deficient in justice and humanity), he possessed not those amiable and useful qualities which alone deserve, and can alone obtain, public confidence and respect. Lyfander, sensible of this imperfection, had recourse to the ordinary expedient by which crafty ambition supplies the want of virtue. He determined to govern by parties<sup>15</sup>. The boldest of the sailors were attached to his person by liberal rewards and more liberal promises. The soldiers were indulged in the most licentious disorders. In every city and in every island, Lyfander had his partisans, whom he flattered with the hopes of obtaining the same authority over their fellow-citizens, which the Spartans enjoyed over the inferior ranks of men in Laconia<sup>16</sup>.

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It was the general expectation at Ephesus, that the Spartans would, for once, depart from established practice, in order to prolong the command of such an able and successful officer. An universal clamour arose, when Callicratidas dis-

His influential reception.

<sup>15</sup> His maxims breathed the odious party spirit. "That it is impossible to do too much good to friends, or *too much evil to enemies*. That children are to be deceived by trinkets, men by oaths; and others equally flagitious." Plut. in Lyfand.

<sup>16</sup> Idem, *ibid.* & Xenoph. Hellen.

played

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played his commission in the council of the confederates. The friends of Lyfander affirmed, "That it was equally imprudent and ungenerous to check the victorious career of a deserving and fortunate commander; that the important charge of the fleet ought not to be entrusted to men who were destitute of experience, and perhaps of abilities; nor would it be just to sacrifice the interest of such a numerous and powerful confederacy to a punctilious observance of the Lacedæmonian laws." Lyfander maintained a decent silence concerning the character of his successor, only observing that he resigned to him a fleet which commanded the sea. The noisy acclamations of the assembly confirmed his assertion.

His honesty and firmness confounds the partisans of Lyfander.

But Callicratidas had a heart untainted with reproach, and incapable of fear. Unabashed by the seditious turbulence of his opponents, he replied, That he must withhold his assent to the magnified superiority of the Peloponnesian fleet, unless Lyfander should set sail from Ephefus, coast along the isle of Samos (where the Athenians then lay), and surrender his victorious squadrons in the harbour of Miletus. The pride of Lyfander might have been confounded by this judicious and solid observation; but his ingenuity suggested a plausible or rather an elusive reply, "That he was no longer admiral."

Callicratidas then addressed the assembly, with the manly simplicity of an honest heart, which disdains the artifice of words, defies the insolence of power, and defeats the intrigues of policy. "La-

cedæmonians and allies, I should have been contented to stay at home; nor does it greatly affect me that Lyfander, or any other, should be held a better seaman than myself. Hither I have been sent by my countrymen to command the fleet, and *my* chief concern is to execute their orders, and to perform my duty. It is my earnest desire to promote the public interest; but you can best inform me whether I ought to continue here, or to return to Sparta." Wonderful is the power of honest intentions and unaffected firmness. The assembly listened with admiration; the partisans of Lyfander were abashed; none ventured to object; and, after a considerable pause, all unanimously acknowledged that it became both Callicratidas and themselves to obey the orders of the Spartan government<sup>17</sup>.

Lyfander, not a little mortified by the language of the assembly, reluctantly resigned his employment; but determined to render it painful, and, if possible, too weighty for the abilities of his successor. For this purpose he returned to the court of Cyrus, to whom he restored a considerable sum of money still unexpended in the service of the Grecian fleet, and to whom he misrepresented, under the names of obstinacy, ignorance, and rusticity, the unaffected plainness, the downright sincerity, and the other manly, but uncomplying, virtues of the generous Callicratidas. When that commander repaired to Sardis to demand the

He meets the arrogance of the Persians with equal contempt.

<sup>17</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. v. & seqq. & Plut. in Lyfand.



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stipulated pay, he could not obtain admission to the royal presence. The first time that he visited the palace he was told that Cyrus was at table. It is well, said the unceremonious Spartan, I will wait till he has dined. The simplicity of this proceeding, confirmed the opinion which Lyfander had given the Persians of his character; and his honest frankness, which was construed into low breeding, seemed a proper object of ridicule to the proud retainers of the court. He returned on another occasion, but without being admitted to see the young prince. The injustice of this treatment might have deserved his resentment, but it chiefly excited his contempt. He left the royal city, despising the pride and perfidy of his Persian allies, whose accidental importance depended on the precarious advantage of riches, and lamenting the domestic dissensions of the Greeks, which obliged them to court the favour of insolent Barbarians.

Obtains  
voluntary  
contribu-  
tions from  
the Ioni-  
ans.

But Callicratidas could not, with honour or safety, return to the fleet at Ephesus, without having collected money to supply the immediate wants of the sailors. He proceeded, therefore, to Miletus and other friendly towns of Ionia; and having met the principal citizens, in their respective assemblies, he explained openly and fully the mean jealousy of Lyfander, and the disdainful arrogance of Cyrus<sup>18</sup>. “The unjust behaviour of

<sup>18</sup> It will appear, in the sequel, that Callicratidas had formed a very false opinion of the Persian prince, whose neglect of a worthy man was occasioned by the perfidious suggestions of his retainers, the friends or creatures of Lyfander.

both compelled him, much against his inclination, to have recourse to the confederate cities (already too much burdened) for the money requisite to support the war. But he assured them, that, should his arms prove successful, he would repay their favours with gratitude. Their own interest required a cheerful compliance with his demands, since the expedition had been principally undertaken to vindicate their freedom. He had, however, sent messengers to require effectual supplies from Sparta; but until these should arrive, it became the Greeks in general, but especially the Ionians, who had suffered peculiar injuries from the usurping tyranny of the great king, to prove to the world that, without the sordid assistance of *his* boasted treasures, they could prosecute their just designs, and take vengeance on their enemies." By those judicious and honourable expedients, Callicratidas, without fraud or violence, obtained such considerable, yet voluntary contributions, as enabled him to gratify the importunate demands of the sailors, and to return with honour to Ephesus, in order to prepare for action<sup>19</sup>.

His first operations were directed against the isle of Lesbos, or rather against the strong and populous towns of Methymna and Mitylené, which respectively commanded the northern and southern divisions of that island. Besides the numerous citizens of an age to bear arms, Methymna was defended by an Athenian garrison. The place

He takes  
Methymna.

<sup>19</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. p. 444.

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made a brave resistance; but the persevering efforts of Callicratidas exhausted its strength: Methymna was taken by storm, and subjected to the depredations of the Peloponnesian troops. The garrison and the slaves were treated as part of the booty. The confederates advised, that the Methymneans also should be sold into servitude; but Callicratidas assured them, that, while *he* enjoyed the command, there should not any Grecian citizen be reduced to the condition of a slave, unless he had taken arms to subvert the public freedom<sup>20</sup>.

Takes  
thirty  
ships, and  
blocks up  
the rest of  
the fleet in  
the har-  
bour of  
Mitylené.

Meanwhile Conon, the most active and enterprising of the Athenian commanders, had put to sea with a squadron of seventy sail, in order to protect the coast of Lesbos. But this design was attempted too late; nor, had it been more early undertaken, was the force of Conon sufficient to accomplish it. Callicratidas observed his motions, discovered his strength, and, with a far superior fleet, intercepted his retreat to the armament of Samos. The Athenians fled towards the coast of Mitylené, but were prevented from entering the harbour of that place by the resentment of the inhabitants, who rejoiced in an opportunity to punish those who had so often conquered, and so long oppressed, their city. In consequence of this unexpected opposition, the Athenian squadron was overtaken by the enemy. The engagement was more sharp and obstinate than might have been expected in such an inequality of strength. Thirty

<sup>20</sup> Xenoph. ubi supra. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 373.



empty ships (for most of the men swam to land) were taken by the Peloponnesians. The remaining forty were haled up under the walls of Mitylené: Callicratidas recalled his troops from Methymna, received a reinforcement from Chios, and blocked up the Athenians by sea and land<sup>21</sup>.

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The condition of Conon was most distressful. He was surrounded on all sides by a superior force; the town of Mitylené was hostile; his men were destitute of provisions, incapable of resistance, yet unwilling to surrender. In this melancholy situation he attempted the only enterprise which could promise a hope of relief. The bravest and most experienced seamen were embarked in two swift-sailing vessels, one of which eluding the vigilance of the enemy, escaped in safety to the Hellespont, and informed the Athenians of the misfortunes and blockade at Lesbos. The intelligence was immediately communicated to Samos and to Athens; and the importance of the object, which was no less than the safety of forty ships, and above eight thousand brave men, excited uncommon exertions of activity. The Athenians reinforced their domestic strength with the assistance of their allies; all able-bodied men were pressed into the service; and, in a few weeks, they had assembled at Samos an hundred and fifty sail, which immediately took the sea, with a resolution to encounter the enemy.

The Athenians fit out a new fleet.

Callicratidas did not decline the engagement. Having left fifty ships to guard the harbour of

Battle of Arginœ, in which Callicratidas

<sup>21</sup> Xenoph. ubi supra. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 373.

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is defeated  
and slain.

Olymp.

xviii. 3.

A. C. 406.

Mitylené, he proceeded with an hundred and twenty to Cape Malea, the most southern point of Lesbos. The Athenians had advanced, the same evening, to the islands, or rather rocks, of Arginussæ, four miles distant from that promontory. The night passed in bold stratagems for mutual surprise, which were rendered ineffectual by a violent tempest of rain and thunder. At the dawn both armaments were eager to engage; but Hermon and Megareus, two experienced seamen, and the chief counsellors of Callicratidas, exhorted him not to commit the weakness of the Peloponnesians with the superior strength and numbers of the enemy. The generous and intrepid Spartan despised danger and death in comparison of glory; but either his magnanimity had not overcome the last imperfection of virtuous minds, and was averse to sacrifice personal glory to public utility, or he imagined that this utility could not be separated from an inflexible adherence to the martial laws of Lycurgus. He answered the prudent admonitions of his friends in these memorable words, which, according to the construction that is put on them<sup>22</sup>,  
deserve

<sup>22</sup> Cicero de Offic. l. i. c. xxiv. takes the unfavourable side.

“*Inventi autem multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed vitam etiam profundero pro patria parati essent: iidem gloriæ jacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne republica quidem postulante; ut Callicratidas, qui cum Lacedæmoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello, multa que fecisset egregie; vertit ad extremum omnia, cum consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginussis removendam, nec cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant. Quibus ille respondit, Lacedæmonios, classe illa amissa aliam parare posse; se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse.*”

Notwith-

deserve our admiration or our pity. “ My death cannot be destructive to Sparta, but my flight would be dishonourable both to Sparta and myself.” So saying, he gave the signal for his ships to advance. The fight was long and bloody; passing, successively, through all the different gradations, from disciplined order and regularity to the most tumultuous confusion. The Spartan commander was slain charging in the centre of the bravest enemies. The hostile squadrons fought with various fortune in different parts of the battle, and promiscuously conquered, pursued, surrendered, or fled. Thirteen Athenian vessels were taken by the Peloponnesians; but, at length, the latter gave way on all sides: seventy of their ships were captured, the rest escaped to Chios and Phocæa<sup>23</sup>.

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The Athenian admirals, though justly elated with their good fortune, cautiously deliberated concerning the best means of improving their victory. Several advised that the fleet should steer its course to Mitylené, to surprise the Peloponnesian squadron which blocked up the harbour of that city. Diomedon recommended it as a more immediate and essential object of their care to recover the bodies of the slain, and to save the wreck of twelve vessels which had been disabled in the engagement.

Stratagem  
of Eteoni-  
cus;

Notwithstanding the respectable authority of Cicero, whoever attentively considers the laws of Lycurgus and the character of Callicratidas, will be disposed to believe, that an undeviating principle of duty, not the fear of losing his glory, formed the sublime motive of that accomplished Spartan.

<sup>23</sup> Xenoph. p. 446. & Diodor. p. 384.



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Thrasylbulus observed, that by dividing their strength, both purposes might be effected. His opinion was approved. The charge of preserving the dying, and collecting the bodies of the dead, was committed to Theramenes and Thrasylbulus. Fifty vessels were destined to that important service, doubly recommended by humanity and superstition. The remainder sailed to the isle of Lesbos, in quest of the Peloponnesians on that coast, who narrowly escaped destruction through the well-conducted stratagem of Eteonicus, the Spartan vice-admiral. Soon after the engagement a brigantine arrived at Mitylené, acquainting him with the death of Callicratidas, as well as with the defeat and flight of the Peloponnesian fleet. The sagacity of Eteonicus immediately foresaw the probable consequences of those events. The Athenians would naturally sail from Arginussæ to pursue their good fortune, and Conon, who was shut up at Mitylené, would be encouraged to break through the harbour, that he might join his victorious countrymen.

which  
saves the  
Pelopon-  
nesian  
squadron  
at Mity-  
lené.

In order to anticipate those measures, and to facilitate his own retreat, the Spartan commander ordered the brigantine privately to leave the harbour, and to return, at the distance of a short time, with joyous acclamations and music, the rowers crowned with garlands, and calling out that Callicratidas had destroyed the last hope of Athens, and obtained a glorious and decisive victory. The contrivance succeeded; the Spartans thanked heaven for the good news by hymns and sacrifices; the  
sailors

failors were enjoined to refresh themselves by a copious repast, and to profit of a favourable gale to sail to the isle of Chios; while the soldiers burned their camp, and marched northward to Methymna, to reinforce the garrison there, which was threatened by a speedy visit of the enemy<sup>24</sup>.

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While the prudent foresight of Eteonicus saved the Peloponnesian squadron at Mitylené, the violence of a storm prevented Theramenes and Thra-sybulus from saving their unfortunate companions, all of whom, excepting one of the admirals and a few others who escaped by their extraordinary dexterity in swimming, were overwhelmed by the waves of a tempestuous sea; nor could their dead bodies ever be recovered. The Athenians were likewise disappointed of the immediate advantages which ought to have resulted from the engagement. Methymna was too strongly fortified to be taken by a sudden assault; they could not spare time for a regular siege; and when they proceeded to Chios in quest of the Peloponnesian fleet, they found it carefully secured in the principal harbour of that island, which had been put in a vigorous posture of defence. These unforeseen circumstances were the more disagreeable and mortifying to the commanders, because, immediately after the battle, they had sent an advice-boat to Athens, acquainting the magistrates with the capture of seventy vessels<sup>25</sup>; mentioning their intended expeditions to

Disap-  
pointment  
of the  
Athenian  
admirals.

<sup>24</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. & Diodor. p. 384.

<sup>25</sup> Xenoph. says sixty-nine; Diodorus, seventy-seven.

Mitylené,

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Mitylené, Methymna, and Chios, from which they had reason to hope the most distinguished success; and particularly taking notice that the important charge of recovering the bodies of the drowned or slain had been committed to Theramenes and Thrasylbulus, two captains of approved conduct and fidelity.

Discon-  
tents in  
Athens.

The joy which the Athenians received from this flattering intelligence was converted into disappointment and sorrow, when they understood that their fleet had returned to Samos, without reaping the expected fruits of victory. They were afflicted beyond measure with the total loss of the wreck, by which their brave and victorious countrymen had been deprived of the sacred rites of funeral; a circumstance viewed with peculiar horror, because it was supposed, according to a superstition consecrated by the belief of ages, to subject their melancholy shades to wander an hundred years on the gloomy banks of the Styx, before they could be transported to the regions of light and felicity. The relations of the dead lamented their private misfortunes; the enemies of the admirals exaggerated the public calamity; both demanded an immediate and serious examination into the cause of this distressful event, that the guilty might be discovered and punished.

Amidst the ferment of popular discontents, Theramenes sailed to Athens, with a view to exculpate himself and his colleague Thrasylbulus. The letter sent thither before them had excited their fear and their resentment; since it rendered  
them



them responsible for a duty which they found it impossible to perform. Theramenes accused the admirals of having neglected the favourable moment to save the perishing, and to recover the bodies of the dead; and, after the opportunity of this important service was irrecoverably lost, of having devolved the charge on others, in order to screen their own misconduct. The Athenians greedily listened to the accusation, and cashiered the absent commanders. Conon, who during the action remained blocked up at Mitylené, was intrusted with the fleet. Protomachus and Aristogenes chose a voluntary banishment. The rest returned home to justify measures which appeared so criminal <sup>26</sup>.

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Among the inestimable rules of jurisprudence, invented by the wisdom of Athens, we may remark that beneficial institution which subjects the life, the character, and the fortune of individuals, not to the capricious will of an arbitrary judge, but to the equitable decision of the public. In every case, civil and criminal, the rights of an Athenian citizen were entrusted to the judgment of his peers; who, according as the question was more or less important, consisted of a committee, more or less numerous, of the popular assembly. But, in order to unite the double advantages of law and liberty, the nine archons, or chief magistrates, men of approved wisdom and fidelity, respectively presided in the several courts of justice, received

Trials of  
the ad-  
mirals.

<sup>26</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. vii. & seqq. Diodor. xiii. 76—97.

complaints,

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complaints, examined the parties, directed process, and regularly conducted the suit through its various steps and stages. In matters of general concernment, such as the treason, perfidy, or malversation of men in power, the senate of the five hundred, or rather the Prytanes, who presided in the senate, performed the functions of the magistrate, and the whole body of the people, convened in full assembly, executed the office of judge and jury. It belonged to the Prytanes to prescribe the form of action or trial, and to admit the accuser to implead or impeach his antagonist. The cause was then referred to the people, who, as judges of the fact, gave their verdict, and, as judges of the law, passed their sentence or decree. Such were the regulations which reason had established, but which passion and interest commonly rendered ineffectual.

Artifices  
of their  
accusers.

Archedemus, an opulent and powerful citizen, and Callixenus, a seditious demagogue, partly moved by the intreaties of Theramenes, and partly excited by personal envy and resentment, denounced the admirals to the senate. The accusation was supported by the relations of the deceased, who appeared in mourning robes, their heads shaved, their arms folded, their eyes bathed in tears, piteously lamenting the loss and disgrace of their families, deprived of their protectors, who had been themselves deprived of those last and solemn duties to which all mankind are entitled. A false witness swore in court, that he had been saved, almost by miracle, from the wreck, and that his

his companions, as they were ready to be drowned, charged him to acquaint his country how they had fallen victims to the cruel neglect of their commanders. During these proceedings it happened that the people had met to celebrate the Apatouria, or festival in January, so named because the Athenians then presented their sons, who had reached their seventh year, to be inscribed in the register of their respective tribes. Callixenus presuming on the evidence given in the senate, and on the actual disposition of the assembly, proposed the following resolution: "That the cause of the admirals should be immediately referred to the people; that the suffrages should be given by tribes, in each of which the criers should make proclamation, having prepared two urns to receive the white and black beans; if the latter were more numerous, the admirals should be delivered to the eleven men, the executioners of public justice, their estates confiscated, and the tenth part consecrated to Minerva."

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This unjust decree, which deprived the commanders of the benefits of a separate trial, of an impartial hearing, and of the time as well as the means necessary to prepare a legal defence, was approved by a majority of the senate, and received with loud acclamations by the people, whose levity, insolence, pride, and cruelty, all eagerly demanded the destruction of the admirals. In such a numerous assembly, two men alone, Euryptolemus and Axiochus, defended the cause of law and justice. The former impeached Callixenus for proposing a

Informality of the trial.



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resolution inconsistent with all the forms of legal procedure. But the rabble made a violent uproar, calling out that none should attempt, with impunity, to abridge their sovereign power. The Prytanes, who attended, as usual, to direct and controul the proceedings of the multitude, endeavoured to moderate the ferment: but they were licentiously told, that if they did not concur with the opinion of the majority, they should be involved in the same accusation with the admirals. This absurd menace (such was the popular frenzy) might be carried into immediate execution. The senators were intimidated into a reluctant compliance with measures which they disapproved, and by which they were for ever to be disgraced. Yet the philosophic firmness of Socrates disdained to submit. He protested against the tameness of his colleagues, and declared that neither threats, nor danger, nor violence, could compel him to conspire with injustice for the destruction of the innocent.

They are  
condemned  
and  
executed.

But what could avail the voice of one virtuous man amidst the licentious madness of thousands? The commanders were accused, tried, condemned; and, with the most irregular precipitancy, delivered to the executioner. Before they were led to death, Diomedon addressed the assembly in a short but ever-memorable speech. "I am afraid, Athenians! lest the sentence which you have passed on us, prove hurtful to the republic. Yet I would exhort you to employ the most proper means to avert the vengeance of heaven. You must carefully

fully perform the sacrifices which, before giving battle at Arginussæ, we promised to the gods in behalf of ourselves and of you. Our misfortunes deprive us of an opportunity to acquit this just debt, and to pay the sincere tribute of our gratitude. But we are deeply sensible that the assistance of the gods enabled us to obtain that glorious and signal victory." The disinterestedness, the patriotism, and the magnanimity of this discourse, must have appeased (if any thing had been able to appease) the tumultuous passions of the vulgar. But their headstrong fury defied every restraint of reason or of sentiment. They persisted in their bloody purpose, which was executed without pity: yet their cruelty was followed by a speedy repentance, and punished by the sharp pangs of remorse, the intolerable pain of which they vainly attempted to mitigate by inflicting a well-merited vengeance on the worthless and detestable Callixenus<sup>27</sup>.

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The removal of the Athenian admirals, and the defeat and death of the Spartan Callicratidas, suspended for several months the military and naval operations on both sides. The behaviour of Philocles and Adimantus, who had been joined in authority with Conon, were better fitted to obstruct than promote the measures of that brave and prudent commander. The former was a man of a violent and impetuous temper, unaccustomed to reflection, destitute of experience, and incapable of governing others, or himself. The latter pos-

Character  
of their  
successors.

<sup>27</sup> Xenoph. & Diodor. *ibid.*

essed

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possessed perhaps the virtue of humanity, but was destitute of spirit and activity, qualities so usual in his age and country. Though ready with his tongue, he was slow with his hand, careless of discipline, negligent of duty, and suspected of a treasonable correspondence with the public enemy.

Eteonicus  
checks a  
mutiny  
among the  
Pelopon-  
nesian  
troops.

Eteonicus, who commanded the Spartans and their confederates, was a man of a very different character. But the distressful situation of affairs prevented him from displaying his abilities in any important enterprise. His armament was inferior in strength; his sailors were disheartened by defeat; he had not money to pay them; even their subsistence at Chios was very sparing and precarious. These vexatious circumstances increased the mutinous spirit by which the confederates were too naturally animated. They reproached the ungenerous parsimony of the Chians, whom they had taken arms to defend; they spurned the authority of their commander; and, in order to obtain those advantages which their services deserved, and which had been unjustly denied them, they determined to become rich at once by seizing and plundering the large and wealthy capital of that flourishing island. The design, though secretly formed, was avowed with open boldness. The conspirators, whose numbers seemed to promise success, or at least to secure impunity, assumed a badge of distinction, that they might encourage each other, and intimidate their opponents. Eteonicus was justly alarmed with the progress of sedition. It was dangerous to attack the insurgents by force: if he destroyed



stroyed them by fraud, he might be exposed to the reproach and obloquy of Greece. The conduct which he pursued was conceived with an enterprising courage, and executed with a resolute firmness. With only fifteen faithful and intrepid followers, armed with concealed daggers, he patrolled the streets of Chios. The first man whom they met distinguished by a reed (for that was the badge of conspiracy) was put to death, and a crowd collecting to know why the man had been slain, they were told it was for wearing a reed on his casque. The report was immediately spread through every quarter of the city. The reed-men (as they were called) were confounded at discovering a conspiracy more secret and more formidable than their own. They dreaded that every man whom they met might know and kill them; and, as they had not time to assemble for their mutual defence, they hastily threw away the reeds, which exposed them to the dangerous assault of their unknown enemies.

The character of Eteonicus, as far as we can judge from his actions, justly entitled him to the command; but the partiality both of Cyrus and of the confederates eagerly solicited the return of Lyfander. The Spartans, though inclined to gratify them, were perplexed by an ancient law enacted in the jealousy of freedom to prohibit the same person from being twice entrusted with the fleet. That they might not violate the respect due to the laws, while at the same time they complied with the request of their powerful allies, they invested

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Lyfander  
resumes  
the com-  
mand, and  
takes  
Lampsa-  
cus.  
Olymp.  
xciii. 3.  
A. C. 406.

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Aracus, a weak and obscure man, with the name of admiral, and sent out Lyfander as second in command. The latter was received at Sardis by the Persian prince, with the warmest demonstrations of joy. He was supplied with money to satisfy the immediate wants of the troops; and, as Cyrus at that time happened to make a journey into Upper Asia, the revenues of his wealthy province were consigned, in his absence, to the management of his Spartan friend. Such powerful resources could not long remain unemployed in the active hands of Lyfander. His emissaries assiduously engaged or pressed the Ionian and Carian seamen. The harbours of Asia Minor, particularly the port of Ephesus, glowed with the ardour of naval preparation, and in a few months Lyfander sailed to the Hellespont with an hundred and fifty gallies, and attacked the important town of Lampfacus. The place, though vigorously defended by the natives as well as by the Athenian garrison, was at length taken by storm; and according to the barbarous practice of the age, abandoned to the licentious rapacity, the avarice, the lust, and the fury, of the conquerors<sup>28</sup>.

The Athenian commanders prepare to give him battle.

The languid and imprudent measures of the Athenians at Samos accuse the abilities of Tydeus, Menander, and Cephisodotus, who had been lately joined in command with Conon and his unworthy colleagues. They sailed too late to save Lampfacus, but as they possessed an hundred and eighty

<sup>28</sup> Plut. in Lyfand.

gallies, a force superior to Lyfander's, they anchored on the opposite, or European side of the Hellespont, at the distance of fifteen furlongs, in order to provoke the enemy to an engagement. Their unfortunate station was the mouth of the Ægos Potamos, or river of the goat, distinguished by that name on account of some small islands, which rising high above the surface of the waters, exhibit to a lively imagination the appearance of that animal. This place was injudiciously chosen, since it afforded very insecure riding; and was distant two miles from Sestos, the nearest town from which the fleet could be provided with necessaries. Alcibiades, who in his Thracian retirement was unable to withdraw his attention from the war in which he had long acted such a distinguished part, modestly admonished his countrymen of their imprudence; but he was arrogantly reproached for presuming, while an exile and an outlaw, to give advice to the admirals of Athens. Their subsequent conduct too faithfully corresponded with this insolence and folly. Despising the inferiority of the Peloponnesian fleet, they advanced in order of battle to the harbour of Lampfacus; and when the enemy moved not from their station, they returned in triumph as acknowledged masters of the sea. The prudence of Lyfander perceived and indulged their presumption. During four days he bore, with extraordinary patience, their repeated insults, affecting the utmost disinclination to an engagement, carefully retaining his fleet in a place of security, and regularly dispatching a few swift-sailing vessels

Their im-  
prudence  
and inso-  
lence.



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vessels to observe the motions and behaviour of the Athenians when they returned from their daily cruise to the road of Ægos Potamos.

Decisive  
battle of  
Ægos Po-  
tamos, in  
which the  
Athenians  
lose their  
fleet.

Olymp.  
xciii. 4.  
A. C. 405.  
Decem-  
ber.

The fifth day they again bore up with the Peloponnesians, and provoked them to battle by more daring menaces than on any former occasion. As they flattered themselves with an undoubted prospect of success, they yielded without reserve to all the petulance of prosperity, and debated in what manner they should treat the Lacedæmonian prisoners who had the misfortune to fall into their power. The cruel Philocles proposed to cut off their right hands, that those enemies of Athens might be equally incapable to manage the oar and to brandish the spear; and this bloody resolution, though opposed by Adimantus, was approved by the majority of his colleagues. After insulting the enemy in a manner the most mortifying and disgraceful, they retired with an air of exultation mingled with contempt. The Peloponnesian spy-boats followed them as usual at a convenient distance, and observed that they had no sooner reached their stations than the seamen landed, straggled about the shore, advanced into the inland country in quest of provisions or amusement, indulged in indolence, or revelled in disorder. The advice-boats returned with uncommon celerity to convey the welcome intelligence to Lyfander, who had embarked the troops, cleared his ships, and made every necessary preparation to avail himself of the favourable opportunity to effect by stratagem what it might have been dangerous

gerous to attempt by force. When his scouts approached the middle of the channel, they hoisted their shields (for that was the appointed signal), and at the same moment the Peloponnesian squadrons were commanded to set sail that they might surprise the hostile fleet, and indulge that resentment and animosity which had been rendered more violent and furious by the long and prudent restraint of their commander. The victory was complete, if that can be called a victory where there was scarcely any resistance. The vigilant activity of Canon endeavoured seasonably to assemble the strength of the Athenians; but his advice was disdained by officers incapable and unworthy of command, and his orders were despised by seamen unaccustomed and unwilling to obey. At length they became sensible of the danger when it was too late to avoid it. Their ships were taken, either altogether empty, or manned with such feeble crews as were unable to work, much less to defend them. The troops and sailors who flocked to the shore from different quarters, and with disordered precipitation, were attacked by the regular onset and disciplined valour of the Peloponnesians. Those who fought were slain; the remainder fled into the inmost recesses of the Chersonesus, or took refuge in the Athenian fortresses which were scattered over that peninsula. When Lyfander reviewed the extent of his well-merited success, he found that of a fleet of an hundred and eighty sail, only nine vessels had escaped, eight of which were conducted by Canon to the friendly island of

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Cyprus, while the ninth carried to Athens the melancholy news of a disaster equally unexpected and fatal. An hundred and seventy-one gallies, and three thousand prisoners (among whom were Philocles and Adimantus), rewarded the patience and fortitude of Lyfander, who returned with his invaluable spoil to Lampfacus, amidst the joyous acclamations of naval triumph<sup>29</sup>.

The Athe-  
nian pri-  
soners exe-  
cuted.

Before pursuing the natural consequences of an event the most important that had hitherto happened in all the Grecian wars, it was necessary for Lyfander to decide the fate of the Athenian prisoners, against whom the confederates were animated by all that unrelenting hatred which is congenial to the stern character of republicans exasperated by continual provocation and recent insult. The injustice and cruelty of that ambitious people

<sup>29</sup> Xenoph. p. 456, & seqq. & Plut. in Lyfand. By the battle of Ægos Potamos the Athenians lost the *empire* of the sea, which they had acquired by the consent of their maritime allies in the fourth year of the seventy-fifth Olympiad. They enjoyed, therefore, that sovereignty, or empire as they styled it, from the year 477 till the year 405 before Christ; that is, a period of seventy-two years. This important computation is not to be found in any ancient writer; and no two authors agree in calculating the duration of the Athenian empire. Lyfias in his Funeral Oration, p. 93. says, "During seventy years in which the Athenians commanded the sea." Diodorus Siculus (ad Olymp. 95. 1.) says, the Athenians commanded the sea sixty-five years. Isocrates in one place (i. p. 174.) agrees with Lyfias; in another (ii. p. 209.) with Diodorus. Andocides (Orat. iii. p. 286.) states it at eighty-five years. Lycurgus (adv. Leoc. p. 145.) at ninety. Dionysius Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. sub init.) at sixty eight. Demosthenes, as we shall see below, states it variously at forty-five, sixty-five, and seventy-three years.

were



were carefully described and maliciously exaggerated in the dreadful tribunal of their enemies.

“ It would be tedious to enumerate, though it was impossible ever to forget, their multiplied and abominable crimes, of which so many individuals, and so many communities, had been the innocent and unhappy victims. Even of late they had destroyed without remorse, and without the shadow of necessity, the helpless crews of a Corinthian and an Andrian vessel. The gods had averted the atrocious resolution proposed by the bloody Philocles, of which the author and the approvers were equally criminal; nor could those deserve pardon who were incapable of pity.” Such discourse, which resounded from every quarter of the assembly, declared, without the necessity of a formal vote, the unanimous decree of the confederates. As the prisoners had been stripped of their arms, there was nothing to be feared from their numbers and despair. They were conducted into the presence of their armed judges; and, as a prelude to the inhuman massacre, Lyfander sternly demanded of Philocles what he deserved to suffer for his intended cruelty. The Athenian replied with firmness, “ Accuse not those whom you are entitled to judge, but inflict on us the same punishment which we, in a different fortune, would have inflicted on our enemies.” The words were scarcely ended when Lyfander hacked him in pieces. The Peloponnesian soldiers followed the bloody example of their commander. Of three thousand Athenians, Adimantus alone was spared, either because he had op-

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posed the detestable resolution of Philocles, or because he had engaged in a treacherous correspondence with the Spartans<sup>30</sup>.

Views of  
Lyfander.

It might be expected, that immediately after an event which gave him the command of the sea, Lyfander should sail to the Piræus, and assault the unfortunate city, which was already grievously oppressed by the Lacedæmonian army at Decelia. But the sagacious Spartan foresaw the numerous obstacles that opposed his conquest of Athens, and prudently restrained the eagerness of the troops and his own. The strongly fortified harbours of that capital, the long and lofty walls which surrounded the city on every side, the ancient renown and actual despair of the Athenians, must render the siege, if not altogether fruitless, at least difficult and tedious; and the precious moments wasted in this doubtful enterprise might be employed in attaining certain, immediate, and most important advantages.

He establishes the Spartan empire over the coasts and islands of Asia and Europe. Olymp. xciii. 4. A. C. 405

On the coast neither of Greece nor of Asia, nor of any of the intermediate islands, was there a naval force capable of contending with the fleet of Lyfander, nor any fortified place in all those countries (except the city of Athens alone) sufficient to resist the impression of his army. It was a design, therefore, which might well deserve his ambition, and which was not condemned by his prudence, to establish or confirm the Lacedæmonian empire over those valuable and extensive coasts. The populous cities of Byzantium and Chalcedon were

<sup>30</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. Plutarch in Lyfand.

attacked

attacked and taken during the astonishment and terror occasioned by the dreadful and irreparable misfortune of their Athenian allies. After these important acquisitions, Lyfander sailed to the island of Lesbos, reduced Mitylené, and confirmed the allegiance of Methymna. While he extended his arms over the neighbouring islands, as well as the maritime towns of Lydia and Caria, a powerful squadron, commanded by the enterprising valour of Eteonicus, ravaged the shores of Macedon, subdued the sea-ports of Thrace, and rode victorious in the Hellespont and Propontis, the Ægean and Euxine seas. In six or eight months after the Athenian disaster at Ægos Potamos, the fairest portion of the ancient world, the most favoured by nature, and the most adorned by art, reluctantly submitted to the power, or voluntarily accepted the alliance of Sparta.

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During this long series of triumphs, Lyfander never lost sight of the reduction of Athens; an object important in itself, and necessary to the completion of his extensive plan. The vigilance of the Peloponnesian squadrons prevented the usual supplies of foreign grain from reaching the distressed city. In all the towns which surrendered, or which were taken by storm, the Athenian garrisons were saved from immediate death, only on condition that they returned to their native country. By such contrivances the crafty Spartan expected that the scarcity of provisions would soon compel the growing multitude of inhabitants to submit to the Lacedæmonian army at Decelia. But the

His measures for the reduction of Athens.



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the Athenians, who despised the assaults of the enemy, braved the hardships of famine. Even after Lysander had blocked up their harbours with an hundred and fifty sail, they still defended, with vigour, their walls and ramparts; patiently endured fatigue and hunger; and beheld with obstinate unconcern, the affliction of their wives and children. Amidst the ravages of death and disease, which advanced with increasing horror, they punished, with the utmost severity, the ignoble cowardice of Archestratus, who first mentioned capitulation, and declared that the same moment should put an end to their independence and their lives.

Siege of  
Athens.  
Olymp.  
xciv. 1.  
A. C. 404.

But notwithstanding the melancholy firmness of the popular assembly, a numerous and powerful party in the state was governed rather by interest than by honour; and the greatest enemies of Athenian liberty flourished in the bosom of the republic. The aristocratical seven of the Four Hundred had infected the whole body of the senate; and not only the inconstant Theramenes, but several other men of abilities and influence, who had been most active in subverting that cruel tyranny, regretted the restoration of democracy to a people, who (as they had recently proved in many parts of their conduct) were unable to enjoy, without abusing, the invaluable gift of freedom. In republican governments, the misfortunes, which ought to bind all ranks of men in the firmest and most indissoluble union, have often little other tendency than to exasperate the political factions  
which

which tear and distract the community. Amidst every form of public distress, the Athenians cabal-  
 bled, clamoured, accused, and persecuted each other; and the faction of the nobles, who acted with superior concert, vigour, and address, destroyed, by dark insinuations, false witnesses, perjury, and every other species of legal fraud and cruelty, the seditious Cleophon, and other turbulent demagogues, who might most effectually have opposed their measures<sup>31</sup>.

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When these obstacles were removed, Theramenes (whose recent merit prevented the suspicion of the assembly) proposed an embassy to Lacedæmon, which should request a suspension of hostilities, and obtain, if possible, some moderate terms of accommodation. He named himself, with nine colleagues, as the persons best qualified to undertake this important commission; flattering the people in the clearest and least ambiguous terms, with an undoubted prospect of success. A decree was immediately passed, investing the ambassadors with full powers. They assumed the sacred badge of their inviolable character, reached in safety the Spartan camp, held a conference with king Agis, and afterwards repaired to the Lacedæmonian capital. During four months they carried on their pretended negotiation with the senate, the kings, the ephori, and especially with Lyfander, whose authority, being unknown to the ancient constitution of Sparta, was far more extensive than that of

Negociation of  
Therame-  
nes with  
the Spar-  
tans;

<sup>31</sup> Lyfias, p. 272.

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all the other magistrates together. With him, principally, the plan was concerted for compelling the Athenians to submit to terms of peace, which they must have regarded as worse, not only than war, but death<sup>32</sup>. The fortifications of their harbours were to be demolished, as well as the long walls which joined them with the city: they were to surrender all their ships, but twelve; to resign every pretension to their ancient possessions in foreign parts; to recal from banishment the surviving members of the late tyrannical aristocracy; to follow the standard of Sparta in war; and, in peace, to mould their political constitution after the model which that victorious republic might think fit to prescribe.

which is  
confirmed  
by the  
Atheni-  
ans.

When Theramenes produced these unexpected fruits of his boasted negotiation, the Athenians had no longer either strength or spirit to resist, or even courage to die. During the long absence of their ambassadors, the siege had been carried on with redoubled vigour. The Lacedæmonians, reinforced by the Thebans as well as by their numerous allies of Peloponnesus, had invested the city on every side, the harbours were closely blocked up by Lyfander, who had become master of Melos, Ceos, Ægina, and Salamis; islands so near to Athens that they were almost regarded as a part of the Attic territory. The greatest misery prevailed within the walls; the famine was intolerable, and the diseases more intolerable than the fa-

<sup>32</sup> Lyfias against Eratosthenes, p. 273.




mine. The full period of thrice nine years had elapsed, which, if we may credit a most accurate and faithful historian<sup>33</sup>, had been assigned by repeated oracles and predictions, as the destined term of the Peloponnesian war and of the Athenian greatness. The principal leaders of the democracy had been cut off by the perfidious snares of their opponents, who were prepared to bear a foreign yoke, provided they might usurp domestic tyranny. That odious faction was ready to approve the measures of Theramenes, who might intimidate the dejected assembly by declaring (a most melancholy truth) that the severity of the Lacedæmonians, excessive as it seemed, was yet moderation and lenity when compared with the furious and unextinguishable rage of the Thebans and Corinthians, who maintained that the Athenians deserved not any terms of accommodation; that their crimes ought to be persecuted with unrelenting vengeance; their proud city demolished with such perfect destruction, that not even its vestige should remain; and the insolent inhabitants utterly extirpated from Greece, which they had so long disturbed by their ambition, and provoked by their tyranny and cruelty. Such an argument Theramenes might have

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<sup>33</sup> The words of Thucydides, l. v. p. 362. are very remarkable. "He remembers, that from the first commencement of hostilities, it had been constantly prophesied that the war would last thrice nine years; which, of all predictions, was *alone* firm and stable;" or as the idiom of the Greek language will bear, "the most firm and stable."

employ-

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employed, if it had been necessary to employ any argument, to justify his negotiation with the Spartans, which was confirmed and ratified by the voice of the aristocratical cabal, and submitted to, rather than accepted, by the majority of the assembly, with the gloomy silence of despair.

Athens  
surrenders  
—its hu-  
miliation  
excites the  
compas-  
sion of its  
enemies.  
Olymp.  
xciv. 1.  
A. C. 404.

On the sixteenth of May, the day on which the Athenians had been accustomed to celebrate the anniversary of the immortal victory of Salamis, the hostile armament took possession of their harbours; the combined army entered their gates. The walls and fortresses of the city of Minerva, which the generous magnanimity of its inhabitants, preferring the public safety to their own, had abandoned in defence of Greece to the fury of a barbarian invader, were ungratefully levelled to the ground by the implacable resentment of the Greeks; who executed their destructive purpose with all the eagerness of emulation, boasting, amidst the triumphs of martial music, that the demolition of Athens would be regarded, in succeeding ages, as the true æra of Grecian freedom. Yet after they had satisfied their vengeance, they seemed to regret its effects. The day was concluded with a magnificent festival, in which the recitation of the poets formed, as usual, the principal ornament of the entertainment. Among other pieces was rehearsed the *Electra* of Euripides, and particularly that affecting chorus, “ We come, O daughter of Agamemnon! to thy rustic and humble roof.” The words were scarcely uttered, when the whole assembly melted into tears, the

forlorn condition of that young and virtuous princess, expelled the royal palace of her father, and inhabiting a miserable cottage, in want and wretchedness, recalling the dreadful vicissitude of fortune which had befallen Athens, once mistress of the sea, and sovereign of Greece, but deprived, in one fatal hour, of her ships, her walls, and her strength, and reduced from the pride of power and prosperity, to misery, dependence, and servitude, without exerting one memorable effort to brighten the last moment of her destiny, and to render her fall illustrious <sup>34</sup>.

<sup>34</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. c. i. & seqq. Diodor. l. xiii. 104—107. Plut. in Lyfand. p. 438. Lyfias in Eratosth. & Agorat.



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*Rapacity and Cruelty of the Spartan Government.*

*—The Thirty Tyrants in Athens.—Persecution of  
Lyfias and his Family.—Theramenes opposes the  
Tyrants.—Sanguinary Speech of Critias.—Death  
of Theramenes.—Persecution and Death of Alci-  
biades.—Thraſybulus ſeizes Phylé—Defeats the  
Tyrants.—Memorable Speech of Thraſybulus.  
—Oath of Amneſty—not faithfully obſerved.*

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The rapa-  
city and  
cruelty of  
the Spar-  
tan go-  
vernment.

THE conquest of Athens, and the acknow-  
ledged dominion of Sparta, terminated the  
memorable war of twenty-seven years. It still  
remained for Lyſander to reduce the iſland of  
Samos<sup>1</sup>, which enjoys the honourable diſtinction  
of being the laſt ſettlement in the Eaſt that defied  
the ambition of Pericles, and the laſt which ſub-  
mitted to the arms of Lyſander. The conquered  
iſlands and cities ſuffered ſtill greater vexations  
under the Spartan, than they had done under  
the Athenian, empire. Among the hostile fac-

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 461. & Plut. iii. p. 31. in  
Lyſand. Lyſias adv. Eratoſth. p. 274. & Diodor. p. 396. It is  
remarkable, that Xenophon and Lyſias, both contemporaries,  
ſhould differ in a matter of chronology; the one placing the con-  
queſt of Samos before, and the other after, Lyſander's voyage  
to Athens.

tions<sup>2</sup> which ambition or danger had formed in those turbulent republics, Lyfander always preferred that party which possessed most craft and least patriotism. At the head of this cabal, he placed a Spartan Harmostes, or governor, on whose obsequious cruelty he could depend. The citadels were garrisoned by mercenaries; a tyrannical faction insulted as subjects, those whom they had envied as rivals, or dreaded as enemies; and every species of licence and disorder was exercised, with a presumption that could be equalled only by the tameness with which it was endured<sup>3</sup>. The Asiatic Greeks regretted the dishonourable yoke of Persia; they regretted the stern dominion of Athens; both which seemed tolerable evils, compared to the oppressive cruelty of Sparta and Lyfander. The contributions, of which they had formerly so much complained, no longer appeared exorbitant. Lyfander was the first and the last conqueror who imposed on those feeble communities the enormous tribute of a thousand talents<sup>4</sup>.

The

<sup>2</sup> These were the *συνωμοτικαὶ ἐπὶ δικαίῃ καὶ ἀρχαίῃ*, mentioned by Thucydides and Xenophon; "associations, or rather conspiracies, for mutual defence in courts of justice, and for mutual assistance in obtaining offices of power."

<sup>3</sup> Instead of the sweet draught of Liberty, Sparta, according to Theopompus, gave Greece the bitter cup of Slavery. In the city of Miletus, he sacrificed at once eight hundred men, of the democratical faction, to the implacable rage of their adversaries. Plut. in Lyfand.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus, p. 400. says, *πλεον των χιλιων ταλαντων καθ' ἑξῆς*, "more than a thousand talents yearly;" that is, above two hundred thousand pounds. It may be computed from Plut.

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Causes  
to which  
ascribed.

The unrelenting severity of Sparta has usually been ascribed to the personal character of her general, whose natural arrogance and cruelty were heightened and confirmed by the sudden exaltation of his fortune. From the simple citizen of a small, and then unfortunate republic, he became, in a few years, the arbiter of Greece. Athens acknowledged his authority; the smaller cities courted his protection; venal poets and orators extolled him with odes and panegyrics; he was honoured with crowns and statues, and worshipped by hymns and sacrifices<sup>5</sup>. Yet it is obvious to remark, that whatever might be the temper and manners of Lyfander, his country is justly accountable for the wrongs which he was allowed to commit with impunity; and it is uncertain whether another general, placed in the same situation, would have acted on different principles; since the nature of the Spartan institutions, and the ambitious views of the republic, seemed to demand and justify uncommon exertions of severity. In the administration of their domestic government, five or six thousand Spartans tyrannised over thirty thousand Lacedæ-

in Lyfand. & Xenoph. p. 462. that Lyfander sent home a still larger sum after the surrender of Samos. The law of Lycurgus respecting gold and silver, which had been long virtually, was now formally, abolished. The use of the precious metals was allowed to the state, but forbidden to individuals, under pain of death. The prohibition, however, was universally disregarded; many Spartans possessed abundance of gold and silver; none incurred the penalty of the law. Compar. Plat. & Xenoph. loc. citat. & Isocrat. in Archidam.

<sup>5</sup> Plut. in Lyfand.



monians; these tyrannised, with still greater rigour, over thrice that number of slaves; and it was natural to expect, that when the slaves were associated with the troops<sup>6</sup>, all these descriptions of men, Spartans, Lacedæmonians, and Helots, would tyrannise, with the emulation of cruelty, over their conquered subjects.

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The scanty materials of ancient history cannot enable us minutely to explain the humiliation and distress of the Asiatic Greeks, oppressed by the double tyranny of the Spartans, and of their fellow-citizens. Contemporary writers, who beheld this scene of misery and desolation, seem at a loss for words to impress its horror. Isocrates endeavours to grasp the amplitude of the subject in the vague language of general description; by strokes of exaggeration and hyperbole, he supplies the place of clear and positive information; but all the copiousness and energy of the Greek tongue sink beneath the heavy afflictions of that unfortunate people; and the mind of the orator seems to labour with a thought which he is unable to express<sup>7</sup>. It is

The deep  
impression  
which  
they made  
on con-  
tempo-  
raries.

<sup>6</sup> The Helots then took the title of *παραμυθεις*, Libertini, *δυναται δε το παραμυθεις ελευθεροι ηδη ειπαι*. Thucydid. l. v. p. 533. From some passages in Isocrates (*Panegy. & de Pace.*), it should seem that Lyfander often appointed these freed men to offices of great trust and authority.

<sup>7</sup> See the oration of Isocrates on the peace, p. 171, &c. In the panegyric of Athens, speaking of the aristocratical factions supported by Lyfander and the Lacedæmonians, Isocrates says, they consisted of wretches, "whose cruelty and injustice are unexampled in the history of mankind. From what indignity did they abstain? Into what excesses were they not transported?"

CHAP. is not, however, from such rhetorical descriptions  
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knowledge of the Spartan administration: history  
delights in plain and authentic facts; and the ri-  
gorous treatment of the Athenians themselves, will  
best represent the hardships inflicted on their Asiatic  
colonies and dependencies.

The thirty  
tyrants in  
Athens.  
Olymp.  
xciv. I.  
A. C. 404.

The Athenians had surrendered their fleet; their walls and harbours were demolished; their citadel was occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison, commanded by Callibius, the friend of Lysander; and their government was usurped by thirty men, the dependants and creatures of Sparta. The furious and profligate Critias formed a proper head for this aristocratical council, whose members have been justly branded in history under the name of the Thirty Tyrants<sup>8</sup>. On pretence of delivering the state from the malice of informers, and the turbulence of seditious demagogues, they destroyed the most valuable portion of the community<sup>9</sup>. Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and a son who inherited not only the opulence, but the virtues of

They, who regarded the most factious as the most faithful; the most treacherous as the most deserving. Their crimes proved infectious, and changed the mildness of human nature into savage ferocity," &c. See p. 52, &c.

<sup>8</sup> Their names are preserved in Xenophon, *Hellen.* ii. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Xenoph. p. 462. which Cæsar, ap. Sallust. de Bello Catil. c. 51. evidently had in view, "*Lacedæmonii devictis Atheniensibus, triginta viros imposuere. . . . Hi primo cœpere pessimum quemque, & omnibus invisum, indemnatum necare. Eo populus lætari, & merito dicere fieri. Post ubi paullatim licentia crevit juxta bonos & malos libidinose interficere. . . . Ita civitas, servitute oppressa, stultæ lætitiæ graves pœnas dedit.*"

his

his illustrious father, was condemned to death; Leon, the most public-spirited, and Antiphon, the most eloquent of his contemporaries, shared the same fate; Thraſybulus and Anytus were banished. Whoever was known to be powerful, was regarded as dangerous; whoever was supposed to be rich, was accused as criminal. Strangers and citizens were involved in one promiscuous ruin <sup>10</sup>.

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Amidst this general wreck of whatever was most worthy and respectable, I shall select the persecution of Lyſias and his family, the only transaction of that kind, recorded with such circumstances as answer the ends of history. Cephalus, the father of that ingenious orator, was by birth a Syracusan. The friendship of Pericles persuaded him to settle in Athens, where, under the protection of that powerful statesman, he obtained wealth and honours. His inoffensive and generous character escaped the enmity and persecution to which the opulent Athenians were commonly exposed; and he enjoyed the rare felicity of living thirty years in the midst of continual trials and impeachments, without being obliged to appear as plaintiff or defendant in any litigation. His sons, Lyſias and Polemarchus, inherited his innocence, his generosity, and his good fortune. Though possessed of the most valuable accomplishments, natural and acquired, the brothers prudently kept aloof from the dangerous paths of public life; contented

Illustrated  
by the per-  
secution of  
Lyſias and  
his family.

<sup>10</sup> Xenoph. l. ii. p. 463, & seqq.



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with their domestic felicity, they aspired not to the rank of Athenian citizens; but liberally contributed to supply the exigencies of the state, from the profits of a flourishing manufacture of shields, which they carried on by the labour of an hundred and twenty slaves. The cruelty of the thirty tyrants; from whose rapacious eye neither obscurity could conceal, nor merit defend, occasioned the death of Polemarchus, and the immediate misfortunes, as well as the future glory of Lysias, who acted a distinguished part in overturning that detestable tyranny, and in bringing its authors and abettors to condign punishment<sup>11</sup>.

The orator's account of that matter.

The history is related by himself with perspicuous precision and graceful simplicity: "The tyrants Theognis and Piso acquainted their associates, that many strangers established at Athens were disaffected to the government. This was a plausible pretence for rifling the effects of these unhappy men; a measure to which the thirty were not only excited by avarice, but prompted by fear. Money was become necessary for the preservation of their power, which, being founded on usurpation, and tyrannically administered; could only be maintained by the influence of corruption, and the mercenary aid of foreign troops. The life of man, therefore, they regarded as a matter of little moment; the amassing of wealth was the principal object of their desire; to gratify which, ten strangers were at once devoted to destruction. In this num-

<sup>11</sup> See the Life of Lysias, and the Orations there referred to, p. 110, & seqq.

ber, indeed, were two poor men; a base and cruel artifice to persuade you, Athenians! that the remaining eight had been condemned, not for the sake of their riches, but in order to preserve the public tranquillity; as if the interest of the public had ever been the concern of that tyrannical cabal! Their infamous design was executed with inhuman cruelty. Their victims were taken in their beds, at supper, in the privacy of domestic retirement. Me they seized exercising the rites of hospitality; my guests were rudely dismissed; I was delivered into the custody of the worthless Piso. While his accomplices continued in the workshop, taking a list of our slaves and effects, I asked him, "Whether money could save my life?" "Yes, a considerable sum." "I will give you a talent of silver." This he consented to accept, as the price of my safety; and to such a melancholy situation was I reduced, that it afforded me a momentary consolation to depend on the precarious faith of a man, who (as I well knew) despised every law, human and divine. But my comfort was of short duration; for I had no sooner opened my coffer to pay him the talent, than he ordered his attendant to seize the contents, consisting of three talents of silver, an hundred Daricks, three hundred Cyzicenes, and three silver cups. I intreated Piso to allow me a small sum to defray the expence of my journey. But he desired me to be thankful to escape with my life. Going out together, we met the tyrants Melobius and Mnesitheides, returning from the workshop. They enquired,

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quired, where we were going? Píso answered, to examine the house of my brother Polemarchus. They desired him to proceed; but commanded me to follow them to the house of Damasiípus. Píso whispered me to be silent, and to fear nothing, because he would immediately come there. Upon our arrival, we found Theognis guarding several of my companions in calamity. I increased the number of his prisoners; but obtained an opportunity to represent my innocence and misfortunes to Damasiípus, intreating him, by our past friendship, to employ his influence in my behalf. He assured me of his intention to intercede with Theognis, whose avarice would easily persuade him to betray his trust. While they conversed on this subject, I took advantage of my knowledge of the house to escape through three secret passages, which all happened to be open and unguarded; and fortunately reaching the country-house of my friend Archimaus, a ship-master, sent him to the city, that he might bring me intelligence of my brother. He discovered, that the tyrant Eratosthenes had dragged him from the road, and conducted him to prison, where he was ordered to drink hemlock. At this melancholy news, I sailed to Megara, under cover of the night. Our effects became the property of the tyrants, whose mean avarice spared not the smallest trifle belonging to us. Even the gold ear-rings of Polemarchus's wife were forcibly torn away by the brutal Melobius <sup>12</sup>."

<sup>12</sup> See the discourses of Lysias against Agoratus and Eratosthenes, p. 258, & seqq.



The Thirty justified these abominable acts of cruelty by the authority of a servile senate, which they still allowed to subsist as the instrument and accomplice of their tyranny. It could not be expected, however, that in a city accustomed to the utmost liberty of opinion and freedom of debate, a body of five hundred, or even of thirty men, should continue to agree in the same odious and oppressive measures. The first seeds of discord, or rather the first symptoms of repentance, appeared in the speeches and behaviour of the bold and active Theramenes; who, though the principal author of the usurpation, was already disposed by the humanity of his nature, or by the singular inconstancy of his temper<sup>13</sup>, to destroy the work of his own hands. His strenuous endeavours were used to save the innocent and unhappy victims whom his furious colleagues daily devoted to destruction; under his protection the citizens assembled, and expressed their resentment or despair; and it was justly apprehended that the government of the Thirty might be dissolved by the same means, and by the same man, who had set on foot and subverted the short-lived tyranny of the four hundred. The present usurpation, indeed, was defended by a Lacedæmonian garrison; but the Thirty dreaded the influence of Theramenes over

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Thera-  
menes op-  
poses the  
tyrants.

<sup>13</sup> Thucyd. viii. 68, & seqq. Lyfias advers. Eratosth. Xenophon paints him more favourably; and Aristot. apud Plut. iii. 337. & Diodor. p. 350, & seqq. still more favourably than Xenophon.

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the foreign troops; they dreaded still more his influence over the Athenian citizens. When they considered the precarious tenure of their authority, and the unjust violence of their administration, they reflected on the past with pain, and viewed the future with terror. But they had gone too far to retreat, and nothing remained but to prop the tottering fabric of their power by enlarging its base. Three thousand citizens were invited to participate in the advantages and dangers of their government. The rest were disarmed and treated with an increase of severity.

He is accused by Critias.

Theramenes vainly opposed the criminal designs of his colleagues, who implicitly submitted their opinions to the implacable fury of Critias. He it was who chiefly encouraged them boldly to persevere, and to remove every obstacle to the unlimited gratification of their passions. The safety of Theramenes, he assured them, was no longer compatible with their own. His delicacy, real or affected, was totally inconsistent with the spirit of the present administration; nor could the government of Thirty, any more than that of *one* tyrant, admit of being curiously canvassed, or fastidiously opposed. These sentiments being received with approbation, we might expect that Theramenes should have been destroyed by that sudden and open violence which had proved fatal to so many others. But as the most daring violators of the laws of society are obliged to establish and observe some rules of justice, in their conduct towards each other, it had been resolved by the Thirty,

that,

that, amidst the violent and capricious outrages which they committed against their subjects, none of their own number should be put to death without the benefit of a trial before the senate; a privilege extending to the three thousand intrusted with the use of arms, and sufficiently denoting the miserable condition of the other citizens. The senate was assembled to try Theramenes; but this tribunal was surrounded by armed men. When the pretended criminal appeared, Critias addressed the court in a speech too remarkable ever to be forgotten.

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“Should you imagine,” O senators! considering the great numbers who have suffered death, that we have been guilty of unnecessary cruelty, you will alter that opinion on reflecting that revolutions of government must always be attended with bloodshed; but particularly when a populous city like Athens, which has been long pampered with liberty, is reduced under the dominion of a few. The actual form of administration was imposed by the Lacedæmonians as the condition of the public safety. In order to maintain its authority we have removed those seditious demagogues, whose democratical madness hath occasioned all our past calamities. It is our duty to proceed in this useful work, and to destroy, without fear or compassion, all who would disturb the public tranquillity. Should a man of this dangerous disposition be found in our own order, he ought to be punished with double rigour, and treated not only as an enemy but as a traitor. That Theramenes is liable

Sanguinary  
speech  
of Critias.

to



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to this accusation appears from the whole tenour of his conduct. He concluded the treaty with the Lacedæmonians; he dissolved the popular government; he directed and approved the first and boldest measures of our administration: but no sooner did difficulties arise than he deserted his associates, declared his opposition to their designs, and undertook the protection of the populace. When the weather was fair and favourable, he pursued the same course with his companions, but, on the first change of wind, he thought proper to alter his navigation. With such an irresolute steersman it is impossible to govern the helm of the republic, and to guide the vessel to her destined harbour. This dangerous inconsistency ought, indeed, to have been expected from a man to whose character perfidy is congenial. He began his political career under the direction of his father Hagnon, a violent partisan of democracy. He afterwards changed his system, in order to obtain the favour of the nobles. He both established and dissolved the government of the four hundred; and the whole strain of his behaviour proves him unfit to govern, and unworthy to live<sup>14</sup>.”

Theramenes's defence.

Theramenes made a copious and persuasive defence, acknowledging, “ That he had often changed his conduct, but denying that he had ever varied his principles. When the democracy flourished, he had maintained the just rights, but repressed the insolence, of the people. When it

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. p. 464—466.

became

became necessary to alter the form of the republic, in compliance with the command of the Spartans, he had supported the legal power, but opposed the tyranny, of the magistrates. Under every administration of government he had approved himself the friend of moderation and justice, which he still continued, and ever would continue, to recommend and enforce, convinced that those virtues alone could give stability and permanence to any system of government, whether aristocratical or popular."

The senators murmured applause, unawed by the presence of Critias and his associates. But this furious tyrant made a signal to the armed men, who surrounded the senate-house, to shew the points of their daggers; and then stepping forward, said, "It is the duty, O senators! of a prudent magistrate, to prevent the deception and danger of his friends. The countenance of those brave youths (pointing to his armed partisans) sufficiently discovers that they will not permit you to save a man who is manifestly subverting the government: I, therefore, with the general consent, strike the name of Theramenes from the list of those who have a right to be tried before the senate; and, with the approbation of my colleagues, I condemn him to immediate death." Roused by this unexpected and bloody sentence, Theramenes started from his seat, and sprang to the altar of the senate-house, at once imploring the compassion, and urging the interest of the spectators, whose names, he observed, might be struck out,

and

Ther-  
menes  
dragged to  
execution.

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and whose lives might be sacrificed, as unjustly and cruelly as his own. But the terror of armed violence prevented any assistance or intercession; and the eleven men (for thus the Athenian delicacy styled the executioners of public justice) dragged him from the altar, and hurried him to execution.

**His death.** In proceeding through the market-place the unhappy victim of tyranny invoked the favour and gratitude of his fellow-citizens, who had often been protected by his eloquence, and defended by his valour. But the impudent Satyrus, the chief minister of vengeance both in authority and cruelty, sternly told him, that if he continued his lamentations and uproar he should soon cry in good earnest<sup>15</sup>: “And shall I not,” said Theramenes, “though I remain silent?” When he drank the fatal hemlock, he poured a libation on the ground with a health to the honest Critias; circumstances unworthy to relate, if they proved not, that even in his last moments, he was forsaken neither by his facetiousness nor by his fortitude<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> Ὅτι οὐ μὲν ἔμελλε, εἰ μὴ σιωπήσῃεν. Literally, that he would cry out unless he were silent. The inaccurate language of the executioner furnished occasion to the smart reply of Theramenes.

<sup>16</sup> Xenoph. p. 470. The glorious death of Theramenes cancelled the imperfections of his life. That his character was inconstant, most writers allow. Lysias adversus Eratoſthen. accuses him of many deliberate crimes; but he died in a virtuous cause, and, however he acted, left the scene gracefully. “Quam me delectat Theramenes! quam elato animo est! Etſi enim flemus, cum legimus, tamen non miserabiliter vir clarus moritur.” Cic. Tusc. Quæst.



The death of Theramenes delivered the tyrants from the only restraint which tended to controul their insolence, and to moderate their cruelty. They might now indulge in all the licentiousness of outrage, without the fear of reproach or the danger of resistance. Their miserable subjects were driven from the city, from the Piræus, from their houses, their farms, and their villages, which were divided among the detestable instruments of an odious usurpation. Nor did the tyrants stop here. A mandate was published, enforced by the authority of the Spartan senate, prohibiting any Grecian city to receive the unfortunate fugitives. But this inhuman order was almost universally disobeyed; the sacred laws of hospitality prevailed over the terror of an unjust decree; Thebes, Argos, and Megara, were crowded with Athenian exiles<sup>17</sup>.

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Excessive  
cruelty of  
the ty-  
rants.

In exercising those abominable acts of cruelty, the Thirty probably consulted the immediate safety of their persons, but they precipitated the downfall of their power. The oppressed Athenians, whose sufferings seemed no longer tolerable, required only a leader to rouse them to arms, and to conduct them to victory and to vengeance. This danger the tyrants had greater reason to apprehend, since they could not expect a reinforcement to the garrison, while the efforts of Lyfander and the Spartans were principally directed towards the extension of their Asiatic conquests. The abilities

They  
dread the  
machina-  
tions of  
Alcibia-  
des.

<sup>17</sup> Diodor. l. xiv. p. 236.

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and resentment of Alcibiades pointed him out as the person best qualified to undertake the arduous and honourable design of reassembling the fugitives, and of animating them with courage to recover their lost country. That illustrious exile had been driven from his Thracian fortrefs by the terror of the Lacedæmonians, then masters of the Hellespont, and had acquired a settlement under the protection of Pharnabazus, in the little village of Grynium in Phrygia, where, undisturbed by the dangerous contentions of war and politics, he enjoyed an obscure happiness in the bosom of love and friendship. But the cruel fears of the tyrants pursued him to this last retreat.

His death,

Lyfander told Pharnabazus that the sacrifice of Alcibiades was necessary for the safety of that form of government which had been recently established in Athens, and which it was the interest both of Sparta and of Persia to maintain. A private reason (which will afterwards appear) prevailed with the satrap to pay immediate attention to this bloody advice. A band of armed Phrygians was sent to surprize and destroy Alcibiades. Such was the fame of his prowess, that these timid assassins durst not attack him in broad day, or by open force. They chose the obscurity of night to surround and set fire to his house, which, according to the fashion of the country, was chiefly composed of light and combustible materials. The crackling noise of the flames alarmed Alcibiades, whose own treacherous character rendered him always suspicious

of

of treachery. He snatched his sword, and, twisting his mantle round his left arm, rushed through the flaming edifice, followed by his faithful Arcadian friend, and by his affectionate mistress Timandra<sup>18</sup>. The cowardice of the Phrygians, declining to meet the fury of his assault, covered him with a shower of javelins. But even these Barbarians spared the weakness and the sex of Timandra, whose tears and entreaties obtained the melancholy consolation of burying her unfortunate lover; a man whose various character can only be represented in the wonderful vicissitudes of his life and fortune; and who, though eminently adorned with the advantages of birth, wealth, valour, and eloquence, and endowed with uncommon gifts of nature and acquirements of art, yet deficient in discretion and probity, involved his country and himself in inextricable calamities.

and character.

Although the life of Alcibiades had been highly pernicious to his country, his death, at this particular juncture, might be regarded as a misfortune, if the Athenian exiles at Thebes had not been headed by a man who possessed his excellencies, unmingled with his defects and vices. The enterprising courage of Thrasylbulus was animated by the love of liberty; and while he generally followed<sup>19</sup> the rules of justice and humanity, he had magnanimity to conceive, abilities to conduct, and perseverance to accomplish, the boldest and most

Thrasylbulus, with a handful of fugitives, seizes Phyla.

<sup>18</sup> Corn. Nepos, & Plut. in Alcibiad.

<sup>19</sup> His conduct, as will appear hereafter, was not uniform.



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The tyrants baffled in their attempts to dislodge them.

arduous designs. Having communicated his intentions to the unhappy fugitives in Thebes and Megara, he encouraged a body of seventy intrepid followers to seize the important fortress of Phyla, situate on the Bœotian and Athenian frontier.

This daring enterprise alarmed the tyrants, who marched forth with the flower of their troops to dislodge the new garrison. But the natural strength of the place baffled their assault; and, when they determined to invest it, the unexpected violence of a tempest, accompanied with an extraordinary fall of snow<sup>20</sup>, obliged them to desist from their undertaking. They returned with precipitation to Athens, leaving behind part of their attendants and baggage, which fell a prey to the garrison of Phyla; the strength of which continually augmented by the confluence of Athenian exiles, and soon increased from seventy, to seven hundred, men.

Thraſybulus surprises and defeats the enemy.

The tyrants had just reason to apprehend that these daring invaders might ravage the surrounding country, and even attack the capital. Alarmed by this danger they dispatched several troops of horse, with the greater part of their Lacedæmonian mercenaries, who encamped in a woody country, at the distance of fifteen furlongs from Phyla, in order to watch the motions and repress the incursions of the enemy. But these forces, which had been sent to guard the territory and city from surprise,

<sup>20</sup> Επιγίνεται της υατος χιονι παμπληθης. Xenoph. p. 471.

were themselves surprised by Thrasybulus, who C H A P.  
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silently marched forth in the night, posted his men amidst the concealed intricacies of the forest, and suddenly attacked the Lacedæmonians before they had time to recollect themselves, or even to stand to their arms. The dread of an ambush probably prevented the wary general from following them to any great distance from the garrison. An hundred and twenty men were slain in the pursuit; a trophy was erected; the baggage and arms were conveyed in triumph to Phyla<sup>21</sup>.

The news of this disaster inspired the Thirty with such terror that they no longer regarded a demolished city like Athens as proper for their residence. They determined to remove to the neighbouring town of Eleusis, which, in case of extremity, seemed more capable of defence. The three thousand, who were entrusted with the use of arms, accompanied them thither, and assisted them in treacherously putting to death all such of the Eleusinians as were thought disaffected to the usurpation. Under pretence of mustering the inhabitants, those unhappy men were singly conducted through a narrow gate leading to the shore, where they were successively disarmed, bound, and executed, by the cruel instruments of tyranny<sup>22</sup>.

Meanwhile the garrison of Phyla continually received new reinforcements. The orator Lyfias, whose domestic sufferings have been recently de-

The tyrants remove to Eleusis.

Thrasybulus marches to the Piræus.

<sup>21</sup> Xenoph. p. 471.

<sup>22</sup> Id. *ibid*.

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scribed, collected three hundred men to take vengeance on the murderers of his brother, and the authors of his own banishment<sup>23</sup>. These useful supplies encouraged Thraſybulus to attempt surprising the Piræus, the inhabitants of which, consisting chiefly of tradesmen, merchants, and mariners, bore with great impatience and indignation the injuries of a subordinate council of Ten, the obsequious imitators of the Thirty. This enterprise was crowned with success, although the tyrants brought forth their whole force to oppose it. Having intercepted their march to the place, Thraſybulus occupied a rising ground, which gave him a decisive advantage in the engagement.

Addresſes  
his fol-  
lowers in  
ſight of  
the ene-  
my.

Before leading his men to action, he animated their valour and reſentment, by reminding them, that the enemy on the right conſiſted of thoſe Lacedæmonians whom only five days before they had ſhamefully routed and put to flight; that the troops on the left were commanded by the Thirty tyrants, who had unjuſtly driven them into baniſhment, conſiſcated their property, and murdered their deareſt friends. “ But the gods have finally given us the opportunity (long ardently deſired) to face our oppreſſors with arms in our hands, and to take vengeance on their multiplied wickedneſs and cruelty. When they inveſted us at Phyla, the gods, conſulting our ſafety, ruffled the ſerenity

<sup>23</sup> Juſtin. l. v. c. ix. The compiler, with his uſual inaccuracy, ſays, *Lyſias Syracuſanus* orator.



of the sky with an unexpected tempest. The assistance of Heaven enabled us, with a handful of men, to raise a trophy over our numerous foes; and the same divine Providence still favours us with the most manifest marks of partiality. The enemy are drawn up in a deep and close array; they must be obliged to ascend the eminence; the javelins of their rear cannot reach beyond their van; while, from the reverse of these circumstances, no weapon of ours needs be discharged in vain. Let us avail ourselves, therefore, of an arrangement evidently produced by the favour of Heaven; each soldier remembering, that he never can achieve a more honourable victory, or obtain a more glorious tomb<sup>24</sup>.”

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The revered authority of the priest enforced the exhortation of the general. He promised them complete success, provided they forbore to charge till one of their men were killed or wounded: “Then,” added he, “I will conduct you on to victory, though I myself shall fall.” He had scarcely ended, when the enemy threw their javelins; upon which, as if guided by a divine impulse, he rushed forward to the attack. Both parts of his prediction were accomplished. The battle was neither long nor bloody; but Critias and Hippomachus, the two most violent of the tyrants, were left among the slain. Thrasylbulus judiciously avoided to pursue the scattered fugitives, who be-

The tyrants defeated.

<sup>24</sup> Xenoph. p. 473. & Diodor. l. xiv. p. 414.

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His pro-  
clamation  
to the van-  
quished.

ing superior in number, might still rally and renew the battle, if he quitted the advantage of the ground. But having proceeded to the foot of the hill, he stopped the ardour of his troops, and commanded the herald Cleocritus to proclaim with a loud voice, “Wherefore, Athenians! would you fly from your countrymen? Wherefore have you driven them from the city? Why do you thirst for their blood? We are all united by religious, civil, and domestic ties. Often, with combined arms, have we fought, by sea and land, to defend our common country and common freedom. Even in this unnatural civil war, excited and fomented by the ambition of impious and abominable tyrants, who have shed more blood in eight months, than the Peloponnesians, our public enemies, in ten years. We have lamented your misfortunes as much as our own; nor is there a man whom you have left on the field of battle, whose death does not excite our sympathy, and increase our affliction.” The tyrants, dreading the effect of a proclamation well calculated to sow the seeds of disaffection, led off their troops with great precipitation; and Thrasylbulus, without stripping the dead, marched to the Piræus<sup>25</sup>.

Govern-  
ment of  
the De-  
cemvirs,

Next day the Thirty, shamefully discomfited in the engagement, and deprived of Critias, their furious but intrepid leader, took their melancholy seats in council with strong indications of expected ruin. Their unfortunate subjects accused their

<sup>25</sup> Xenoph. p. 474.

commanders, and each other; a new sedition arose; nor was the ferment allayed, until the tyrants had been deprived of their dignity, and ten magistrates (one elected from each tribe) appointed in their room<sup>26</sup>. The surviving tyrants, with those who were too closely united with them in guilt, not to be united in interest, fled to Eleusis.

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It might be expected that the Decemvirs, who now assumed the government, should have been deterred from injustice by the fatal example of their predecessors. But in the turbulent republics of Greece, however free in theory, men were little acquainted with the benefits of practical liberty. Whether the nobles, or people, or a prevailing faction of either; whatever party in the state obtained the chief administration, their authority was almost alike oppressive and tyrannical. Alternately masters and slaves, those fierce republicans were either unable or unwilling to draw that decisive and impervious line between the power of government, and the liberty of the subject; a line which forms the only solid barrier of an uniform, consistent, and rational freedom.

as violent  
as that of  
the Thirty.

The Ten had no sooner been invested with the ensigns of command, than they shewed an equal inclination with the Thirty to obey the Lacedæmonians, and to tyrannise over their fellow-citizens<sup>27</sup>. After various skirmishes, which hap-

Lyfander  
marches  
to the Pi-  
ræus.

<sup>26</sup> Xenoph. p. 474. & Isocrat. ii. p. 426.

<sup>27</sup> Lyfias advers. Eratosth. p. 212, & seqq.



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pened in the course of two weeks, and generally proved honourable to the bravery and conduct of Thraſybulus, the tyrants both in Eleuſis and in Athens diſpatched meſſengers to ſolicit farther aſſiſtance from Sparta and Lyſander. That active and enterpriſing leader employed his uſual diligence to protect the government which he had eſtabliſhed. At the head of a powerful body of mercenaries, he marched to the Piræus, which he inveſted by land; while his brother Libys, who commanded a conſiderable ſquadron, blocked up the harbour<sup>26</sup>.

His mea-  
ſures  
thwarted  
by Pau-  
ſanias.

Theſe vigorous exertions reſtored the hopes and courage of the tyrants; nor can it be doubted that Thraſybulus and his followers muſt have ſpeedily been compelled to ſurrender, had the Spartan commanders been allowed to act without controul. But the proud arrogance of Lyſander, and the rapacious avarice of his dependants, provoked the indignation and reſentment of whatever was moſt reſpectable in his country. The kings, magiſtrates, and ſenate, conſpired to humble his ambition; and, leſt he ſhould enjoy the glory of conquering Athens a ſecond time, Pauſanias, the moſt popular and beloved of the Spartan princes, haſtily levied the domeſtic troops, and a conſiderable body of Peloponneſian allies, and marching through the Iſthmus of Corinth encamped in the neighbourhood of Athens; little ſolicitous to in-

<sup>26</sup> Xenoph. p. 476. & Diodor. ubi ſupra,

crease the dissensions in that city, provided he could anticipate and thwart the measures of Lyfander.

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While the two Lacedæmonian armies discovered, in the distance of their encampments, a disunion of their views and interests, an incident happened which determined Pausanias to undertake the protection of Thraſybulus and his adherents; a resolution to which he was naturally inclined from opposition to an envied and odious rival. Diognotus, an Athenian of an amiable and respectable character, brought him the children of Niceratus and Eucrates; the former the son, the latter the brother, of the great Nicias, with whom the Spartan king was connected by the hereditary ties of hospitality and friendship. Having placed the helpless infants on his knees, he conjured him, by his religious regard for the memory of their much-respected ancestor, to pity their innocence and weakness, and to defend them against the cruel tyranny of a worthless faction, ambitious to cut off and destroy whatever was distinguished by birth, wealth, or virtue<sup>29</sup>. This affecting scene, had it failed to touch the heart of Pausanias, must at least have afforded him a plausible pretence for embracing the party of Thraſybulus, which numbered among its adherents the friends and family of Nicias, who had long been suspected of an undue attachment to the Spartan interest.

Pausanias  
espouses  
the inter-  
est of  
Thraſy-  
bulus and  
his ad-  
herents.  
Olymp.  
xciv. 2.  
A. C. 403.

<sup>29</sup> Lyſias adv. Poliuchum, p. 323. and the translation of Lyſias, p. 231.

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Commissioners appointed to settle the affairs of Athens.

Before he could fully persuade the enemy of his favourable intentions, several bloody skirmishes were fought, in which the partisans of democracy defended the Piræus with unequal force, but with uncommon resolution<sup>30</sup>. At length Pausanias made them understand, that, instead of destroying their persons, he wished to protect their liberties. In Athens his emissaries made known this unexpected revolution, which excited a numerous party to throw off the yoke of the tyrants, and to desire a reconciliation with their fellow-citizens in the Piræus. The deputies were favourably received by the Spartan king, and sent, under his protection, to propose overtures of accommodation to the ephori and senate. The messengers of Lyfander and the tyrants endeavoured to traverse this negociation; but notwithstanding *their* opposition, the Spartans appointed fifteen commissioners, who, in conjunction with Pausanias, were empowered to settle the affairs of Athens<sup>31</sup>.

This happily effected.

With the approbation, or rather by the command, of those ministers, the Athenian factions ceased from hostility; the tyrants were divested of their power; the foreign garrison was withdrawn; and the popular government re-established. This important revolution was remarkable for its singular mildness. The authors and instruments of the most oppressive usurpation recorded in the annals of any people were allowed to retire in safety to

<sup>30</sup> Xenoph. Diodor. Lyfias, ubi supra.

<sup>31</sup> Xenoph. p. 478.



Eleusis. Thrasylbulus conducted a military procession to the temple of Minerva in the citadel, where the acknowledgments of thanks and sacrifice were offered to that protecting divinity, who had restored the virtuous exiles to their country, and healed the divisions of the state. The citizens who had been banished, and those who had driven them into banishment, joined in this solemn exercise of religious duty; after which, convening in full assembly, they were addressed by Thrasylbulus in these memorable words:

“ The experience of your past transactions may enable you, men of Athens! to know each other, and to know yourselves. On what pretence could you, who drove us from the city, abet a tyrannical faction? Why would you have enslaved your fellow-citizens? On what superiority of merit could you found your claim of dominion? Is it that you are more honest and virtuous? Yet the people whom you insulted never relieved their poverty by unjust gain; whereas the tyrants, whom you served, increased their wealth by the most oppressive rapacity. Is it that you are more brave and warlike? Yet this injured people, alone and unassisted, and almost unarmed, have overcome your superior numbers, reinforced by the Lacedæmonian garrison, the powerful succours of Pausanias, and the experienced mercenaries of Lyfander. As you must yield the prize both of probity and of prowess, so neither can you claim the honour of superior prudence and sagacity. You have

Memo-  
rable  
speech of  
Thrasyl-  
bulus.

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have been not only conquered in war, but overcome in negociation, by the people whom you despised; to whom your Lacedæmonian masters have delivered you, like biting curs<sup>32</sup>, bound and muzzled, to be justly punished for your unprovoked insolence and audacity. But as to you, my fellow-sufferers and fellow-exiles ! you, who shared the hardships of my banishment, and who now share the triumph of my victorious return, I exhort you to forgive and forget our common injuries. Let the dignity of your sentiments adorn the splendour of your actions. Prove yourselves superior to your enemies, not only in valour but in clemency, that moderation may produce concord, and concord strength."

The amnesty

The effect of this generous enthusiasm, excited and diffused by Thrasybulus, appeared in a very extraordinary resolution of the assembly. During the usurpation of the Thirty, an hundred talents had been borrowed from the Lacedæmonians, to support the rigorous cruelty of a government which had banished five thousand<sup>33</sup>, and put to death, untried, fifteen hundred citizens. The repayment of this sum was not to be expected from the people at large, against whose interest and safety it had been so notoriously employed. Yet the Athe-

<sup>32</sup> Ὡς περ τῆς δακνόντος κλοιῷ δισσάντες παραδιδόασιν. Xenoph. Hellen. ii. sub fin. In their comparisons the ancients, it is well known, regarded justness more than dignity.

<sup>33</sup> Isocrat. in Areopag. p. 345. says upwards of five hundred. Diodorus says the one-half of the citizens,

nians unanimously resolved, on this occasion, that the money should be charged indiscriminately on them all<sup>34</sup>. This unexampled generosity might have encouraged even the enfeebled party of the tyrants to return from Eleufis. But they were too sensible of their guilt to expect forgiveness or impunity. Having fortified their insecure residence, in the best manner that their circumstances could permit, they began to prepare arms; to collect mercenaries; and to try, anew, the fortune of war. But their unequal hostility, the effect of rage and despair, was easily defeated by the vigour of the new republic. The most obnoxious leaders sealed, with their blood, the safety of their adherents, who submitted to the clemency of Thrafybulus. That fortunate and magnanimous commander generously undertook their cause, and obtained a decree of the people for restoring them to the city, for reinstating them in their fortunes and privileges, and for burying in oblivion the memory of their past offences<sup>35</sup>. The assembly even ratified, by oath, this act

<sup>34</sup> Isocrates, *ibid.* & p. 495. of the translation.

<sup>35</sup> Among these offences were reckoned the arbitrary laws enacted during their usurpation. All these laws were annulled, and those of Solon, Clifthenes, Pericles, &c. re-established. It appears that the Athenians embraced the same opportunity of examining their ancient laws, abolishing such as no longer suited the condition of the times, and enacting some new ones. *Andocid. Orat. i. de Myfter. p. 212. & Demost. adv. Timocrat. p. 469.* The year in which the democracy was restored, or, in other words, the archonship of Euclides, was regarded, therefore, as an important æra in Athenian jurisprudence. The only material alterations on record consist, 1. In the law confining the right of voting in the assembly to those born of Athenian mothers.

Former.



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not ob-  
served.

act of amnesty, of which both the idea and the name have been adopted by most civilised nations, and extolled by all historians, ancient and modern; who, dazzled by the splendour of a transaction so honourable to Thrasylbulus and to Athens, have universally forgot to mention, that the conditions of the amnesty were not faithfully observed. Yet there is the fullest evidence to prove<sup>36</sup>, that, when the tyrants were no more, the abettors of their usurpation were accused, convicted, and punished, for crimes of which they had been promised indemnity by a solemn oath. So true it is, that the Athenians had wisdom to discern, but wanted constancy to practise, the lessons of sound policy, or even the rules of justice.

Formerly it sufficed that the father was a citizen, the condition of the mother not being regarded. Athenæus, xiii. p. 285. & Mark. in Vit. Lyfiæ, p. 55. 2. In the law of Demophantus, requiring the citizens to take an oath that no personal danger should prevent them from doing their utmost to deliver their country from tyrants. Vid. Lycurg. adv. Leocr. p. 180. & Andoc. de Myst. p. 220.

<sup>36</sup> See Lyfias's Orations against Agoratus and Eratosthenes, from p. 233. to p. 280.

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*Accusation of Socrates.—Artifices of his Accusers.—His Defence.—Condemnation.—Address to the Judges.—His Conversation in Prison—and Death.—Transient Persecution of his Disciples.—Writings of Cebes—Æschines.—State of Philosophy.—Of the Fine Arts.—Of Literature.—Herodotus—Thucydides—Xenophon.—Transition to the public Transactions of Greece.—The Spartans invade Elis.—The Messenians driven from Greece.—History of Cyrene—Of Sicily.—War with Carthage.—Siege of Agrigentum.—Reign of Dionysius.—Sicily the first Province of Rome.*

IT were well for the honour of Athens, if none but the cruel abettors of an aristocratical faction had experienced the unjust rigour of its tribunals. But among the first memorable transactions, after the re-establishment of democracy, happened the trial and condemnation of Socrates; a man guiltless of every offence but that of disgracing, by his illustrious merit, the vices and follies of his contemporaries. His death sealed the inimitable virtues of his useful and honourable life; it seemed to be bestowed as a favour, not inflicted as a punishment; since, had Socrates,

who

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Accusa-  
tion of  
Socrates.  
Olymp.  
xcv. 1.  
A. C. 407.

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causes of  
that mea-  
sure.

who had already passed his seventieth year, yielded to the decays of nature, his fame would have descended less splendid, certainly more doubtful, to posterity.

The remote cause of his prosecution was the ludicrous farce of Aristophanes, entitled the Clouds; to which we had occasion formerly to allude. In this infamous performance, Socrates is introduced denying the religion of his country, corrupting the morals of his disciples, and professing the odious arts of sophistry and chicanery. The envy of a licentious populace, which ever attends virtue too independent to court, and too sincere to flatter them, gradually envenomed the shafts of the poet, and malignantly insinuated that the pretended sage was really such a person as the petulance of Aristophanes had described him. The calumny was greedily received, and its virulence embittered by the craft of designing priests and ambitious demagogues, as well as by the resentment of bad poets and vain sophists, whose pretended excellencies the discernment of Socrates had unmasked, and whose irritable temper his sincerity had grievously offended<sup>1</sup>. From such a powerful combination it seems extraordinary that Socrates should have lived so long, especially since, during

<sup>1</sup> The causes of his persecution, which are hinted at in Xenophon's Apology for Socrates, are more fully explained in that written by Plato. Vid. Plat. Apolog. Socrat. sect. vi. From these two admirable treatises of practical morality, together with the first chapter of Xenophon's Memorabilia, and Plato's Phædo, the narrative in the text is principally extracted.



the democracy, he never disguised his contempt for the capricious levity, injustice, and cruelty of the multitude, and during the usurpation of the Thirty openly arraigned the vices, and defied the authority of those odious tyrants. His long escape he himself ascribed to his total want of ambition. Had he intermeddled in public affairs, and endeavoured, by arming himself with authority, to withstand the corruptions of the times, his more formidable opposition would have exposed him to an earlier fate<sup>2</sup>. Notwithstanding his private station, it seems still to have appeared remarkable to his disciples, that amidst the litigious turbulence of democracy, his invidious fame and merit should have escaped persecution during a long life of seventy years.

When his enemies finally determined to raise an accusation against him, it required uncommon

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Artifices  
of his ac-  
cusers.

<sup>2</sup> The memorable words of Socrates will for ever brand the stern unfeeling spirit of democracy. Εὐ γὰρ ἴσῃ ὡ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ παλαι ἐπιχειρήσα τα πολιτικὰ πράγματα, παλαι ἂν ἀποθῶμαι, καὶ ὅτε ἂν ὑμᾶς ἀφῆλκειν ἔδειν ὅτε ἂν ἑμαυτοῖς. καὶ τοὶ μὴ ἀχθῆσθε λέγοντι τ' ἀληθῆ, ἢ γὰρ εἰν ὅστις σωθῆσεται, ὅτε ὑμῖν ὅτε ἄλλῳ ἔδειν πληθεῖ γήσιως ἐναντιμῆνος, καὶ διακλυῶν πολλὰ ἀδικα καὶ πλεονομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ τῷ ὄντι μαχέμεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆ δικαίᾳ, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθῆσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλ' μὴ δημοσιεύειν. Plut. Apolog. Socrat. c. xiii. "You well know, Athenians! that had I formerly intermeddled in public affairs I should formerly have perished, without benefiting either you or myself. Be not offended; but it is impossible that *he* should live long who arraigns and manfully opposes the injustice and licentiousness of you, Athenians! or of any other multitude. A champion for virtue, if he would survive but a few years, must lead a private life, and not interfere in politics."

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addresses to give their malignant calumnies the appearance of probability. Socrates conversed in public with every description of men, in all places, and on all occasions. His opinions were as well known as his person, and ever uniform and consistent; he taught no secret doctrines; admitted no private auditors; his lessons were open to all; and that they were gratuitous, his poverty, compared with the exorbitant wealth of the sophists who accused him, furnished abundant proof. To balance these stubborn circumstances, his enemies confided in the hatred of the jury and judges, composed of the meanest populace, and the perjury of false witnesses, which might be purchased at Athens for the small sum of a few drachmas. They trusted, however, not less in the artifices and eloquence of Miletus, Anytus<sup>3</sup>, and Lycon; the first of whom appeared on the part of the priests and poets; the second, on that of the politicians and artists; the third, on that of the rhetoricians and sophists<sup>4</sup>.

Informa-  
tion of the  
trial,

From the nature of an accusation, which principally respected religion, the cause ought to have been regularly tried in the less numerous but more enlightened tribunal of the Areopagus; yet it was immediately carried before the tumultuary assen-

<sup>3</sup> Some personal reasons are glanced at why Miletus and Anytus stepped forth as accusers. Vid. Andocid. Orat. i. & Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. Libanius has swelled to a long story, and strangely disfigured the hint of Xenophon. Apol. Soc. p. 642, & seqq.

<sup>4</sup> Plato Apol. Soc. c. x.

bly, or rather mob of the *Heliaæ*<sup>5</sup>, a court, for so it was called, consisting of five hundred persons, most of whom were liable, by their education and way of life, to be seduced by eloquence, intimidated by authority, and corrupted by every species of undue influence.

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In a degenerate age and nation, few virtuous or able men ever acquired popularity merely by their virtues or abilities. In such a nation, should a person, otherwise estimable, be unfortunately cursed with ambition, he must endeavour to gratify it at the expence of his feelings and his principles, and can attain general favour only in proportion as he ceases to deserve it. Uncomplying integrity will meet with derision; and wisdom, disdaining artifice, will grovel in obscurity, while those alone will reach fame, or fortune, or honour, who, though endowed with talents just beyond mediocrity, condescend to flatter the prejudices, imitate the manners, gratify the pride, or adopt the resentments, of an insolent populace.

Uncom-  
plying  
integrity  
of Socra-  
tes.

The superior mind of Socrates was incapable of such mean compliances. When called to make his

His de-  
fence.

<sup>5</sup> This appears from innumerable circumstances, some of which are mentioned below, though Meursius, in his Treatise on the Areopagus (vid. Gronov. Thesaur. vol. v.), maintains that Socrates was tried in that court; an opinion which has been generally followed, but which the slightest attention to the works of the Athenian orators is sufficient to disprove. Vid. Isoc. Orat. Areopag. Lyfias adv. Andocid. p. 108. & Andocid. Orat. i. p. 215. The oath to which Socrates alludes in Xenophon's Apology, c. iv. can only apply to the *Heliaæ*. It is recited at length by Demosthenes, Orat. cont. Timocrat.



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defence, he honestly acknowledged that he himself was much affected by the persuasive eloquence of his adversaries; though, in truth, if he might use the expression, they had said nothing to the purpose<sup>6</sup>. He then observed, that the fond partiality of his friend Chærephon, having asked the Delphic oracle, whether any man was wiser than Socrates?—the oracle replied, that Socrates was the wisest of men. In order to justify the answer of that god, whose veracity they all acknowledged, he had conversed with every distinction of persons, most eminent in the republic; and finding that they universally pretended to know many things of which they were ignorant, he began to suspect, that in this circumstance he excelled them, since he pretended to no sort of knowledge of which he was not really master. What he did know, he freely communicated, striving, to the utmost, to render his fellow-citizens more virtuous and more happy; an employment to which he believed himself called by the god, “whose authority I respect, Athenians! still more than yours.”

Provokes  
the anger  
of his  
judges.

The judges were seized with indignation at this firm language from a man capitally accused, from whom they expected that, according to the usual practice, he would have brought his wife and children to intercede for him by their tears<sup>7</sup>, or even

<sup>6</sup> The simplicity of the original is inimitable—Και τοι ἀληθες γέ, ὡς εἶπες, εἶπεν, ἔθεν εἰρηκασί. Plut. Apol.

<sup>7</sup> These circumstances, which are mentioned both by Xenophon and Plato, prove that Socrates was tried before a popular tribunal.

even have employed the elaborate discourse which his friend Lyfias, the orator, had composed for his defence; a discourse alike fitted to detect calumny, and to excite compassion. But Socrates, who considered it as a far greater misfortune to commit, than to suffer an injustice, declared, that he thought it unbecoming his fame, and unworthy his character, to employ any other defence than that of an innocent and useful life. Whether to incur the penalties of the delinquency with which he was falsely charged ought to be regarded as an evil, the gods alone knew. For his part he imagined that he should have no reason for sorrow at being delivered from the inconveniences of old age, which were ready to overtake him, and at being commanded to quit life<sup>s</sup> while his mind, still active and vigorous, was likely to leave behind him the most agreeable impression in the remembrance of his friends.

The firm magnanimity of Socrates could not alter the resolution of his judges; yet such is the ascendancy of virtue over the worst of minds, that he was found guilty by a majority of only

Socrates is  
condemned.

nal. It is well known that the Areopagus rigorously proscribed all such undue methods of biasing the judgment and seducing the passions. Vid. Demosth. in Near. & Aristocrat. Æschin. in Timarch. Lucian. Hermotim. & Isocrat. Areopag.

<sup>s</sup> Xenophon says, that he writes Socrates's Defence, after so many others, who had already executed that task with sufficient skill and fidelity, in order to illustrate one point much insisted on by Socrates, "That it was better for him to die than to live." Xenoph. Apol. sub init.

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three voices<sup>9</sup>. The court then commanded him, agreeably to a principle which betrays the true spirit of democratical tyranny, to pass sentence of condemnation on himself, and to name the punishment which ought to be inflicted on him. The punishment, said Socrates, which I deserve for having spent my whole life in endeavouring to render my fellow-citizens wiser and better, and particularly in striving to inspire the Athenian youth with the love of justice and temperance, is, "To be maintained, during the remainder of my life, in the Prytanæum; an honour due to *me*, rather than to the victors in the Olympic games, since, as far as depended on me, I have made my countrymen more happy *in reality*; they only in *appearance*." Provoked by this observation, by which they ought to have been confounded, the judges proceeded to pass sentence, and condemned Socrates to drink hemlock<sup>10</sup>.

His address to the judges who voted in his favour.

This atrocious injustice excited the indignation of his numerous friends and disciples, most of whom had accompanied him to the court; but it awakened no other passion in the illustrious sage than that of pity for the blind prejudices of the Athenians. He then addressed that part of the court who had been favourable to him, or rather to themselves, since they had avoided the misfortune of passing an unjust sentence, which would have disgraced and embittered the latest moment

<sup>9</sup> Plato Apol.

<sup>10</sup> Idem, ibid.



of their lives. “ He considered them as friends with whom he would willingly converse for a moment, upon the event which had happened to him, before he was summoned to death. From the commencement of the prosecution, an unusual circumstance, he observed, had attended all his words and actions, and every step which he had taken in the whole course of his trial. The dæmon, who on ordinary occasions had ever been so watchful to restrain him, when he prepared to say or do any thing improper or hurtful, had never once withheld him, during the whole progress of this affair, from following the bent of his own inclination. For this reason he was apt to suspect that the fate which the court had decreed him, although they meant it for an evil, was to him a real good. If to die was only to change the scene, must it not be an advantage to remove from these pretended judges to Minos, Rhadamanthus, and other real judges, who, through their love of justice, had been exalted by the divinity to this important function of government? What delight to live and converse with the immortal heroes and poets of antiquity ! It becomes you also, my friends ! to be of good comfort with regard to death, since no evil, in life or death, can befall virtuous men, whose true interest is ever the concern of heaven. For my part, I am persuaded that it is better for me to die than to live, and therefore am not offended with my judges. I intreat you all to behave towards my sons, when they attain the years of reason, as I have done to you, not ceasing to

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blame and accuse them, when they prefer wealth or pleasure, or any other frivolous object, to the inestimable worth of virtue. If they think highly of their own merit, while in fact it is of little value, reproach them severely, Athenians! as I have done you. By so doing you will behave justly to me and to my sons. It is now time for us to part. I go to die, you to live; but which is best, none but the Divinity knows <sup>11</sup>."

The execution of the sentence deferred on account of the Delian festival.

It is not wonderful that the disciples of Socrates should have believed the events of his extraordinary life, and especially its concluding scene, to be regulated by the interposition of a particular providence <sup>12</sup>. Every circumstance conspired to evince his unalterable firmness, and display his inimitable virtue. It happened, before the day of his trial, that the high-priest had crowned the stern of the vessel, which was annually sent to Delos, to commemorate, by grateful acknowledgments to Apollo, the triumphant return of Theseus from Crete, and the happy deliverance of Athens from a disgraceful tribute <sup>13</sup>. This ceremony announced the commencement of the festival, which ended with the return

<sup>11</sup> Plato Apol. sub fin.

<sup>12</sup> According to Plato nothing happened in this transaction *αυτο θειας μοιρας*. Plat. Apol. Yet in the Phædo. sub init. he says, *τυχη τις αυταις, ω Εδεξαταις! αυτεβου.* But *τυχη* here refers not to the cause, but to the effect; not to blind chance, but to an unaccountable-disposition of events produced by a particular interposition of the divinity. In this sense the word is used not only by philosophers but orators, particularly Demosthenes, as we shall see below.

<sup>13</sup> See vol. i. p. 32.

of the vessel; and, during the intervening time, which was consecrated to the honour of Apollo, it was not lawful to inflict any capital punishment. Contrary winds protracted the ceremony thirty days, during which Socrates lay in prison, and in fetters. His friends daily visited him, repairing, at the dawn, to the prison-gate, and impatiently waiting till it opened. Their conversation turned on the same subjects which had formerly occupied them; but afforded not that pure unmixed pleasure which they usually derived from the company of Socrates. It occasioned, however, nothing of that gloom which is naturally excited by the presence of a friend under sentence of death. They felt a certain pleasing melancholy, a mixed sensation of sorrow and delight, for which no language has assigned a name<sup>14</sup>.

When the fatal vessel arrived in the harbour of Sunium, and was hourly expected in the Piræus, Crito, the most confidential of the disciples of Socrates<sup>15</sup>, first brought the melancholy intelli-

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He refuses  
to escape  
from  
prison.

<sup>14</sup> This is admirably described by Plato: Ἀλλὰ ἀτεχνῶς ἀτοπος τὴ μοι πάθος παρῆν, καὶ τὴς ἀθῆς κρασις—ἀπο τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη οἶμα καὶ τῆς λυπῆς. The following circumstances are inimitable: Καὶ πάντες ὅι παρόντες οὐδ' ἔτι ἔτῳ διεκείμεθα, ποτε μὲν γελῶντες, ἐπιοτε δὲ δακρυῶντες· εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν διαφέροντως ἀπολλοδόου· οἷσθα γὰρ τὸν ἀνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ. Phædo, viii. c. ii. Socrates alone felt none of these sensations; but as Montaigne, who had seized his true character, says, Et qui ne rec'noisse en luy, non seulement de la fermeté & de la constance (c'étoit son affiette ordinaire que celle là) mais je ne sçay quel contentement nouveau & une allegresse enjouée en ses propos & façons dernières.

<sup>15</sup> Finding Socrates in a profound sleep, he reposed himself by his side till he awoke. Plat. *ibid*.

gence;

gence; and, moved by the near danger of his admired friend, ventured to propose a clandestine escape, shewing him at the same time that he had collected a sufficient sum of money to corrupt the fidelity of his keepers. This unmanly proposal, which nothing but the undistinguishing ardour of friendship could excuse, Socrates answered in a vein of pleasantry, which shewed the perfect freedom of his mind, "In what country, O Crito! can I escape death? where shall I fly to elude this irrevocable doom, passed on all human kind?" To Apollodorus, a man of no great depth of understanding, but his affectionate and zealous admirer, who said, "That what grieved him beyond measure was, that such a man should perish unjustly," he replied, stroking the head of his friend, "And would you be less grieved, O Apollodorus! were I deserving of death?" When his friends, and Crito especially, insisted, "That it would be no less ungenerous than imprudent, in compliance with the hasty resolution of a malignant or misguided multitude, to render his wife a widow, his children orphans, his disciples for ever miserable and forlorn, and conjured him, by every thing sacred, to save a life so inestimably precious;" Socrates assumed a tone more serious, recalled the maxims which he professed, and the doctrines which he had ever inculcated, "That how unjustly soever we were treated, it could never be our interest to practise injustice, much less to retort

<sup>16</sup> Xenoph. & Plat. *ibid.*



the injuries of our parents or our country; and to teach, by our example, disobedience to the laws.”

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The strength of his arguments, and still more, the unalterable firmness and cheerful serenity that appeared in his looks, words, and actions<sup>17</sup>, silenced the struggling emotions of his disciples. The dignity of virtue elevated their souls; they parted with tears of inexpressible admiration, and with a firm purpose to see their master earlier than usual on the fatal morning.

Having arrived at the prison-gate, they were desired to wait without, because the Eleven (so the delicacy of Athens styled the executioners of public justice) unloosed the fetters of Socrates, and announced to him his death before the setting of the sun. They had not waited long, when they were desired to enter. They found Socrates just relieved from the weight of his bonds, attended by his wife Xantippé, who bore in her arms his infant son. At their appearance, she exclaimed, “Alas! Socrates, here come your friends, whom you for the last time behold, and who for the last time behold you!” Socrates, looking at Crito, desired some one to conduct her home. She departed, beating her breast, and lamenting with that clamorous sorrow natural to her sex<sup>18</sup> and her character.

His behaviour during the last day of his confinement.

<sup>17</sup> Καὶ οἰμασί καὶ σχημασί καὶ βαδισμασί Φαίδρος. Xenoph. Apol.

<sup>18</sup> Βωσαν τε καὶ κοπτομένη; and a little above, “ὅσα δὲ σιωπᾶσι αἱ γυναῖκες.” Phædo, sect. iii.

Socrates,

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His con-  
versation  
with his  
disciples.

Socrates, meanwhile, reclining on the couch with his usual composure, drew his leg towards him, and gently rubbing the part which had been galled by the fetters, remarked the wonderful connection between what men call pleasure, and its opposite, pain. The one sensation, he observed (as just happened to his leg after being delivered from the smart of the irons), was generally followed by the other. Neither of them could long exist apart; they are seldom pure and unmixed; and whoever feels the one, may be sure that he will soon feel the other. “I think, that had Æsop the fabulist made this reflection, he would have said, that the Divinity, desirous to reconcile these opposite natures, but finding the design impracticable, had at least joined their summits; for which reason pleasure has ever since dragged pain after it, and pain pleasure.”

Why he  
composed  
verses in  
prison,  
having  
never done  
it before.

The mention of Æsop recalled to Cebes, the Theban, a conversation which he had recently had with Euenus of Paros, a celebrated elegiac poet, then resident in Athens<sup>19</sup>. The poet asked Cebes, “Why his master, who had never before addicted himself to poetry, should, since his confinement, have written a hymn to Apollo, and turned into verse several of Æsop’s fables?” The Theban seized the present opportunity to satisfy himself in this particular, and to acquire such information as

<sup>19</sup> The following narrative, to the death of Socrates, is entirely borrowed from the *Phædo*, to which it is therefore unnecessary at every moment to refer.

might satisfy Euenus, who, he assured Socrates, would certainly repeat his question. The illustrious sage, whose inimitable virtues were all tinged, or rather brightened, by enthusiasm, desired Cebes to tell Euenus, “ That it was not with a view to rival him, or with a hope to excel his poetry (for *that*, he knew, would not be easy), that he had begun late in life this new pursuit. He had attempted it in compliance with a divine mandate, which frequently commanded him in dreams to cultivate music. He had, therefore, first applied to philosophy, thinking *that* the greatest music; but since he was under sentence of death, he judged it safest to try likewise the popular music, lest any thing should on his part be omitted, which the gods had enjoined him. For this reason, he had composed a hymn to Apollo, whose festival was now celebrating; and not being himself a mythologist, had versified such fables of Æsop as happened most readily to occur to his memory. Tell this to Euenus—bid him farewell; and farther, that if he is wise, he will follow me; for I depart, as it is likely, to-day; so the Athenians have ordered it.”

The last words introduced an important conversation concerning suicide, and the immortality of the soul. Socrates maintained, that though it was better for a wise man to die than to live, because there was reason to believe that he would be happier in a future than in the present state of existence, yet it could never be allowable for him to perish by his own hand, or even to lay down life without

His opinion concerning suicide, and the immortality of the soul.

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without a sufficient motive, such as that which influenced himself, a respectful submission to the laws of his country. This interesting discussion consumed the greatest part of the day. Socrates encouraged his disciples not to spare his opinions from delicacy to his present situation. Those who were of his mind he exhorted to persevere. Entwining his hand in the long hair of Phædo, "These beautiful locks, my dear Phædo, you will this day cut off<sup>20</sup>; but were I in your place, I would not again allow them to grow, but make a vow (as the Argives did in a matter of infinitely less moment) never to resume the wonted ornament of my beauty, until I had confirmed the doctrine of the soul's immortality."

Concern-  
ing death,  
burial, and  
the duties  
of friends  
to the de-  
ceased.

The arguments of Socrates convinced and consoled his disciples, as they have often done the learned and virtuous in succeeding times. "Those who had adorned their minds with temperance, justice, and fortitude, and had despised the vain ornaments and vain pleasures of the body, could never regret their separation from this terrestrial companion. And now," continued he, in the language of tragedy, "the destined hour summons me to death; it is almost time to bathe, and surely it will be better that I myself, before I drink the poison, should perform this ceremony, than occasion unnecessary trouble to the women after I am dead." "So let it be," said Crito; "but first

<sup>20</sup> The ceremony of cutting off the hair at funerals was mentioned above, vol. I. c. vii. p. 324. where the transaction of the Argives, alluded to in the text, is related.



inform us, Socrates, in what we can do you pleasure, respecting your children, or any other concern." "Nothing new, O Crito! but what I have always told you. By consulting your own happiness, you will act the best part with regard to my children, to me, and to all mankind; although you bind not yourselves by any new promise. But if you forsake the rules of virtue, which we have just endeavoured to explain, you will benefit neither my children, nor any with whom you live, although you should now swear to the contrary." Crito then asked him, "How he chose to be buried?" "As you please, provided I don't escape you." Saying this, he smiled, adding, that as to his *body*, they might bury it as seemed most decent, and most suitable to the laws of his country.

He then retired into the adjoining chamber, accompanied only by Crito; the rest remained behind, like children mourning a father. When he had bathed and dressed, his sons (one grown up, and two children), together with his female relations<sup>21</sup>, were admitted to him. He conversed with them in the presence of Crito, and then returned to his disciples near sun-set, for he tarried long within. Before he had time to begin any new

<sup>21</sup> The *οἰκετι γυναικες* of Plato. This expression seems to have given rise to the absurd fable, that Socrates had two wives, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, and others; and the absurd explication of that irregularity, "that the Athenians, after the pestilence, had allowed polygamy, at least bigamy, to repair the ravages of that dreadful malady."

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is address-  
ed by the  
messenger  
of death.

subject, the keeper of the prison entered, and standing near Socrates, "I cannot," said he, "accuse you, O Socrates! of the rage and execrations too often vented against me by those here confined, to whom, by command of the magistrates, I announce that it is time to drink the poison. Your fortitude, mildness, and generosity exceed all that I have ever witnessed; even now I know you pardon me, since I act by compulsion; and as you are acquainted with the purport of my message, farewell, and bear your fate with as much patience as possible." At these words the executioner, hardened as he was in scenes of death, dissolved in tears, and, turning from Socrates, went out. The latter following him with his eye, replied, "And you also farewell; as to me, I shall obey your instructions." Then looking at his disciples, "How truly polite," said he, "is *the man*<sup>22</sup>! During my confinement, he often visited and conversed with me; and now, how generously does he lament my death! But let the poison be brought, that we may obey his orders."

His con-  
versation  
before  
drinking  
the poison.

Crito then said, "Still, O Socrates! there is time; the sun still brightens the tops of the mountains. Many have I known, who have drank the poison late in the night, after a luxurious supper and generous wines, and lastly, after enjoying the embraces of those with whom they were enamoured<sup>23</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> Ὁ ἀνδραγωγός, the term for the executioner.

<sup>23</sup> Συγγενομένοις γ' ἐνὶς αἰνῶνι τυχῶσι ἐπιθυμοῦσι &c. Phæd. c. xlviil.  
What an extraordinary picture of Athenian manners!

But

But hasten not; it is yet time." "With good reason," said Socrates, "these persons did what you say, because they believed thereby to be gainers; and with good reason I shall act otherwise; because I am convinced that I should gain nothing but ridicule by an over-anxious solicitude for life, when it is just ready to leave me." Crito then made a sign to the boy who waited; he went, ground the hemlock, and returned with him who was to administer it. Socrates perceiving his arrival, "Tell me," said he, "for you are experienced in such matters, what have I to do?" "Nothing farther than to walk in the apartment till your limbs feel heavy; then repose yourself on the couch." Socrates then taking the cup in his hand, and looking at him with ineffable serenity, "Say, as to this beverage, is it lawful to employ any part of it in libation?" The other replied, "There is no more than what is proper to drink." "But it is *proper*," rejoined Socrates, "and necessary, if we would perform our duty, to pray the gods, that our passage hence may be fortunate." So saying, he was silent for a moment, and then drank the poison with an unaltered countenance. Mingling gentleness with authority, he stilled the noisy lamentations of his friends, saying, that in order to avoid such unmanly complaints, he had before dismissed the women. As the poison began to gain his vitals, he uncovered his face, and said to Crito, "We owe a cock to Æsculapius; sacrifice it, and neglect it not." Crito asked, if he had

His prayer  
and death,

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any thing further to command? But he made no reply. A little after, he was in agony—Crito shut his eyes. Thus died Socrates; whom, his disciples declared, they could never cease to remember, nor remembering, cease to admire. “If any man,” says Xenophon inimitably, “if any man, a lover of virtue, ever found a more profitable companion than Socrates, I deem that man the happiest of human kind <sup>24</sup>.”

Transient  
persecu-  
tion of his  
disciples.

The current of popular passions appears nowhere more uniform than in the history of Athens. The factitious resentment excited against Socrates by such improbable calumnies, as even those who were the readiest to receive and to disseminate, could never seriously believe, extended itself with rapidity to his numerous friends and adherents. But fortunately for the interest of letters and humanity, the endemic contagion was confined within the Athenian frontiers. Plato, Antisthenes, Æschines, Critobulus, and other Athenians, wisely eluded a storm which they had not strength to resist. Some took refuge in Thebes with their fellow-disciples, Simmias, Cebes, and Phædonidas; others found protection in Megara from Euclid and Terpsion. This persecution of philosophy, however, was accidental and transient. Mingled sentiments of pity, shame, and resentment, soon gave a new direction to the popular

The Athe-  
nians re-  
pent, and  
honour  
the me-  
mory of  
Socrates.

<sup>24</sup> Plato speaks with equal feeling, or rather enthusiasm. *Και γὰρ τὸ μνησθαι, καὶ αὐτοὶ λεγόντα, καὶ ἄλλα ἀκούοντα, ἐμίσγε-  
ται παντὶ ᾧδιστο.* Phæd. c. ii.



fury, which raged with more destructive, yet far C H A P.  
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 juster cruelty, against the accusers and judges of  
 Socrates<sup>25</sup>. Many were driven into exile; many  
 were put to death; several perished in despair, by  
 their own hands. The illustrious sage was ho-  
 noured by signal monuments of public admira-  
 tion<sup>26</sup>; his fame, like the hardy oak, derived  
 vigour from years<sup>27</sup>; and increased from age to  
 age, till the superstition of the Athenians at length  
 worshipped, as a god<sup>28</sup>, him whom their injustice  
 had condemned as a criminal.

The persecution, the death, and the honours of  
 Socrates, all conspired to animate the affection, and  
 to increase the zeal, of his disciples. Their num-  
 ber had been great in his lifetime: it became  
 greater after his death; since those who followed,  
 and those who rejected his doctrines, alike styled  
 themselves Socratic philosophers. His name was  
 thus adopted and prophaned by many sects, who,  
 while they differed widely from each other, uni-  
 versally changed, exaggerated, or perverted the  
 tenets of their common master. Among the  
 genuine followers of Socrates, Xenophon, as will  
 appear hereafter, unquestionably merits the first  
 place. Plato comes next, yet separated by a long

The writ-  
 ings of his  
 disciples.

<sup>25</sup> Plutarch. de Invid. p. 338.

<sup>26</sup> Statues, altars, even a chapel, called Socrateion. Vide Diogen. in Socrat.

<sup>27</sup> Crescit occulto, velut arbor, ævo

Fama Marcelli—

HORACE.

<sup>28</sup> Or rather as a demi-god; but the boundaries were not very accurately ascertained, though *that* is attempted by Arrian, in Expedit. Alexand. I. iv. p. 86.

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Cebes.

Æschines.

The philo-  
sophers  
who mis-  
represent-  
ed his opi-  
nions.Euclid and  
Phædo,  
Aristippus  
and Antis-  
thenes.

interval. In the same class may be ranked Cebes the Theban, Æschines, Crito, and Simon, Athenians. The table of Cebes, which has been transmitted to modern times, contains a beautiful and affecting picture of human life, delineated with accuracy of judgment, and illuminated by the splendour of sentiment. Three remaining dialogues of Æschines breathe the same sublime spirit, and abound in irresistible persuasions to virtue: "That happiness is attained, not by gratifying, but by moderating the passions; that he alone is rich and powerful, whose faculties exceed his desires; that virtue is true wisdom, and being attended with the only secure happiness which can be enjoyed in the present life, must, according to the unalterable laws of Providence, be crowned with immortal felicity hereafter."

The remains of Cebes and Æschines, and far more, as will appear in the sequel, the copious writings of Plato and Xenophon, may enable us to discriminate the philosophy of Socrates, from that of the various sects who misrepresented or adulterated his opinions. The establishment of these sects belongs not to the period of history now under our review. But the foundation of their respective tenets, which had been laid in a former age, was confirmed by the philosophers who flourished in the time of Socrates. Of these, the most distinguished were Euclid of Megara, Phædo of Elis, Aristippus of Cyrené, Antisthenes of Athens. The two first restored the captious logic of the sophists; Aristippus embraced their licen-  
tious

tious morality. While the schools of Elis and Megara studied to confound the understanding, that of Cyrené laboured to corrupt the heart. Antisthenes set himself to oppose these pernicious sects, deriding the refined subtleties of the sceptics, and disdaining the mean pleasures of the Epicureans<sup>29</sup>. To prefer the mind to the body, duty to interest, and virtue to pleasure, were the great lessons of Antisthenes. Yet this sublime philosophy he carried to extravagance<sup>30</sup>, affecting not only to moderate and govern, but to silence and extirpate the passions, and declaring bodily pleasure not only unworthy of pursuit, but a thing carefully to be avoided, as the greatest and most dangerous of evils. His rigid severity of life deceived not the penetration of Socrates. The sage could discern, that no small share of spiritual pride lurked under the tattered cloak of Antisthenes.

While philosophy, true or false, thus flourished in Greece, a propitious destiny watched over the imitative arts, which continued, during half a

State of  
the fine  
arts dur-  
ing the  
period un-  
der review.

<sup>29</sup> I anticipate these names. The *scepticism* of Pyrrho, as will be explained hereafter, arose from the quibbling sophisms of the schools of Elis and Megara. *Epicurus*, having adopted and refined the selfish philosophy of Aristippus, had the honour of distinguishing by his name, the *Epicurean* sect.

<sup>30</sup> His follower, Diogenes, as will appear in the sequel, pushed this extravagance still farther. They both taught in the suburb of Athens called the *Cynsarges*, from which they and their disciples were called *Cynics*. In a subsequent part of this work, it will be explained, how the *Cynical philosophy* gave rise to *Stoicism*, so called, because Zeno and his followers taught at Athens in the "*Stoa pæcile*," the painted portico.



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A. C. 431  
— 404.

century of perpetual wars and revolutions, to be cultivated with equal assiduity and success. The most distinguished scholars of Phidias were Alcámenes of Athens, and Agoracritus of the isle of Paros. They contended for the prize of sculpture in their respective statues of Venus; and the Athenians, it is said, too partially decided in favour of their countryman. Agoracritus, unwilling that his work should remain in a city where it had met with so little justice, sold it to the borough of Rhamnus. There it was beheld with admiration, and soon passed for a production of Phidias<sup>31</sup> himself. The sculptor Cteselaus excelled in heroes. He chose noble subjects, and still farther ennobled them by his art<sup>32</sup>. His contemporary Patrocles distinguished himself by his statues of Olympic victors, and particularly of celebrated wrestlers. Assisted by Canachus, he made the greatest work mentioned during the period now under our review, thirty-one figures of bronze, representing the respective commanders of the several cities or republics, who, under the conduct of Lyfander, obtained the memorable victory of Ægos Potamos. They were erected in the temple of Delphian Apollo, together with the statue of Lyfander himself, crowned by Neptune. Inferior artists<sup>33</sup> were employed to copy the statues of various divinities, dedicated at the same time, and in the same place, by the Lacedæmonian conqueror.

<sup>31</sup> Vid. Suid. & Hesych. voc. Παμμος.

<sup>32</sup> Plin. l. xxxv.

<sup>33</sup> See their names in Pausan. l. x. p. 625, & seqq.



It appears not however that, during the Peloponnesian war, any new style was attempted either in sculpture or painting. The artists of that period contented themselves with walking in the footsteps of their great predecessors. The same observation applies to music and poetry; but eloquence, on the contrary, received a new form, and flourishing amidst the tumults of war and the contentions of active life, produced that concise, rapid, and manly character of composition which thenceforth distinguished the Attic writers. The works of Homer, Sophocles, and Pindar, left few laurels to be gained by their successors. It was impossible to excel, it was dangerous to rival them. Great genius was required to start, without disgrace, in a career where such candidates had run. But great genius is rare, and commonly disdains imitation; and the first poetical prizes being already carried off, men who felt the animation and vigour of their own powers, naturally directed them to objects which possessed the charms of novelty, and promised the hope of excellence.

Even in prosaic composition the merit and fame of Herodotus and Democritus<sup>34</sup> (not to mention authors more ancient) opposed very formidable

Principal authors in prose preceding this period.

<sup>34</sup> Itaque video visum esse nonnullis Platonis & Democriti locutionem, etsi ablit a versu, tamen quod incitatus feratur, & clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poëma putandum, quàm comicorum poetarum. Cicero ad M. Brutum Orator, c. xx. See also de Orator. l. i. c. xi. It is impossible to read Lucretius, without fancying, if we recollect Cicero's criticisms on Democritus, that we are perusing the long lost works of that great philosopher.

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Character  
of Hero-  
dotus as an  
historian.

obstacles to the ambition of their successors. In a work no less splendid than important, the father of prophane history had deduced the transactions between the Greeks and Barbarians, from the earliest accounts till the conclusion of the Persian war; a work including the history of many centuries, and comprehending the greatest kingdoms and empires of the ancient world. This extensive subject was handled with order and dignity. The episodes were ingeniously interwoven with the principal action. The various parts of the narrative were so skilfully combined, that they mutually reflected light on each other. Geography, manners, religion, laws, and arts, entered into the plan of his work; and it is remarkable that the earliest of historians agrees more nearly, as to the design and form of his undertaking, with the enlightened writers of the present century, than any historical author in the long series of intervening ages.

His language was the picture of his mind; natural, flowing, persuasive; lofty on great occasions<sup>35</sup>, affecting in scenes of distress<sup>36</sup>, perspicuous in narration, animated in description. Yet this admired writer has sometimes inserted reports romantic and incredible. Of many, indeed, of the fables of Herodotus, as ignorance conceited of its knowledge long affected to call them, subsequent experience has proved the reality;

<sup>35</sup> Longinus cites as an example of the sublime, Herodot. l. vii. c. lx. The whole expedition of Xerxes is written with an elevation becoming the subject.

<sup>36</sup> See the affecting story of Adrastus, l. i. c. xxxv.

modern discoveries and voyages seem purposely directed to vindicate the fame of a writer, whom Cicero<sup>37</sup> dignifies with the appellation of Prince of Historians. Of other wondrous tales which he relates, his own discernment shewed him the futility. Whatever is contrary to the analogy of nature he rejects with scorn. He speaks with contempt of the Ægepodes, and of the one-eyed Arimaspi, and of other ridiculous and absurd fictions which have been adopted, however, by some credulous writers even in the eighteenth century. But Herodotus thought himself bound in duty to relate what he had heard, not always to believe what he related<sup>38</sup>. Having travelled into Egypt and the East, he recounts, with fidelity, the reports current in those remote countries. And his mind being opened and enlarged by an extensive view of men and manners, he had learned to set bounds to his disbelief, as well as to his credulity. Yet it must not be dissembled that the fabulous traditions, in which he too much abounds, give the air of romance to his history. Though forming, comparatively, but a small part of the work, they assume magnitude and importance, when invidiously detached from it<sup>39</sup>. It thus seems as if  
this

<sup>37</sup> L. ii. de Orator.

<sup>38</sup> Εγὼ δὲ οφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαι γὰρ μὴν ἢ πανταπασι οφείλω. Herodot. l. vii. c. clii. p. 433.

<sup>39</sup> The reproaches which Juvenal (Satyr. 10.) and Plutarch (in his treatise entitled the Malignity of Herodotus) make to this great historian, are fully answered by Aldus Manutius, Camerarius, and Stephanus. Plutarch, forsooth, was offended that his country-



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this most instructive author had written with a view rather to amuse the fancy than to inform the understanding. The lively graces of his diction tend to confirm this supposition. His mode of composition may be regarded as the intermediate shade between epic poetry and history. Neither concise nor vehement, the general character of his style is natural, copious, and flowing<sup>40</sup>; and his manner throughout breathes the softness of Ionia, rather than the active contention of Athens.

Of Thu-  
cydides.

In this light Herodotus appeared to the Athenians in the age immediately succeeding his own. At the Olympic games he had read his work with universal applause. Thucydides, then a youth, wept mixed tears of wonder and emulation<sup>41</sup>. His father was complimented on the generous ar-

countrymen made so bad a figure in the history of Herodotus. The criticism of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a writer of more taste and discernment than Plutarch, does ample justice to the father of history.

<sup>40</sup> Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric*, l. iii. c. ix. distinguishes two kinds of style; the continuous and the periodic. The former flows on without interruption, until the sense is complete. The latter is divided, by stops, into due proportions of duration, which are easily felt by the ear, and measured by the mind. The former style is tiresome, because in every thing men delight to see the end; even racers, when they pass the goal, are quickly out of breath. Herodotus is the most remarkable instance of the continuous style. In his time scarcely any other was in use; but it is now entirely laid aside. So far Aristotle, who seems rather unjust to Herodotus, since many parts of his work are sufficiently adorned by periods, although the loose style in general prevails. But the partiality of his countryman Dionysius completely avenges the wrongs of Herodotus,

<sup>41</sup> Suidas, Photius, Marcellinus.

dour



dour of a son, whose early inquietude at another's fame announced a character formed for great designs and illustrious exertions. But Herodotus had preoccupied the subjects best adapted to historical composition; and it was not till the commencement of the memorable war of twenty-seven years, that Thucydides, amidst the dangers which threatened his country, rejoiced in a theme worthy to exercise the genius, and call forth the whole vigour of an historian. From the breaking out of this war, in which he proved an unfortunate actor, he judged that it would be the greatest, the most obstinate, and important that had ever been carried on. He began therefore to collect, and treasure up, such materials as were necessary for describing it; in the selection, as well as in the distribution of which, he afterwards discovered an evident purpose to rival and surpass Herodotus. Too much indulgence for fiction had disgraced the narrative of the latter: Thucydides professed to be animated purely by the love of truth. "His relation was not intended to delight the ears of an Olympic audience. By a faithful account of the past, he hoped to assist his readers in conjecturing the future. While human nature remained the same, his work would have its use, being built on such principles as rendered it an everlasting possession, not a contentious instrument of temporary applause<sup>42</sup>." The execution corresponded with this noble design. In his introductory discourse

<sup>42</sup> Thucyd. in proem.

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he runs over the fabulous ages of Greece, carefully separating the ore from the dross. In speaking of Thrace, he touches, with proper brevity, on the fable of Tereus and Progne<sup>43</sup>; and in describing Sicily, glances at the Cyclops and Lestrigons. But he recedes, as it were, with disgust, from such monstrous phantoms, and immediately returns to the main purpose of his history. In order to render it a faithful picture of the times, he professes to relate not only what was done, but what was said, by inserting such speeches of statesmen and generals as he had himself heard, or as had been reported to him by others. This valuable part of his work was imitated by all future historians, till the improvement of military discipline on the one hand, and the corruption of manners on the other, rendered such speeches superfluous. Eloquence once served as an incentive to courage, and an instrument of government. But the time was to arrive, when the dead principles of fear and interest should alone predominate. In most countries of Europe, despotism has rendered public assemblies a dramatic representation; and in the few, where men are not enslaved by a master, they are the slaves of pride, of avarice, and of faction.

Comparison  
between  
them.

Thucydides, doubtless, had his model in the short and oblique speeches of Herodotus; but in this particular he must be acknowledged far to surpass his patron. In the distribution of his subject,

<sup>43</sup> Ovid. *Metam.* l. vi.

how-

however, he fell short of that writer. Thucydides, aspiring at extraordinary accuracy, divides his work by summers and winters, relating apart the events comprehended in each period of six months. But this space of time is commonly too short for events deserving the notice of history, to be begun, carried on, and completed. His narrative, therefore, is continually broken and interrupted: curiosity is raised without being satisfied, and the reader is transported, as by magic, from Athens to Corcyra, from Lesbos to Peloponnesus, from the coast of Asia to Sicily. Thucydides follows the order of time; Herodotus the connection of events: in the language of a great critic, the skill and taste of Herodotus have reduced a very complicated argument into one harmonious whole; the preposterous industry of Thucydides has divided a very simple subject into many detached parts and scattered limbs of history, which it is difficult again to reduce into one regular body<sup>44</sup>. The same critic observes, that Herodotus's history not only possesses more art and variety, but displays more gaiety and splendour. A settled gloom, doubtless, hangs over the events of the Peloponnesian war: but what is the history of all wars, but a description of crimes and calamities? The austere gravity of Thucydides admirably corresponds with his subject. His majesty is worthy of Athens, when she commanded a thousand tributary republics. His concise, nervous, and energetic style, his

<sup>44</sup> Dionys. Halicarn. de Herodot. & Thucydid.



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abrupt brevity, and elaborate plainness, admirably represent the contentions of active life, and the tumult of democratical assemblies. Demosthenes, whom Dionysius himself extols above all orators, transcribed eight times, not the elegant flowing smoothness of Herodotus, but the sententious, harsh, and often obscure annals of Thucydides<sup>45</sup>.

Transi-  
tion to  
the mili-  
tary trans-  
actions  
of Greece.

Thucydides left his work unfinished in the twenty-first year of the Peloponnesian war. It was continued by Xenophon, who deduced the revolutions of Greece through a series of forty-eight years to the battle of Mantinæa; a work which enables us to pursue the important series of Grecian history.

To a reader accustomed to contemplate the uniform and consistent operations of modern policy, it must appear extraordinary that, at the distance of less than two years from the subversion of the Athenian democracy by a Spartan general, the same turbulent form of government should have been re-established with new splendour, by the approbation, and even the assistance, of a Spartan king. The reasons explained in the preceding Chapter may lessen, but cannot altogether remove, his surprise; and, in order fully to comprehend the causes of this event, it is necessary to consider not only the internal factions which distracted the councils of Sparta, but the external objects of ambition or revenge which solicited and employed her arms.

<sup>45</sup> Dionys. Halicarn. de Herodot. & Thucydid.

While the fortune of the Peloponnesian war still hung in doubtful suspense, the peaceful inhabitants of Elis often testified an inclination to preserve an inoffensive neutrality, that they might apply, with undivided attention, to their happy rural labours, to the administration of the Olympian festival, and to the indispensable worship of those gods and heroes to whom their territory was peculiarly consecrated. The continual sollicitation of Sparta, and the unprovoked violence of Athens, determined the Elians to declare for the former republic; but of all the Spartan allies they were the most lukewarm and indifferent. In time of action their assistance was languid and ineffectual, and when the regular return of the Olympic solemnity suspended the course of hostilities, they shewed little partiality or respect for their powerful confederates, whose warlike and ambitious spirit seemed incompatible with the enjoyment of their own contemplative tranquillity. This omission of duty was followed by the actual transgression of the Elians. In conjunction with the Mantinæans and Argives they deserted the alliance of Sparta; defended themselves by arms against the usurpations of that republic; and excluded its members from consulting the oracle, and from partaking of the games and sacrifices celebrated at Olympia<sup>46</sup>. These injuries passed with impunity until the successful issue of the war of Peloponnesus disposed the Spartans to feel with sensibility, and enabled them severely to chastise every insult that had been

The  
Elians in-  
cur the  
displea-  
sure of  
Sparta.

<sup>46</sup> Thucyd. l. v.

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offered them during the less prosperous current of their fortune.

The Spar-  
tans in-  
vade Elis.  
Olymp.  
xciv. 2.  
A. C. 403.

While Pausanias and Lyfander settled the affairs of Athens and of Asia, Agis, the most warlike of their princes, levied a powerful army, to inflict a late, but terrible vengeance, on the Elians. That he might attack the enemy unprepared, he led his forces through the countries of Argolis and Achaia, entering the Elian territory by the way of Lariffa, and intending to march by the shortest road to the devoted capital. But he had scarcely passed the river Lariffus, which gives name to the town, and separates the adjoining provinces of Elis and Achaia, when the invaders were admonished, by repeated shocks of an earthquake, to abstain from ravaging a country which enjoyed the immediate protection of Heaven. Into such a menace, at least, this terrible phenomenon was interpreted by the superstition of the Spartan king, who immediately repassed the river, and, returning home, disbanded his army. But the hostility of the Spartans was restrained, not extinguished. Having offered due supplications and sacrifices to sanctify their impious invasion, the ephori, next year, commanded Agis again to levy troops, and to enter the Elian territory. No unfavourable sign checked the progress of his arms. During two summers and autumns, the country was desolated; the villages burned or demolished; their inhabitants dragged into captivity; the sacred edifices were despoiled of their most valued ornaments; the porticos, gymnasia, and temples, which adorned



adorned the city of Jupiter, were many of them reduced to ruins. C H A P.  
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The Spartans neither alone incurred the guilt, nor exclusively enjoyed the profits of this cruel devastation. The Elian invasion furnished a rich harvest of plunder to the Arcadians and other communities of Peloponnesus, whose rapacious lust was enflamed by the virgin bloom of a country which had long been protected by religion against the ravages of war. When the principal property of the Elians was destroyed or plundered, the Spartans at length granted them a peace, on condition that they surrendered their fleet, acknowledged the independence of the inferior towns and villages, which were scattered along the delightful banks of the Peneus and the Alpheus, and modelled their internal government according to the plan prescribed by their conquerors<sup>47</sup>.

The war of Elis occupied, but did not engross, the attention of the Spartans; nor did the punishment of that unfortunate republic divert them from other projects of revenge. The Messenians were not their accidental and temporary, but their natural and inveterate, foes; and might justly expect to feel the unhappy consequences of their triumph. After the destruction of Messenê, and the long wanderings and misery of its persecuted citizens, the town of Naupactus, situate on the northern shore of the Corinthian gulph, furnished a safe retreat to a feeble remnant of that ancient

The Spartans drive the Messenians from Greece.  
Olymp. xcv. 4.  
A. C. 401.

<sup>47</sup> Xenophon Hellen. l. iii. c. 2. Diodor. l. xiv. p. 404.

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community; which, flourishing under the protection of Athens, spread along the western coast, and planted a considerable colony in the neighbouring island of Cephallenia. We have already described the memorable gratitude of the Messenians, who were the most active, zealous, and, according to their ability, the most useful, allies of Athens in the Peloponnesian war. But *their* assistance (and assistance far more powerful than theirs) proved ineffectual; and the time was now arrived when they were to suffer a severe punishment for their recent as well as ancient injuries. The resentment of Sparta drove them from Naupactus and Cephallenia. The greater part escaped to Sicily; above three thousand failed to Cyrenaica, the only countries inhabited by the Hellenic race, which lay beyond the reach of the Lacedæmonian power<sup>48</sup>.

Causes  
which  
withdrew  
Cyrenaica  
and Sicily  
from the  
sphere of  
Grecian  
politics.

From the æra of this important migration, the names of Sicily and Cyrenaica will seldom occur in the present history; on which account it may not be improper briefly to explain the causes which withdrew from the general sphere of Grecian politics a fruitful and extensive coast, and an island not less fruitful and extensive, and far more populous and powerful. The insulated situation of those remote provinces, while it rendered it extremely inconvenient for Greece to interfere in their affairs, peculiarly exposed them to two evils, which rendered it still more inconvenient for them to interfere in the affairs of Greece. Removed from the

<sup>48</sup> Diodor. l. xiv. p. 415.

protection of their Peloponnesian ancestors, both the Cyreneans and Sicilians often endured the oppression of domestic tyrants, and often suffered the ravages of foreign barbarians.

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The inhabitants of Cyrenaica alternately carried on war against the Libyans and Carthaginians<sup>49</sup>. They were actually oppressed by the tyrant Ariston. Soon afterwards they recovered their civil liberty<sup>50</sup>; but were compelled frequently to struggle for their national independence. Though often invaded, their country was never subdued by any barbarian enemy; and their liberties survived the republics of their European brethren, since they reluctantly submitted, for the first time, to the fortunate general of Alexander, who, in the division of his master's conquests, obtained the fertile and wealthy kingdom of Egypt<sup>51</sup>.

Subse-  
quent his-  
tory of  
Cyrenai-  
ca.

The revolutions of Sicily are far better known than those of Cyrené, and still more worthy to be remembered. During the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, the assistance given by Syracuse to the Lacedæmonians became gradually more faint and imperceptible, and at length it was totally withdrawn. This was occasioned by the necessity of defending the safety of the whole island, in which that of the capital was involved, against the formidable descents of the Carthaginians, whom the invitation of Segesta and several inferior cities at va-

Of Sicily,

<sup>49</sup> Aristot. Polit. Sallust. de Bell. Jugurth.

<sup>50</sup> Diodor. l. xiv. p. 415.

<sup>51</sup> Diodor. l. xix. p. 715. & Strabo, l. xvii. p. 836.



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riance with their powerful neighbours, the hopes of acquiring at once those valuable commodities, the annual purchase of which drained Africa of such immense treasures, and, above all, the desire of revenging the death of Hamilcar, and the dishonour of the Carthaginian name in the unfortunate siege of Himera, encouraged to undertake and carry on various expeditions for the entire subjugation of Sicily.

which is long harassed by the Carthaginians ;

Olymp. xcii. 3.  
Olymp. xciv. 1.  
A. C. 410  
—404.

Hannibal, the grandson of Hamilcar, was entrusted with the conduct of the war, which commenced the four hundred and tenth, and continued, with little intermission, till the four hundred and fourth year before the Christian æra. The domestic troops of Carthage were reinforced by their African allies. Considerable levies were made among the native Spaniards and Italians, who had long envied the splendour, and dreaded the power of the Greeks, to whose conquests and colonies they saw no bounds. The united army exceeded an hundred thousand men, and was conveyed to the southern shore of Sicily in a proportionable number of transports and gallies<sup>52</sup>.

whose conquests are interrupted by pestilence.

A. C. 409.

The design of Hannibal, as far it appears from his measures, was to conquer successively the smaller and more defenceless towns, before he laid siege to Syracuse, whose natural strength, recently improved by art, bidding defiance to assault, could only be taken by blockade. The first campaign was rendered memorable by the conquest of Se-

<sup>52</sup> Diodor. Sicul. l. xiii. c. 43, & seqq.

linus and Himera; the second by the demolition of Agrigentum; the third by the taking of Gela. The inferior cities of Solas, Egesta, Motya, An-cyra, Entelta, and Panormus, either invited the Carthaginian arms, or surrendered without resist-ance. The invaders might have proceeded to the siege of Syracuse, the main object of their expedi-tion; but pestilence followed the bloody havoc of war, and swept off, in undistinguished ruin, the victors and the vanquished. Not only the general, but the most numerous portion of his troops, had fallen a prey to this calamity; and Hamilcar, who succeeded to the command, contented himself with leaving garrisons in the towns which had been conquered, and returned to Africa with the enfeebled remains of his armament, which com-municated the pestilential infection to Carthage, where it long raged with destructive fury<sup>53</sup>.


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XXIV.A. C. 406.  
A. C. 405.

According to the genius of Grecian superstition, it was natural to ascribe the sufferings of the Carthaginians to the unexampled cruelty and impiety with which, in their successive ravages, they had deformed the fair face of Sicily. It would be useless and disgusting to describe the horrid scenes of bloodshed and slaughter transacted in the several places which presumed to resist their power. Whatever atrocities could be invented by the unprincipled licence of the Italians, approved by the stern insensibility of the Spaniards, and inflicted by the implacable revenge of the Africans, were com-

Excessive  
cruelty of  
the Car-  
thagini-  
ans.<sup>53</sup> Diodor. l. xiii. c. 70, & seqq.

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mitted in the miserable cities of Selinus, Himera, Gela, and Agrigentum. After the taking of Himera, Hannibal sacrificed in one day, three thousand of its inhabitants to the manes of his grandfather, who, in the first Carthaginian invasion, had perished before its walls; and the lot of these unhappy victims, dreadful as it was, might justly be an object of envy to the long-tormented natives of Gela and Selinus.

Ancient  
magnifi-  
cence of  
Agrigen-  
tum.

Yet of all Sicilian cities, the fate of Agrigentum seemed the most worthy to be deplored, from the striking contrast of its fallen state with its recent splendour and prosperity. The natural beauties<sup>54</sup> of Agrigentum were secured by strength, and adorned with elegance; and whoever considered, either the innumerable advantages of the city itself, or the gay cultivation of the surrounding territory, which abounded in every luxury of the sea and land, was ready to pronounce the Agrigentines the most favoured inhabitants of the earth. The exuberant fertility of the soil, particularly the rich luxuriance of the vines and olives<sup>55</sup>, exceeded every thing that is related of the happiest climates, and furnished the materials of a lucrative commerce with the populous coast of Africa, which was very sparingly provided in those valuable plants. The

<sup>54</sup> The following particulars in the text, concerning Agrigentum, we learn from Diodorus Siculus, p. 374—379. Valer. Maxim. l. iv. 8. Athenæus, l. i. c. 3.

<sup>55</sup> Diodorus celebrates the height of the vines, which we are not used to consider as a proper subject of panegyric.



extraordinary wealth of the Agrigentines was displayed in the magnificence of public edifices, and in the splendid enjoyment of private fortunes. They had begun, and almost completed, the celebrated temple of Jupiter, built in the grandest style of architecture employed by the Greeks on the greatest and most solemn occasions. Its walls were encompassed by pillars without, and adorned by pilasters within; and its magnitude far exceeded the ordinary dimensions of ancient temples, as it extended three hundred and forty feet in length, sixty in breadth, and an hundred and twenty in height, without including the lofty and spacious dome. The grandeur of the doors and vestibule corresponded with the simple majesty of the whole edifice, whose sculptured ornaments represented, with finished elegance, and with a laborious accuracy that distinguished each particular figure, the defeat of the Giants, and the taking of Troy; respectively, the most illustrious exploits of Grecian gods, and Grecian heroes.

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The temple of Jupiter.

This noble monument, consecrated to piety and patriotism, might be contrasted, by a philosophic mind, with others destined to a very different purpose. Without the walls of Agrigentum an artificial pond, or rather lake, thirty feet deep and near a mile in circumference, was continually replenished with a rare variety of the most delicate fishes, to furnish a sure supply to the sumptuous extravagance of public entertainments. But nothing could rival the elegance and beauty of the

Their luxury.

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tombs and sepulchres erected by the Agrigentines, to perpetuate the fame of their courfers which had obtained the Olympic prize; and, if we believe the testimony of an eye-witness<sup>56</sup>, to commemorate the quails and other delicate birds, which were cherished with an affectionate and partial fondness by the effeminate youth of both sexes. Such capricious and absurd abuses of opulence and the arts might be expected amidst the mortifying discrimination of ranks, and the enormous superabundance of private riches, which distinguished the Agrigentines. The labour of numerous and active slaves cultivated agriculture and manufactures with extraordinary success. From the profit of these servile hands many citizens attained, and exceeded, the measure not only of Grecian, but of modern wealth. A short time before the siege of the town, Hexenitus returned in triumph from Olympia, with three hundred chariots, each drawn by two milk-white horses of Sicilian blood. Antisthenes had eclipsed this magnificence in celebrating the marriage of his daughter. But every native of Agrigentum yielded the fame of splendour to the hospitable Gellias, whose palace could entertain and lodge five hundred guests, who had been clothed from his wardrobe, and whose cellars, consisting of three hundred spacious reservoirs, cut in the solid rock, daily invited the joyous festivity of strangers and citizens.

Excessive  
wealth of  
individu-  
als.

<sup>56</sup> Timæus apud Diodor. l. xiii.

Before the second Carthaginian invasion, the Agrigentines, warned by the fate of Selinus and Himera, had prepared whatever seemed most necessary for their own defence. Their magazines were stored with provisions, their arsenals with arms. Elevated by the confidence of prosperity, they had courage to resist the first impressions of their enemies; but, corrupted by the vices of wealth and luxury, they wanted fortitude to persevere. Their allies in Sicily and Italy shewed not that degree of ardour which might have been expected in a war which so deeply concerned them all: yet, by the partial assistance of Syracuse, Gela, and Camerina, as well as several Grecian allies in Italy, the Agrigentines stood the siege eight months, during which, the Carthaginians employed every resource of strength and ingenuity. At length the place was reduced to great difficulties by means of immense wooden machines, drawn on wheels, which enabled the besiegers to fight on equal ground with those who defended the walls. But before any breach was effected, the greater part of the inhabitants determined to abandon the city.

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Siege of  
Agrigen-  
tum.

In the obscurity of night, they departed with their wives and families, and many of them fortunately escaped to Gela, Syracuse, and Leontium. Others, wanting courage for this dangerous resolution, or unwilling to survive the fate of their country, perished by their own hands. A third class, more timid, or more superstitious, shut themselves up in the temples, expecting to be saved by the protection

Unhappy  
fate of its  
inhabit-  
ants.



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tection of the gods, or by the religious awe of the enemy. But the Barbarians no more respected what was sacred, than what was profane. The consecrated statues, and altars, and offerings, were confounded with things the most vile, and plundered or destroyed in the promiscuous ruin. One memorable act of despair may represent the general horror of this dreadful scene. With his numerous friends, and most valued treasure, the humane and hospitable Gellias had taken refuge in the temple of Minerva; but when he understood the universal desolation of his country, he set fire to that sacred edifice, chusing to perish by the flames rather than by the rage of the Carthaginians<sup>57</sup>.

Amidst  
the tu-  
mults of  
war and  
faction  
Dionysius  
rises to  
eminence.  
Olymp.  
xciii. 1.  
A. C. 408.

Near fourscore years before the demolition of Agrigentum, Sicily had acquired immortal glory, by defeating more numerous invaders; but, at that time, the efforts of the whole island were united and animated by the virtues and abilities of Gelon; whereas, amidst the actual dangers and trepidation of the Carthaginian war, the Sicilians were distracted by domestic factions. Syracuse had banished the only man whose consummate wisdom, and approved valour and fidelity, seemed worthy to direct the helm in the present tempestuous juncture. In the interval between the siege of Himera and that of Agrigentum, the patriotic Hermocrates had returned to Sicily; and, at the head of his numerous adherents, had attempted to gain

<sup>57</sup> Diodorus, p. 379.

admission into the capital. But the attempt was immediately fatal to himself; and, in its consequences, destructive of the public freedom. His partisans, though discomfited and banished, soon found a leader qualified to avenge their cause, and to punish the ingratitude of Syracuse.

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This was the celebrated Dionysius, a youth of twenty-two years; of mean parentage, but unbounded ambition; destitute (if we believe historians) of almost every virtue, and possessed of every talent; and whose fortune it was, to live and flourish amidst those perturbed circumstances of foreign war and civil dissension, which are favourable to the elevation of superior minds. Though esteemed and entrusted by Hermocrates, who could more easily discern the merit of his abilities, than discover the danger of his ambition, Dionysius had gained friends in the opposite faction, by whose interest he was recalled from exile. His services in the Carthaginian war raised him to eminence. He excelled in valour; he was unrivalled in eloquence; his ends were pursued with steady perseverance; his means were varied with convenient flexibility; the appearance of patriotism rendered him popular, and he employed his popularity to restore his banished friends.

His character.

The gratitude of one party, and the admiration of both, enabled him to attain the command of the mercenaries, and the conduct of the war. But he was less solicitous to conquer the Carthaginians than to enslave his fellow-citizens, whose factious turbulence rendered them unworthy of liberty.

Means by which he usurped the government of Syracuse.  
Olymp. xciii. 4.  
A. C. 405.

By

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By the affected dread of violence from his enemies, he obtained a guard for his person, which his artful generosity easily attached to his interest; and the arms of his troops, the influence and wealth of Philistus, the historian of Sicily, who was honoured with the appellation of the second Thucydides<sup>58</sup>, above all his own crafty and daring ambition, enabled him, at the age of twenty-five, to usurp the government of Syracuse, which he held for thirty-eight years.

His suc-  
cessful  
reign.  
Olymp.  
xciii. 4.  
A. C. 405.  
Olymp.  
ciii. 2.  
A. C. 367.

During his long and active reign he was generally engaged in war; sometimes with the Carthaginians, sometimes with his revolted subjects. Yet in both contests he finally prevailed, having reduced the Carthaginian power in Sicily, and appeased, or intimidated, domestic rebellion. His actual condition, however splendid, he regarded only as a preparation for higher grandeur. He besieged and took Rhegium, the key of Italy: nor could the feeble confederacy of the Italian Greeks have prevented the conquest of that country, had not the renewed hostilities of the Carthaginians, and fresh discontents at home, interrupted the progress of his arms. This growing storm he resisted as successfully as before, and transmitted, to a degenerate son, the peaceful inheritance of the greatest part of Sicily; after having strengthened, with wonderful art, the fortifications of the capital; enlarged the size, and improved the form of the

<sup>58</sup> Cicero de Orator. l. xi.



Syracusan gallies; invented the military catapults, an engine of war which he employed, with great advantage, in the siege of Motya and Rhegium; and not only defended his native island against foreign invasion, but rendered its power formidable to the neighbouring countries.

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His poetical labours were the least uniformly successful of all his undertakings. His verses, though rehearsed by the most skilful *rhapsodists* of the age, were treated with signal contempt at the Olympic games. A second time he renewed his pretension to literary fame in that illustrious assembly; but his ambassador was insulted by the most humiliating indignities; and the orator Lyfias pronounced a discourse, in which he maintained the impropriety of admitting the representative of an impious tyrant to assist at a solemnity consecrated to religion, virtue, and liberty<sup>59</sup>. The oration of Lyfias leaves room to suspect that the plenitude of Dionysius's power, rather than the defect of his poetry, exposed him to the censure and derision of the Olympic spectators; and this suspicion receives strong confirmation by considering, that, in the last year of his reign, he deserved and obtained the poetic crown at Athens; a city renowned for the impartiality of its literary decisions<sup>60</sup>.

His literary ambition.

A. C. 387.

It is remarkable, that, with such an active, vigorous, and comprehensive mind; with such a variety of talents, and such an accumulation of

Reasons why the character of Dionysius appears

<sup>59</sup> Life of Lyfias, p. 117. Dionys. Halicar. de Demosth.

<sup>60</sup> Isocrat. Panegy.

glory,

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peared so  
odious to  
ancient  
historians.

glory, Dionysius should be universally held out and branded, as the most conspicuous example of an odious and miserable tyrant, the object of terror in his own, and of detestation in succeeding ages. Yet the uncorrupted evidence of history will prove, that the character of Dionysius was not decisively flagitious. His situation rendered it artificial; and he is acknowledged often to have assumed the semblance of virtue. Always crafty and cautious; but by turns, and as it suited his interest, mild, affable, and condescending; or cruel, arrogant, and imperious: nor did the Syracusans feel the rigour of his tyranny, until they had justly provoked it by an insurrection, during which they treated his wife and children with the most barbarous and brutal fury. But there are two circumstances in the character of Dionysius which peculiarly excited the indignation of the moralists of Greece and Rome, and which the moderation or the softness of modern times will be disposed to consider with less severity. He had usurped the government of a free republic; a crime necessarily heinous in the sight of those who held the assassination of a tyrant to be the most meritorious exertion of human virtue; and he professed an open contempt for the religion of his country; a crime of which the bare suspicion had brought to death the most amiable and respected of men. Yet the impiety of Dionysius was only the child of his interest, and sometimes the parent of his wit. He stripped a celebrated statue of Jupiter of a golden robe, observing, that it was too heavy  
in

in summer, and too cold in winter. For a reason equally ingenious he deprived Æsculapius of his golden beard; asserting, that such a venerable ornament ill became the son of the beardless Apollo. But if he despoiled the altars and statues, he increased and improved the fleets and armies, of Syracuse, which were successfully employed against the public enemy. And to the general current of satire and declamation against this extraordinary man<sup>61</sup>, may be opposed the opinion of Polybius and Scipio Africanus, the most illustrious characters of the most illustrious age of Rome: "That none ever concerted his schemes with more prudence, or executed them with more boldness, than Dionysius the Elder."

His son, Dionysius the Younger, exceeded his vices without possessing his abilities. The reign of this second tyrant was distracted and inglorious. His kinsman Dion, the amiable disciple of Plato, endeavoured to correct the disorders of his ungoverned mind. But the task was too heavy for Dion, and even for Plato himself. The former, unable to restrain the excesses of the prince, undertook the defence of the people. His patriotism interrupted, but did not destroy, the tyranny of Dionysius, which was finally abolished, twenty-two

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Inglorious  
reign of  
Dionysius the  
Younger.  
Olymp.  
civ. 3.  
A. C. 362.  
Olymp.  
cx. 1.  
A. C. 340.

<sup>61</sup> The authentic history of the reign of Dionysius is copiously recorded by Diodorus Siculus, l. xiv. & xv. To relate the numerous and improbable stories told of him by Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca, and other moralists, would be to transcribe what it is not easy to believe. The reader may consult, particularly, Plut. ex edit. Paris, in Moral. pp. 78 & 83. De Garrul. p. 508. In Dion. p. 961; and various passages of Cicero de Officiis, & Tusculan. Quæst.



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years after he first mounted the throne, by the magnanimity of Timoleon<sup>62</sup>. This revolution happened only two years before Corinth, the country of Timoleon, as well as the other republics of Greece, submitted to the arms of Philip of Macedon; and, having lost their own independence, became incapable of asserting the freedom of their colonies.

Sicily becomes a province of Rome. Olymp. cxlii. i. A. C. 212.

New tyrants started up in Syracuse, and almost in every city of Sicily, and held a precarious sway under the alternate protection of the Carthaginians and Romans. The citizens of Syracuse, mindful of their ancient fame, dethroned their usurpers, and enjoyed considerable intervals of liberty. But at length the Romans gained possession of the place; the persevering valour of Marcellus, assisted by the treachery of the garrison, prevailing, after a siege of three years, over the bold efforts of mechanical power, directed by the inventive genius of Archimedes<sup>63</sup>. The reduction of the capital was immediately followed by the conquest of the adjoining territory; and Sicily came thus to be regarded as the eldest province of Rome, and the first country, without the limits of Italy, which had taught that victorious republic to taste and enjoy the sweets of foreign dominion<sup>64</sup>.

<sup>62</sup> Corn. Nepos. Diodorus Sicul. Plut. Dion.

<sup>63</sup> Polyb. Excerpt. l. viii. Plut. in Marcell.

<sup>64</sup> Livy, l. xxiv. & Cicero in Verrem in few words—*Omnium exterarum gentium princeps Sicilia ad amicitiam fidemque, P. R. applicuit; primaque omnium, id quod ornamentum imperii est, provincia est appellata: prima docuit majores nostros, quam præclarum esset exteris gentibus imperitare.*

## C H A P. XXV.

*Death of Darius Nothus.—Cyrus disputes the Succession with his elder Brother Artaxerxes.—Character of Cyrus.—State of Lower Asia under his Administration.—His Strength and Resources.—His Expedition into Upper Asia.—Describes the vast Army of his Brother.—Battle of Canaxa.—Death of Cyrus.—His Grecian Auxiliaries victorious.—Their Treaty with Tissaphernes.—Perfidious Assassination of the Grecian Generals.—Artaxerxes sends to the Greeks to demand their Arms.—Conference on that Subject.*

WHILE the operations of war conspired with the revolutions of government, to detach the Grecian colonies in Italy, Sicily, and Cyrené, from the general interests and politics of the mother country, a series of events, not less curious than important, connected, in the closest intimacy, the history of Greece with the annals of the Persian empire. The same memorable year which terminated the destructive war of Peloponnesus brought to a conclusion the active and prosperous reign of Darius Nothus. He named as his successor Artaxerxes, styled Mnemon, from the strength of his memory; and persisted in this choice, notwithstanding the opposition of the art-ful

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Death of  
Darius  
Nothus.  
Olymp.  
xciv. 1.  
A. C. 404.

The suc-  
cession of  
Artaxer-  
xes is dis-  
puted  
by his  
younger  
brother  
Cyrus.

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ful and ambitious Paryfatis, who employed her extensive influence over the mind of an old and uxorious husband, to obtain the kingdom for Cyrus, the younger brother of Artaxerxes, and the peculiar favourite of his mother. The rivalry of the young princes, both of whom were at court during the last illness of Darius, unhappily degenerated into enmity; and a circumstance, which would be thought immaterial in the present age, increased the indignation of Cyrus. The birth of Artaxerxes had happened before the accession of his father to the throne, but Cyrus was born the son of a king; a distinction which, however frivolous it may appear in modern times, had engaged Darius Hyftafpes to prefer Xerxes, the younger of his sons, to his elder brother Artabazanes<sup>1</sup>.

Cause of  
his resentment  
against Ar-  
taxerxes.

The precedent established by such an illustrious monarch might have enforced the partial arguments of Paryfatis, and both might have been confirmed by the strong claim of merit, since Cyrus early discovered such talents and virtues, as fitted him to fill the most difficult, and to adorn the most exalted, station. At the age of seventeen, he had obtained the government of Lydia, Phrygia, and Cappadocia; and the same mandate of Darius, which destroyed his hopes of succession to the Persian throne, rendered him hereditary satrap of those valuable provinces. On the demise of that monarch, Cyrus prepared to return to Asia

<sup>1</sup> Herodot. l. vii. c. ii.



Minor, attended by the same escort with which he had come to Susa; a faithful body of three hundred heavy-armed Greeks, commanded by Xenias, an Arcadian. But when he prepared to leave court, a very criminal and unfortunate incident retarded his departure. The selfish and perfidious Tissaphernes, who expected to divide the spoils of the young prince, accused him of treason. He was apprehended by order of Artaxerxes; but the powerful protection of Parysatis, who, though she loved only one, was beloved, or at least feared, by both of her sons, defended his life, vindicated his honour, and restored him in safety to his government.

The danger that had threatened his person could not much affect the heroic fortitude of Cyrus; but the affront offered to his dignity sunk deep into his heart; and from the moment that he recovered his freedom, he determined to revenge his injuries<sup>2</sup>, or to perish in the attempt. In the despotic countries of the East, as there is scarcely any intermediate gradation between the prince and people, and scarcely any alternative but that of dominion or servitude, a discontented or rebellious subject must either stifle his animosity, submit to die, or aspire to reign<sup>3</sup>. The magnanimity of Cyrus na-

Circumstances favourable to his ambition.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Anabaf. l. i. c. i. This was the origin of his resentment, which Xenophon expresses with great delicacy; ὁ δὲ κινδυνεύσας καὶ αἰτιασθεὶς, βεβηλευται ὅπως μὴ ποτε εἴη ἐπὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ, &c. He asserted independence, the first wish of every great mind.

<sup>3</sup> "Cyrus determined no longer," says Xenophon, "to depend on his brother; ἀλλὰ ἢ δύνηται βασιλεύειν αὐτ' ἐκείνῳ, "but, if possible, to reign in his stead."

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turally preferred the road of danger and glory; he prepared not only to punish the injustice, but to usurp the throne of Artaxerxes, defended as it was by a million of armed men, and protected both by the power of superstition, and by the splendour of hereditary renown. This design would have been great, but romantic, if the young prince had not enjoyed very extraordinary resources in the powers of his own mind, in the affectionate attachment of his Barbarian subjects, and, above all, in the fidelity and valour of his Lacedæmonian allies.

Character  
of Cyrus;

Whether we consider what he said, or what he did, the testimony of his contemporaries, or the more unerring testimony of his life and actions, Cyrus appears to have been born for the honour of human nature, and particularly for the honour of Asia, which, though the richest and most populous quarter of the globe, has never, in any age, abounded in great characters. From the age of seven years, he had been trained, at the gate of the palace, to shoot with the bow, to manage the horse, and to speak truth; according to the discipline instituted by the great founder of the monarchy, and well adapted, in an age of simplicity, to form the princes and nobles of Persia. But in the course of two centuries, the progress of refinement and luxury, the infectious example of a corrupt court, and the perfidious lessons of the world, had perverted, or rendered ineffectual, a very salutary system of education; and the grandees of Persia, whatever proficiency they made in their exercises,

contrasted  
with that  
of the  
Persian  
nobles.

felt

felt so little regard for veracity, that (as will abundantly appear in the sequel) they seldom spoke but with a view to deceive, and rarely made a promise which they did not break, or took an oath which they did not violate. The behaviour of Cyrus was totally the reverse. He equalled, and surpassed his companions in all exterior accomplishments. But while his manly beauty, his bodily activity and address, and the superior courage, as well as skill, which he displayed in hunting, horsemanship, and every military exercise, commanded the admiration of the multitude; he himself seems not to have estimated such superficial advantages beyond their real worth. He regarded integrity of heart as the only solid basis of a great character. His probity was uniform, his word sacred, his friendship inviolable. In the giddy season of youth, he yielded, with uncommon docility, to the admonitions of experience. Neither wealth, nor birth, nor rank, but age and virtue, were the objects of his respect: and his behaviour, equally meritorious and singular, was justly and universally admired.

His subjects in Lesser Asia, in particular, were seized with the most pleasing astonishment, when, instead of a greedy and voluptuous satrap, eager only to squeeze, to amass, and to enjoy, they beheld a prince who preferred the public interest to his own; who alleviated the weight of taxes, that he might encourage the operations of industry; whose own hands gave the useful example of rural labour;

State of  
Lower  
Asia dur-  
ing his  
admini-  
stration.



C H A P. XXV. labour<sup>4</sup>; whose decisions united justice and mercy; and whose active vigilance introduced (what neither before nor since the government of Cyrus has been known in the Asiatic peninsula) such regularity of police, as rendered intercourse safe, and property secure.

His popular acts.

The virtues of justice and integrity, when accompanied with diligence and abilities, must procure such a degree of respect for the administration, as will naturally be extended to the person, of a prince. But something farther is required, not to obtain the public gratitude and esteem, but to excite the affectionate ardour of select and devoted friends; without the assistance of whom, it is seldom possible to accomplish any great and memorable design. Cyrus excelled all his contemporaries in the art both of acquiring and of preserving the most valuable friendships. His gratitude overpaid every favour; his liberality was large, yet discerning; and his donatives were always enhanced by the handsome and affectionate manner in which they were bestowed. When he discovered a man really worthy of his confidence and esteem, he was not satisfied with giving him a partial share of his affections; he gave his heart entire: and it was his constant prayer to the gods, that he might live to requite and surpass the good offices of his friends, and the injuries of his enemies.

<sup>4</sup> Xenoph. *ibid.* Cic. in Senect. Plut. in Lyfand. have all celebrated this part of his character.

With

With such sentiments and character, Cyrus acquired the firm attachment of a few, and the willing obedience of all his Barbarian subjects, in the populous provinces which he commanded, whose united strength exceeded an hundred thousand fighting men; who, unwarlike as they were, yet excelled, both in bravery and in skill, the effeminate troops of Upper Asia.

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Amount  
of his barbarian  
troops.

They were probably indebted for this advantage to their intercourse with the Greeks, whose disciplined valour, far more than the numbers of his Barbarians, encouraged Cyrus to undertake an expedition for acquiring the empire of the East. By the most important services he had deserved the gratitude of the Lacedæmonian republic; which had been raised, chiefly by his assistance, to the head of Greece, and to the command of the sea. In return for that favour, so inestimable in the sight of an ambitious people, the Spartans readily complied with his request, by sending into Asia eight hundred heavy-armed men, under the command of the intrepid Cheirisophus; and they charged their admiral, Samius, who had succeeded Lyfander in the government of the Ionian coast, faithfully to co-operate with Cyrus, by employing his powerful fleet in whatever service the Persian prince might think proper to recommend<sup>s</sup>. Had they done nothing more than this, Cyrus might well have approved their useful gratitude; especially as their alliance, securing him on the

His chief  
confidence in  
the gratitude and  
valour  
of the  
Greeks.

<sup>s</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. 1. iii.

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Amount  
of his  
Grecian  
troops.

side of Europe, enabled him, without danger, to drain his western garrisons, and to augment the strength of his army. But the friendship of the Spartans carried them still farther. They allowed him to recruit his forces in every part of their dominions; and the generous munificence of Cyrus had acquired numerous partisans well qualified to raise and to command those valuable levies. Clearchus the Spartan, Menon the Thessalian, Proxenus the Bœotian, Agias the Arcadian, and Socrates the Achæan, all alike devoted to the interest and glory of the Persian prince, collected, chiefly from their respective republics, above ten thousand heavy-armed men, and near three thousand archers and targeteers.

Secrecy of  
his pre-  
parations.

These preparations, which were carried on with silence and celerity, deceived the haughty indolence of the Persians; but they could not escape the vigilance of Alcibiades, who then resided at Grynium, a town of Phrygia, under the protection of Pharnabazus. Moved by resentment against the Lacedæmonians, or ambitious of gaining merit with the great king, he desired an escort from the satrap, that he might undertake with safety a journey to Susa, in order to acquaint Artaxerxes with the hostile designs of his brother. Pharnabazus, who possessed not the merit, desired the reward of the discovery; and therefore (as we formerly had occasion to relate<sup>6</sup>) readily gratified the request of Lyfander, by the destruction of Alcibiades.

<sup>6</sup> See above, p. 112.

But



But neither the intelligence conveyed by the Persian governor, nor the repeated solicitations of Tissaphernes, nor the consciousness of his own injustice and cruelty, could rouse Artaxerxes from the profound security of his repose. Cyrus completed his levies without molestation, and almost without suspicion; and prepared, in the beginning of the year four hundred before Christ, to march from the Ionian coast into Upper Asia, at the head of an hundred thousand Barbarians, and above thirteen thousand Greeks. His journey towards Babylon, his defeat and death in the plain of Cynaxa, the retreat and dispersion of his followers, and the memorable return of the Greeks to their native country, have been related by the admired disciple of Socrates (whom the friendship of Proxenus, the Bœotian, recommended to the service and esteem of Cyrus), with such descriptive beauty, with such profound knowledge of war and of human nature, and with such inimitable eloquence, as never were re-united in the work of any one man but that of Xenophon the Athenian. The retreat was principally conducted by Xenophon himself; which has enabled him to adorn his narrative with such an affecting variety of incidents and characters, as will always serve to prove that the force of truth and nature is far superior to the powers of the most fertile fancy. It would be an undertaking not only hardy, but presumptuous, to invade the province of such an accomplished writer, if the design of the present work did not oblige us to select the principal circumstances which illustrate

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Cyrus undertakes his expedition into Upper Asia. Olymp. xcv. 1. A. C. 400.

Xenophon's account of the expedition.

**C H A P.** the condition of the times, and connect the expedition of Cyrus with the subsequent history of Greece.  
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Rapidity  
of his  
march.

Having assembled his forces at Sardis, the Persian prince was carried, by the activity of his resentment or ambition, with the utmost celerity, towards Upper Asia. In ninety-three marches he travelled through the central provinces of Lydia, Phrygia, Cappadocia; traversed the mountains of Cilicia; passed unresisted through Syria; crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus; and after penetrating the desert, entered the confines of Babylonia. In a journey of above twelve hundred miles, his numerous army experienced fewer difficulties than might naturally be expected. The fertile territory of Asia Minor supplying them abundantly with provisions, enabled them to proceed commonly at the rate of fifteen or sixteen miles a-day; and almost every second day brought them to a large and populous city. The dependent satraps or viceroys of Lycaonia and Cilicia were less solicitous to defend the throne of Artaxerxes, than anxious to protect their respective provinces from plunder and devastation. But the former experienced the severity of an invader whom he had the weakness to oppose, without the strength or courage to resist<sup>7</sup>.

Cilicia defended by the beauty of Epyaxa.

Syennesis, governor of Cilicia, had reason to fear that his country might be plundered with equal rapacity. He endeavoured, therefore, to avail

<sup>7</sup> Xenoph. Anabaf. l. i. p. 248.

himself of the natural strength of a province whose southern boundaries are washed by the sea, and which is defended on other sides by the winding branches of Mount Taurus<sup>8</sup>. Towards the west is but one pass, called by Arrian the Gates of Cilicia<sup>9</sup>; sufficient to admit only one chariot at a time, and rendered dark and difficult by steep and almost inaccessible mountains. These were occupied by the troops of Syennesis, who, had he maintained his post, might have easily prevented the passage of an army. But the timid Cilician had not trusted in arms alone for the defence of his country. By the order, or at least with the permission of her husband, his queen, the beautiful Epyaxa, had met Cyrus at Cylenæ, on the frontiers of Phrygia; and, according to the custom of the East, presented her acknowledged liege-lord and superior with gold, silver, and other costly gifts. But the greatest gift was her youth and beauty, which she submitted, it is said, to the enamoured prince, who, after entertaining her with the utmost magnificence and distinction<sup>10</sup>, restored

<sup>8</sup> Xenoph. p. 248.

<sup>9</sup> Arrian. Exped. Alexand. l. ii. p. 31.

<sup>10</sup> She requested Cyrus to shew her his troops. He complied; and attended her coach, in an open car. But the curiosity of Epyaxa had almost cost her dear. "When the Barbarians were reviewed, the Greeks were ordered to their arms, and commanded to advance, as to a charge; after which, the soldiers, of their own accord, ran with shouts to their tents. The Barbarians were thrown into consternation; Epyaxa quitted her coach; the Greeks returned laughing to their tents; and Cyrus rejoiced at seeing the terror with which the Greeks had inspired the Barbarians." Xenoph. Anabaf. l. i. p. 247.



CHAPTER XXV. her to Cilicia by a near, but difficult road, which led across the mountains.

The  
Greeks  
plunder  
Tarsus.

To the escort which accompanied her, Cyrus added a considerable body of Greeks commanded by Menon the Theſſalian. The greater part arrived at Tarsus, the capital, before the army of Cyrus reached the gates of Cilicia; but two companies, amounting together to an hundred men, were miſſing, and ſuppoſed to have been deſtroyed by the mountaineers, while they wandered in queſt of booty. Syenneſis was mortified at hearing that the enemy had already entered his province. But when he likewiſe received intelligence that the Peloponneſian fleet had ſailed round from Ionia, in order to co-operate with the army, the diſagreeable news totally diſconcerted the meaſures of his defence. He fled in precipitation, abandoning his tents and baggage to the invaders. Cyrus croſſed the mountains without oppoſition, and traversed the beautiful irriguous plains of Cilicia, which were adorned with trees and vines, and abounded in ſeſame, panic, millet, wheat, and barley. In four days he arrived at the large and rich city of Tarsus, which was plundered by the reſentment of the Greeks, for the loſs of their companions.

Cyrus exchanges  
preſents  
with Syenneſis of  
Cilicia.

Cyrus immediately ſent for the governor, who had removed from his palace, and, attended by the greater part of the inhabitants, had taken refuge among the ſtrefneſſes in the neighbouring mountains. By the aſſurances of Epyaxa, her

timorous

timorous<sup>11</sup> husband was with much difficulty persuaded to put himself in the power of a superior, to whom, as the price of his safety, he carried large sums of money. Cyrus courteously accepted the welcome supply, which the demands of his troops rendered peculiarly seasonable; and, in return, honoured Syennesis with such presents as were deemed of great value by the kings of the East. They consisted in a Persian robe, a horse with a golden bit, a chain, bracelets, and scimitar of gold, the restoration of prisoners, and the exemption of Cilicia from farther plunder<sup>12</sup>.

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During their luxurious residence at Tarsus, the Greeks were corrupted by prosperity. They disdained to obey their commanders, and refused to continue their journey. The design of marching to Babylon, though it was not unknown to Clearchus, or to the Spartan senate, had been concealed from the soldiers, lest their impatience or their fears might be alarmed by the prospect of such a long and dangerous undertaking. At Tarsus they first discovered their suspicions of the deceit, which immediately broke out into licentious clamours. They insulted the majesty of Cyrus; they reproached the perfidy of their generals; and their

Mutiny in  
the Gre-  
cian camp.

<sup>11</sup> Pride, as well as fear, seems to have actuated Syennesis; ὁ δὲ ἔτι προτέρων ἔδει πῶς κρείττονι ἑαυτῷ εἰς χεῖρας εἶθαι ἐφ', ἔτι τότε Κυρῷ ἰσχυρὰ ἠθέλει, πρὶν ἢ γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ πείσει; "Syennesis declared, that he had never formerly put himself in the power of a man in any respect superior to himself; nor would he then go to Cyrus, till his wife persuaded him," &c. A true picture of oriental manners, meanness varnished with pride!

<sup>12</sup> Xenophon. Anabaf. p. 249.

anger

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Appeased  
by the ad-  
dress of  
Clearchus.

anger was ready to vent itself in open sedition, when the ferment was appeased by the address and prudence of Clearchus. While he privately assured Cyrus of his best endeavours to make the affair take a favourable turn, he openly embraced the cause of the soldiers, affected deeply to feel their grievances, and eagerly concurred with every measure that seemed proper to remove them. His eloquence and his tears diverted the design of immediate hostility. An assembly was summoned to deliberate on the actual posture of affairs. Several, of their own accord, offered their opinion; others spoke as they had been directed by Clearchus. One counsellor, who was heard with applause, advised them to pack up their baggage, and to demand guides or ships from Cyrus, to facilitate their return. Another shewed the folly of this request from a man whose measures they had traversed, and whose purpose they had endeavoured to defeat<sup>13</sup>. They surely could not trust in guides given

<sup>13</sup> This passage is translated as follows by Mr. Spelman: "After him another got up, shewing the folly of the man who advised to demand the ships, as if Cyrus would not resume his expedition. He shewed also how weak a thing it was to apply for a guide to that person whose undertaking we had defeated." If Cyrus resumed his expedition, it could not be said that his undertaking was defeated; nor is this the proper meaning of the word *λυμαινεσθαι*, which signifies to hurt or weaken. I am sensible that by an easy transition, it sometimes signifies to corrupt, to destroy, to defeat; but in the passage before us, if a translator should choose to explain it by any of those words, he must say, "whose undertaking we had begun, endeavoured, or purposed, to defeat; an explanation of *λυμαινεσθαι*, which is justified by the analogy of the Greek language, and which the sense



given them by an enemy; nor could it be expected that Cyrus should part with his ships, which were evidently so necessary to the success of his expedition. At length it was determined to send commissioners to treat with Cyrus, that he might either, by granting the demands of the Greeks, prevail on them to follow him, or be himself prevailed on to allow them to return home; and the difference was thus finally adjusted, by promising each soldier a darick and a half, instead of a darick, of monthly pay<sup>14</sup>.

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When this storm was happily appeased, the enemy left Tarsus, and marched five days through the fertile plains of Cilicia, till they arrived at Issus, the last town of the province; large, rich, and populous; and only fifteen miles distant from the frontier of Syria. This wealthy province was defended by two fortresses, called the Gates of Syria and Cilicia. They extended from the mountains to the sea. The interval of three furlongs between them contained several passes, narrow and intricate, besides the rapid Kerfas, which flowed in the middle, one hundred feet in breadth. It was on this occasion that Cyrus experienced the full advantage of the Lacedæmonian assistance. A fleet of sixty sail, conducted by Pythagoras the Spartan, who had succeeded Samius in the naval command, prepared to land the Greeks on the

Cyrus  
passes the  
Syrian  
gates.

sense absolutely requires." This is one of the few minute mistakes which I have discovered in Mr. Spelman's most accurate translation.

<sup>14</sup> Xenoph. *ibid.* p. 250, & seqq.

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eastern side of the Gates, which must have exposed the Syrian works to a double assault; but the cowardice of Abrocomas, who commanded the numerous forces of Syria and Phœnicia, rendered the execution of this measure unnecessary. The design, alone, was sufficient to terrify him. He abandoned his forts, and fled with precipitation before the approach of an enemy <sup>15</sup>.

The army  
wade the  
Euphra-  
tes.

Cyrus thenceforth proceeded without meeting with any appearance of opposition, and in fifteen days march, reached the banks of the Euphrates. At Thapsacus, which in some eastern languages signifies the ford <sup>16</sup>, this noble river is above half a mile in breadth, but so shoaly that the navigation is reckoned dangerous even for boats which draw very little water. The shallowness increases in the autumnal season, which happened to be the time that the army passed the Euphrates, which nowhere reached above the breast. This favourable circumstance furnished an opportunity to the inhabitants of Thapsacus to flatter Cyrus, that the great river had visibly submitted to him as its future king <sup>17</sup>. Elevated by this auspicious prediction, he pursued his journey through Mesopotamia, part of which was anciently comprehended under the name of Syria <sup>18</sup>. While he proceeded through this fertile country he did not forget that a laborious march of seventeen days, through a barren

<sup>15</sup> Xenoph. p. 253.

<sup>16</sup> Foster's Geographical Dissertation on Xenophon's Retreat.

<sup>17</sup> Xenoph. p. 255.

<sup>18</sup> So it is called by Xenoph. *ibid*.

desart,

desert, must conduct him to the cultivated plains of Babylon. C H A P.  
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Having amply provided for this dangerous undertaking, he performed it with uncommon celerity, both in order to avoid risking the want of provisions, and, if possible, to take his enemy unprepared. For several days the army marched, without interruption, through the province of Babylonia; and, on the fifth, came to a deep and broad ditch, which had been recently dug to intercept, or retard, their passage. But as this defence was left altogether unguarded, and the great king had taken no measures to protect the most valuable portion of his dominions, it was generally believed that he had laid aside the design of venturing an engagement. The troops of Cyrus, therefore, who had hitherto maintained their ranks with circumspection, no longer observed any order of march; their arms were carried in waggons, or on sumpter horses; and their general, in his car, rode in the van with few armed attendants. While they proceeded in this fearless contempt of the enemy, and approached the plain of Cynaxa, which is within a day's journey of Babylon<sup>19</sup>, Patagyas, a Persian, and confidential friend of Cyrus, came riding to-

Traverse  
the desert,  
and enter  
Babylonia.

<sup>19</sup> I have used an indeterminate expression to denote the uncertain situation of those places as described by Strabo, l. ii. & Plut. in Artaxerx. Mr. Spelman justly observes, that the error of Xenophon (unnoticed by any former translator), who makes the distance between Babylon three thousand and sixty stadia, is so enormous, that it can only be owing to a mistake of the transcriber.



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wards them in full speed, his horse all in a foam, calling aloud successively in his own language, and in Greek, that the king was at hand with a vast army <sup>20</sup>.

Cyrus describes the immense army of his brother.

The experienced Greeks, who best knew the danger of being attacked in disorder, were most sensibly alarmed by this sudden surprise. Cyrus, leaping from his car, put on his corslet, mounted his horse, seized his javelin, commanded the troops to arm, and ordered every man to his post. His orders were readily obeyed; and the army advanced, several hours, in order of battle. It was now mid-day; yet no enemy appeared: but in the afternoon they perceived a dust like a white cloud, which gradually thickened into darkness, and overspread the plain. At length the brazen armour flashed; the motion, the ranks, and spears, were distinctly seen. In the front were innumerable chariots, armed with scythes in a downward, and in an oblique direction. The cavalry, commanded by Tissaphernes, were distinguished by white corslets; the Persians by wicker bucklers; the Egyptians by wooden shields reaching down to their feet. These formed the chief strength of Artaxerxes; but the various multitude of nations, marching in separate columns according to their respective countries, had scarcely any armour of defence, and could annoy the enemy only at a distance, with their slings, darts, and arrows <sup>21</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> Xenoph. p. 263.

<sup>21</sup> Xenoph. p. 263, & seqq.

While the hostile battalions approached, Cyrus, accompanied by Pigres the interpreter, and a few chosen attendants, all mounted on horses of extraordinary swiftness, rode through the intermediate space, observing the numbers and disposition of the enemy. He had learned from deserters, that the troops of the great king amounted to twelve hundred thousand, divided into four equal bodies of men, respectively commanded by the four generals Tissaphernes, Gobrias, Arbaces, and Abracomus. The last, however, had not yet joined; nor did he reach Babylonia till five days after the battle. But, notwithstanding this defect, the numbers of Artaxerxes were still sufficient to perform whatever numbers can accomplish. According to the custom of the East, the king, surrounded by a chosen body of cavalry, occupied the centre of the army, as the place of greatest security, and most convenient for issuing his orders with promptitude and effect. But such was the extent of ground covered by the various nations whom he commanded, that even his centre reached beyond the left wing of the army of Cyrus; who, therefore, called aloud to Clearchus to advance opposite to the king's guard, because, if that should be broken, the work would be done. But Clearchus was unwilling to withdraw the Greeks from the Euphrates, lest they should be surrounded by the enemy; he therefore kept his post, assuring Cyrus of his utmost care to make all go well.

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Its number and disposition.

The disobedience of Clearchus, and the distrust of Cyrus, threw away the fortune of the day,

The battle of Cynaxa.

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which involved the fate of Persia, and the renown of Greece. For although, by skilful evolutions, Clearchus eluded the armed chariots and cavalry of the enemy ; though the Greeks, by their countenance and shouts alone, put to flight the opposing crowd, who could not endure the sight of their regular array, their burnished arms, or hear without terror the martial sounds of their harmonious Pœans, intermixed with the clanging of their spears against their brazen bucklers ; yet the great king, perceiving the rapid pursuit of the Greeks, and that nothing opposed him in front, commanded his men to wheel to the left, and advanced with celerity in order to attack the rear of the enemy. If this design had been carried into execution, it is probable that the Greeks, having prevailed on the first onset, would immediately have faced about, and, animated by the joy of victory, and their native ardour, have repelled and routed the troops of Artaxerxes.

Rash im-  
petuosity  
of Cyrus.

But the impatience of Cyrus defeated this favourable prospect. He observed the movement of his brother, and eagerly rode to meet him, at the head of only six hundred horse. Such was the rapid violence of his assault, that the advanced guards of the king were thrown into disorder, and their leader Artagerfes fell by the hand of Cyrus, who, with all his great qualities, had not learned to distinguish between the duties of a soldier and a general. By a seasonable retreat he might still, perhaps, have saved his life, and gained a crown. But his eye darting along the ranks, met that of  
his



his brother. He rushed forward, with a blind instinctive fury, crying out, "I see the man!" and, penetrating the thick globe of attendants, aimed his javelin at the king, pierced his corslet, and wounded his breast. His eagerness to destroy the enemy prevented proper attention to save himself. From an uncertain hand he received a severe wound in the face, which, however, only increased the fury with which he assaulted his brother. Various and inconsistent accounts were given of the death of Cyrus, even by those who assisted in this memorable engagement. The crowd of historians thought it incumbent on them to make him die like the hero of a tragedy, after many vicissitudes of fortune, and many variations of misery. Dinon and Ctesias<sup>22</sup>, the longer to suspend the curiosity of their readers, kill him as with a blunted weapon; but Xenophon is contented with saying, that he fell in the tumultuary conflict of his attendants with the guards of Artaxerxes, who zealously defended their respective masters; and that eight of his most confidential friends lay dead upon him, thus sealing with their blood their inviolable affection and fidelity<sup>32</sup>.

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His death.

Such was the catastrophe of this audacious and fatal enterprise; after which the troops of Artaxerxes advanced, in the ardour of success, and proceeded, without encountering any resistance, to the hostile camp; Ariæus leading off the forces of

The Persian troops plunder the camp of Cyrus.

<sup>22</sup> Apud Plutarch. in Artaxerx.

<sup>23</sup> Xenoph. p. 266.

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Lesser Asia, dejected and dismayed by the loss of their prince and general. Among the valuable plunder in the tents of Cyrus, the Barbarians found two Grecian women, his favourite mistresses, the elder of Phocæa, the younger of Miletus. The former, whose wit and accomplishments heightened the charms of her beauty, received and deserved the name of Aspasia, from the celebrated mistress of Pericles, whose talents she rivalled, and whose character she too faithfully resembled. The young Milesian likewise fell into the hands of the enemy; but while carelessly guarded by the Barbarians, intent on more useful plunder, escaped unobserved, and arrived naked in the quarter of the Greeks, where a small guard had been left to defend the baggage.

The  
Greeks,  
victorious  
in their  
quarter  
of the  
field, pur-  
sue the  
enemy.

Meanwhile Clearchus, at the head of the Grecian phalanx, pursuing the fugitives, had been carried above the distance of three miles from Artaxerxes. But when he heard that the Barbarians were in his tent; and perceived, that, tired with plunder, they advanced to attack his rear, he faced about in order to receive them. The time was spent, till sun-set, in various dispositions made by the cavalry of Artaxerxes; but neither the soldiers, nor their commanders, had courage to come within the reach of the Grecian spear. They fled in scattered disorder, wherever the Grecians advanced; who, wearied with marching against an enemy that seemed incapable to fight, at length determined to return to their camp; wondering that neither Cyrus himself appeared, nor any of his

his messengers<sup>24</sup>. They arrived in the beginning of the night; but found their tents in disorder, their baggage plundered, their provisions destroyed or spent. They chiefly regretted the loss of four hundred carriages filled with wine and flour, which had been provided by the foresight of Cyrus, as a resource in time of want. Even these were rifled by the king's troops; and the Greeks, whom the sudden appearance of the enemy had not allowed to dine, were obliged to pass the night without supper; their bodies exhausted by the fatigue of a laborious day, and their minds perplexed by the uncertain fate of their allies<sup>25</sup>.

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At the approach of light, they prepared to move their camp, when the messengers of Ariæus arrived, acquainting them with the death of Cyrus. The new commander, they said, had assembled the troops of Lesser Asia in their former encampment, about twelve miles from the field of battle; where he intended to continue that day, that the Greeks might have time to join him; but if they delayed, he would next day proceed, without them, towards Ionia, with the utmost expedition. When

Behaviour  
of the  
Greeks  
when in-  
formed of  
Cyrus's  
death.

<sup>24</sup> In relating this battle, I have followed the advice of Plutarch in Artaxerxes, who says, "that Xenophon has described it with such perspicuity, elegance, and force, as sets the action before the eyes of his reader, and makes him assist with emotion at every incident, not as past, but as present. A man of sense, therefore, will despair to rival Xenophon; and, instead of relating the action in detail, will select such circumstances only as are most worthy of notice."

<sup>25</sup> Xenoph. p. 270, & seqq.



CHAP. XXV. the Greeks recovered from the consternation into which they were thrown by these unexpected and melancholy tidings, Clearchus replied, "Would to God Cyrus were alive! but since he is dead, let Ariæus know, that we have conquered the king; that his troops have every-where fled before us; and that now no enemy appears to resist our arms. You may, therefore, assure Ariæus, that if he will come hither, we will place him on the Persian throne, which is the just reward of our victory." With this proposal the messengers departed, and Clearchus led his troops to the field of battle, to collect provisions, which were prepared by using for fuel the wooden bucklers, shields, and arrows, of the Barbarians<sup>26</sup>.

Their answer to the heralds of Artaxerxes, who demanded their armour.

Next morning heralds arrived from Artaxerxes, who entertained a very different opinion from that expressed by Clearchus, concerning the issue of the battle. Among these respected ministers was Philinus, a fugitive Greek, a man esteemed by Tissaphernes, both as a skilful captain and as an able negociator. When the chiefs were assembled, Philinus, speaking for his colleagues, declared it to be the will of the great king, who had defeated and killed Cyrus, "That the Greeks, who had now become the slaves of the conqueror, should surrender their arms." The demand was heard with universal indignation. One desired him to tell the king "to come and take them;" another, "that it was better to die, than to deliver up their arms."

<sup>26</sup> Xenoph. p. 272.

Xenophon spoke to the following purpose: "We have nothing, as you see, O Philinus! but our arms, and our valour. While we keep possession of the one, we can avail ourselves of the other: but, if we deliver up our arms, we also surrender our persons. Do not therefore expect that we shall throw away the only advantages which we still enjoy; on the contrary, be assured, that, relying on our arms and our valour, we will dispute with you those advantages which you possess." Clearchus enforced the sentiments of Xenophon, which were confirmed by the army; and Philinus, after a fruitless attempt to discover the immediate designs of the Greeks, returned with his colleagues to the Persian camp<sup>27</sup>.

Meanwhile, Ariæus replied to the honourable embassy which had been sent him, "That there were many Persians of greater consideration than himself, who would never permit him to be their king; he repeated his desire that the Greeks should join him; but, if they declined to come, persisted in his resolution of returning with all haste to Ionia." This proposal was approved by the propitious indications of the victims: the army marched in order of battle to the encampment of Ariæus; who, with the most distinguished of his captains, entered into treaty with the Grecian commanders, binding themselves by mutual oaths to perform to each other the duties of faithful and affectionate allies. Having ratified this engagement by a fo-

Their plan  
of retreat  
concerted  
with Ari-  
æus.

<sup>27</sup> Xenoph. p. 273.

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lemn sacrifice, they proceeded to deliberate concerning their intended journey. It was determined, that instead of traversing the desolated country by which they had arrived at the field of battle, they should direct their course towards the north, by which means they would avoid the desert, acquire provisions in greater plenty, and cross the great rivers, which commonly diminish near their source, with less difficulty and danger. They resolved also to perform their first marches with all possible expedition, in order to anticipate the king's approach; since with a small force he would not dare to follow, and with a great army he would not be able to overtake, them <sup>28</sup>.

They accepted a  
truce  
from Artaxerxes.

This plan of retreat proposed by Ariæus, had the dishonourable appearance of flight; but fortune proved a more glorious conductor. Such was the effect of the Grecian courage and firmness on the counsels of Artaxerxes, that he, who had so lately commanded the soldiers to surrender their arms, sent heralds to them the day following to treat of a truce. This memorable agreement, the consequences of which were so calamitous, yet so honourable to the Greeks, was concluded by the intervention of Tissaphernes; who engaged, on the part of his master, to furnish them with a market, to cause them to be treated as friends in the countries through which they marched, and to conduct them without guile into Greece. For the Greeks, on the other hand, Clearchus and the generals swore,

<sup>28</sup> Xenoph. p. 276.

that



that they should abstain from ravaging the king's territories; that they should supply themselves with meat and drink only, when, by any accident, the market was not provided; but when it was, that they should purchase whatever they wanted for a reasonable price<sup>29</sup>.

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When this business was transacted, Tissaphernes returned to the king, promising to come back as soon as possible. But on various pretences, he delayed twenty days; during which the Persians had an opportunity to practise with Ariæus. By the dread of punishment, if he persisted in rebellion; by the promise of pardon, if he returned to his allegiance; and, above all, by the warm solicitation of his kinsmen and friends, that unsteady Barbarian was totally detached from the interest of his Grecian allies. His conduct gave just ground to suspect this disposition, which became fully evident after the return of Tissaphernes. From that moment Ariæus no longer encamped with the Greeks, but preferred the neighbourhood of that perfidious satrap. Yet, for three weeks, no open hostility was committed; the armies, fearing, and feared by each other, pursued the same line of march; Tissaphernes led the way; and, according to agreement, furnished the Greeks with a market; but treacherously increased the difficulty of their journey, by conducting them by many windings through the canals and marshes between the Tigris and Euphrates. When they had crossed the

Trea-  
chery of  
Tissa-  
phernes  
and Ari-  
æus.

<sup>29</sup> Xenoph. p. 281, & seqq.

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former river, they continued to march northward along its eastern banks, always encamping at the distance of two or three miles from the Barbarians. Yet this precaution was unable to prevent the parties sent out to provide wood or forage from quarrelling with each other. From reproachful words, they soon proceeded to hostile actions; and these partial encounters were likely to produce the worst consequences, by inflaming the latent, but general animosity, which it had been so difficult to stifle or conceal<sup>30</sup>.

Perfidious  
seizure  
of the  
Grecian  
generals.

At length they arrived at the fatal scene, where the river Zabatus, flowing westward from the mountains of Media, pours its tributary waters into the broad stream of the Tigris. The Grecian generals, and particularly Clearchus, who had long seen and lamented the unfortunate jealousies prevailing among those who had sworn mutual fidelity, proposed a conference between the commanders, in order amicably to explain and remove every ground of hatred and complaint. Tisaphernes and Ariæus, as well as their colleague Orontes, eagerly desired the conference, though their motives were very different from those which actuated Clearchus. A measure so agreeable to both parties was, without difficulty, carried into execution; and the Greeks, on this occasion alone, forsook that prudence and caution, which, both before and after, uniformly governed their conduct. Five generals, and twenty captains, repaired to the

<sup>30</sup> Xenoph. p. 282.

tent of Tiffaphernes; only two hundred foldiers followed them, under pretence of going to market. C H A P.  
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 Clearchus, with his colleagues, Menon, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, were conducted into the fa-  
 trap's apartment; the rest, whether captains or sol-  
 diers, were not allowed to enter. This separation  
 occasioned fear and distrust. The appearance of  
 armed Barbarians increased the terror. A gloomy  
 silence prevailed; when, on a given signal, those  
 within the tent were apprehended, and those with-  
 out cut to pieces. At the same time the Persian  
 cavalry scoured the plain, destroying whomever  
 they encountered. The Greeks were astonished at  
 this mad excursion, which they beheld from their  
 camp; until Nicarchus, an Arcadian, came,  
 miserably mangled, and informed them of the  
 dreadful tragedy that had been acted<sup>31</sup>.

Upon this intelligence they ran to their arms, expecting an immediate assault. But the cowardly Barbarians, not daring to engage in open and honourable war, endeavoured to accomplish their designs by the same impious treachery with which they had begun them. Instead of advancing in a body to attack the Grecian camp, they sent Ariæus, Arteazus, and Mithridates, persons whose great credit with Cyrus might prevent their intentions from being suspected by the enemy. They were attended by three hundred Persians, clad in complete armour. When they drew near to the Greeks, a herald called out, " That, if any of

Artaxer-  
xes sends  
to the  
Greeks to  
demand  
their arms.

<sup>31</sup> Xenoph. p. 286, & seqq.



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Confer-  
ence on  
that sub-  
ject.

the generals or captains were present, they should advance, in order to be made acquainted with the king's pleasure." Cheirisophus the Lacedæmonian, who, next to Clearchus, had hitherto maintained the greatest influence over the army, happened to be absent with a party of foragers. But the remaining generals, Cleanor the Orchomenian, and Sophonetus the Stymphalian, proceeded with caution from the camp, accompanied by Xenophon the Athenian, who (though only a volunteer) followed the commanders, that he might learn what was become of his friend Proxenus<sup>32</sup>. When they came within hearing of the Barbarians, Ariæus said, "Clearchus, O Greeks! having violated his oath, and the articles of peace, is punished with just death; but Proxenus and Menon, who gave information of his crimes, are rewarded with the king's favour. Of you the king demands your arms, which, he says, are now his property, because they belonged to Cyrus, who was his slave." Cleanor the Orchomenian, speaking in the name of the rest, replied to this demand with the utmost indignation, reproaching the perfidy of Ariæus, who had betrayed the friends and benefactors of his master Cyrus; and who co-operated with the enemy of that master, the deceitful and impious Tissaphernes. The Persian endeavoured to justify himself, by repeating his accusation of Clearchus. Upon which Xenophon observed, "That Clearchus, if guilty of perjury, had been justly punished;

<sup>32</sup> Xenoph. p. 288, & seqq.

but

but where are Proxenus and Menon, who are *your* C H A P. benefactors, and *our* commanders? Let them, at XXV. least, be sent to us, since it is evident that their friendship for both parties will make them advise what is best for both." This reasonable request it was impossible to elude; and the Barbarians, after long conferring together, departed without attempting an answer<sup>33</sup>. Their mean duplicity in this interview sufficiently indicated the unhappy treatment of the Grecian commanders, who were kept in close captivity, and afterwards sent to Artaxerxes, by whose order they were put to death.

<sup>33</sup> Xenoph. p. 129.

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*Consternation of the Greeks.—Manly Advice of Xenophon.—Their Retreat.—Difficulties attending it.—Surmounted by their Skill and Perseverance.—Their sufferings among the Carduchian Mountains.—They traverse Armenia.—First behold the Sea from Mount Tbeches.—Defeat the Colchians.—Description of the southern Shore of the Euxine.—Transactions with the Greek Colonies there.—The Greeks arrive at Byzantium.—Enter into the Service of Seuthes.—His History.—Conjunct Expeditions of the Greeks and Thracians.—The Greeks return to the Service of their Country.*

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Consternation  
of the  
Greeks.

THE perfidious assassination of their commanders converted the alarm and terror, that had hitherto reigned in the Grecian camp, into consternation and despair. This dreadful catastrophe completed the afflictions of men distant above twelve hundred miles from their native land; surrounded by craggy mountains, deep and rapid rivers; by famine, war, and the treachery of their allies, still more formidable than the resentment of their enemies. The soldiers reflected, that it was dangerous to depart, yet more dangerous to remain; provisions could be acquired only by the point of the sword; every country was hostile; although



although they conquered one enemy, another would be still ready to receive them; they wanted cavalry to pursue the Barbarians, or to elude their pursuit; victory itself would be fruitless; defeat, certain ruin.

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Amidst these melancholy reflections they had spent the greater part of the night; when Xenophon the Athenian, inspired, as he acknowledges, by a favourable dream, and animated, as his conduct proves, by the native vigour of a virtuous mind, roused and emboldened by adversity, undertook, amidst the general dejection and dismay, the care of his own and of the public safety. Having assembled the captains belonging to the division of his beloved Proxenus, he faithfully represented to them their situation, which, dangerous as it was, ought not to sink brave men to despair. Even in the worst circumstances, fortitude, and fortitude alone, could afford relief. They had been deceived, but not conquered, by the Barbarians; whose perfidious violation of faith, friendship, and hospitality, rendered them odious and contemptible to men and gods; the gods, who were the umpires of the contest, and whose assistance could make the cause of justice and valour prevail over every superiority of strength and numbers<sup>1</sup>.

Manly advice of Xenophon;

The manly piety of Xenophon was communicated, by a generous sympathy, to the breasts of his hearers; who, dispersing through the various quarters of the camp, summoned together the

who, together with Chelrifophus the Spartan, is

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. p. 295.

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named to  
the chief  
command.

principal officers in the army. To them Xenophon addressed a similar discourse, encouraging them by every argument that religion, philosophy, experience, and particularly their own experience, and that of the Grecian history, could afford, to expect success from their own bravery, and the favour of Heaven, and to disdain the offers of accommodation (if such should be made) from their impious foes, whose insidious friendship had always proved more hurtful than their open enmity. The hearty approbation of the Spartan Cheiriso-phus added weight and authority to the persuasive eloquence of the Athenian; who farther exhorted them to substitute commanders in the room of those whom they had lost; to disentangle themselves from every superfluous incumbrance that might obstruct the progress of their march, and to advance with all expedition towards the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates, in the form of a hollow square, having the baggage and those who attended it in the middle, and presenting the valour of their battalions on every side to the enemy. These resolutions were unanimously approved by the council, after which they were referred to the assembled troops, by whom they were readily confirmed, and carried into immediate execution<sup>2</sup>. Timasion, Xanthicles, Cleanor, Philysias, succeeded to the late commanders; Xenophon supplied the place of Proxenus; and so ably was the ascendant of Spartan and Athenian virtue main-

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. p. 299.

tained by him and Cheirifophus, that the names of their unequal colleagues will seldom occur in the following narrative of their retreat.

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The greater part of the day had been employed in these necessary measures; and in the afternoon, the troops having passed the Zabatus, pursued their march in the disposition recommended by Xenophon. But they had not proceeded far, before their rear was harassed by the Persian archers and cavalry, which afforded them a very inauspicious presage of the hardships to which they must be continually exposed in eighteen days journey along the level frontiers of Media. It was difficult to repel these light skirmishers, and impossible to attack them without being exposed to considerable loss; because a detachment of heavy-armed men, or even of targeteers, could not overtake them in a short space, nor could they continue the pursuit without being cut off from the rest of the army. Xenophon, with more valour than prudence, tried the unfortunate experiment; but was obliged to retreat fighting, and brought back his men wounded, disheartened, and disgraced<sup>3</sup>.

The  
Greeks  
harassed in  
their re-  
treat by  
the Persian  
archers  
and caval-  
ry.

But this unfortunate event neither disheartened nor disgraced the commander. He ingenuously acknowledged his error, which, pernicious as it was, had taught the Greeks their wants. They wanted cavalry and light-armed troops; the former of which might be obtained by equipping for war the baggage-horses which had been taken from

They  
equip their  
sumpter  
horses for  
war, and  
furnish the  
Rhodians  
with  
slings.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. p. 305, & seqq.



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the enemy ; and the latter might be supplied by the Rhodians (well skilled in the sling), of whom there were great numbers in the army. This advice was approved ; a company of fifty horsemen was soon raised, the men vying with each other to obtain the honour of this distinguished service ; and two hundred Rhodians were drawn from the ranks, who furnished themselves with slings and leaden balls, which they threw twice as far as the stones employed by the Barbarians. The horsemen wore buff coats and corslets ; they were commanded by Lycius the Athenian <sup>4</sup>.

Their suc-  
cess in  
conse-  
quence of  
these mea-  
sures.

The utility of these preparations was discovered as soon as the enemy renewed their assaults, with a thousand horse, and four thousand slingers and archers. The newly-raised troops advanced with boldness and celerity, being assured that their unequal attack would be sustained by the targeteers and heavy-armed men. But the Persians, not waiting to receive them, fled in scattered disorder ; the Greeks pursued, took many prisoners, made great slaughter, and mangled the bodies of the slain, in order to terrify, by such a dreadful spectacle of revenge, their cowardly and perfidious enemies <sup>5</sup>.

New dif-  
ficulties  
with  
which  
they had  
to strug-  
gle.

After this advantage, the army continued to march along the banks of the Tigris, and the western boundaries of Media, meeting with many rich and populous villages, from which they were supplied with provisions ; and admiring, as they

<sup>4</sup> Xenoph. p. 307.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. p. 308.

passed

passed along, the immense walls, the lofty and durable pyramids, the spacious but deserted cities, which testified the ancient greatness of that flourishing kingdom, before the Medes reluctantly submitted to the oppressive government of Persia. The Barbarians still endeavoured to annoy them, but with very little success, unless when they passed a bridge, or any narrow defile. On such occasions, the square form, in which they had hitherto marched, was found doubly inconvenient<sup>6</sup>. In order to traverse such a passage, the soldiers were obliged to close the wings, and to crowd into a narrow space, which disordered the ranks, and made them obstruct each other. When they had crossed the bridge or defile, they were again obliged to run with all haste, in order to extend the wings, and resume their ranks, which occasioned a void in the centre, and much disheartened the men, thus exposed to the sudden attack of the pursuers.

To obviate both inconveniencies, the Greeks separated from the army six companies, each consisting of an hundred men. These were subdivided into smaller bodies, of fifty and twenty-five, each division of the company, as well as the whole, commanded by proper officers. When it became necessary to close the wings, in order to pass a defile, these troops staid behind, thus disburdening the army of a superfluous mass, and thereby enabling them to proceed without confusion

Sur-  
mounted  
by their  
military  
skill.

<sup>6</sup> Xenoph. p. 310.

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in their ranks. After the passage was effected, the army might again extend the wings, and assume the same loose arrangement as before, without exposing the centre to danger; because the vacuity left there was immediately supplied by the detached companies; the opening, if small, being filled up by the six divisions of an hundred men each; if larger, by the twelve divisions of fifty; and if very large, by the twenty-four divisions of twenty-five<sup>7</sup>; as the same number of men, in proportion to the number of columns into which they were divided, would occupy a wider extent of ground<sup>8</sup>.

The  
Greeks  
approach  
the coun-  
try of the  
Cardu-  
chians.

With this useful precaution the Greeks performed a successful march to the mountains of the Carduchians, where the enemy's cavalry could no longer annoy them. But here they found new difficulties, far more formidable than those with which they had hitherto been obliged to contend. The Tigris, on their left, was so deep and rapid, that the passage appeared absolutely impracticable. Before them rose the high and craggy mountains, which overshadowed the river, inhabited by a

<sup>7</sup> Xenoph. p. 310.

<sup>8</sup> I have explained this matter minutely, because the words of Xenophon are mistaken by great military writers. Major Mauvillon, a skilful engineer and excellent scholar, proposes a transposition of the words of Xenophon, that the greater gaps may be filled up by the greater divisions. He justly observes, that no translator or commentator has taken notice of the difficulty that naturally presents itself on reading the passage, which, however, I hope is sufficiently perspicuous in the text. See *l'Essai sur l'Influence de la Poudre à Canon*, &c. a work which, I believe, no military man can read without receiving from it instruction and entertainment.

warlike



warlike race of men, whose barbarous independence had always defied the hostilities<sup>9</sup> of Persia, as that of their successors, the modern Curdes, does the arms of the Turk, to whom they are but nominally subject<sup>10</sup>. While the Greeks doubted what course to pursue, a certain Rhodian undertook to deliver them from their perplexity, provided they gave him a talent, to reward his labour. “I shall want, besides,” continued he, “two thousand leather bags, which may be obtained by slaying the sheep, goats, oxen, and asses, which the country affords in such numbers as we see around us. The skins may be blown, tied at the ends, and fastened together by the girts belonging to the sumpter horses, then covered with fascines, and lastly with earth. I shall use large stones instead of anchors; every bag will bear two men, whom the fascines and earth will prevent from slipping, and whom, with very little labour on their part, the rapidity of the current will waft across the river<sup>11</sup>.”

Ingenious contrivance of a Rhodian for passing the Tigris.

This ingenious contrivance was commended, but not carried into execution; the Grecians having learned from some prisoners recently taken, that the road through the country of the Carduchians would soon conduct them to the spacious and plentiful province of Armenia. Thither they fearlessly penetrated, regardless of the report, that under a former reign, a Persian army of an hundred

The sufferings of the Greeks among the mountains of the Carduchians.

<sup>9</sup> Xenoph. p. 315.

<sup>10</sup> Rauwolf's Travels.

<sup>11</sup> Xenoph. p. 314.

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and twenty thousand men had been cut off by those fierce barbarians, whose manners were more rude and inhospitable than the mountains which they inhabited. At the approach of the Greeks, the Carduchians retired to their fastnesses, leaving the villages in the plain at the mercy of the invaders. The troops were restrained from injury; but their inoffensive behaviour, and kind invitations to peace, were regarded with contempt by the common enemies of the Greeks, of the Persians, and of human kind. They seized every opportunity to obstruct the march of the army; and though unprepared for a close engagement, used with extraordinary effect their bows, three cubits long, which they bent by pressing the lower part with their left foot. The arrows were near as long as the bows; and their irresistible points pierced the firmest shields and corslets. The Greeks employed their skill in tactics, and their valour, to elude, or to repel, the assault of these dangerous foes, from whom they suffered more in seven days than they had done in as many weeks from the bravest troops of Artaxerxes <sup>12</sup>. At length they arrived at the river Centrites, two hundred feet broad, which forms the southern boundary of Armenia, having just reason to rejoice that they had escaped the weapons of the Carduchians, whose posterity, the Parthians <sup>13</sup>, with the same arms and address, became formidable to Rome, when Rome was formidable to the world <sup>14</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> Xenoph. p. 218—226.

<sup>13</sup> Strabo, l. xvi. p. 515.

<sup>14</sup> Plut. in Crasso & Marc. Anton.

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verse Ar-  
menia.

The month of January was employed in traversing the fruitful plains of Armenia<sup>15</sup>, which are beautifully diversified by hills of easy ascent. Teribazus, the Persian governor of the province, entered into an agreement with the generals, that if they abstained from hostilities, he would not obstruct their march, but furnish them plentifully with provisions. But this league was perfidiously violated. The Greeks had recourse to arms; pursued Teribazus; assaulted and plundered his camp<sup>16</sup>. Next day they were exposed to a more dangerous contest, in which neither skill nor valour could avail. The snow fell in such quantities during the night, as completely covered the men with their arms. Their bodies were benumbed and parched with the piercing coldness of the north wind. Many slaves and sumpter horses perished, with about thirty soldiers. The rest could scarcely be persuaded by Xenophon to put themselves in motion, which was known to be the only remedy for their distress; and as the severity of the weather still continued during the remainder of their march through Armenia, several soldiers lost their sight by the glare of the snow, and their toes and fingers by the intenseness of the cold<sup>17</sup>. The eyes were best defended by wearing something black before

In danger  
of perishing  
by the  
intense  
cold of  
that coun-  
try.

<sup>15</sup> There the Greeks found *παντα τα επιτηδεια, ὅσα εἰν ἀγαθα, βερεια, σιτον, οἶνος παλαιος ευωδεις, ασαφιδας, οσπρια παντοδαπα*; “all kinds of necessaries, and even luxuries, victims, corn, old fragrant wines, dried grapes, and all sorts of pulse.”

<sup>16</sup> Xenoph. p. 328.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p. 329, & seqq.

them;



**CHAP.** them; the feet were preserved by constant motion  
**XXVI.** in the day, and by stripping bare in the night.

Proceed  
 through  
 the terri-  
 tories of  
 the Tao-  
 chians.

From Armenia they proceeded to the country of the Taochians, who, alarmed by the approach of an unknown enemy, had abandoned the vallies, and taken refuge on the mountains, with their wives, children, and cattle. Hither also they had conveyed all their provisions; so that the Greeks were obliged to attack these fastnesses, otherwise the army must have been starved. The Barbarians boldly defended them, by letting fly innumerable volleys of stones down the precipices. But this artillery was at length exhausted; the Greeks became masters of the heights; and a dreadful scene followed. The women first threw their children down the rocks, and then themselves. The men imitated this frantic example of despair; so that the assailants made few prisoners, but took a considerable quantity of sheep, oxen, and asses <sup>18</sup>.

The fierce  
 and fear-  
 less cha-  
 racter of  
 the Chaly-  
 beans.

From thence the army proceeded with uncommon celerity through the bleak and rocky country of the Chalybeans; marching, in seven days, about an hundred and fifty miles. The Chalybeans were the fiercest nation in all those parts. They wore, for their defence, linen corslets, greaves, and helmets; they carried a short falchion at their girdles; and attacked with pikes fifteen cubits long. Instead of discovering any symptoms of flight or fear, they sang, danced, and rejoiced, at the approach of an enemy. They boldly defended

<sup>18</sup> Xenoph. p. 333.

their villages, not declining even a close engagement with the Greeks; who could supply themselves with nothing from this inhospitable and warlike country, but, in their dangerous march through it, subsisted entirely on the cattle lately taken from the Taochians<sup>19</sup>.

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The river Harpafus, four hundred feet broad, separated the territories of the Chalybeans and Scythinians. From the latter the Greeks met with little resistance, in a march of thirteen days, which brought them to the lofty mount Theches, a place held in particular devotion by the inhabitants of the neighbouring territory. The vanguard had no sooner ascended this sacred mountain, than the army were alarmed by loud shouts, which continued to redouble with increasing violence. It was imagined that some new form of danger had appeared, or that some new enemy was ready to assail them. The rear advanced with all possible expedition to the assistance of their companions; but having arrived within hearing, were seized with the most pleasing astonishment, when their ears were saluted from every quarter with the repetition, "The sea! the sea!" the sight of which, a sight so long wished in vain, at first filled them with transports of tumultuous joy, and afterwards recalled more distinctly the remembrance of their parents, their friends, their country, and every object of their most tender concern<sup>20</sup>. The soldiers, with tears in their eyes, em-

The  
Greeks  
arrive at  
mount  
Theches,  
from  
which  
they be-  
hold the  
sea.

<sup>19</sup> Xenoph. p. 338.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p. 339.

braced

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braced each other, and embraced their commanders; and then, as by a hidden consent of sympathy (for it was never known by whose orders), heaped up a mount of stones, which they covered with barbaric arms, as a trophy of their memorable journey through so many fierce and hostile nations.

They pass  
through  
the coun-  
try of the  
Macro-  
nians.

The distant prospect of the Euxine made them forget that they had not yet attained the end of their labours. A space, indeed, of less than sixty miles intervened; but it was covered by the trackless forests of the Macronians, and by the abrupt and intricate windings of the Colchian mountains. A fortunate circumstance enabled them without difficulty to surmount the first of those obstacles. Among the Grecian targeteers was a man who understood the language of the Barbarians. He had been carried to Athens in his youth, where he had served as a slave. At the sight of the Macronians, he recognised his long-forgotten countrymen; and having addressed them in terms of friendship and respect, engaged them to exchange presents, and to enter into alliance with the Greeks<sup>21</sup>, whom they plentifully supplied with provisions, and having cut down the trees that interrupted their passage, conducted them in three days to the western frontier of Colchos.

Enter  
Colchos.

This country, so famous in the fables of antiquity<sup>22</sup>, was inhabited by an ancient colony of Egyptians, who long preserved pure from any foreign admixture, not only their original language,

<sup>21</sup> Xenoph. p. 349.

<sup>22</sup> See Vol. I. p. 19, & seqq.



but the singular manners, and the more singular rites and ceremonies, of their mother-country<sup>23</sup>. C H A P.  
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Though distinguished in other respects from the neighbouring nations, whom they detested, and to whom they seemed detestable, they agreed with them in their jealousy of the Greeks, whose flourishing colonies along the southern shores of the Euxine threatened the safety of their dominions. They assembled therefore from all quarters, occupied the heights, and prepared to dispute the passage with obstinacy. Their numbers, their discipline, their arms, but, still more, their situation, rendered them formidable. If the Greeks advanced in a phalanx, or full line, their ranks would be broken by the inequalities of the ground, the centre would be disordered, and the superior numbers of the enemy would outreach either wing<sup>24</sup>. These inconveniences might partly be remedied by making such parts of the line, as had an easy ascent, wait for the slow and difficult progress of their companions through more abrupt and inaccessible mountains; and, by extending the phalanx in length, and leaving very few men in file, their front might be rendered equal to that of the Colchians. But the first of these operations would have too long exposed the army to the darts and arrows of the Barbarians, and the second would have so much enfeebled the line, as must have rendered it liable to be penetrated. Amidst this choice of difficul-

<sup>23</sup> Herodot. l. xi. c. civ.<sup>24</sup> Idem, p. 341.

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ties, Xenophon proposed, and the proposal was readily approved by his colleagues, that the heavy-armed men should be divided into companies of an hundred each, and that each division should be thrown into a separate column. The wide intervals between the columns might thus enable the smaller army to extend on the right and left beyond the enemy's line; each company or division might ascend the mountain wherever they found it most convenient; the bravest men might be led first to the charge; the depth of the columns<sup>25</sup> could not possibly be penetrated; nor could the enemy fall into the intervals between them, without being cut off by the divisions on either side, which might be arranged in such a manner as to relieve, encourage, and support each other.

Defeat the  
Colchians.

This judicious disposition was attended with the expected success. The heavy-armed men formed eighty companies; the targeteers and archers, divided into three bodies, each of about six hundred men, flanked the army on the right and left. Their third division, consisting chiefly of Arcadians, occupied a distinguished place in the centre. Thus disposed for battle, the wings of the Grecian army, and particularly the targeteers and archers, who were most capable of expedition, advanced with

<sup>25</sup> The *λοχος ορθιος* is defined by Arrian to be a body of men, with the files longer than the ranks; that is, with more men in depth than in front. The *φαλαγξ*, without any epithet, means the contrary. But the *φαλαγξ ορθια* is an army, as the same author tells us, *ὅταν ἐπὶ κερως παρευηται*, that is, having more men in depth than in front, and employing, for some extraordinary reason, what is naturally the line of march as an order of battle.

celerity

celerity to the attack. The enemy, who saw them approach, and who perceived that on either hand they outreached their line, fled to the right and left in order to receive them. By this movement they left a void in their centre, towards which the Arcadian targeteers, supported by the nearest columns, advanced with rapidity, and soon gained the summit. They could thus fight on equal terms with the Barbarians, who, thinking they had lost all when they lost the advantage of the ground, no longer offered resistance, but fled on every side with disordered trepidation, leaving the Greeks masters of the field of battle, as well as of the numerous villages in that neighbourhood<sup>26</sup>, and within two days march of the Euxine sea, without any other enemy to oppose their long-disputed passage thither.

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The southern shore of the Euxine, which actually presents one uniform scene of effeminate indolence and sullen tyranny, anciently contained many barbarous but warlike tribes, totally independent on each other, and scarcely acknowledging any dependence on the king of Persia. That part which extends towards the east and the borders of Mount Caucasus, and which afterwards formed the kingdom of the great Mithridates, was inhabited by the Colchians, Drillians, Mysonæcians, and Tybarenians; the middle division was possessed by the Paphlagonians, who gloried in the irresistible prowess of their numerous cavalry; and the western parts, extending two hundred miles from Heraclea.

Descrip-  
tion of the  
southern  
shore of  
the Eux-  
ine.

<sup>26</sup> Xenoph. p. 341.



**C H A P.** to the Thracian Bosphorus, were occupied by the  
**XXVI.** inhospitable Bithynians; a colony of Thrace, who  
 excelled and delighted in war, which, like their an-  
 cestors in Europe, they carried on with a savage  
 fury <sup>27</sup>.

**The** Amidst the formidable hostility of those nume-  
**Greek** rous nations arose, at wide intervals, several Gre-  
**colony of** cian cities, which enlivened the barbaric gloom,  
**Sinopé.** and displayed the peculiar glory of their arts and  
 arms. Sinopé, the mother and the queen of those  
 cities, was advantageously situated on a narrow  
 isthmus which joined its territory, consisting in a  
 small but fertile peninsula <sup>28</sup>, to the province of  
 Paphlagonia. The foundation of Sinopé re-  
 mounted to the highest antiquity, and was ascribed  
 to Antolycus, one of the Argonauts <sup>29</sup>. The city  
 was afterwards increased by a powerful accession of  
 Milesians. It possessed convenient harbours on either  
 side of the isthmus. The peninsula was surround-  
 ed by sharp rocks, which rendered it inaccessible to  
 an enemy; and the sea abounded with the tunny  
 fish, which flow in shoals from the Palus Mæotis,  
 where they are supposed to be bred <sup>30</sup>, to the Euxine  
 and Propontis.

<sup>27</sup> See Dionysius Periegetes, and Arrian's Periplus.

<sup>28</sup> Tournefort, v. iii. p. 46. says it is about six miles in circum-  
 ference.

<sup>29</sup> See the account of the Argonautic expedition, vol. i. p. 19,  
 & seqq. Strabo, l. xii. p. 546. who gives us this information, says  
 farther, that Lucullus, when he took the town, carried away the  
 statue of Antolycus.

<sup>30</sup> Tournefort, Voyage au Levant.

Such multiplied advantages rendered the Sinopians populous and powerful. They diffused their colonies to the east and west. It is not improbable that they founded Heraclea<sup>31</sup>, on the frontier of Bithynia; and it is certain that they built Cotyora in the territory of the Tybarenians, Cerasus in that of the Myfonæcians, and Trapezus in that of the Drillians.

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The Sinopians found new colonies on that coast.

Trapezus, or Trebizond, was the first friendly city at which the Grecians arrived, after spending more than a twelvemonth in almost continual travelling and war. The numerous inhabitants of this flourishing sea-port, which has now decayed into the much-neglected harbour of Platana<sup>32</sup>, received them with open arms, generously supplied their wants, and treated them with all that endearing yet respectful hospitality of kinsmen, who commiserated their sufferings and admired their virtue. The Grecians, on their part, displayed a very just and becoming sense of the evils which they had escaped, and of their actual security. In the fervour of religious gratitude they paid the solemn vows and sacrifices which they had promised to Ju-

The Greeks are hospitably received at Trebizond, one of these colonies.

<sup>31</sup> Strabo, l. xii. p. 542. calls Heraclea a colony of the Milesians, by whom we may understand the Sinopians, who were themselves a colony of that people. Xenophon, however, called Heraclea a colony of Megareans. Xenoph. Anabaf. p. 358.

<sup>32</sup> Tournefort, l. xvii. This place, however, is still large but depopulated; containing more woods and gardens than houses, and those only of one story; yet the town retains the form of an oblong square, the modern walls being built on the ruins of the ancient, the shape of which occasioned the name of Trapezus, from the Greek word signifying a table. Tournefort, *ibid.*

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piter the preserver, and the other gods and heroes, whose bountiful protection had hitherto conducted them through so many known, and so many concealed dangers. They afterwards celebrated, with much pomp and festivity, the gymnastic games and exercises; an entertainment equally agreeable to themselves, to the citizens of Trebizond, and to the divinities whom they both adored. When these essential duties, for such the Greeks deemed them, had been performed with universal satisfaction, the soldiers, who were unwilling to be burdensome to their Trebizontian friends, found sufficient employment in providing for their own subsistence, and that of their numerous attendants. For several days they ravaged the neighbouring villages of the Colchians and Drillians; and while they cruelly harassed the enemies, they carefully respected the allies, of Trebizond. Their repeated devastations at length desolated the country immediately around them, so that the foraging parties could no longer set out and return on the same day; nor could they penetrate deep into the territory, without being endangered by the nocturnal assaults of the Barbarians. These circumstances rendered it necessary for them to think of leaving Trebizond; on which account an assembly was convened to fix the day of their departure, and to regulate the mode and plan of their future journey<sup>33</sup>.

Chiriso-  
phus sails  
to the

In this important deliberation the soldiers very generally embraced the opinion of Antileon of

<sup>33</sup> Xenoph. 343, & seqq.



Thuria, who told them that, for his part, he was already tired with packing up his baggage, marching, running, mounting guard, and fighting, and now wished, after all his labours, to perform the remainder of the journey like Ulysses, and, stretched out at his ease, to be carried asleep<sup>34</sup> into Greece. That this pleasing proposal might be put in execution, Cheirifophus sailed to the Hellespont, hoping to obtain ships from Anaxibius, who commanded the Spartan fleet in that sea. But in case such a request could not be conveniently granted, the soldiers determined to demand a few ships of war from the inhabitants of Trebizond, with which they intended to put to sea, and to capture whatever merchantmen they could meet with in the Euxine, in order to employ them as transports<sup>35</sup>.

C H A P.  
XXVI.Helle-  
spont to  
demand  
transports  
from the  
Spartan  
admiral.

Several weeks elapsed without bringing any news of Cheirifophus, or promising any hope of assist-

Mean-  
while the  
Greeks

<sup>34</sup> Thus was Ulysses transported by the Phæatians, who placed him sleeping on the shore of Ithaca :

Οἱ δὲ εὐδοῦντ' ἐν νηὶ θοῇ ἐπὶ πόντον ἀγοῖτες

Καθεστάν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ, &c. *Odyss.* xiii. 133.

The beautiful images which the poet, in the same book, gives of the pleasures of rest, after immoderate labour, played about the fancy of Antileon :

Καὶ τῷ νηδυμὸς ὕπνος ἐπὶ βλεφαροῖσι ἐπιπτεῖ

Νηγετός ἡδίστος θανάτῳ ἀγχιστὰ εἰκώς. v. 80.

And again, “ The ship cut the waves with a rapidity, which the flight of the swiftest hawk could not accompany, carrying a man

Ὅς πρὶν μὲν μάλα πολλὰ παθ' ἀλγέα ὅν κατὰ θυμὸν

Ἀνδρῶν τε πτολεμῆς, ἀλεγείνα τε κυματὰ πείρων·

Δη τότε γ' αἵρεμας εὐδε, λελασμένος ἴσος' ἐπιποιθεῖ.”

<sup>35</sup> Xenoph. p. 345.

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capture  
the mer-  
chantmen  
in the  
Euxine;  
in which  
they trans-  
port  
their sick,  
&c. to  
Cerafus.

ance from the Spartan admiral. Meanwhile the Grecian pirates, for they deserve no better name, infested the Euxine sea. Dexippus, the Lacedæmonian, with a degree of perfidy worthy of his commission, betrayed his companions, and sailed off with the galley which he commanded<sup>36</sup>. But Polycrates, the Athenian, behaved with an ardour and fidelity which even robbers sometimes display in their transactions with each other; and his successful diligence soon collected such a number of vessels as served to transport to Cerafus the aged, the infirm, the women and baggage; while the strength of the army, consisting of men below forty years of age, reached the same place in three days march<sup>37</sup>.

Transac-  
tions of  
the Greeks  
at that  
place.

The colony of Cerafus, or Cerazunt, was delightfully situated near the sea, among hills of easy ascent, covered in every age<sup>38</sup> with whole woods of cherry-trees, from which, in all probability, the place derived its name<sup>39</sup>. From thence the voluptuous Lucullus, in the six hundred and eightieth year of Rome, first brought into Italy this delicious fruit, which ancient naturalists scarcely believed capable of thriving in an Italian sky; but which actually adorns the bleakest and most northern re-

<sup>36</sup> Xenoph. p. 345.      <sup>37</sup> Xenoph. p. 349.

<sup>38</sup> Tournefort.

<sup>39</sup> *Κεραύς*, cerasus, cerise, cherry. For a similar reason Tadmor in the desert was called Palmyra, à *palmis*, the palm tree. Tournefort mentions it as the opinion of St. Jerom, that the place gave name to the fruit. The difference is not material.

gions of our own island. At Ceraſus the Greeks remained ten days, diſpoſing of their booty, ſupplying their wants, and reviewing the army, which ſtill amounted to eight thouſand fix hundred men, the reſt having perished by fatigue, war, cold, and ſickneſs <sup>40</sup>.

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After this neceſſary delay, the leſs active portion again embarked, while the vigorous youth purſued their journey through the romantic country of the Moſynæcians; a barbarous, yet powerful tribe, who received their ſingular denomination from the wooden houſes, or rather towers, which they inhabited <sup>41</sup>; and which, either by chance or deſign, were ſcattered in ſuch a manner among the hills and vallies, that at the diſtance of eight miles, the villages could hear and alarm each other <sup>42</sup>. The army next proceeded through the dark and narrow diſtrict of the Chalybians, who ſubſiſted by the working of iron; and whoſe toiſome labours, rugged mountains, and more rugged manners <sup>43</sup>, muſt have formed a ſtriking contrast with the ſmiling plains, the paſtoral life <sup>44</sup>, the innocent and hoſpitable character of their Tyberenian neighbours; who treated the Greeks with every mark of friendſhip and reſpect, and conducted them, with attentive civility, to the city of Cotyora.

They tra-  
verſe the  
territories  
of the  
Moſynæ-  
cians;

Chaly-  
bians;

and Ty-  
berenians.

It might be expected, that the army, having reached the country of their friends and kiſmen,

Diffen-  
ſions in  
the camp,

<sup>40</sup> Xenoph. p. 349.

<sup>41</sup> *Μοſυν & οἰκῶν.*

<sup>42</sup> Xenoph. p. 351.

<sup>43</sup> Idem, p. 354.

<sup>44</sup> Dionyſius Periegetes qualifies them by the epithet *πολυθῆνες*, abounding in ſheep.



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soon after  
their ar-  
rival in  
Cotyora.

should have been disposed peaceably to enjoy the fruits of their past labours and dangers. If they were unwilling to expose themselves to fresh hostilities from the warlike inhabitants of Paphlagonia and Bithynia, they might have waited the arrival of ships from Sinopé and Heraclea, or from the Spartan admiral in the Hellespont, who would either retain them in his own service, or transport them to the Chersonesus, to Byzantium, and to other cities and territories, which, being lately conquered by Sparta, required the vigilant protection of brave and numerous garrisons. But it is more easy for men to repel the assaults of external violence, than to elude the effects of their own ungovernable passions. The Greeks were involved in real danger, in proportion as they attained apparent security. During the long course of their laborious journey, the terror of unknown Barbarians hanging over them, preserved their discipline and their union. But the air of a Grecian colony at once dissolved both. They, who in the remote regions of the East had acted with one soul, and regarded each other as brethren, again felt the unhappy influence of their provincial distinctions. The army was divided by separate interests, as well as by partial attachments. Those who had acquired wealth, desired to return home to enjoy it. Those who were destitute of fortune, longed to plunder friends and foes, Greeks and Barbarians. The commanders despised and deceived the troops; the troops clamoured against, and insulted the commanders. Both were really in the wrong;  
and

and both suspected and accused each other of imaginary crimes, of which none were guilty.

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Xenophon, who, with wonderful address, has justified himself from every reproach<sup>45</sup> that can reflect either on his understanding or his heart, does not deny an imputation to which he was exposed by discovering (somewhat, perhaps, unreasonably) the just and extensive views of a philosopher. When he surveyed the southern shores of the Euxine, covered in ancient times, as well as they are at present, with tall and majestic forest trees, admirably adapted to ship-building; when he considered the convenience of the harbours, and the productions of the neighbouring territory, consisting in flax, iron, and every commodity most necessary in raising a naval power, he was ambitious of establishing a new settlement, which the numbers, the valour, and the activity of his followers, must soon render superior to the other Grecian colonies on the Euxine, or perhaps in any part of Asia. But this noble design, which might have proved so useful and honourable to the army, was blasted by the mean jealousy of his enemies. Xenophon was reproached with forming projects equally romantic and dangerous; and accused of an intention to keep the soldiers from home, that they might continue dependent on himself, and that he might increase his own fame and fortune at the risk of the public safety<sup>46</sup>.

Xenophon's great views defeated by the mean jealousy of his enemies.

<sup>45</sup> Xenoph. p. 367.

<sup>46</sup> Idem, p. 359, & seqq.

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Sufferings  
of the  
Greeks in  
their  
march  
through  
Bithynia.

The mutinous and distracted spirit of the troops rendered all their future measures weak and wavering. The terror which they inspired, and their wants, which it was necessary to supply, made them very unwelcome guests at Cotyora, Sinopé, and Heraclea, at which places they continued several months, under pretence of waiting for transports, but meanwhile plundering the neighbouring country, laying the cities under contribution, and threatening them with burdens that exceeded their faculties. The inhabitants of Heraclea, while they affected to consider those unreasonable demands, removed their effects from the villages, shut the gates of their city, and placed armed men on the walls. Cheirisophus had by this time returned with vessels from Anaxibius, the Spartan admiral, but not sufficiently numerous to transport so great an army. The soldiers thus disappointed of their hopes, and discontented with their commanders, and with each other, rashly undertook, in separate bodies, the dangerous journey through Bithynia, a country extending two hundred miles from Heraclea to Byzantium, and totally inhabited, or rather wasted, by the Thynians, a Thracian tribe, the most cruel and inhospitable of the human race. In this expedition they lost above a thousand men; and the destruction must have been much greater, had not the generous activity of Xenophon seasonably led his own division to the assistance of those who had deserted his standard. Cheirisophus was soon afterwards killed by a medicine which he had taken in a fever. The sole command de-  
volved



volved on Xenophon; not by appointment, but by the voluntary submission of the troops to his superior mind. He at length taught them to defeat the irregular fury of the Thynians; and, after taking many slaves, and much useful booty, conducted them in safety to Chrysepolis<sup>47</sup>, which is now known by the name of Scutari, and considered as the Asiatic suburb of Constantinople.

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After the death of Cheirifophus, are conducted by Xenophon to Byzantium.

The neighbourhood of a Grecian colony seemed infectious to the temper of the troops. At Byzantium their mutinous spirits were again thrown into fermentation. Cleander, the governor of that city, who had come to meet them, narrowly escaped death during the fury of a military sedition. Their behaviour rendered them the objects of terror to all the inhabitants of those parts. The Lacedæmonians dreaded the assistance of such dangerous allies; and the satrap Pharnabazus, alarmed for the safety of his province, practised with Anaxibius, who commanded in the Hellespont, to allure them, by fair promises, into Europe. Gained by the bribes of the Persian, not only Anaxibius, but his successor Aristarchus, made proposals of advantage to the army, which he had not any intention to fulfil. The troops, enraged at this disappointment, and still more at the treachery of the Spartan commanders, would have attacked and plundered Byzantium, had they not been restrained by the wisdom and authority of Xenophon, who, struggling like a skilful pilot against the violence

The mutinous spirit of the troops breaks out afresh at Byzantium.

<sup>47</sup> Xenoph. p. 277, & seqq.

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of a tempest, prevented the execution of a measure which must have exposed them to immediate danger, and covered them with eternal infamy<sup>48</sup>.

Xenophon dissuades them from plundering that place.

With tears and prayers, he conjured them “ not to tarnish, by the destruction of a Grecian city, the glory of a campaign signalized by so many illustrious victories over the Barbarians. What hopes of safety could they entertain, if, after unsuccessfully attempting to dethrone the king of Persia, they should provoke the resentment of Sparta? Destitute as they were of friends, of money, of subsistence; and reduced by their misconduct to a handful of men, could they expect to insult with impunity the two greatest powers in the world? The experience of late years ought to correct their folly. They had seen that even Athens, in the zenith of her greatness, possessed of four hundred galleys, an annual revenue of a thousand talents, and ten times that sum in her treasury; Athens, who commanded all the islands, and occupied many cities both in Asia and Europe, among which was Byzantium itself, the present object of their frantic ambition, had yielded to the arms of Sparta, whose authority was actually acknowledged in every part of Greece. What madness, then, for men in their friendless condition, a mixed assemblage of different nations, to attack the dominions of a people whose valour was irresistible, and from whose vengeance it was impossible for them to fly, without flying from their country, and taking refuge

<sup>48</sup> Xenoph. p. 399, & seqq.

among those hostile Barbarians, from whom, for  
 near two years past, they had met with nothing  
 but cruelty, injustice, persecution, and treachery?"

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The judicious representations of Xenophon saved  
 Byzantium; but it is probable that neither the  
 weight of argument, nor the power of eloquence,  
 would have long restrained the discontented and  
 needy troops from attempting other enterprises of  
 a similar nature, if an opportunity had not fortu-  
 nately presented itself of employing their danger-  
 ous activity in the service of Seuthes, a bold and  
 successful adventurer of Lower Thrace. Mæfades,  
 the father of Seuthes, reigned over the Melan-  
 deptans, the Thynians, and the Thranipsans, who  
 inhabited the European shores of the Propontis  
 and Euxine sea. The licentious turbulence of  
 his subjects compelled him to fly from his do-  
 minions. He took refuge with Medocus, king  
 of the Odrysians, the most powerful tribe in Up-  
 per Thrace, with whose family his own had long  
 been connected by the sacred ties of hospitality.  
 Medocus kindly received, and generously enter-  
 tained, the father; and, after his decease, continued  
 the same protection and bounty to his son, Seuthes.  
 But the independent spirit of the young prince dis-  
 dained, as he expresses it, to live like a dog at an-  
 other man's table. He desired horses and soldiers  
 from Medocus, that he might acquire subsistence  
 for himself. His request was granted; his incur-  
 sions were successful; the terror of his name filled  
 all the maritime parts of Thrace; and there was  
 reason

The  
Greeks  
invited  
into the  
service  
of Seuthes;

his history.



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Their  
agreement  
with that  
prince.

reason to believe that if he could join the Grecian forces to his own, he might easily regain possession of his hereditary dominions<sup>49</sup>.

For this purpose he sent to Xenophon Medofades, a Thracian, who, understanding the Greek language, usually served him as ambassador. The terms of the treaty were soon agreed on. Seuthes promised each foldier a Cyzicene (about eighteen shillings sterling), the captains two Cyzicenes, and the generals four, of monthly pay. The money, it was observed, would be clear gain, as they might subsist by plundering the country; yet such of the booty as was not of a perishable nature, Seuthes reserved for himself, that by selling it in the maritime towns, he might provide for the pay of his new auxiliaries<sup>50</sup>.

The  
Grecian  
command-  
ers en-  
tertained  
in the  
camp of  
Seuthes.

Having communicated their designs to the army, the Grecian commanders followed Medofades to the camp of Seuthes, which was distant about six miles from the coast of Perinthus, a city of considerable note in the neighbourhood of Byzantium. They arrived after sun-set, but found the Barbarians awake and watchful. Seuthes himself was posted in a strong tower; horses ready bridled stood at the gate; large fires blazed at a distance, while the camp itself was concealed in darkness; precautions, however singular, yet necessary against the Thynians, who were deemed, of all men, the most dangerous enemies in the

<sup>49</sup> Xenoph. p. 393, & seqq.

<sup>50</sup> Idem ibid.

night.

night. The Greeks were permitted to enter. C H A P.  
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 Seuthes received them with rustic hospitality; before entering on business, challenged them to drink in large horns full of wine; then confirmed the promises of his ambassador; and still farther allured Xenophon by the hopes of receiving, besides the stipulated pay, lands and cattle, and an advantageous establishment on the sea-shore.

Next day the Grecian army joined the camp of their new master. The commanders were again entertained with a copious feast, in which Seuthes displayed all his magnificence. After supper, the buffoons and dancers were introduced, the cup went briskly round, and the whole assembly were dissolved in merriment. But Seuthes knew how far to indulge, and when to restrain, the joys of festivity. Without allowing his revels to disturb the stillness of the night, he rose with a martial shout, imitating a man who avoided a javelin; and then addressing the Grecian captains without any sign of intoxication, desired them to have their men ready to march in a few hours, that the enemy, who were as yet unacquainted with the powerful reinforcement which he had received, might be taken unprepared, and conquered by surprise<sup>51</sup>.

The camp was in motion at midnight; it was the middle of winter, and the ground was in many parts covered with a deep snow. But the Thracians, clothed in skins of foxes, were well prepared for such nocturnal expeditions. The Greeks suf-

The army  
joins his  
standard.

Conjunct  
expedi-  
tions of  
the Greeks  
and Thra-  
cians.

<sup>51</sup> Xenoph. p. 406, & seqq.

C H A P.  
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By the assistance of the Greeks, Seuthes recovers his hereditary dominions.

ferred much<sup>52</sup> by the cold; but the rapidity of their march, animated by the certain prospect of success, made them forget their sufferings. Wherever they arrived, the villages were attacked and plundered, the houses were burned, many captives and cattle were taken, and the ravages of that bloody night sufficiently represent the uniform scene of cruelty, by which, in the course of a few weeks, Seuthes compelled into submission the inhabitants of that fertile and populous slip of land that lies between the Euxine and Propontis. But the possession of this territory, which formed the most valuable portion of his hereditary dominions, could not satisfy his ambition. He turned his arms northwards, and over-ran the country about Salmydessus, a maritime city situate at the mouth of a river of the same name, which flows from the southern branch of mount Hæmus into a spacious bay of the Euxine. There the allied army repeated the same destructive havoc which they had already made in the south; and avenged, by their cruel incursions, the cause of violated hospitality; for the Barbarians of those parts were so much accustomed to plunder the vessels which were often shipwrecked on their shoaly coast, that they had distinguished it by pillars, in the nature of

<sup>52</sup> *Ἦν δὲ χιών πολλή, καὶ ψυχρὸς ὡς τὸ ὕδωρ ὃ ἐφέροντο ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, ἐπηγυιότο, καὶ ὁ οἶνος ἐν τοῖς ἀγγείοις· καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πολλῶν καὶ ῥίγες ἀπέκλειοντο καὶ ὤτα.* There was much snow, and the cold so intense, that the water froze as they were carrying it to supper, and the wine in the vessels. Many of the Greeks also lost their ears and noses. Xenoph. p. 408.



land-marks, to prevent intestine quarrels, by ascertaining the property of the spoil<sup>53</sup>.

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In the space of two months after his junction with the Greeks, Seuthes extended his possessions several days march from the sea; his numerous, but unskilful enemies, fighting singly, were successively subdued; each vanquished tribe encreased the strength of his army; the Odrysians, allured by the hopes of plunder, flocked to his standard, and the growing prosperity of his fortune, no longer requiring the support, disposed him to neglect the services, of his Grecian auxiliaries<sup>54</sup>. The ungrateful levity of the Barbarian was encouraged by the perfidious counsels of his favourite Heraclides of Maronea, one of those fugitive Greeks, who having merited punishment at home for their wickedness, obtained distinction abroad by their talents; men sullied with every vice, prepared alike to die or to deceive, and who having provoked the resentment of their own countrymen by their intrigues and their audacity, often acquired the esteem of foreigners by their valour and eloquence, Heraclides strongly exhorted his master to defraud the Greeks of their pay, and to deliver himself from their troublesome importunities, by dismissing them from his service. But the fears, rather than the delicacy of Seuthes, prevented him from complying with this advice; he lost his honour

His signal ingratitude.

<sup>53</sup> Xenoph. p. 408.

<sup>54</sup> Idem, p. 414, & seqq.

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The  
Greeks re-  
turn to  
the service  
of their  
country.

without saving his money; and the Grecian generals had an early opportunity to reproach his perfidy and ingratitude, being soon called to engage in a more honourable war<sup>55</sup>, kindled by the resentment of Artaxerxes against the presumption of the Spartans, who had so strenuously supported the unfortunate rebellion of Cyrus.

<sup>55</sup> Xenoph. p. 427.

## C H A P. XXVII.

*Tissaphernes makes War on the Greeks, by Order of Artaxerxes.—Attacks the Æolian Cities.—Expedition of Thimbron.—He is succeeded by Dercyllidas.—His Treaty with Tissaphernes.—Agesilaus King of Sparta.—Cinadon's Conspiracy.—Agesilaus Commander of the Grecian Forces in Asia.—His Success.—Tissaphernes succeeded by Tithraustes.—Great Views of Agesilaus.—War rekindled in Greece.—League against Sparta.—Campaign of Lysander in Bœotia.—His Death.*

IT does honour rather to the modesty than to the judgment of Xenophon, that he has excluded, from his general history of Grecian affairs, the account of an expedition, in which he himself acted so distinguished a part, and which immediately occasioned very important transactions both in Asia and in Europe. After the downfall of Athenian greatness, the Spartans were naturally exposed to the jealousy and resentment of Persia, by their dominion in Greece, by their conquests on the coast of Asia, by the pre-eminence of their naval power, and especially by their open participation in the rebellious designs of Cyrus. The former circumstances rendered their republic the

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Tissaphernes prepares to make war on the Lacedæmonian allies in Asia, by order of Artaxerxes. Olymp. xciv. 2. A. C. 399.



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rival of the king of Persia; but their co-operation with an ambitious rebel rendered them the personal enemies of Artaxerxes. His resolution to chastise their audacity was communicated to Tissaphernes, who, after harassing the retreat of the Greeks to the foot of the Carduchian mountains, beyond which he had not courage to follow them, returned with a powerful army towards Lower Asia, to resume the government of Caria, his hereditary province, as well as to take possession of the rich spoils of Cyrus, bestowed on him by the gratitude of his master, in return for his recent and signal services against that dangerous pretender to the throne.

Attacks  
the Æo-  
lian ci-  
ties.

Honoured with this magnificent present, Tissaphernes was farther entrusted with executing the vengeance of the great king against the Spartans. Without any formal declaration of war, which the late hostilities in the East seemed to render unnecessary, he attacked the Æolian cities; the satrap Pharnabazus readily entered into his views, and concurred with all his measures. The Lacedæmonian garrison, supported by the townsmen, defended themselves with their usual courage, earnestly soliciting, however, a reinforcement from home, which might enable them to resist and to surmount such an unexpected danger<sup>1</sup>.

The Spar-  
tans send  
Thembron

On this important occasion, the Spartan senate and assembly were not wanting to the assistance of

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 480. Diodor. Sicul. l. xiv. p. 416.

their garrisons, or to the hopes of their Æolian allies. They immediately levied a body of five thousand Peloponnesian troops, and demanded a considerable supply from the Athenians. The latter sent them three hundred horsemen, who having served under the thirty tyrants, were cheerfully sacrificed to this dangerous duty by the partisans of the new democracy. The command of the joint forces was entrusted to the Spartan Thimbron, who had orders<sup>2</sup>, as soon as he arrived in Æolis, to take into pay the Greeks who had engaged in the expedition of Cyrus, and who were actually employed in the dishonourable service of an ungrateful Barbarian. The mean and perfidious behaviour of Seuthes, who, in his new character of prince, still retained his original manners of a Thracian robber, rendered the proposal of joining Thimbron extremely agreeable to Xenophon, who conducted to the Lacedæmonian standard six thousand men, the venerable remains of an army exhausted and ennobled by unexampled toils and dangers<sup>3</sup>.

Having received this powerful reinforcement, Thimbron opened the campaign against the lieutenant of Artaxerxes, at the distance of two years after Cyrus had marched from Ephesus to dispute the crown of Persia. The first impressions of the Grecian arms were attended with considerable success. Thimbron took, or regained, the towns of

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with an  
army to  
their assist-  
ance;

which is  
reinforced  
by the  
Greeks  
who had  
returned  
from Up-  
per Asia.

Thimbron  
opens the  
campaign  
with suc-  
cess;  
Olymp.  
xcv. 3.  
A. C. 398.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. p. 550. Diodor. p. 416.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. Anabaf. l. vii. p. 427.

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fails in the  
siege of  
Larissa;

Pergamus, Teuthrania, Halisarnia, Myrina, Cymé, and Grynium. But the walls of Larissa, a strong city in the Troade, defied his assault; the vigilant garrison baffled all his contrivances for depriving them of fresh water; and, assisted by the inhabitants of the place, made a vigorous sally, repelled the besiegers, and burned or demolished their works.

recalled  
and dis-  
graced;

Nothing but continual action, and an uninterrupted career of victory, could restrain the licentious passions of the troops, composed of a motley assemblage from so many different, and often hostile communities. Their seditious spirit rendered them formidable to each other, and to the Greeks of Asia. Their rapacity spared not the territories of the Lacedæmonian allies, who loudly complained to the senate, ascribing the violence of the troops to the weakness of the general. In consequence of this representation, Thimbron was recalled and disgraced<sup>4</sup>, and the command, for which he seemed

is succeed-  
ed by Der-  
cylidas;

so ill qualified, was bestowed on Dercyllidas, a man fertile in resources, who could often vary his conduct without changing his principles; who knew when to relax, and when to enforce the discipline of the camp, and who, to the talents of an able general, added the reputation of being the best engineer of his times. By a judicious direction of the machines of war which he invented, or improved, Dercyllidas overcame the obstinacy of Larissa; and in the space of eight days, reduced

who ad-  
ministers  
with equal  
ability the  
affairs of  
war and  
peace.

<sup>4</sup> Xenoph. p. 481.



eight other cities in the province of Pharnabazus. C H A P.  
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 The rapidity of his conquests recommended him to the Spartan senate, and his moderate use of victory endeared him to the Asiatic colonies. He lessened their taxes, encouraged their industry, heard their complaints with candour; and decided their differences with the most impartial justice. Disdaining the cruel example of his predecessors, he imposed not any arbitrary exactions on the peaceful citizens and husbandmen; and lest the maintenance of his troops should prove burdensome to the allies and subjects of Sparta, he fixed his winter-quarters in Bithynia, where the valour of Xenophon and his followers had lately spread the terror of the Grecian name.

Early in the spring, commissioners were sent from Sparta to inspect the affairs of Asia, and to prorogue, for another year, the authority of Dercyllidas, provided their observations and inquiries confirmed the very favourable accounts that had been given of his administration. On their arrival at Lampfacus, where the army was then assembled, they visited the camp, and assured the soldiers, that the magistrates of the republic as much approved their conduct in the last, as they had condemned it in the preceding, year. A captain, expressing the sense of the multitude, replied, that the different behaviour of the troops, now and formerly, was yet less different than the characters of Thimbron and Dercyllidas. This testimony of military approbation was not more flattering to the general, than satisfactory to the commissioners;

Commissioners sent from Sparta to prorogue his authority. Olymp. xcv 4. A. C. 497.

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who afterwards, at his request, visited the neighbouring towns of Æolis and Ionia, and found them in a condition extremely happy and flourishing<sup>5</sup>.

Dercyllidas fortifies the Chersonesus.

Before taking leave of Dercyllidas they acquainted him, that the inhabitants of the Thracian Chersonesus had lately sent to Sparta an embassy, requesting assistance against the fierce Barbarians who inhabited the adjoining territory; and that, should circumstances permit him to afford protection to those industrious and distressed Greeks, he would perform a signal service to the state. The inactivity of Tissaphernes, who, notwithstanding the powerful army which he had conducted from Upper Asia, still expected further reinforcements from the East, encouraged the Grecian general to undertake this useful and meritorious enterprize. The Chersonesus was one of the most fertile<sup>6</sup> and best cultivated spots in the ancient world. In an extent of fifty miles in length, and fifteen in breadth, it contained eleven rich and flourishing cities, and several commodious harbours. The fields, producing the most valuable grains, were interspersed and adorned with delightful plantations and orchards, as well as with lawns and meadows, stored with all sorts of useful cattle. Had this beautiful country enjoyed an insular form, its happiness would have been complete; but a neck of land, thirty-seven furlongs in breadth, joined it to the territories of the

<sup>5</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 487.

<sup>6</sup> Περὶ φρουράων καὶ ἀγρῶν. Xenoph. p. 488.

fiercest

fiercest tribes in Thrace. The troops of Dercyllidas could easily have repelled their inroads. They might have punished their cruelty by destroying their miserable villages in the open country; but the Barbarians would have found a secure refuge in their woods and mountains, and whenever the army was withdrawn, would have again poured down on the helpless Chersonesus with their native fury, heightened by revenge. Dercyllidas afforded a more useful assistance to those unhappy Greeks; and employed in their defence, not the courage, but the labour, of his soldiers. With incessant toil, begun in the spring, and continued almost to the autumn, they formed a strong wall across the isthmus; the space was marked out, and the labour distinctly apportioned to the separate communities from which the army had been levied; and the spur of emulation was sharpened by the incitement of gain, the general in person superintending the work, and bestowing rewards (lavishly furnished by the wealthy Chersonites) on the most diligent and deserving<sup>7</sup>.

Dercyllidas had scarcely returned from this employment, justly ennobled by its utility, when the combined forces of Pharnabazus and Tiffaphernes appeared in the neighbourhood of Ephesus. The general collected his whole strength in order to give them battle; the European soldiers displayed a noble ardour for action; but the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast, who had flocked to his standard,

Enters  
into treaty  
with Tiffaphernes.

<sup>7</sup> Xenoph. p. 488.



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were intimidated by the sight of an enemy whose numbers far exceeded their own. This panic might have proved fatal, had not the troops of Tissaphernes felt the terror which they inspired. They recollected the bravery of the ten thousand who had accompanied Cyrus; they perceived that the forces with whom they now had to contend exceeded that number; but they did not reflect that the army of Dercyllidas was swelled by the degenerate Greeks of Æolis and Ionia, whose minds had been enfeebled and degraded by a long series of oppression. The cowardice of the Persians engaged Tissaphernes, much against the inclination of Pharnabazus, to propose a conference; the cowardice of the Ionians engaged Dercyllidas to accept the proposal. Hostilities were thus suspended; mutual hostages were given; overtures of peace were made; and messengers were dispatched for instructions to the Spartan council, and to the court of Persia.

The Persians secretly prepare to renew the war.

The design of Tissaphernes, however, was only to gain time by amusing the enemy. The most solemn oaths and engagements had long lost their power over his perfidious mind. He treacherously watched an opportunity to renew the war, waiting with impatience for the promised reinforcements from the East, and especially for the equipment of a fleet, which Artaxerxes was preparing, with silence and celerity, in the ports of Phœnicia. These secret preparations were communicated to the Spartan magistrates by the patriotism of Herodas, a Syracusan, who, animated by the love of Greece,

Greece, betrayed his Phœnician master. The Spartans were alarmed with the danger, indignant at the treachery of Tiffaphernes, and perhaps displeased with the too easy credulity of their general. But the death of king Agis had given them, in the person of their first magistrate, a commander who equalled Dercyllidas in merit, and who has far surpassed him in renown.

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The destructive expedition against the Eleans was the last exploit of the long and warlike reign of Agis. On his death-bed he acknowledged for his son Leotychides, whose legitimacy, the levity or the guilt of his mother Timæa had exposed to just suspicion. But this late avowal of a successor, whom he had so long disowned, did not satisfy the partisans of Agefilaus, who was the brother of Agis on the side of his father Archidamus, but younger by many years, being born of a different mother, and failing Leotychides, the nearest heir to the throne. Under a diminutive and ignoble form, Agefilaus concealed a vigorous and fervid mind, a manly elevation of character, a generous ambition of soul. These respectable qualities, adorned by the milder virtues of modesty, candour, condescension, and unlimited complaisance for his friends, early attracted the notice, and merited the esteem, of the first names of Sparta; and of none more than Lyfander, who, as his personal hopes of grandeur were blasted by the universal jealousy and resentment that had been justly excited in Sparta against his ostentatious abuse of power, confined all his projects of ambition to the aggrandisement

Agefilaus  
declared  
king of  
Sparta.

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ment of his favourite. That eloquence and address<sup>s</sup>, which would have been ineffectual if employed for himself, succeeded in behalf of another; and by the influence and intrigues of Lyfander, still more than by the strong claims of justice and of merit, Agefilaus was declared successor to the vacant throne; and, at the distance of about two years, commander in chief of the Greek forces in Asia; an office less splendid in name than that of king of Sparta, but carrying with it more solid weight and authority.

Cinadon's  
conspira-  
cy,

In the interval of these successive honours, he approved his attentive vigilance in the service of the republic, of which the safety, and even the existence, was endangered by a daring and bloody conspiracy. A youth named Cinadon, distinguished above his companions by extraordinary strength and agility, was not less conspicuous for undaunted courage and ambition. Descended of an obscure family, Cinadon felt and regretted the mortifying partiality of the government under

<sup>s</sup> The partisans of Leotychides, in pleading his cause before the assembly, alleged an oracle that exhorted the Spartans to beware of a lame reign. This pointed at Agefilaus, who limped in walking. But Lyfander, by one of those ready and unexpected turns, which often decide the resolutions of numerous assemblies, directed the battery of the oracle against Leotychides, asserting, that it was the lameness of the title only which Apollo must have had in view, since it was a matter indifferent to the gods whether the Spartan kings walked gracefully; but a matter of high importance whether they descended from Hercules, the son of Jupiter, or Alcibiades, an Athenian profligate and exile. Com. Plut. in Agefil. & Lyfand. & Xenoph. Agefil. Panegyr. & Hellen. l. iii. p. 493.



which he lived. His pride was deeply wounded with the reflection, that whatever abilities his youth might promise, and his manhood mature, the unfortunate circumstances of his birth must for ever exclude him from the principal dignities of the state, which circulated among a few Spartan families, without the possibility of extending beyond that very limited sphere. The warmth of his character, and the impetuosity of his passions, prompted him to seek justice and revenge: nor was his blind and headlong ferocity alarmed by the means, however atrocious, that must lead to this favourite end. He communicated the horrid design to men of his own, and of an inferior condition, exaggerating their cruel treatment by a stern aristocracy, which he contrasted with the mild equality of the neighbouring communities; and perhaps asserting, that if they must submit to a master, it would be better to have one than many; that even the subjects of a monarchy enjoyed greater equality and liberty than the members of the Spartan republic<sup>9</sup>, since the former all equally participated in those preferments and honours, to which not only the slaves, the Helots, and freedmen, but the whole body of the Lacedæmonian people, were forbidden to aspire. After this general representation, he neglected not, what was more effectual and important, to arraign the arrogance

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<sup>9</sup> This language I have often heard from the *subjects* of a modern republic, whose *citizens* are not more remarkable for their firmness in maintaining power, than for their moderation in exercising it.

and

**C H A P.** and cruelty of particular senators, and to inflame  
**XXVII.** the resentment of individuals against their private  
 and domestic foes ; nor did he forget to encourage  
 them all with the certain prospect of success, by  
 contrasting their own strength and numbers with  
 the weakness of an enemy, who might be taken  
 unarmed, and cut off by surprise <sup>10</sup>.

is disco-  
 vered  
 when ripe  
 for execu-  
 tion.

The time for action approached, and the author  
 of the conspiracy commanded his associates to stay  
 at home, that they might be ready at a call. Age-  
 filaus, meanwhile, performed the accustomed vows  
 and sacrifices for the safety of the republic ; the  
 appearance of the entrails announced some dread-  
 ful and concealed danger ; a second victim was  
 slain, and the signs were still more unfavourable ;  
 but after examining the third sacrifice, the priest  
 exclaimed, " We seem, O Agefilaus ! to be in  
 the midst of our enemies." Soon afterwards, a  
 person, whose name has not been thought worthy  
 of record, denounced Cinadon to the magistrates,  
 as guilty of a treasonable design, of which he had  
 endeavoured to render himself an accomplice.  
 When the informer was desired to explain his de-  
 claration more fully, he told them, that Cinadon  
 having conducted him to the great square of the  
 city, which, being destined for the public assembly  
 and the market, was the usual place of rendezvous,  
 desired him to count the number of Spartans whom  
 he saw in that spacious resort. That he counted  
 the king, the ephori, the senators, and about forty

<sup>10</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 493, & seqq.

others,

others, and then asked Cinadon, for what purpose he had required him to take that seemingly useless trouble? Because, replied the conspirator, I reckon the Spartans to be enemies, and all the rest, whose great numbers you behold in the market-place, to be friends. Nor does this proportion apply to Sparta only; in the farms and villages adjacent to the city, we shall in each house and family have one enemy, the master, but all the servants will be our friends. Cinadon then acquainted him with the object and cause of the conspiracy, which had been formed by men of probity and fortitude, and which was soon to be communicated to the slaves, peasants, and the whole body of Lacedæmonian people, whose animosity against the Spartans was too violent to be concealed. That the greatest part of the conspirators, being trained for war, had arms in their hands; that the shops of the armourers, the tools of those artificers who wrought in metal, wood, and stone, and even the instruments of agriculture, might furnish such weapons to the rest, as would fully answer the purpose against unarmed men.

This alarming intelligence roused the activity, without shaking the firmness, of the Spartan magistrates. It would have been imprudent to seize Cinadon in the capital, as they were unacquainted with the extent of his resources, and the number of his associates. On pretence of the public service, they contrived to send him to Aulon (for in similar expeditions they had often employed his ready arm and enterprising valour), that he might

Activity  
and pru-  
dence of  
the Spar-  
tan ma-  
gistrates.

seize,



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Cinadon  
and his  
accomplices  
seized and  
punished.

seize, in that licentious city, and bring within the reach of justice, several daring violators of the Spartan laws, among whom was a very beautiful woman, who corrupted the manners of young and old<sup>11</sup>. The senate prepared waggons for conveying the prisoners, and furnished every thing necessary for the journey. A body of chosen horsemen was appointed to accompany Cinadon, who set out without suspecting that this long train of preparation was destined against himself alone. But no sooner had he reached a proper distance from the city, than he was seized as a traitor, and compelled, by the terror of immediate death, to denounce his accomplices. Their names were sent to the senate, who instantly secured their persons. Cinadon, Tisamenus, a priest, and the other leaders of the conspiracy, were scourged through the city, gored with instruments of torture, and finally relieved by death.

Agefilaus  
takes the  
command  
of the  
Greek  
forces in  
Asia.  
Olymp.  
xcvi. 1.  
A. C. 396.

The rash enterprise of Cinadon still filled the Spartans with alarm, when intelligence was conveyed of the formidable preparations of Artaxerxes, against whom the persuasive influence of Lyfander encouraged them to employ the great and solid, but as yet unknown abilities, of their young and warlike prince. Since the reign of Agamemnon, Agefilaus was the first Grecian king who led the united forces of his country to make war in Asia; and his expedition, though not less im-

<sup>11</sup> Ἀγαγὼν δ' ἐπέλεον τὴν γυναῖκα ἡ καλλίστη μὲν εἰλετο αὐτοῖς  
εἶναι, λυγρανέσθαι δ' ἰσχυρῆς τῆς ἀφικνησάσης Λακκεδαιμονίων καὶ πρῶ-  
τερος καὶ νεώτερος. Xenoph. p. 494.

portant than the exploits of the sons of Atreus and Achilles, is much inferior in renown; because the panegyric of Xenophon, warm and splendid as it is, even beyond the usual colour of his compositions, must yet, like all the works of man, be for ever eclipsed by the lustre of the Iliad. But the conquests of Agesilaus, however different in fame, yet surpassed in misfortune, the war of Troy. Both were pernicious to the interests of Greece; but of the two, the victories of Agesilaus proved the most fatal, not indeed in their immediate, but in their remote consequences.

In the spring of the year three hundred and ninety-six before Christ, he left Sparta, with three thousand Lacedæmonian freedmen, and a body of foreign troops, amounting to six thousand, chiefly collected from the confederate cities of Peloponnesus. Since the irregular and unjustifiable conduct of Agis, in his unfortunate expedition against Argos, the Spartan kings were usually attended in the field by a council of ten senators, whose concurrence was held necessary in all public measures. Agesilaus demanded a council, not of ten, but of thirty Spartans: a refined stroke of policy, which strongly indicates that artful dexterity with which, during a long administration, he uniformly promoted the views of his interest and ambition. By augmenting the number of the council, he diminished its importance. Each member, as he possessed less weight and influence, felt himself less concerned in the honour of the body; and the whole were more easily swayed and governed by the

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Disgraces  
Lyfander,  
who alone  
rivalled  
his autho-  
rity.

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the king. Lyfander alone, whose name in Asia was illustrious or terrible, rivalled for a while the power of Agesilaus. But the colleagues of Lyfander were the first to dispute his pretensions, and to controul his authority. Agesilaus availed himself of their envy, and listened too easily to the dictates of selfishness, in humbling the arrogance of a rival who had been the chief author of his own greatness. By thwarting the measures of Lyfander, by denying his requests, by employing him in offices unbecoming his dignity<sup>12</sup>, he rendered him contemptible in the eyes of those by whom he had been so long feared. This ungenerous treatment of a benefactor, as well as the aspiring pride of the benefactor himself, which could excite such black ingratitude in an otherwise virtuous breast, doubly prove the instability of friendship between ambitious minds. After a disgraceful rupture, which ended in an affected reconciliation, Lyfander was sent by Agesilaus and his council to command the Lacedæmonian Squadron in the Hellespont, an inactive and subordinate service, in which he could not expect an opportunity to perform any thing worthy of his ancient fame. He returned, therefore, in a few months to Sparta, covered with disgrace, enraged by disappointment, and vowing implacable revenge against the cruel ingratitude of his friend, which

<sup>12</sup> Lyfander was known in the East as a conqueror; Agesilaus made him a commissary. Vid. Plut. in Agesil. & Lyfand. & Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 497.



he felt more deeply than the injustice of all his enemies together.

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Treachery  
of Tiffa-  
phernes.

Agefilaus fixed his head-quarters at Ephesus, a place recommended by its central situation, as the most convenient rendezvous for the recruits which flocked to his standard from every part of the coast; at the same time that such a station enabled him to conceal from the enemy which of their provinces was the intended object of his invasion. Thither Tiffaphernes sent an embassy, demanding the reason of such mighty preparations. Agefilaus replied, "That the Greeks in Asia might enjoy the same liberty with their brethren in Europe." The messengers of Tiffaphernes had orders to declare, that the king was inclined to acknowledge the ancient freedom and independence of the Grecian colonies; that the report of his hostile intentions against either them or the mother-country was totally void of foundation; and that, in consequence of the recent transactions between Tiffaphernes and Dercyllidas, ambassadors might shortly be expected from Susa, impowered to ratify a firm and lasting peace between Artaxerxes and the Greeks. Until this desirable work should be completed, Tiffaphernes earnestly desired a continuation of the truce, which, on his side, he was ready to seal by whatever formalities Agefilaus thought proper to require. The Spartan king frankly avowed his suspicions of treachery; yet being unwilling to embroil his country in an unnecessary war, he dispatched Dercyllidas, with two members of the Spartan council, to renew his late

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engagements with Tiffaphernes. The perfidious satrap swore and deceived for the last time. No sooner had he received the long-expected auxiliaries from the East, than he commanded Agefilaus to leave Ephesus, and to evacuate the coast of Asia; if he delayed to comply, the weight of the Persian arms would enforce obedience. The prudent, or pious Spartan, while his friends were alarmed with this unexpected declaration, assumed an unusual gaiety of countenance, observing, that he rejoiced to commence the war under such favourable auspices, since the treachery of Tiffaphernes must render the gods his enemies.

Innocent  
stratagem  
of Agefi-  
laus.

Meanwhile he prepared to encounter the insidious arts of the satrap, with equal, but more innocent address. It was industriously given out, that he intended to march into the province of Caria, the favourite residence of Tiffaphernes, which was adorned by his voluptuous parks and palaces, and strengthened by a fortress, the repository of his treasures. The intervening cities were ordered to mend the roads, to furnish a market, and to prepare every thing most necessary to facilitate the march of the Grecian army. Tiffaphernes, not doubting that Caria was the intended scene of war, especially as the mountainous nature of that province rendered it improper for horse, in which the Greeks were very poorly provided, encamped with his own numerous cavalry in the plains of the Meander, in order to intercept the passage of the enemy. But Agefilaus having posted a sufficient garrison in Ephesus, left that city, and

He defeats  
the Per-  
sians, and  
plunders  
Phrygia.

turning to the north, advanced by rapid marches into Phrygia, the rich plunder of which rewarded the active diligence of his soldiers. The selfish satrap was unwilling to relieve the province of Pharnabazus, by weakening the defence of his own; and accordingly remained inactive on the fruitful banks of the Meander, whose winding stream skirts the northern frontier of Caria, still suspecting an invasion of the Greeks from Ephesus and the neighbouring sea-ports. During the greatest part of the summer Agefilaus ravaged Phrygia; the Barbarians were shamefully defeated in several rencounters; at length they ceased to resist his arms; nor attempted even to harass his retreat, when, having gratified the just resentment of his country, he returned, loaded with spoil, to winter in Ephesus<sup>13</sup>.

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In the Phrygian expedition, Agefilaus shared, and surpassed, the toils of the meanest foldier, from whom he refused to be distinguished by his dress, his food, or his accommodations, by day or night. The inactive season of the year was most diligently and usefully employed. Ephesus and the neighbouring towns glowed with the ardour of military preparation. The Phrygian wealth was employed to urge the hand of industry. Shields, spears, swords, and helmets, filled every shop, and crowded every magazine. The inhabitants of the country were allured by great rewards to form their best horses to the discipline of the field; and

Employ-  
ment of  
the Greeks  
during  
their  
winter-  
quarters  
in Phry-  
gia.

<sup>13</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 498, & seqq.



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the wealthy citizens were exempted from the service of the ensuing campaign, upon condition only that they furnished a horseman, properly equipped, to perform their vicarious duty. The veteran soldiers, as well as the new levies, were daily exercised within the walls of Ephesus, in those martial amusements which represented a faithful image, and which formed the best school, of war. Agefilaus often condescended to dispute the prize of valour or dexterity; his popular manners endeared him to the troops; the superiority of his talents commanded their willing obedience; they vied with each other in loyalty to their prince; they vied in gratitude to the gods with their prince himself, who, as often as he obtained the crown of victory, dedicated the honourable reward in the admired temple of Ephesian Diana. "What then (adds a soldier, a philosopher, and a man of piety) might not be expected from troops who delighted in the exercise of war, respected their general, and revered the gods <sup>14</sup>?"

Agefilaus  
prepares  
for the  
ensuing  
campaign.  
Olymp.  
xvi. 2.  
A.C. 395.

The expectation of Xenophon, who beheld the interesting scenes at Ephesus, which he has inimitably described, was fully gratified by the success of the ensuing campaign. Agreeably to the annual revolution of offices in the Lacedæmonian republic, a commission of thirty Spartans was sent early in the spring to supply the place of Lyfander and his colleagues. Among the members of this new council Agefilaus distributed the various de-

<sup>14</sup> Xenoph. Panegy. Agefil.

partments of military command. The superior abilities of Herippidas were entrusted with the veteran army who had served under Cyrus. Xenocles was appointed to conduct the cavalry. Mygdo commanded the Asiatic levies; Scythes, the Lacedæmonian freedmen; for himself, as his peculiar care, the general reserved the faithful and warlike body of Peloponnesian allies, chosen from the flower and vigour of many flourishing republics. With a view to encourage his soldiers before taking the field, he ordered the Phrygian prisoners to be brought forth, stripped, and exposed to sale. The Greeks viewed with contempt the delicate whiteness of their skins, their flaccid muscles, their awkward motions, their shapeless forms, their unwieldy corpulence, and the effeminate softness of their whole persons. Such an enemy they considered as nothing superior to an army of women<sup>15</sup>.

Agefilaus had declared, that he would be no longer satisfied with ravaging the extremities, but was determined to attack the center, of the Persian power. Tissaphernes, fearful of being deceived by a second feint, again conducted his squadrons to the banks of the Meander, and reinforced with the flower of his infantry the garrisons of Caria, which (as the contrary had been industriously reported) he concluded to be the main object of approaching hostilities. But the Spartan was too able a general to repeat the same game. On this

Attacks  
the center  
of the Per-  
sian do-  
minions in  
Lower  
Asia.

<sup>15</sup> Xenoph. p. 500.

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Death of  
Tissapher-  
nes.

occasion, therefore, he carried into execution the design which had been made public, marched towards the royal city of Sardis, and ravaged the adjoining territory without opposition. He had acquired much valuable booty, and shaken the fidelity of the Lydians, before any enemy appeared to resist his progress. That resistance, which was made too late, proved ineffectual. After several successful skirmishes, he defeated the Persians in a general engagement on the banks of the Pactolus, surrounded and took their camp, in which, beside other riches, he found seventy talents of silver. He likewise expected to have taken the unrelenting enemy of the Greeks, the perfidious Tissaphernes; but that crafty traitor, suspecting the event of the battle, had thrown himself, with a considerable body of troops, within the strong walls of Sardis, where his cowardice continued to reside, displaying the inglorious pride of pomp and luxury, while the provinces of Artaxerxes fell a prey to the hostile invader. The time of his punishment, however, was now arrived. His whole life had been disgraceful to himself; but its last scene had disgraced the arms of his master, who cancelled, by one stroke of royal ingratitude, the merit of innumerable perfidies and cruelties committed for his service. Tithraustes was sent from court to take off the head of the obnoxious satrap; who, being allured to a conference, was caught by his own arts<sup>16</sup>, and met with a just fate; although

<sup>16</sup> Polyænus, l. vii. The fact is mentioned with few circumstances in Diodorus, and with none in Xenophon, p. 501.



the author of his death was, perhaps, the only man in Persia or in Greece with whom Tissaphernes had any claim of merit.

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Tithraustes, who had come from Babylon escorted by a powerful body of cavalry, possessed the mandate of the great king for assuming the government of Lower Asia, and the conduct of the war. Having removed the only rival who had interest or ability to dispute this extensive and honourable commission, his next care was to send an embassy to Agesilaus, which, instead of indicating the character of a great general (for such Tithraustes was esteemed in the East), betrayed the mean and temporising genius of his worthless predecessor. The ambassadors were instructed to declare, "That Tissaphernes, the author of those troubles which embroiled Greece and Persia, had suffered a just death; and that the king, who had been too long deceived by his artifices, was now ready to acknowledge the independence of the Grecian colonies, on condition that Agesilaus withdrew his troops from Asia." The Spartan honestly replied, "That the alternative of war or peace depended, not on himself, but on the resolution of the assembly and senate; nor could he remove his forces from the East without the express command of his republic." The artful satrap perceiving that it was impossible for him to interrupt, determined at least to divert, the course of hostilities. None knew better than Tithraustes the use of money as an instrument of negociation. He condescended to purchase from Agesilaus, by a very

He is succeeded by Tithraustes, who pursues the same line of conduct.

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large sum, the tranquillity of Lydia; and as it seemed a matter of indifference to the Spartan king whichever part of the Persian dominions felt the weight of his invasion, he evacuated that province, and again entered Phrygia.

Agefilæus  
entrusted  
with the  
command  
of the  
Grecian  
fleet;  
Olynth.  
xxvii. 3.  
A. C. 594.

While he pursued his march northwards, he was overtaken in Ionia by a welcome messenger from home, who delivered him a letter, testifying the grateful admiration of his countrymen, prolonging the term of his military command, and entrusting him with the numerous fleet, which had sailed two years before, to counteract the designs of the enemy<sup>17</sup>. This fleet, consisting of ninety galleys, was actually commanded by Pharax, who, during the glorious career of Agefilæus's victories, had silently performed very useful and meritorious service. The naval preparations of Artaxerxes, which, as above mentioned, first excited the alarm in Greece, were still carried on with activity. Various squadrons were equipped in the harbours of Phœnicia, Cilicia, and other maritime provinces, of which the combined strength far exceeded the fleet of Greece. But the vigilant diligence of Pharax prevented their union. His ships were victualled by Nephres, the rebellious viceroy of Egypt; with whom, in the name of Sparta, he had contracted an alliance. The ports of Cyprus, Rhodes, and the Greek cities in the Carian Chersonesus, were open to his cruisers. Availing himself of those important advantages, he

<sup>17</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 501.

steered with rapidity along the hostile shores; and seasonably dividing or combining his fleet, effectually restrained the enemy from making their projected descents on Peloponnesus, and even deterred them from sailing the Asiatic seas<sup>18</sup>. Agefilaus, unmindful of this essential service, which had prevented any diversion of the Greek forces in the East, deprived Pharax of the command, and substituted in his stead Pisander, a near relation of his own, who possessed indeed the ambitious valour and manly firmness of the Spartan character, but neither the experience, nor the abilities, sufficient to qualify him for this weighty trust.

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which he  
commits  
to Pisander.

The first effects of this fatal error were eclipsed by a momentary blaze of glory. Agefilaus entered Phrygia; attacked, conquered, and pursued Pharnabazus; who, flying from post to post, was successively driven from every part of his valuable province<sup>19</sup>. The fame of the Grecian victories struck terror into the neighbouring countries. Cotys<sup>20</sup>, or Corylas, the proud tyrant of Paphlagonia, who disdained the friendship of the great king<sup>21</sup>, sent humbly to request that the native valour of his numerous and invincible cavalry might be associated with the Spartan arms<sup>22</sup>. The inferior satraps, and especially their oppressed sub-

Agefilaus  
entertains  
hopes of  
conquer-  
ing the  
Persian  
empire;

<sup>18</sup> Isocrat. Panegyr. He does not give the name of the admiral, which we find in Xenophon's Gr. Hist.

<sup>19</sup> Xenophon compares him to the Scythian Nomades.

<sup>20</sup> He is called Cotys in Xenoph. Gr. Hist. Plutarch, and Diodorus; and Corylas in Xenoph. Anabaf. l. v. p. 370.

<sup>21</sup> Xenoph. ibid,

<sup>22</sup> Plut. in Agefil.

jects,



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jects, courted the protection of Agesilaus, expecting that the unknown dominion of Greece would be lighter than the yoke of Persia, of which they had long felt and regretted the severity. The deceitful Ariæus, who had shared the guilt, without sharing the punishment of Cyrus, could never be heartily reconciled to a master against whom he had once rebelled. His actual wealth, and ancient honours, gave him a powerful influence over the numerous Barbarians who had followed the standard of Cyrus and his own; and whose discontented spirits might easily be inflamed into a second revolt<sup>23</sup>. The commotion was general in Lesser Asia; and, as Egypt had already rebelled, Agesilaus, at the head of about twenty thousand Greeks, and innumerable Barbarian allies, might entertain a very rational expectation to shake the throne of Artaxerxes; especially as the experience of his friend and admirer, Xenophon, who was still the companion of his arms, must have powerfully encouraged him to that glorious enterprise<sup>24</sup>.

which are  
blasted by  
unexpected  
intelligence from  
Greece.

But an undertaking of which the success, however splendid, could not probably have been followed by any solid advantages, because the diminutive territory and population of Sparta formed a basis far too feeble to support such a weight of conquest, was blasted, in the bloom of hope, by intelligence equally unexpected and distressful. Tithraustes, who knew the power of gold over the

<sup>23</sup> Plut. in Agesil. Diodor. l. xiv. p. 439.

<sup>24</sup> Diodor. *ibid.* & Xenoph. Agesil. Panegy. & Plut. in Agesil.

Grecian councils, determined, with the approbation of the king his master, to give full play to this main-spring of politics. The Cretan and Ægean seas were carelessly guarded by the unsuspecting confidence of the new admiral. Tithraustes perceived the neglect; and dispatched, without any fear of capture, various emissaries into Greece, well qualified, by bribes and address, to practise with the discontented and factious demagogues, the natural enemies of Sparta, of aristocratic government, and of the public tranquillity <sup>25</sup>.

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The principal instrument of these secret negotiations was Timocrates of Rhodes, a man of an intriguing and audacious spirit, who carried with him no less a sum than fifty talents (above nine thousand pounds sterling), which he distributed, with lavish promises of future bounty, to Cyclon of Argos, to Timolaus and Polyantes of Corinth, to Androclides Ismenias and Galaxadourus of Thebes; names for the most part obscure in the annals of war, but important in the history of domestic faction. The tyranny of Sparta was the perpetual theme of these venal hirelings, not only in their respective communities, but in every quarter of Greece, to which they were successively carried with a mercenary diligence. They painted in the strongest colours the injustice, the cruelty, and the immeasurable ambition of that haughty republic, who had made soldiers of her slaves,

Means by which the Persians kindle a war in that country.

<sup>25</sup> Xenoph. p. 513, & seqq.

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that she might make slaves of her allies. The destructive and impious devastation of the sacred territory of Elis was arraigned with every term of reproach. The same calamities, it was prophesied, must soon overwhelm the neighbouring countries, unless they prepared (while it was yet time to prepare) for a vigorous defence; since Sparta pursued her conquests in Asia with no other view but to lull the security, and rivet the chains, of Greece <sup>26</sup>.

Motives  
by which  
the ene-  
mies of  
Sparta  
were actu-  
ated.

Strong as these invectives may appear, and interested as they certainly were, they did not exceed the truth; and, what is of more importance, they were addressed to men well disposed to believe them. Since the subversion of the Athenian power, the imperious government of Sparta had rendered her almost alike odious to her old, and to her new, confederates. The former, and particularly the Corinthians, Arcadians, and Achæans, complained with the warmth which justice gives, that, after sharing the toils and dangers of the Peloponnesian war, they had been cruelly deprived of the fruits of victory. The latter, and especially such communities as had revolted from Athens, lamented that their blood and treasure had been spent in vain. They had fought for freedom and independence; but their valour had been rewarded by a more intolerable servitude. Argos had long been the enemy, and Thebes aspired to become the rival, of Sparta. Above all, the

<sup>26</sup> Xenoph. p. 514.



Athenians, animated by the patriotifm of Thrafybulus, their deliverer from the Spartan yoke, longed to employ the firft moments of returning vigour in the purfuit of glory and revenge.

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The corruption of thofe morbid humours, which muft have foon fermented of themfelves, was accelerated by the mercenary emiffaries of Tithrauftes. The occafion, too, feemed favourable for affaulting the domeftic ftrength of a republic, whofe arms were ambitioufly employed in extending her diftant conquelts. The conduct of the Thebans had already announced this defign. They not only refufed affiftance to Agefilaus towards carrying on his eaftern campaign, but treated him without refpect or decency, while he croffed their dominions; and, were not ambition blind, he muft have perceived and refented their hoftility, and have delayed to undertake his expedition againft Afia, till he had extinguifhed the feeds of war in Greece.

Circum-  
ftances  
which en-  
couraged  
their hofti-  
lity.

But, notwithstanding the concurring caufes which haftened a rupture, fuch was the terror of the Spartan name, encreafed by the recent glory of Agefilaus, that none of her numerous enemies had courage openly to take arms, and to avow their juft animofity. After various, but fecret conferences, held in the principal cities, it was determined to wound that republic through her allies, the Phocians, who were diftinguifhed, amidft the very general difcontent, by their unfhaken attachment and fidelity. The Locri Ozolæ, a fierce and

Their cau-  
tion in be-  
ginning  
the war.

**C H A P.** and insolent people <sup>27</sup>, who lived in the neighbourhood of Phocis, were easily persuaded to levy contributions from a district on their eastern frontier, to which they had not the smallest claim, and of which the dominion had been long a matter of dispute between the Phocians and Thebans. Both these states seem to have been injured, and exactly in the same degree, by this aggression; but the Phocians, who were the enemies of the Locri, took arms to revenge, while the Thebans, who were their friends, prepared to abet, their injustice. They expected, and their expectation was gratified, that the Spartans would quickly interfere in a quarrel that affected the most important interests of their Phocian allies; a measure which tended precisely to that issue which prudence and policy required, since the Thebans would be compelled to arm in their own defence, and must appear to all the neutral states of Greece, and even to their Lacedæmonian enemies, to be undesignedly dragged into a war, not from an inclination to commit, but from the necessity to repel, injuries <sup>28</sup>.

Campaign  
of Lyfan-  
der in  
Bœotia.

The irascible pride of Sparta, ever prone to chastise the smallest offences with unbounded severity, conspired with the most sanguine hopes of Thebes and her allies. Instead of condescending to remonstrate, instead of demanding satisfaction, instead of ordering the Thebans to eva-

<sup>27</sup> Thucydid. l. i. p. 4. & p. 47.

<sup>28</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. ad fin. Diodor. xiv. 82. Plutarch. in Lyfand. p. 448, & seqq.

cuates the territory of Phocis, and to abstain from future injury, the Spartans flew to arms, and marched to invade Bœotia. On the first rumour of hostilities, the activity of Lysander had been employed to assemble their northern confederates, the Maleans, Heracleans, with those who inhabited the villages of Doris and Mount Oeta. He penetrated into the Theban territory, gained Lebadea by force, Orchomenus by address, and prepared to assault the walls of Haliartus, which, next to Thebes, was the strongest of the Bœotian cities. The difficulty of this enterprise made him dispatch a messenger to hasten the arrival of Pausanias, the Spartan king, who had led forth six thousand Peloponnesians, to co-operate with this experienced commander. The unfortunate messenger was taken by the scouts of the Thebans, and with him a letter, in which Lysander had signified his purpose, and appointed the time of rendezvous with Pausanias, that they might surprise Haliartus with their combined forces<sup>29</sup>.

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At the same time that this useful intelligence was brought to Thebes, there arrived in that city a powerful reinforcement of Athenian troops, who, though their own capital was unwall'd and defenceless, had been persuaded by Thrasybulus to brave the resentment of Sparta. To these generous auxiliaries the Thebans committed their city, their wives, their children, and every object of their most tender concern; while the warlike youth,

The Thebans march in the night to the defence of Haliartus.

<sup>29</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. p. 503, & seqq.



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and almost all those of a military age, assembled in complete armour, set out in the dead of night, and performing a journey of fifteen miles with silence and celerity, reached, while it was yet dark, the gates of Haliartus. Their unexpected arrival struck a pleasing terror into their friends, who were affected still more deeply, when they understood the cause of this nocturnal expedition. The Thebans dispelled their fear, and animated their hope, expecting not only to save Haliartus, but to obtain a signal advantage over the unsuspecting confidence of the assailants.

Stratagem  
by which  
they de-  
feat the  
assailants.

For this purpose, they sent a strong detachment to lie in ambush without the walls. The rest, reinforced by the townsmen, formed themselves in battle array, and stood to their arms, behind the gates. Lyfander arrived in the morning; but Pausanias, who had not received his message, still continued in the neighbourhood of Plataea. The soldiers, flushed by recent victory, disdained to depend on the tardy motions of their auxiliaries. They requested Lyfander to lead them against the place; a measure to which he was otherwise much inclined, being eager to snatch the glory to himself, without dividing it with Pausanias, his rival and enemy.

Battle of  
Haliartus,  
and death  
of Ly-  
fander.

He approached the town, and boldly began the attack, perceiving the walls and battlements to be unguarded. But before any breach was made, the different gates at once flew open, while the Thebans and Haliartians rushed forth with one consent, and with irresistible fury. Lyfander, with a priest

priest who attended him, was slain on the first onset. His men began to rally, but the Thebans, posted in ambush without the city, occasioned a new terror. The enemy every where gave way; above a thousand fell in the field of battle, the rest were routed, put to flight, and pursued with great slaughter<sup>20</sup>.

The first intelligence of this fatal disaster brought Pausanias to the scene of action, that he might examine the full extent of the calamity. It would have been fruitless to attempt the siege of Haliartus; but it was necessary to carry off the bodies of the slain. Pausanias held a council of war, to determine whether this pious duty should be effected by force, or whether he might condescend to solicit the humanity of the victors. Force seemed dangerous, as the principal destruction had happened immediately under the walls of the place, which it would be impossible to approach without suffering extremely from the missile weapons of the enemy, and without being exposed to a second attack, perhaps more bloody than the first. It was therefore unanimously resolved to send a Spartan herald to Haliartus, requesting leave to bury the dead. The demand was granted, on condition that the Peloponnesian army should immediately evacuate Bœotia. Pausanias complied, and returned to Sparta. His want of success, rather than his demerit, subjected him to trial and condemnation. He escaped

<sup>20</sup> Xenoph. l. iii. p. 505, & seqq. Plutarch. in Lyfand.

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capital punishment by flying to Tegea, where he soon afterwards sickened and died. His son Agesipolis assumed the Spartan sceptre, which, at that juncture, required the direction of more experienced hands<sup>31</sup>.

<sup>31</sup> Xenoph. l. iii. p. 505, & seqq. Plutarch. in Lyfand.



## C H A P. XXVIII.

*Recal of Agesilaus from the East.—He invades  
Bœotia.—Views of Evagoras King of Cyprus.—  
His Friendship with Conon.—The latter entrusted  
with the Persian Fleet.—He defeats the Lacedæ-  
monians.—Battle of Coronæa.—The Corinthian  
War.—Conon rebuilds the Walls and Harbours  
of Athens.—Conquests of Conon and Thrasybulus,  
—Peace of Antalcidas.*

THE defeat at Haliartus, which exasperated, without humbling, the Spartans, confirmed the courage of their enemies, and hastened the defection of their allies. The league was openly ratified and avowed by the republics of Thebes, Argos, Athens, and Corinth. The spirit of revolt seized Eubœa, pervaded the provinces of Acarnania, Leucas, Ambracia, the rich cities of Chalcis, and the warlike principalities of Thesfaly<sup>1</sup>. The whole fabric of the Spartan power, raised and cemented by a war of twenty-seven years, was shaken to the foundation; their victorious leaders were no more; nor did any resource remain, but that of recalling Agesilaus from his Asiatic victories, that the fortune and valour of

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The league formed against Sparta obliges that republic to recal Agesilaus from the East. Olymp. xcvi. 3. A. C. 394.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. l. xiv. p. 443. Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 507.

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this accomplished general might sustain the falling ruins of his country. He received the fatal scy-talé<sup>2</sup>, intimating his recall, at the important crisis of his fortune. He had completed his preparations for marching into Upper Asia, and his heart already beat with the ardour of promised conquest and glory<sup>3</sup>.

He com-  
municates  
his recall  
to the  
troops.

Having assembled the confederates, he communicated the revered order of the republic, with which he expressed his resolution immediately to comply. The generous troops, having associated their own honour with the renown of the general, testified their grief and their reluctance by tears and entreaties. But Agefilaus remained firm in his purpose, to obey the command of Sparta, to set bounds to his triumphs in the East, and to turn the direction of his arms towards a less promising field, to which he was summoned by the danger of his country<sup>4</sup>. Before crossing the Hellespont, he detached four thousand veteran soldiers, to strengthen the Asiatic garrisons; several of which he visited in person, every where assuring his friends, that it was his most earnest wish to rejoin them in Asia, whenever the troubles of Greece should permit his absence,

<sup>2</sup> See Vol. II. c. xii. p. 60.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch. in Agefil. & Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 513.

<sup>4</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. & Panegy. Agefil. & Plutarch. in Agefil. bestow seemingly immoderate praises on this resolution; but it is to be considered, that in the tumultuary governments of Greece, it was not uncommon to behold a successful general, proud of the zeal and strength of his followers, set at defiance the feeble authority of his republic.

The greater part of the army, and particularly the new levies of Ionians and Æolians, who had passed their apprenticeship in arms under his fortunate standard, declared, with tears of affection, that they never would abandon their beloved general. Agésilæus encouraged this disposition, which was extremely favourable to his views; and lest it might be nothing but a fall of temporary enthusiasm, artfully secured its permanence, by proposing the distribution of valuable rewards, in the Thracian Chersonesus, to such officers as brought the best companies of foot or cavalry for the service of his intended expedition. He was able to perform his promises with a generous magnificence; since, after defraying the necessary expences of the war, he carried from Asia above a thousand talents, or an hundred and ninety-three thousand pounds sterling<sup>5</sup>.

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Their desire to follow him prudently encouraged by Agésilæus.

When the whole forces were assembled in the Chersonesus, they probably amounted to about ten thousand men. Their nearest rout into Greece lay through the same countries that had been traversed near a century before by Xerxes; but the activity of Agésilæus accomplished in a month what, to eastern effeminacy, had been the journey of a laborious year. In the long interval of time between these celebrated expeditions, the Barbarians of Thrace and Macedon, through whose countries it was necessary to march, seem not to have made

His return to Greece.

<sup>5</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. & Panegyri. Agésil. & Plutarch. in Agésil. & Diodor. p. 441.



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XXVIII.He defeats  
the Thes-  
salian ca-  
valry.

much improvement in the arts of war or peace. They were still undisciplined and disunited; and their desultory arms were alike incapable of opposing the Spartan and the Persian. Agesilaus descended without resistance into the plains of Thessaly, where his progress was stopped for a moment by the numerous cavalry of that country, whose petty princes had acceded to the alliance formed against the ambition of Sparta. By a judicious disposition of his forces, and by evolutions equally skilful and rapid, he speedily surmounted this obstacle. To the charge of the Thessalian cavalry, he opposed the weight of his heavy-armed men, by whom the enemy were routed and put to flight. Then with his own horsemen, who would have proved an unequal match for the unbroken vigour of the Thessalians, he pursued them with great slaughter, took many prisoners, and erected a trophy of his victory, between the mountains Prantes and NARTHACIUM<sup>6</sup>, which form the western boundary of the extensive plain of CORONAÆA.

Invades  
Bœotia.

Instead of continuing his journey through the hostile country of Locris, whose weakness he disdained to chastise, he marched through the friendly territories of Doris and Phocis, that he might turn the shock of the war against the daring and rebellious Thebans. He found them in arms with their powerful allies, rather provoked, than discouraged, by a bloody but undecisive battle, which, soon after the disaster at Haliartus, had been

<sup>6</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 517.

fought against the Lacedæmonians at Epiecia, a small town on the common frontier of Corinth and Sicyon. The confederate army was still about twenty thousand strong; the forces of Agesilaus fully equalled that number, as he had received considerable supplies from Sparta and Phocis; and as the secondary cities, particularly Orchomenus of Bœotia, and Epidaurus of Argolis, had joined his arms, prompted by their usual envy and resentment against their respective capitals. The hostile battalions approached; those of Agesilaus marching, in good order, from the banks of the Cephissus, while the Thebans impetuously descended from the mountains of Helicon. Before they arrived at the scene of action, in the Bœotian plain of Coronæa<sup>7</sup>, a city thirty miles distant from Thebes, the superstition of both armies was alarmed by an eclipse of the sun; and the wisdom of Agesilaus was alarmed, far more justly, by most unexpected intelligence from the East<sup>8</sup>.

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Since his unfortunate partiality had intrusted the Lacedæmonian fleet to the obstinacy and inexperience of his kinsman Pisander, the Persian, or rather Phœnician, squadrons had been committed to the direction of a far more able commander. After the decisive engagement at Ægos-Potamos, which was followed by the taking of Athens, and the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, Conon,

Evagoras  
recovers  
his heredi-  
tary do-  
minion in  
Cyprus.

<sup>7</sup> The places distinguished by that name are described by Strabo, p. 407. 410, 411, and 434.

<sup>8</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 518. Plut. in Agesil.

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the Athenian admiral, escaped with a few gallees into the harbour of Salamis, the capital of the isle of Cyprus. That city, and a considerable part of the island, was then subject to Evagoras, a man whom the voice of panegyric represents as governing, with consummate wisdom<sup>9</sup>, a kingdom, which he had acquired by heroic valour. This admired prince boasted a descent from Teucer, who, returning from the siege of Troy eight hundred years before the reign of Evagoras, had founded the first Grecian colony on the Cyprian shore. During that long space of time, Salamis had undergone various revolutions. Evagoras was born and educated, under the reign of an usurper, who fell by the dagger of an assassin, who in his turn assumed the crown. Evagoras fled to Cilicia, obtained the protection of the satrap of that province, returned to Salamis with a handful of men, surprised and dethroned the new tyrant, to whom he was not bound by any tie of allegiance.

His attachment to Athens, and friendship for Cimon the Athenian.

From the moment that he began to reign, he discovered the most partial fondness for Athens, in whose language, arts, and institutions, his youth had been liberally instructed; and which afterwards formed the study and delight of his manhood, the amusement and consolation of his declining age. But unfortunately for the sensibility and affectionate gratitude of Evagoras towards a country to which he owed his education and his happiness, he

<sup>9</sup> Isocrates's panegyric of Evagoras may be entitled the picture of a great king: the character is only too perfect.



lived at a period when, before the situation of his principality enabled him to afford any effectual assistance to Athens, he beheld that proud republic deprived of the splendour and dominion which she had enjoyed above seventy years. He lamented her misfortunes with a filial tenderness, and received with the kindest hospitality her oppressed and afflicted citizens. The virtuous and enterprising Conon deserved his affection and esteem, and soon acquired the unlimited confidence of a mind congenial to his own. They acted with the happiest concert for the security and aggrandisement of the little kingdom, alluring new inhabitants from Greece, increasing their arts and industry, extending navigation and commerce; and, in a short time, Salamis was able to fit out a considerable naval power, and to subdue and incorporate with her own subjects several of the neighbouring communities. The great king, who had long been considered as lord paramount of Cyprus, interfered not in the domestic concerns of the island, provided he received from thence his small customary tribute. The flourishing state of Evagoras's affairs might enable him to pay, and to exceed, the stipulated sum; though it is probable that he early meditated, what he afterwards attempted to accomplish, the deliverance of his country from this mark of bondage.

But a design which actually engaged him more deeply, and to which he was strongly incited by the ardent solicitations of Conon, was the restoration of Athens (which he considered as his adop-

Evagoras  
and Conon deter-  
mine to  
retrieve  
the for-  
tune of

tive

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that re-  
public.

tive country and parent) to that state of glory and pre-eminence from which she had miserably fallen. The virtuous and patriotic friends (for as such contemporaries describe them) are represented as pilots and mariners watching the tides and currents, and catching every propitious gale that might facilitate the execution of this hazardous enterprise. The victories of Agesilaus in the East, which threatened to shake the throne of Artaxerxes, furnished an opportunity too favourable to escape their vigilance. Conon had been already recommended to the great king by Evagoras; and the recommendation had been enforced by Pharnabazus, who knew and admired his merit. The experienced skill of the illustrious Athenian, and of his countrymen Hieronymus and Nicodemus, had assisted in equipping the Barbarian squadrons in the Cilician and Phœnician harbours. But the abilities of Phœnix, the Spartan admiral, and the cowardice or negligence of the Persian commanders, hitherto rendered useless a fleet of near three hundred sail, which was ill manned, and which often wanted money.

Conon entrusted with the command of the Persian fleet.

The activity of Conon undertook to remedy these evils. He left Cilicia, travelled to Thapsacus, embarked in the Euphrates; and, as his vessel was moved by the combined impulse of winds, oars, and stream, he descended with rapidity along the winding channel to Babylon<sup>10</sup>. The only obstacle to his intended conference with Artaxerxes

<sup>10</sup> Diodorus, l. xiv. p. 442.

was, his unwillingness to degrade the Athenian character by depressing the body, bending the knee, and paying the usual marks of respectful submission, which were readily granted by Barbarians to the monarch of the East; but which the Greeks refused to man, and reserved for the majesty of the gods. This difficulty, however, was at length obviated by those whose mutual interest strongly solicited an interview. Conon represented to the trembling monarch, who was still agitated by the terror of Agesilaus's victories, the necessity of opposing the Spartans vigorously by sea. Their fleet alone had acquired, and maintained, the command of the Asiatic coast. A single defeat at sea would excite their allies to revolt, and drive their armies from Asia. But to obtain this advantage, the great king must employ an admiral worthy to command, and men willing to obey. In looking for the first, the valour of Pharnabazus could not escape his notice. The second might be purchased by money. And should Artaxerxes entrust him with the requisite sum, he pledged his life that he would soon collect such a number of sailors (chiefly from the Grecian coasts and islands) as would enable him to defeat the fleet of Sparta, and to compel that republic to abandon her eastern conquests. The proposal pleased Artaxerxes, the money was raised, and Conon returned to Cilicia to accomplish his undertaking.

From various sea-ports of Asia, from the smaller Greek cities, the reluctant subjects of Sparta, from several maritime towns whose inhabitants were ready

He defeats the Spartans, and takes



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fifty gal-  
lies.

Olymp.

xcvi. 3.

A. C. 394.

ready to serve any master for pay, but chiefly from the powerful islands of Rhodes and Cyprus, he soon collected a naval force exceeding his most sanguine hopes; and which might have enabled him (independent of the Barbarian squadrons commanded by Pharnabazus) to contend on nearly equal terms with Pisander. With their combined strength, Conon and Pharnabazus sailed westward in quest of the hostile fleet, persuaded that the rash confidence of the Spartan admiral would not decline battle with a superior enemy. As the united armament doubled the northern point of Rhodes, they perceived the Lacedæmonian squadron, amounting to near an hundred gallies, in the capacious bay which is formed between the projections of the Dorian shore, and the small islands called Sporades, from the careless irregularity with which they seem to have been scattered by the hand of nature<sup>11</sup>. The unexpected approach of such a formidable fleet did not shake the sullen obstinacy of Pisander. He commanded (as it had been foreseen) his men to prepare for battle. They bore up against the enemy, but on a nearer survey were alarmed and terrified with the excessive disproportion of numbers. The greater part turned their prows, and retired towards the friendly shore of Cnidus. Pisander advanced in the admiral galley, and died fighting bravely in defence of the

<sup>11</sup> Virgil expresses, in few words, the geography described in the text:

— Et crebris legimus freta consista terris.

Virg. *Æneid.* lii. v. 129.

Spartan

Spartan honour, vainly endeavouring to maintain, by the vigour of his arm, what had been betrayed by the weakness of his counsels. The victors pursued; and after destroying great numbers of the enemy, took and carried off fifty gallees; a capture sufficient to decide the fate of any Grecian republic<sup>12</sup>.

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It was the intelligence of this battle, of which he anticipated the consequences, in the loss of the Spartan dominions from Cnidus to Byzantium, that justly alarmed and afflicted the patriotic breast of Agesilaus. He assembled the troops, honestly confessed the death of Pisander, but artfully declared, that, though the admiral was slain, his fleet had obtained a complete victory, for which it became himself and them to pay the usual tribute of thanks and sacrifices to the protecting gods. He then crowned himself with a chaplet of flowers, and set the example of performing this pious duty.

The battle  
of Coro-  
næa.  
Olymp.  
xcvi. 3.  
A. C. 394.

<sup>12</sup> Polybius seems to consider the battle of Cnidus as the æra at which the Spartans lost the command of the sea, which they had acquired by their victory at Ægos-Potamos. He says, their dominion lasted twelve years. This number, however, is too large for the interval between those battles, as appears from the text. Other writers say, that the Lacedæmonian empire, which the Greeks speak of as synonymous with the command of the sea, lasted thirty years, reckoning from the battle of Ægos-Potamos to the defeat at Leuctra. But this number again is too small for the interval between those events; a remarkable proof of the carelessness of Greek writers in matters of chronology. See Isocrat. de Pace, & Casaub. ad Polyb. vol. iii. p. 97—99. edit. Gronov.

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The devout stratagem was attended with a very salutary effect; for in a skirmish between the advanced guards, immediately preceding the battle, the Lacedæmonian troops, animated by their imagined victory in the East, defeated and repelled the enemy. Meanwhile the main bodies of either army advanced into the plain of Coronæa, at first in awful silence; but having approached within a furlong of each other, the Thebans raised an universal shout, and ran furiously to the charge. Their impetuosity bore down every thing before them; but the troops immediately commanded by Agesilaus, repelled the left wing of the enemy, chiefly consisting of Argives and Athenians. Already those who surrounded his person saluted him as conqueror, and adorned him with the crown of victory; when it was told, that the Thebans had broke and totally routed the Orchomenians, and were advancing to seize the baggage. Agesilaus, by a rapid evolution, prepared to intercept them, in order to frustrate this design. The Thebans perceived this movement, wheeled about, and marched in an opposite direction, that they might join, and rally their allies, who fled towards the mountains of Helicon. In the rencounter which followed, Xenophon is disposed to admire rather the valour, than the prudence, of the Spartan king. Instead of allowing the Thebans to pass, that he might attack their rear and flanks, he boldly opposed their progress, and assailed their front. The shock was terrible; their shields meeting, clashed; they



they fought, slew, and were slain. No voice was heard, yet none was silent; the field resounded with the noise of rage and battle<sup>13</sup>; and this was the most desperate and bloody scene of an action, itself the most desperate and bloody of any in that age. At length, the firmness of the Thebans effected their long-attempted passage to Helicon; but could not encourage their allies to renew the engagement. The Spartans thus remained masters of the field, the sight of which seems to have deeply affected a spectator whose mind was habituated to such objects of horror. It was covered with steel and blood, with the bodies of friends and foes heaped promiscuously together, with transfixed bucklers and broken lances, some strewed on the ground, others deeply adhering in the mortal wounds which they had inflicted, and others still grasped by the cold and insensible hands of the combatants who had lately fought with such impetuous ardour<sup>14</sup>.

Agésilas himself had received several wounds from various kinds of weapons; yet did he restrain his resentment in the moment of victory. When informed that about fourscore of the enemy had taken refuge in a neighbouring temple of Minerva, he religiously respected the right of sanctuary, or-

<sup>13</sup> Καὶ κραυγὴ μὲν ἑδμεῖα παρῆν, ὃ μὲν ἑδε σιγῇ· φωνὴ δὲ τις ἢ τοιαυτῇ, ὡς ὅταν οὐγὴ τε καὶ μάχῃ παρασχοῖτ' αὐτ. Xenoph. Agésilas, c. xii. Such passages, inimitable in any other language, shew the superiority of the Greek.

<sup>14</sup> Xenoph. Agésil. c. xii.

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dered his soldiers to abstain from hurting them, and even appointed a body of horse to conduct them to a place of security. The next day was employed by the victors in erecting a trophy on the scene of this important action; while the enemy acknowledged their defeat, by requesting the bodies of the slain. Notwithstanding his fatigue and wounds, Agefilaus then travelled to Phocis, that he might dedicate the tenth of his Asiatic spoil (amounting to above an hundred talents) in the temple of Delphian Apollo. Having returned towards the Peloponnesus, he disbanded his eastern troops, most of whom were desirous to revisit their respective cities; his Peloponnesian, and even Lacedæmonian, forces inclined also to return home, that they might reap the fruits of harvest<sup>15</sup>; and the general, probably to avoid a journey painful to his wounds, failed to Sparta, and joined in the celebration of the Hyacinthian festival.

The Co-  
rinthian  
war.

Olymp.  
xcvi. 3.

A. C. 394.

Olymp.  
xcviii. 2.

A. C. 387.

The sea-fight off Cnidus, and the battle of Coronæa, were the most important and decisive actions in the Bœotian or Corinthian war, which lasted eight years. The contending republics seem at once to have put forth their sting; and afterwards to have retained their resentment when they had lost the power of gratifying it. Petty hostilities indeed were carried on by mutual inroads, and ravages in the spring and autumn; the Lacedæmonians issuing from Sicyon, and the Thebans

<sup>15</sup> The solar eclipse, mentioned above in the text, fixes the battle of Coronæa to the fourteenth of August.

from

from Corinth. The inhabitants of the latter city had eagerly promoted the alliance against Sparta; but when their country was made the seat of war, they began to repent of this rash measure. The noble and wealthy part of the community, who had most to fear, as they had most to lose, talked of a separate peace; and, as they were abetted by a majority of the people, their dependents or clients, they intended to summon an assembly which might confirm this laudable resolution. But the partisans of Timolaus and Polyanthes, who, though the mercenaries of a Barbarian slave, were the patrons of Corinthian liberty, anticipated a design so unfavourable to their interests, by committing one of the most horrid massacres recorded in history. They chose the Eucleian festival<sup>16</sup>, a circumstance which seemed to blacken the atrocity of a crime which nothing could aggravate. Many of the citizens were then enjoying themselves in the market-place, or assembled at the dramatic entertainments. The assault was rapid and general. The Corinthians were assassinated in the circles of conversation, some in the public walks, most in the theatre; the judges on the bench, the priests at the altar: nor did those monsters cease from destroying, till they had cut off whomever they deemed most willing, or most able, to oppose their measures. The great body of the people, who

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Massacre  
in Corinth.

<sup>16</sup> Xenophon, with the superstitious insensibility of his age, dwells on the enormous impiety of this choice.



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perceived that even the temples, and adored images of the gods (whose knees they grasped), afforded not any protection to the victims of this impious fury, prepared to fly from their country; when they were restrained, first, by the lamentable cries of their wives and children, and then by the declaration of the assassins, that they intended nothing farther than to deliver the city from traitors, the partisans of Sparta and slavery. This abominable massacre infected Corinth with the plague of sedition, which silently lurked, or openly raged, in that unfortunate republic, during the six following years. The Spartans and Argives assisted their respective factions; Corinth was alternately subject to the one and the other, but always to a foreign power; and of the two Corinthian harbours, which were considered as an important part of the capital, the Lechæum was long garrisoned by the Spartans, while the Cenchreæ remained in possession of the Argives.

The Spartans successful by land, and the Athenians by sea.

After the battles of Cnidus and Coronæa, there was not any general engagement by land or sea; and it is worthy of observation, that the partial actions, which happened on either element, generally followed the bias of those important victories. Success for the most part attended the sailors of Athens, and the soldiers of Sparta; though the naval exploits of Teleutias, the kinsman of Agesilaus, who surprised the Piræus with twelve galleys, took many merchantmen, destroyed several ships

of war, and scoured the coast of Attica, formed an exception extremely honourable to that commander; and the military advantages of Iphicrates the Athenian, though unimportant in their consequences, announced those great talents for war, which afterwards rendered him so illustrious. But, in general, Agesilaus and the Spartans maintained their superiority in the field; while Conon, Thrasylbulus, and Chabrias, proved successful against Thimbron, Anaxibius, and the other naval commanders of the enemy<sup>17</sup>.

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In the actual state of Greece, the respective successes of the contending powers were not accompanied by proportional advantages. The Lacedæmonians derived not any solid or permanent benefit from their victory at Coronæa, unless we account as such the gratification of their revenge, in ravaging without resistance the Argive and Bœotian territory; but their defeat at Cnidus deprived them in one day of the fruit of many laborious campaigns, since, with the assistance of a superior naval force, and with the command of the Persian treasury, Conon found little difficulty in detaching for ever from their dominion the whole western coast of Lesser Asia. This enterprise must have been effected with uncommon rapidity, and, unless the Persian fleet kept the sea in the middle of winter (which is not at all probable), could only

Conquests  
of Conon.

<sup>17</sup> Diodor. l. xiv. ad Olym. xcvi. 4. & Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. 5.

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Brave de-  
fence of  
Abydus.

employ about three months. The measures taken by the Spartans, either to preserve or to recover their important possessions in the East, have scarcely deserved the notice of history, if we except their resistance at Abydus, a place less famous for this memorable defence, (such is the love of fiction, and the contempt of truth!) than for the fabulous amours of Hero and Leander. Dercyllidas had obtained the government of this strong and populous town, as the reward of his military services. Instead of imitating the pusillanimity of the neighbouring governors, many of whom, alarmed by the disaster at Cnidus, fled in precipitation from the places entrusted to their command, Dercyllidas assembled the Abydenians; assured them that one naval defeat had not ruined the power of Sparta<sup>18</sup>, who, even before she had attained the sovereignty of the sea, now unfortunately lost, was able to reward her benefactors, and to punish her enemies. “The moment of adversity furnished an occasion to display their inviolable attachment to the republic; and it would be glorious for them alone, of all the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast, to brave the power of Persia.” Having confirmed the courage of the Abydenians, he sailed to the town of Sef-

<sup>18</sup> The remarkable expression of Xenophon shews the importance of this defeat in the general estimation of the Abydenians, and of Dercyllidas himself, though he would fain dissemble it. *Ετι δε οχ ὅτως εἶχον, ἐπὶ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ ἐκράτηθημεν, ὅθεν ἀρὰ ἐπὶ εἰσμεν.* “The matter stands not thus, that because we have been worsted in the sea-fight, we are therefore nothing.”



tos, across the most frequented and narrowest passage of the Hellespont. Sestos was the principal place of the Thracian Chersonesus, the inhabitants of which owed their protection and safety to the useful labours of Dercyllidas<sup>19</sup>; and this claim of merit enabled him to secure their allegiance. The fidelity of these towns, amidst the general defection of the coast of Europe and of Asia, prevented the inconveniences and hardships to which the expelled Spartans, who had been employed in the garrisons of those parts, must have been otherwise exposed; and delivered them from the necessity of undertaking a winter's journey to the Peloponnesus, through the territories of many hostile republics. The unfortunate governors and garrisons, who had fled, or who had been driven from the places of their respective command, took refuge within the friendly walls of Sestos and Abydos. Their numbers increased the security of those cities, and enabled Dercyllidas, who excelled in the art of fortification, to put them in such a posture of defence as baffled the attempts of Conon and Pharnabazus.

But the success of these commanders was still sufficiently complete; and the importance of their services excited the warmest gratitude in the breast of Artaxerxes. The merit of the satrap was acknowledged soon afterwards, by his obtaining in marriage the daughter of the great king.

<sup>19</sup> See above, p. 246.

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Conon re-  
builds the  
walls and  
harbours  
of Athens.  
Olymp.  
xvi. 4.  
A.C. 393.

The patriotic Conon neither desired nor received any personal reward; but employed his favour with Artaxerxes to retrieve the affairs of Athens, the interest of which formed the honourable motive that had alone engaged, and that still retained him, in the Persian service. He inflamed the resentment which both Pharnabazus and his master had justly conceived against Sparta, and encouraged them, early in the spring, to send their victorious armament towards Greece, to retaliate the ravages committed in the East by the arms of Agesilaus. But he instructed them, that if they would render their vengeance complete, and humble for ever the Spartan pride, they must raise the fallen rival of that imperious republic. The disbursement of a sum of money, which would be scarcely felt by the treasury of Persia, might suffice to rebuild the walls and harbours of Athens; a measure by which they would inflict the deepest wound on the power, as well as on the pride, of their ambitious enemy. The proposal was heard with approbation; the expence was liberally supplied; the Persian fleet set sail, reduced the Cyclades and Cythera, ravaged the coast of Laconia, and, after performing in detached squadrons whatever seemed most useful for the Persian service, assembled in the long-deserted harbours of the Phalerus, Munichia, and Piræus. There, the important task of restoring the ancient ornaments and defence of the city of Minerva, was begun, carried on, and accomplished, with extraordinary diligence.

gence. The ready service of the crews belonging to the numerous fleet, assisted the industry of mercenary workmen, whom the allurements of gain had brought from every quarter of Greece; and the labour of both was seconded and encouraged by the voluntary and eager exertions of the Bœotians and Argives; but, above all, by the zeal of the Athenians themselves, who justly regarded their actual employment as the second foundation of their once glorious capital.

The work was completed before the return of spring; and the mortifying intelligence, when brought to Sparta, affected the magistrates of that republic with the cruellest anxiety. They were ready to abandon for ever the prospect of recovering their lost dominion in the East; they were desirous to obtain an accommodation with Artaxerxes on the most humiliating terms; they were willing to deprive themselves of the only advantage yet in their power, to forego even the pleasure of revenge, and to abstain from ravaging the territories of their neighbours and enemies, provided only the great king and his satraps would grant them a condition, with which it was easy to comply, since it required nothing but that they should cease to lavish their own money in raising the dangerous power of the Athenians. For effecting this purpose, they sent successive embassies to the court of Persia, as well as to Teribazus, who had lately succeeded Tithraustes in the government of the southern provinces. They industriously neglected Pharnabazus, from whom they could not reason-

Sparta, alarmed by that measure, solicits peace from Persia.  
Olymp. xcvi. r.  
A. C. 392.



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Employ  
Antalci-  
das as  
their mini-  
ster.

ably expect any favour, as the hostilities of Agefilaus had peculiarly excited the resentment of that warlike satrap.

Among the ministers employed by Sparta, in this negociation, was Antalcidas, a man whose prior history is little known. He appears to have had an intercourse of hospitality with several noble Persians<sup>20</sup>; it is not improbable that he had served under the standard of Cyrus, and perhaps continued in the East during the successive expeditions of Thimbron, Dercyllidas, and Agefilaus. If we except the artful and daring Lyfander, Sparta never employed a more proper agent to treat with the Barbarians. Antalcidas was bold, eloquent, subtle, complying, a master in all the arts of insinuation and address, and equally well qualified, by his abilities and vices, to execute an insidious commission at a corrupt court. The revered institutions of his country were the objects of real or well-feigned contempt; he derided the frugal and self-denying maxims of the divine Lycurgus; but peculiarly delighted the voluptuous, cowardly, and treacherous satraps and courtiers, when he directed the poisoned shafts of his ridicule against the manly firmness, the probity, and the patriotism of Leonidas and Callicratidas, names equally glorious to Sparta and dishonourable to Persia.


His nego-  
ciation fa-  
cilitated  
by the un-

The success of such a minister, almost ensured by his own character and talents, was hastened by the imprudent ambition of Conon and the Athe-

<sup>20</sup> Xenoph. Hellen.

nians, too soon and too fatally intoxicated by the deceitful gifts of prosperity. When this illustrious commander co-operated with Pharnabazus in expelling the Lacedæmonians from the East, he earnestly exhorted the satrap to confirm the Asiatic Greeks in the enjoyment of their ancient liberties, lest the fear of oppression might suggest the means of resistance, and oblige them to form a general alliance for their own defence, which might prove favourable to Artaxerxes. In this plausible advice the patriotic Athenian had a farther view than it was possible for the Persian at that time to discover. After rebuilding the walls and harbours of Athens, he requested Pharnabazus, who prepared to return to his province, that he might be allowed, for a few months longer, to employ a squadron of Persian ships, in conjunction with his own, to infest the territories of Sparta and her allies. The satrap, naturally unsuspicious, and perhaps betrayed by his resentment, readily granted this demand. But Conon, unmindful of his promised operations against the common enemy, thought only of promoting the interest of his republic. He sailed to the Cyclades, to Chios, to Lesbos, and even to the coast of Eolis and Ionia, displayed the strength of his armament, described the flourishing fortune of Athens, and endeavoured to persuade or to compel the astonished Asiatics and islanders to acknowledge the just authority of their ancient metropolis or sovereign, who having risen more splendid from her ruins, required only the attachment of her former allies and subjects, to resume

C H A P.  
XXVIII.feasible  
ambition  
of Conon  
and the  
Atheni-  
ans.

C H A P. XXVIII.  sume her wonted power, and recover her hereditary renown.

Negociations of the adverse states with Persia.

The success of this extraordinary enterprise is not particularly described, nor is the omission material, since this last expedition of Conon had not any other permanent effect but that of ruining himself. His unjustifiable ambition furnished powerful weapons to the dexterity of Antalcidas, who represented him as guilty of the most unexampled audacity, aggravated by the most perfidious ingratitude, in attempting to alienate and to conquer the king's dominions, even by the assistance of the king's forces, to which both his country and himself owed so many recent and signal benefits. The accusation was probably rendered more welcome to Teribazus, by the jealousy which he naturally entertained of the neighbouring satrap, the friend of Conon, and his own rival. But after the last unwarrantable transaction of the Athenian, which he could defend only by the obsolete Greek maxim, that every thing is lawful to a man in the service of his country, even his late colleague Pharnabazus seems to have withdrawn from him the protection and friendship by which he had been so long distinguished, so that the influence of that powerful satrap formed not any opposition to the negotiations and intrigues of Antalcidas. The Athenians, however, sent Dion, Hermogenes, with other emissaries, to watch and counteract his measures. Conon was named at the head of this deputation; and as he knew not the full extent of Teribazus's animosity, inflamed and exas-



exasperated by the address of Antalcidas, he expected that the personal presence of a man, who had formerly served the Persians with fidelity and success, might obtain an easy pardon from the satrap, and perhaps prove useful to the affairs of Athens. The Bœotians and Argives likewise sent their ambassadors, who had instructions to act in concert with Conon and his colleagues. But *their* overtures were little regarded, while those of Antalcidas met with warm approbation from Teribazus.

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The Lacedæmonian ambassador declared that he had been commanded to offer such terms of peace as suited equally the dignity and the interest of the great king. "The Spartans resigned all pretensions to the Greek cities in Asia, which they acknowledged to be dependencies of the Persian empire. Why should Artaxerxes, then, continue to lavish his treasure in vain? since the Spartans not only ceded to him the immediate object of dispute, but earnestly desired to promote the future prosperity of his dominions, by settling the affairs of Greece, as best answered his convenience. For this purpose they were ready to declare all the cities and islands, small and great, totally independent of each other; in consequence of which there would not be any republic sufficiently powerful thenceforth to disturb the tranquillity of Persia." These conditions, which the most insolent minister of the great king might himself have dictated, were too advantageous not to be liable to suspicion. But Teribazus was so blinded

The over-  
tures of  
Sparta  
most ac-  
ceptable  
to the  
Persian  
ministers.

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Death of  
Conon.

blinded by partiality for the Spartan minister, that he seems not to have entertained the smallest doubt of his sincerity. The terms of peace were transmitted to the court of Susa, that they might be approved and ratified by Artaxerxes. The subtlety of Antalcidas was rewarded by a considerable sum of money; and the patriotism of Conon (a patriotism which had carried him beyond the bounds of justice and propriety) was punished by immediate death<sup>21</sup>, or by an ignominious confinement<sup>22</sup>. His fate is variously related; but his actions justly rank him with the first of Grecian names; and the fame of an illustrious father was supported and rivalled by that of his son Timotheus<sup>23</sup>.

Obstacles  
to the con-  
clusion of  
the treaty  
of peace.  
Olymp.  
xcvii. 3.  
A. C. 390.

It might have been expected that a plan of accommodation, so advantageous and honourable for Persia, should have been readily accepted by Artaxerxes. But the negotiation languished for several years, partly on account of the temporary disgrace of Teribazus, who was succeeded by Struthas; a man who, moved by some unknown motive, warmly espoused the interest of the Athenians; and partly by the powerful sollicitations and remonstrances of the Bœotian and Argive ambassadors, who accused the sincerity, and unveiled the latent ambition, of Sparta.

Military  
opera-  
tions.

Meanwhile the war was carried on with unremitting activity. The Lacedæmonians and their

<sup>21</sup> Isoc. Panegy.

<sup>22</sup> Xenoph. Gr. Hist. I. iv.

<sup>23</sup> Dinarch. adv. Demost. p. 94. & Corn. Nepos, in Vit. Conon. & Timoth.

allies sallied from their strong garrisons in Sicyon and the Lechæum, to destroy the harvests and the villages of their Peloponnesian enemies. The Bœotians and Argives retaliated these injuries by several hostile incursions into the territories of Sparta; while the Athenians, as if they had again attained the command of the sea, bent the whole vigour of their republic towards an element long propitious to their ancestors.

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The recent splendour of Conon had eclipsed the ancient and well-merited renown of Thraſybulus, whose extraordinary abilities, and more extraordinary good fortune, had twice rescued his country from the yoke of tyrants. But after the lamented death or captivity of the former, the Athenian fleet, amounting to forty sail, was entrusted to Thraſybulus; who, having scoured the Ægean sea, sailed to the Hellespont, and persuaded or compelled the inhabitants of Byzantium, and several other Thracian cities, to abolish their aristocratic government, and to accept the alliance of Athens. His activity was next directed against the isle of Lesbos, in which the Lacedæmonian interest was still supported by a considerable body of troops. Having landed his men, he joined battle with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Methymna, and obtained a complete victory, after killing with his own hand Therimachus, the Spartan governor and general. The principal cities of the island acknowledged the Athenian power, and seasonably reinforced the fleet, by the terror of which they had been subdued. Encouraged by this

Conquests  
of Thraſy-  
bulus.



C H A P.  
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this success, Thraſybulus failed toward Rhodes, in order to aſſiſt the democratic faction, who equally contended for the intereſt of Athens and their own.

He is ſur-  
prized and  
ſlain.

Before proceeding, however, to that important iſland, he determined to multiply the reſources, and to confirm the affections, of the fleet. For this purpoſe he raiſed conſiderable ſupplies of whatever ſeemed moſt neceſſary for his expedition from the maritime towns of Aſia, and at length entered the mouth of the Eurymedon (the glorious ſcene of Cimon's victories), and levied a heavy contribution on Aſpendus, the principal ſea-port and capital of Pamphylia. But here his good fortune ended<sup>24</sup>. The patient timidity of the Barbarians had endured the public depredation, to which they were long accuſtomed; but even *their* ſervility could not brook the private rapacity and intolerable exactions of the ſailors and troops, which were imputed (not perhaps without reaſon) to the unrelenting avarice of the commander. The reſentment of the Pamphylians overcame their cowardice. They attacked the Grecian tents in the night, and ſurprized the ſecurity of Thraſybulus, who thus fell a ſacrifice to a very unjuſtifiable defect, which if we may believe a contemporary writer, greatly debaſed the dignity of his otherwiſe illuſtrious character<sup>25</sup>.

The

<sup>24</sup> Corn. Nep. in Vit. Thraſybul.

<sup>25</sup> Lyſias againſt Ergocles. This Ergocles was the friend and confidant of Thraſybulus. He had aſſiſted him in expelling the  
thirty

The unjust treatment of Aspendus, which had been retorted by such signal revenge, would never perhaps have reached the ears of Artaxerxes, had not his voluptuous indolence been beset by the active importunity of Antalcidas. This vigilant and artful minister let slip no opportunity to rouse the jealousy of the great king against the Athenians, his hereditary foes, and to obliterate his resentment against the Spartans, his recent but less natural enemies. The severe exactions from Pamphylia, a province acknowledging his authority, afforded a powerful topic of persuasion, which the Spartan ambassador could not fail to employ; but it is uncertain whether even this important argument would have conquered the reluctance of the Persian monarch to concur with the measures of a people, who had enabled the rebellious Cyrus to dispute his throne, and who had recently invaded and plundered, not a maritime city, but the interior provinces of the empire. His interest and inclination were combated by his resentment and his pride; when his fluctuating irresolution was at length decided by the Athenians, whose mad imprudence crowned the triumph of Antalcidas.

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Activity of  
Antalcidas at the  
Persian  
court.  
Olymp.  
xcvii. 4.  
A. C. 389.

thirty tyrants, and had recently accompanied him in his expedition to the coast of Thrace, mentioned in the text. The military exploits of Thraſybulus in Thrace were highly honourable and meritorious; but his private behaviour was the reverse. He stuck at nothing by which he could enrich himself or his dependants. Ergocles was condemned to death for the share which he had taken in this unjustifiable peculation and rapacity. Lyſias's Orations against Ergocles and Philocrates. See likewise Aristophanes Eccleſiaz. v. 356. & Schol. ad locum.

The

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Revolt of  
Cyprus  
abetted by  
the Athe-  
nians.

The signal victories of Conon and Thrasylbulus, and the rising fortune of Athens, encouraged Evagoras king of Salamis, who had received some late cause of disgust, to execute his long-meditated design of revolting from Persia. Egypt was actually in rebellion; Artaxerxes had undertaken a war against the barbarous Carduchians<sup>26</sup>, who were by no means a contemptible enemy. These were very favourable circumstances; but the Persian fleet, which, after performing the service for which it had been equipped, had continued to lie inactive in the Phœnician and Cilician harbours, was ready to be employed in any new enterprise. The skilful and experienced bravery of the king of Salamis, seconded by the youthful ardour of his son Protagoras, obtained an easy victory over the first squadrons that were sent to invade his island. But there was reason to dread the arrival of a far superior force. In this danger Evagoras requested, and obtained, the assistance of the Athenians; who not only enjoyed peace with Persia, but whose ambassadors were endeavouring to prevent that court from making peace with their enemies.

The great  
king dic-  
tates the  
terms of  
a general  
peace.  
Olymp.  
xcviii. 1.  
A. C. 388.

This extraordinary measure of a people, in preferring their gratitude to their interest; a gratitude which they might have foreseen to be useless to him whom they meant to oblige, and pernicious to the most important interests of their republic, finally determined Artaxerxes to espouse

<sup>26</sup> These and the following circumstances concerning the war of Cyprus are scattered through Diodorus, Isocrates's Panegyric of Athens, and the panegyric of Evagoras.



the cause of the Spartans; and to dictate the terms of a general peace, almost in the same words which had been proposed by Antalcidas: "That the Greek cities in Asia, with the island of Cyprus and the peninsula of Clazomené, should be subject to Persia; Athens should be allowed to retain her immemorial jurisdiction in the isles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; but all the other republics, small and great, should enjoy the independent government of their own hereditary laws. Whatever people rejected these conditions, so evidently calculated for preserving the public tranquillity, must expect the utmost indignation of the great king, who, in conjunction with the republic of Sparta, would make war, on their perverse and dangerous obstinacy, by sea and land, with ships and money<sup>27</sup>."

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Teribazus and Antalcidas returned from the East, charged with the definitive resolutions, or rather the haughty mandate of Artaxerxes, which had been confirmed by the unalterable sanction of the royal signet. There was reason, however, to apprehend that Thebes, Athens, and Argos, might still reject the terms of a peace proposed by their avowed enemies, pernicious to their particular and immediate interests, and equally disadvantageous and dishonourable to the whole Grecian name. The remembrance of the glorious confederacy, for defending the Asiatic colonies against the op-

Which the  
Grecian  
states are  
compelled  
to accept.  
Olymp.  
xcviii. 2.  
A. C. 387.

<sup>27</sup> The last words are literally translated from Xenoph. p. 550. See likewise Diodor. l. xiv. c. cx. Plut. Agefil. p. 608; and Artaxerx. p. 1022.

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pression of Barbarians, could not indeed much influence the degenerate councils of those republics; but the Thebans must resign, with reluctance, their real or pretended authority over the inferior cities of Bœotia; the Argives must unwillingly withdraw their garrison from Corinth, and leave that important capital in the power of the aristocratic or Lacedæmonian faction; and the Athenians must abandon, with regret, the fruits of their recent victories, and the hopes of recovering their ancient grandeur. The opposition of these states had been foreseen by Antalcidas, who took the most effectual measures to render it impotent. By the assistance of Persian money he equipped a fleet of eighty sail, from the mercenary sea-ports of Greece and Asia, from the intermediate isles, and even from the coasts of Italy and Sicily. This armament was independent of the squadrons with which Teribazus prepared to attack the isle of Cyprus, if the presumption of Evagoras, unassisted and alone, should dare to provoke his hostility. The satrap also had collected a very considerable army, which was ready to embark for Greece, and to co-operate with Agesilaus, who had assembled the domestic troops and allies of Sparta to march, at the first summons, against any city or republic that might reject the peace of Antalcidas<sup>28</sup>. These vigorous preparations, intimidating the weakness of the confederates, compelled them into a reluctant compliance with the terms of the treaty. The

<sup>28</sup> Τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδα εἰρήνης καλῶμενης. Xenoph. p. 277.

Thebans made the strongest and most obstinate resistance; but their pretensions were finally silenced by the threats of the Spartan king, the inveterate enemy of their republic. The Bœotian cities were acknowledged to be independent, and admitted as parties in the peace. The Argives retired from Corinth, which being deserted by the leaders of the democratical faction, became a faithful ally to Sparta. The military and naval operations ceased, tranquillity was restored, and the armies and fleets were, on both sides, disbanded and dissolved<sup>29</sup>.

But amidst this universal and most obsequious submission to the court of Persia, one man avowed his discontent, and prepared to maintain his opposition. The article respecting Cyprus was loudly rejected by Evagoras, who asserted the independence of his native island; and, with a magnanimity that formed a striking contrast with the degenerate and disgraceful softness of his Grecian allies, set the power of Artaxerxes at defiance. Evagoras trusted to the resources of his own vigorous mind, to the superior skill of his seamen, and to the assistance of Acoris king of Egypt. But the numerous squadrons of Teribazus prevailed over all his hopes. He was discomfited in a naval engagement; his territories were invaded and ravaged; he was reduced to his capital Salamis; and even Salamis was threatened with a siege. His resistance had already exceeded what his strength warranted, or what his dignity required. His ene-

Evagoras  
alone re-  
jects the  
authority  
Persia.

<sup>29</sup> Διαλυσθῆναι τὰ πνεύματα, &c. Xenoph. p. 551.



C H A P. XXVIII.            mies were incapable of perseverance, or unwilling to drive him to despair. He resigned his numerous and recent conquests in Cyprus, but retained possession of the ancient principality of Teucer, which his fortunate arms had recovered from an usurper; and submitted, without dishonour, to imitate the example of many preceding princes of Salamis, and to acknowledge himself the tributary of the king of Persia<sup>30</sup>.

Submits to  
an honour-  
able com-  
promise.  
Olymp.  
xcviii. 4.  
A. C. 385.

<sup>30</sup> Diodor. l. xv. p. 462.

## C H A P. XXIX.

*Reflections upon the Peace of Antalcidas.—Ambitious Views of Sparta.—State of Arcadia.—Siege of Mantinæa.—Olynthian Confederacy.—The Spartans make War on Olynthus.—Submission of that Republic.—Pella becomes the Capital of Macedon.—Phæbidas seizes the Theban Citadel.—The Measure approved by Agesilaus.—Conspiracy of the Theban Exiles.—The Theban Democracy restored.*

THE peace of Antalcidas forms an important and disgraceful æra in the Grecian history. The valuable colonies in Asia, the cause, the object, and the scene, of so many memorable wars, were resigned and abandoned for ever to the power of a Barbarian master. The king of Persia dismembered the distant dependencies, and controuled the domestic arrangements of a people who had given law to his ancestors<sup>1</sup>. Their ancient confederacies were dissolved; the smaller cities were loosened from dependence on their powerful neighbours; all were disunited and weakened;

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Reflections on the peace of Antalcidas.

<sup>1</sup> See the articles of the treaty concluded in 449, A. C. Vol. II. c. xii. p. 80.

CHAP. and Greece felt the languor of peace, without enjoying the benefits of security.

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But if the whole Grecian name was dishonoured by accepting this ignominious treaty, what peculiar infamy must belong to the magistrates of Sparta, by whom it was proposed and promoted? What motives of advantage could balance this weight of disgrace? Or rather, what advantage could the Spartans derive from such ignoble condescension as seemed totally unworthy of their actual power, but far more unworthy of their ancient renown? This question, like most political questions, may be best answered by facts; and the transactions which both preceded and followed the peace of Antalcidas clearly discover and ascertain the secret, but powerful, causes of that dishonourable, and seemingly disadvantageous, measure.

Motives which engaged the Spartans eagerly to embrace that treaty.

The ambition of making conquests in the East, which it now appeared impossible to retain, had deprived the Lacedæmonians of an authority, or rather dominion, in Greece, acquired by the success of the Peloponnesian war, and which they might have reasonably expected to preserve and to confirm. Not only their power, but their safety, was threatened by the arms of a hostile confederacy, which had been formed and fomented by the wealth of Persia. Athens, their rival, their superior, their subject, but always their unrelenting enemy, had recovered her walls and fleet, and aspired to command the sea. Thebes and Argos had become sensible of their natural strength, and disdained



dained to acknowledge the pre-eminence, or to follow the standard, of any foreign republic. The inferior states of Peloponnesus were weary of obeying every idle summons to war, from which they derived not any advantage but that of gratifying the ambition of their Spartan masters. The valuable colonies in Macedon and Thrace, and particularly the rich and populous cities of the Chalcidic region, the bloodless conquests of the virtuous Brasidas, had forsaken the interest of Sparta, when Sparta forsook the interest of justice. Scarcely any vestige appeared of the memorable trophies erected in a war of twenty-seven years. The Eastern provinces (incomparably the most important of all) were irrecoverably lost; and this rapid decline of power had happened in the course of ten years, and had been chiefly occasioned by the fatal splendour of Agesilaus's victories in Asia.

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About a century before, and almost on the same scene, the Spartans had been first deprived of their hereditary fame, and prescriptive honours<sup>2</sup>. Almost every interference, in peace or war, with the Ionian colonies, had hurt the interests of their republic. They naturally began to suspect, therefore, that such distant expeditions suited not the circumstances of Sparta, an inland city, with a fertile territory, but destitute of arts, industry, and commerce; and whose inhabitants, having little genius for the sea, were naturally unable to equip, or to maintain, such a naval force as might

Advantages  
which they  
derived  
from it.

<sup>2</sup> See above, Vol. II. p. 58.

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command the obedience of an extensive coast, attached by powerful ties to their Athenian rivals. The abandoning, therefore, of what they could not hope to regain, or, if regained, to preserve, seemed a very prudent and salutary measure; since, in return for this imaginary concession, they received many real and important advantages. They were appointed to superintend and to direct the execution of the treaty; and in order to make their authority effectual, entitled to demand the assistance of Persian money, with which they might easily purchase Grecian soldiers. The condition requiring the smaller cities to be declared free and independent (although the dexterity of Antalcidas had proposed it as the best means of preventing the future invasion of Asia), was peculiarly beneficial to the Spartans. It represented them as the patrons of universal liberty, and restored them that honourable reputation which they had long lost. From the nature of the condition itself, it could only apply to such places as being kept in a reluctant subjection, still possessed courage to vindicate their freedom. In the secondary towns of Messenia and Laconia, the stern policy of Sparta had crushed the hope, and almost the desire, of obtaining this inestimable benefit. The authority of other capitals was less imperious and imposing; the sovereign and subject were more on a footing of equality; and it was a maxim in Greece, "That men are disposed to reject the just rights of their equals, rather than to revolt against the unlawful tyranny

tyranny of their masters<sup>3</sup>. But Sparta expected not only to detach the inferior communities from their more powerful neighbours, but to add them to the confederacy of which she formed the head; and by such multiplied accessions of power, of wealth, and of fame, to re-establish that solid power in Greece, which had been imprudently abandoned for the hope of Asiatic triumphs<sup>4</sup>.

That such considerations of interest and ambition, not a sincere desire to promote the public tranquillity, had produced this perfidious treaty, could not long be kept secret; notwithstanding the various artifices employed to conceal it. Thebes and Argos were required to comply with the terms of the peace; but no mention was made of withdrawing the Lacedæmonian garrisons from the places which they occupied. Lest this injustice might occasion general discontent, the Athenians were allowed the same privilege. The possession of the unimportant isles of Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros, flattered their vain hopes, and lulled them into false security; and, as they expected to reap the fruits of the victories of Conon and Thrasylbulus, they were averse to renew the war for the sake of their allies, whose interests were now separated from their own. Meanwhile the Spartan emissaries negotiated and intrigued in all the subordinate cities, encouraging the aristocratical fac-

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Their ambitious designs immediately after that event.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. *passim*. See particularly the speech of the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Vol. II. c. xv. p. 203.

<sup>4</sup> Vid. Isocrat. *de Pace*, *passim*.

tions,



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tions, and fomenting the animosities of the citizens against each other, and against their respective capitals. The jealousies and complaints, which had been principally occasioned by these secret cabals, were usually referred to the Spartan senate; whose affected moderation, under pretence of defending the cause of the weak and the injured, always decided the contest in the way most favourable for themselves. But the warlike disciples of Lycurgus could not long remain satisfied with these juridical usurpations. They determined to take arms, which they probably hoped to employ with such artful dexterity as might prevent any general, or very dangerous, alarm; beginning with such cities as had not entered into the late confederacy against them, gradually extending their hostilities to the more powerful members of that confederacy; and thus conquering successively those, whose entire and collective strength it would have been vain to assail<sup>s</sup>.

State of  
Arcadia.  
Olymp.  
xcviii. 3.  
A. C. 386.

The first victim of this ambitious policy was the flourishing republic of Mantinæa, whose territory was situate almost in the center of Arcadia, itself the center of the Peloponnesus. The origin of Mantinæa was the same with that of Tegea, Stymphalis, Heræa, Orchomenos, and other neighbouring cities, which had grown into populousness and power from the scattered villages of shepherds inhabiting the vallies and mountains of

<sup>s</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. p. 551. & Diodor. l. xv. p. 448.

Arcadia,

Arcadia. The exuberant fertility, the inland situation, the generous warmth, yet lively verdure<sup>6</sup>, together with the picturesque and animating scenery of this delightful region, seemed peculiarly adapted to inspire, and to gratify, the love of rural happiness; and to afford, in all their elegance and dignity, *those sublime and sacred joys of the country*, which the genius of ancient poets hath felt, and described with such affecting sensibility. Every district of Arcadia was marked and diversified by hills, some of which, could we credit the inaccuracy of geographical description, ascend two miles in perpendicular height<sup>7</sup>, and which supply innumerable streams, that water and fertilise the rich vallies which they inclose and defend. This secure and insulated position of their territory long preserved the Arcadians ignorant and uncorrupted; and a little before the period of history now under review, they were distinguished by the innocent simplicity of their manners, and by their fond attachment to a pastoral life. But the turbulent ambition of their neighbours had often obliged them to employ the sword instead of the sheep-hook. They had *reluctantly* taken arms; yet, when compelled by necessity, or excited by honour, the mountaineers of Arcadia had displayed such stubborn valour, and exerted such efforts of vigour and activity, as made their services eagerly desired,

<sup>6</sup> These circumstances are common to Arcadia with the other mountainous districts of Greece, as well as with the islands of the Archipelago. TOURNEFORT.

<sup>7</sup> Descript. Græc. apud Gronov. vol. I.

C H A P. and purchased with emulation, by the surrounding  
 XXIX. states. Nor had they trusted to their personal  
 strength and bravery alone for the defence of their  
 beloved possessions. Having quitted their farms  
 and villages, they had assembled into walled towns,  
 from which their numerous garrisons were ready to  
 sally forth against an hostile invader. The danger-  
 ous vicinity of Sparta had early driven the com-  
 panions of Pan and the Nymphs from the vocal  
 woods of mount Mænalus<sup>8</sup>, into the fortifications  
 of Tegea, formerly the principal city of the pro-  
 vince<sup>9</sup>, but afterwards rivalled and surpassed by  
 Mantinæa, which was become an object of jealousy  
 and envy, not only to the neighbouring cities of  
 Arcadia, but even to Sparta herself.

The proud  
 message of  
 the Spar-  
 tans to the  
 Mantinæ-  
 ans.  
 Olymp.  
 xcvi. 3.  
 A. C. 386.

In the year immediately following the treaty of  
 Antalcidas, Lacedæmonian ambassadors were sent  
 to Mantinæa, to discharge a very extraordinary  
 commission. Having demanded an audience of  
 the assembly, they expressed the resentment of their  
 republic against a people, who, pretending to live  
 in friendship with them, had in the late war re-  
 peatedly furnished with corn their avowed enemies  
 the Argives. That, on other occasions, the  
 Mantinæans had unguardedly discovered their secret  
 hatred to Sparta, rejoicing in her misfortunes, and  
 envying her prosperity. That it was time to anti-  
 cipate this dangerous and unjust animosity; for

<sup>8</sup> Mænalus argutumque nemus pinosque loquētes  
 Semper habet; semper pastorum ille audit amores  
 Panaque, &c. VIRG. Ecl. viii. v. 22.

<sup>9</sup> Herodot. i. vi. c. 105,

which



which purpose the Spartans commanded them to demolish their walls, to abandon their proud city, and to return to those peaceful villages in which their ancestors had lived and flourished<sup>10</sup>. The Mantinæans received this proposal with the indignation which it merited; the ambassadors retired in disgust; the Spartans declared war; summoned the assistance of their confederates; and a powerful army, commanded by king Agefipolis, invaded the hostile territory.

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But the most destructive ravages could not bend the resolution of the Mantinæans. The strength and loftiness of their walls bade defiance to assault; nor could a regular siege be undertaken with certain success, as the magazines of Mantinæa were abundantly stored with various kinds of grain, the crops of the former year having been uncommonly plentiful. Agefipolis, however, embraced this doubtful mode of attack, and drew first a ditch, and then a wall, entirely round the place, employing one part of his troops in the work, and another in guarding the workmen. This tedious service exhausted the patience of the besiegers, without shaking the firmness of the Mantinæans. The Spartans were afraid to detain longer in the field their reluctant confederates; but Agefipolis proposed a new measure, which was attended with complete and immediate success. The river Ophis, formed by the collected torrents from

Mantinæa  
besieged.

<sup>10</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. c. 2, & seqq. Diodor. l. xv. c. 7, & seqq.

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mount Anchisius, a river broad, deep, and rapid, flowed through the plain, and the city of Mantinæa. It was a laborious undertaking to stop the course of this copious stream; which was no sooner effected, than the lower parts of the walls of Mantinæa were laid under water. According to the usual practice of the Greeks, the fortifications of this place were built of raw bricks, which being less liable to break into chinks, and to fly out of their courses, were preferred as the best defence against the battering-engines then in use. But it is the inconvenience of raw bricks, to be as easily dissolved by water, as wax is melted by the sun<sup>11</sup>. The walls of Mantinæa began to yield, to shake, to fall in pieces. The activity of the inhabitants propped them with wood, but without any permanent advantage; so that, despairing of being able to exclude the enemy, they sent to capitulate, requesting that they might be permitted to keep possession of their city, on condition that they demolished their fortifications, and followed, in peace and war, the fortune of Sparta.

The town  
capitu-  
lates.

Hard con-  
ditions to  
which the  
inhabit-  
ants are  
compelled  
to submit.  
Olymp.  
xcviii. 4.  
A. C. 385.

Agefipolis and his counsellors refused to grant them any other terms of peace than those which had been originally proposed by the republic. He observed, that while they lived together in one populous city, their numbers exposed them to the delusions of seditious demagogues, whose address

<sup>11</sup> This is the expression of Pausanias, in Arcad. who mentions the name of the river Ophis, omitted by Xenophon and Diodorus.

and

and eloquence easily seduced the multitude from their real interest, and destroyed the influence of their superiors in rank, in wealth, and in wisdom, on whose attachment alone the Lacedæmonians could safely depend. They insisted, therefore, that the Mantinæans should destroy their houses in the city; separate into four distinct communities<sup>12</sup>; and return to those villages which their ancestors had inhabited. The terror of an immediate assault made it necessary to comply with this humiliating demand; but the most zealous partisans of democracy, to the number of sixty, afraid of trusting to the capitulation, were *allowed* to fly from their country; which is mentioned as an instance of moderation<sup>13</sup> in the Lacedæmonian soldiers, who might have put them to death as they passed through the gates.

This transaction was scarcely finished, when the Spartan magistrates seized an opportunity of the domestic discontents among the Phliasians, to display the same tyrannical spirit, but with still greater exertions of severity. The little republic of Phlius, like every state of Greece in those unfortunate, at least turbulent times, was distracted by factions. The prevailing party banished their opponents, the friends of Sparta and aristocracy. They were allowed to return from exile, in consequence of the commands and threats of Agesi-

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The Spartans regulate, with a strong hand, the affairs of Phlius. Olymp. xcix. 1.  
A. C. 384.

<sup>12</sup> Xenophon says four, Diodorus five.

<sup>13</sup> Or rather of good discipline; *πειθαρχία*. The nobles of the Mantinæans, *οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν Μαντινέων*, were not so temperate; vide Xenoph. p. 552.

laus;



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laus<sup>14</sup>; but met not with that respectful treatment which seemed due to persons who enjoyed such powerful protection. They complained, and Agefilaus again interfered, by appointing commissioners to try and condemn to death the obnoxious Phliasians; an odious office, which must have been executed with unexampled rigour, since the city of Phlius, which had hitherto been divided by a variety of interests, thenceforward continued invariably the steadfast ally of Sparta<sup>15</sup>.

Embassy  
of Acan-  
thus and  
Apollonia  
to Sparta.

Meanwhile ambassadors arrived from Acanthus and Apollonia, two cities of the Chalcidicé, requesting the Lacedæmonian assistance against the dangerous ambition of Olynthus. This city, of which we had occasion to mention the foundation towards the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was situate nine miles from the sea, in a fertile and secure district, between the rivers Olynthus and Amnias, which flow into the lake Bolyca, a name improperly bestowed on the inmost recess of the Toronaic gulph. The vexatious government of Athens first drove the maritime communities of the Chalcidic region within the walls of Olynthus; the oppressive tyranny of Sparta obliged them to strengthen those walls, as well as to provide sufficient garrisons to defend them; and the subsequent misfortunes of these domineering republics, together with the weakness of Macedon, encouraged and enabled the inhabitants of Olyn-

<sup>14</sup> Xenoph. in Agefil. & Hellen. l. v. p. 553.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. l. vii. p. 624.

thus successfully to employ, in offensive war, the forces which had been raised with no other view than to maintain their own independence. The towns which they subdued were either incorporated or associated with their own; and Olynthus became the head of a confederacy, whose extent, power, resources, and hopes, occasioned just alarm among the neighbouring communities of Greeks and Barbarians. They had already conquered the southern shores of Macedon, which comprehended the delightful regions of Chalcis and Pieria, indented by two great and two smaller bays, and affording, in the highest perfection, the united benefits of agriculture, pasturage, and commerce. They aspired at acquiring the valuable district of mount Pangæus, whose timber and mines alike tempted their ambition and avarice; and Olynthus being favourably situate in the centre of the Chalcidicé, itself the centre of the Macedonian and Thracian coasts, might have preserved and extended her dominion, if the ambassadors of Acanthus and Apollonia had not completely effected the object of their commission at Sparta. They applied to the Ephori, who introduced them to the greater assembly, consisting, not only of the Spartans and Lacedæmonians, but of the deputies sent by their confederates. Cleigenes, the Acanthian, spoke in the name of his colleagues: "We apprehend, O Lacedæmonians, and allies! that amidst the multiplied objects of your care and correction, you have overlooked a great and growing

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They petition the assistance of that republic against the Olynthian confederacy.

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disorder which threatens, like a pestilence, to infect and pervade Greece. The ambition of the Olynthians has increased with their power. By the voluntary submission of the smaller cities in their neighbourhood, they have been enabled to subdue the more powerful. Emboldened by this accession of strength, they have wrested from the king of Macedon his most valuable provinces. They actually possess Pella, the greatest city in that kingdom; and the unfortunate Amyntas is on the point of abandoning the remainder of his dominions, which he is unable to defend. There is not any community in Thrace capable to stop their progress. The independent tribes of that warlike but divided country, respect the authority, and court the friendship of the Olynthians, who will doubtless be tempted to extend their dominion on that side, in order to augment the great revenues which they derive from their commercial cities and harbours, by the inexhaustible mines in mount Pangæus. If this extensive plan should be effected, what can prevent them from acquiring a decisive superiority by sea and land? and should they enter into an alliance with Athens and Thebes (a measure actually in contemplation), what will become, we say not, of the hereditary pre-eminence of Sparta, but of its independence and safety? The present emergency, therefore, solicits, by every motive of interest and of honour, the activity and valour of your republic. By yielding a seasonable assistance to Acanthus and Apollonia,



Apollonia, which, unmoved by the pusillanimous example of their neighbours, have hitherto spurned the yoke, and defied the threats of Olynthus, you will save from oppression two peaceful communities, and check the ambition of an usurping tyrant. The reluctant subjects of the Olynthians will court your protection; and the Chalcidian cities will be encouraged to revolt, especially as they are not yet inseparably linked with the capital by the ties of intermarriage and consanguinity, and by the interchange of rights and possessions<sup>16</sup>. When such a connection shall take place (for the Olynthians have made a law to encourage it), you will be unable to break the force of this powerful and dangerous confederacy."

The speech of Cleigenes, and the ambitious views of the republic to which it was addressed, afford reason to conjecture that the ambassadors neither asked any thing in favour of their own communities, nor urged any accusation against Olynthus, which had not been previously suggested by the Spartan emissaries in Macedon. The reception given to the proposal of Cleigenes tends to confirm this conclusion. The Lacedæmonians, with affected impartiality and indifference, desired the opinion of their allies, before declaring their own. But there was not any occasion to declare what none could be so blind as to mistake. The confederates with one consent, but especially those

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The Spartans readily listen to a request probably suggested by themselves. Olymp. xcix. 2. A. C. 383.

<sup>16</sup> Επιγαμίαις και συκτηήσεσι παραλληλαι. Xenoph. p. 555.

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Their pre-  
 parations  
 for the  
 Olynthian  
 war.

who wished to ingratiate themselves with Sparta<sup>17</sup>, determined to undertake the expedition against Olynthus. The Spartans commended their resolution, and proceeded to deliberate concerning the strength of the army to be raised, the mode of levying it, and the time for taking the field. It was resolved, that the whole forces should amount to ten thousand effective men; and a list was prepared, containing the respective contingents to be furnished by the several cities. If any state should be unable to supply the full complement of soldiers, money would be taken in their stead, at the rate of half a drachm a day (or three-pence halfpenny) for each man; but if neither the troops nor the money were sent in due time, the Lacedæmonians would punish the disobedience of the obstinate or neglectful, by fining them eight times the sum which they had been originally required to contribute.

The ambassadors then rose up, and Cleigenes, again speaking for the rest, declared that these were indeed noble and generous resolutions; but, unfortunately, could not be executed with such promptitude as suited the urgency of the present crisis. The dangerous situation of Acanthus and Apollonia demanded immediate assistance. He proposed, therefore, that those troops which were ready, should instantly take the field; and insisted

<sup>17</sup> Καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἐυλομενὸς χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις.  
 Xenoph. p. 555.

On this measure as a matter of the utmost importance to the future success of the war.

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The Lacedæmonians acknowledged the expediency of the advice; and commanded Eudamidas, with two thousand men, to proceed without delay to Macedon, while his brother Phœbidas collected a powerful reinforcement, in order to follow him. A very extraordinary event, which we shall have occasion fully to explain, retarded the arrival of those auxiliaries, until the season for action had been nearly spent. But Eudamidas, with his little band, performed very essential service. He strengthened the garrisons of such places as were most exposed to assaults from the enemy; the appearance of a Spartan army encouraged the spirit of revolt among the allies and subjects of Olynthus; and soon after his march into the Chalcidicé, Eudamidas received the voluntary surrender of Potidæa, a city of great importance in the isthmus of Palléné.

First campaign against Olynthus. Olymp. xcix. 2. A. C. 383.

Such was the first campaign of a war which lasted four years, and was carried on under four successive generals. Eudamidas, too much elated by his first success, ravaged the Olynthian territory, and unguardedly approached the city. He was intercepted, conquered, and slain, and his army dispersed or lost<sup>18</sup>.

Eudamidas defeated and slain.

Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus, whose naval exploits have been already mentioned with applause, assumed the conduct of this distant ex-

Second campaign under Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus,

<sup>18</sup> Xenoph. p. 556.



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Olymp.  
xcix. 3.  
A. C. 382.

pedition, with a body of ten thousand men. He was assisted by Amyntas, king of Macedon, and still more effectually by Derdas, the brother of that prince, and the governor, or rather sovereign, of Elymea, the most western province of Macedon, which abounded in cavalry. By the united efforts of these formidable enemies, the Olynthians, who had been defeated in various rencounters, were shut up within their walls, and prevented from cultivating their territory. Teleutias at length marched with his whole forces, in order to invest, or if he found an opportunity, to assault the place. His surprise and indignation were excited by the boldness of the Olynthian horse, who ventured to pass the Amnias in sight of such a superior army; and he ordered the targeteers, who were commanded by Tlemonidas, to repel their insolence. The cavalry made an artful retreat across the Amnias, and were fiercely pursued by the Lacedæmonians. When a considerable part of the latter had likewise passed the river, the Olynthians suddenly faced about, and charged them. Tlemonidas, with above an hundred of his companions, fell in the action. The Spartan general beheld with grief and rage the successful bravery of the enemy. Grasping his shield and lance, he commanded the cavalry, and the remainder of the targeteers, to pursue without intermission; and, at the head of his heavy-armed men, advanced with less order than celerity. The Olynthians attempted not to stop their progress, till they arrived under the walls and battlements. At that moment  
the

the townsmen mounted their ramparts, and assailed the enemy with a shower of darts and arrows, and every kind of missile weapon, which greatly added to the confusion occasioned by the rapidity of their march. Meanwhile the flower of the Olynthian troops, who had been purposely drawn up behind the gates, sallied forth with irresistible violence; Teleutias, attempting to rally his men, was slain in the first onset; the Spartans who attended him gave ground; the whole army was repelled, and pursued with great slaughter, while they fled in scattered disorder towards the friendly towns of Acanthus, Apollonia, Spartolus, and Potidæa<sup>19</sup>.

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Teleutias  
likewise  
defeated  
and slain.

This mortifying disaster did not cool the ardour of the Spartans for gaining possession of Olynthus. In the year three hundred and eighty-one before Christ, which was the third of the war, they sent Agesipolis, with a powerful reinforcement, into Macedon. The arrival of this prince early in the spring, revived the hopes of the vanquished, and confirmed the attachment of the Lacedæmonian allies. He invaded and ravaged such parts of the Olynthian territory as had been spared in former incursions, and took by storm the strong city of Torona. But while he prepared to avail himself of these advantages for rendering his success complete, he was seized by a calenture, a disease incident to warm climates, and, as the name expresses, affecting the patient with a painful sensation of burning heat, which he is eager to extin-

Third  
campaign  
underking  
Agesipolis;  
Olymp.  
xcix. 4.  
A. C. 381.

who dies  
of a calen-  
ture.

<sup>19</sup> Xenoph. p. 561, & seqq.

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guish by the most violent and dangerous remedies <sup>20</sup>. Agefipolis had lately visited the temple of Apollo at Aphytis, a maritime town on the Toranaic gulph. In the paroxysm of his disorder, he longed for the fanning breezes, the shady walks and groves, and the cool crystalline streams, of that delightful retreat. His attendants indulged his inclination, but could not save his life. He died on the seventh day of the disease, within the precincts of the consecrated ground. His remains, embalmed in honey, were conveyed to Sparta <sup>21</sup>. His brother Cleombrotus succeeded to the throne; and Polybiades, a general of experience and capacity, was invested with the command in Macedon.

Fourth  
campaign  
under  
Polybi-  
ades.  
Olymp.  
C. I.  
A. C. 380.

Polybiades, imitating the example of his predecessors, conducted a powerful reinforcement against Olynthus, which was completely surrounded by land, while a squadron of Lacedæmonian galleys blocked up the neighbouring harbour of Mecyberna. The events of the siege, which lasted eight or ten months, have not been thought worthy of record. It is probable that the Olynthians no longer ventured to sally forth against such a superior force: yet they must have been exceedingly distressed by famine before their obsti-

<sup>20</sup> It is supposed, with great probability, that the sailors who suddenly disappear in the Mediterranean, during the heat of summer, have been attacked in the night by the calenture, and have thrown themselves into the sea. Cyclopæd. Par. ad voc. The disorder is examined by Dr. Shaw, Phil. Trans. Abridg vol. iv.

<sup>21</sup> Xenoph. p. 564.



nacy could be determined to capitulate. They formally relinquished all claim to the dominion of the Chalcidicé: they ceded the Macedonian cities to their ancient sovereign; and engaged, by solemn oaths, to obey, in peace and war, the commands of their Spartan confederates and masters<sup>22</sup>.

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In consequence of this humiliating treaty, or rather of this absolute submission of the Olynthians, Polybiades led off his victorious army, and Amyntas forsook the royal residence of Ægæ or Edeffa, and re-established his court at Pella, a place of great strength and beauty, situate on an eminence, which, with an adjoining plain of considerable extent, was defended by the rivers Axios and Lydias, and by impervious lakes and morasses. The city was distant only fifteen miles from the Ægean sea, with which it communicated by means of the above-mentioned rivers. It had been of old founded by Greeks, by whom it was recently conquered and peopled; but in consequence of the misfortunes and surrender of Olynthus, Pella became, and thenceforth continued, the capital of Macedon.

Olynthus  
finally  
submits.

Pella re-  
stored to  
Amyntas,  
and con-  
tinues  
thence-  
forth the  
capital of  
Macedon.

The commencement, and especially the conclusion of the Olynthian war, breathed the same spirit with the peace of Antalcidas, and proved the degenerate ambition of the Spartans, who were prepared to aggrandise the Barbarians on every side, in order to obtain their assistance towards extending their own dominion in Greece. This selfish and

Daring  
enterprise  
of the  
Spartan  
Phœbidas.

<sup>22</sup> Xenoph. p 565.

cruel system of policy deserved the indignation and resentment of the whole Grecian name, who were at length excited against Sparta by a very extraordinary transaction, to which we already had occasion to allude. When Eudamidas undertook the expedition against Olynthus, it was intended that his brother Phœbidas should follow him at the head of eight thousand men. This powerful reinforcement marched from Peloponnesus, and, in their journey northwards, encamped in the neighbourhood of Thebes, which was then torn by the inveterate hostility of contending factions. Ismenias, whose name has already occurred on a very dishonourable occasion, headed the democratical party; Leontiades supported the interest of Sparta and aristocracy; and both were invested with the *archonship*, the chief magistracy in the commonwealth. It is not absolutely certain that Phœbidas had previous orders to interfere in this dissension<sup>23</sup>, when he was accosted by Leontiades, “who exhorted him to seize the opportunity, which fortune had thrown in his way, of performing a signal service to his country. He then explained to the Lacedæmonian the distracted state of Thebes, and the facility with which he might become master of the citadel; so that while his brother Eudamidas was carrying on the war against

<sup>23</sup> Diodorus boldly asserts that Phœbidas acted by orders of his republic, and that the feigned complaints against him were nothing but a mask to disguise or to conceal the injustice of the community.

Olynthus, he himself would acquire possession of a much greater city <sup>24</sup>.”

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A contemporary historian, whose known partiality for the Lacedæmonians disposed him to regard this singular enterprise as an act of private audacity, represents Phœbidas as a man of a light and vain mind, who loved the fame of a splendid action more than life itself, and who embraced, with childish transports of joy <sup>25</sup>, the proposal of Leontiades. The mode of executing their plan was soon settled between them. To elude suspicion Phœbidas made the usual preparations for continuing his journey, when he was suddenly recalled by his associate. It was the month of July; the heat was intense; and, at mid-day, few or no passengers were to be seen in the roads or streets. The Theban matrons celebrated the festival of Ceres, and prayed that bountiful divinity to preserve the hope of a favourable harvest. The appropriated scene of their female worship was the Cædma, or citadel, of which the gates had been purposely thrown open, and which was totally defenceless, as the males were universally excluded from this venerable ceremony. Every circumstance conspired to facilitate the design of Leontiades, who conducted the Lacedæmonians to the fortress, without finding the smallest opposition. He immediately descended to the senate, which,

In time of  
peace he  
seizes the  
Theban  
citadel.  
Olymp.  
xcix. 2.  
A. C. 383.

<sup>24</sup> Xenoph. p. 297, & seqq. Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. p. 457.

<sup>25</sup> *Ανεμυσθίον* is the expression used by Xenophon.

though



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though it usually assembled in the Cadmæa, was then sitting in the market-place; declared that the Lacedæmonians had acted by his advice, and without any purpose of hostility; seized Ismenias with his own hand as a disturber of the public peace, and ordered the other leaders of the republican faction to be taken into safe custody. Many were caught and imprisoned, and about four hundred escaped to Athens <sup>26</sup>.

The measure approved by Agefilæus.

When the news of this event reached Sparta, the senate and assembly resounded with real or well-feigned complaints against the madness of Phœbidas, who, unprovoked by any injury, had violently seized a place in alliance and amity with the republic. Agefilæus, however, undertook his defence; his ambitious mind had long fomented the domineering arrogance of his country; possibly he had prompted the enterprise of Phœbidas, which he warmly approved; and his influence being as extensive as his abilities, he easily persuaded his countrymen to justify the fortunate rashness <sup>27</sup> of that commander, by keeping possession of the Theban citadel.

The cruelties of Sparta drive the Thebans to despair.

During five years the Spartans maintained, in the Cadmæa, a garrison of fifteen hundred men. Protected by such a body of foreign troops, which might be reinforced on the shortest warning, the

<sup>26</sup> Xenoph. p. 557.

<sup>27</sup> To save appearances, however, Phœbidas was fined. Even his accusers were offended, not at his injustice, but at his acting without orders. Xenoph. *ibid.* & Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 336.

partisans of aristocracy acquired an absolute ascendant in the affairs of the republic, which they conducted in such a manner as best suited their own interest, and the convenience of Sparta. Without pretending to describe the banishments, confiscations, and murders, of which they were guilty, it is sufficient for the purpose of general history to observe, that the miserable victims of their vengeance suffered similar calamities to those which afflicted Athens under the thirty tyrants. The severity of the government at length drove the Thebans to despair; and both the persecuted exiles abroad, and the oppressed subjects at home, prepared to embrace any measures, however daring and hazardous, which promised them a faint hope of relief<sup>28</sup>.

Among the Theban fugitives, who had taken refuge in Athens, and whose persons were now loudly demanded by Sparta, was Pelopidas, the son of Hippocles, a youth whose distinguished advantages might have justly rendered him an object of envy, before he was involved in the misfortunes of his country. He yielded to none in birth; he surpassed all in fortune; he excelled in the manly exercises so much esteemed by the Greeks, and was unrivalled in qualities still more estimable, generosity and courage. He had an hereditary attachment to the democratic form of policy; and, previous to the late melancholy revolution, was

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Conspiracy of the  
Theban  
exiles.  
Olymp.  
c. 3.  
A. C. 378.

<sup>28</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. c. iv. Plut. in Pelopid. idem de Genio Socratis, p. 322, & seqq.

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marked out by his numerous friends and adherents as the person most worthy of administering the government. Pelopidas had often conferred with his fellow-sufferers at Athens about the means of returning to their country, and restoring the democracy; encouraging them by the example of the patriotic Thrasybulus, who, with a handful of men, had issued from Thebes, and effected a similar, but still more difficult, enterprise. While they secretly deliberated on this important object, Mello, one of the exiles, introduced to their nocturnal assembly his friend Phyllidas, who had lately arrived from Thebes; a man whose enterprising activity, singular address, and crafty boldness, justly entitle him to the regard of history.

Assisted by  
Phyllidas,  
secretary  
to the  
Theban  
council.

Phyllidas was strongly attached to the cause of the exiles; yet, by his insinuating complaisance, and officious servility, he had acquired the entire confidence of Leontiades, Archias, and the other magistrates, or rather tyrants<sup>29</sup>, of the republic. In business and in pleasure, he rendered himself alike necessary to his masters; his diligence and abilities had procured him the important office of secretary to the council; and he had lately promised to Archias and Philip, the two most licentious of the tyrants, that he would give them an entertainment, during which they might enjoy the conversation and the persons of the finest women in Thebes. The day was appointed for this infamous rendezvous, which these magisterial de-

<sup>29</sup> Τῆς περὶ Ἀρχίας τυραννίδος. Xenoph.



bauchees expected with the greatest impatience; and, in the interval, Phyllidas set out for Athens, on pretence of private business <sup>30</sup>.

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In Athens, the time and the means were adjusted for executing the conspiracy. A body of Theban exiles assembled in the Thriasian plain, on the frontier of Attica, where seven <sup>31</sup>, or twelve <sup>32</sup>, of the youngest and most enterprising, voluntarily offered themselves to enter the capital, and to co-operate with Phyllidas in the destruction of the magistrates. The distance between Thebes and Athens was about thirty-five miles. The conspirators had thirteen miles to march through a hostile territory. They disguised themselves in the garb of peasants, arrived at the city towards evening with nets and hunting poles, and passed the gates without suspicion. During that night, and the succeeding day, the house of Charon, a wealthy and respectable citizen, the friend of Phyllidas, and a determined enemy of the aristocracy, afforded them a secure refuge, till the favourable moment summoned them to action.

The time  
and means  
of execu-  
tion ad-  
justed.

The important evening approached, when the artful secretary had prepared his long-expected entertainment in the treasury. Nothing had been omitted that could flatter the senses, and lull the activity of the mind in a dream of pleasure. But a secret and obscure rumour, which had spread in the city, hung, like a drawn dagger, over the voluptuous joys of the festivity. It had been darkly

Fidelity of  
the con-  
spirators  
to each  
other.

<sup>30</sup> Xenoph. p. 566.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Plutarch, in Pelopid.

reported,

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reported, that some unknown strangers, supposed to be a party of the exiles, had been received into the house of Charon. All the address of Phyllidas could not divert the terrors of his guests. They dispatched one of their lictors or attendants to demand the immediate presence of Charon. The conspirators were already buckling on their armour, in hopes of being immediately summoned to execute their purpose. But what was their astonishment and terror, when their host and protector was sternly ordered to appear before the magistrates! The most sanguine were persuaded that their design had become public, and that they must all miserably perish, without effecting any thing worthy of their courage. After a moment of dreadful reflection, they exhorted Charon to obey the mandate without delay. But that firm and patriotic Theban first went to the apartment of his wife, took his infant son, an only child, and presented him to Pelopidas and Mello, requesting them to retain in their hands this dearest pledge of his fidelity. They unanimously declared their entire confidence in his honour, and entreated him to remove from danger an helpless infant, who might become, in some future time, the avenger of his country's wrongs. But Charon was inflexible, declaring, "That his son could never aspire at a happier fortune, than that of dying honourably with his father and friends."

Their dissimulation and address.

So saying, he addressed a short prayer to the gods, embraced his associates, and departed. Before he arrived at the treasury, he was met by

Archias

Archias and Phyllidas. The former asked him, in the presence of the other magistrates, whose anxiety had brought them from table, "Who are those strangers said to have arrived the other day, and to be now entertained in your family?" Charon had composed his countenance so artfully, and retorted the question with such well-dissembled surprise, as considerably quieted the solicitude of the tyrants, which was totally removed by a whisper of Phyllidas, "That the absurd rumour had doubtless been spread for no other purpose but that of disturbing their pleasures."

They had scarcely returned to the banquet, when Fortune, as if she had taken pleasure to confound the dexterity of Phyllidas, raised up a new and most alarming danger. A courier arrived from Athens with every mark of haste and trepidation, desiring to see Archias, to whom he delivered a letter from an Athenian magistrate of the same name, his ancient friend and guest. This letter revealed the conspiracy; a secret not entrusted to the messenger, who had orders, however, to request Archias to read the dispatch immediately, as containing matters of the utmost importance. But that careless voluptuary, whose thoughts were totally absorbed in the expected scene of pleasure, replied with a smile, "Business to-morrow;" deposited the letter under the pillow of the couch, on which, according to ancient custom, he lay at the entertainment; and resumed his conversation with Phyllidas concerning the ladies, whom he had promised to introduce.

The Theban magistrates assassinated.



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ters were now come to a crisis; Phyllidas retired for a moment; the conspirators were put in motion; their weapons concealed under the flowing swell of female attire, and their countenances overshadowed and hid by a load of crowns and garlands. In this disguise they were presented to the magistrates intoxicated with wine and folly. At a given signal they drew their daggers, and effected their purpose<sup>33</sup>. Charon and Mello were the principal actors in this bloody scene, which was entirely directed by Phyllidas. But a more difficult task remained. Leontiades, with other abettors of the tyranny, still lived, to avenge the murder of their associates. The conspirators, encouraged by their first success, and conducted by Phyllidas, gained admission into their houses successively, by means of the unsuspected secretary. On the appearance of disorder and tumult, Leontiades seized his sword, and boldly prepared for his defence. Pelopidas had the merit of destroying the principal author of the Theban servitude and disgrace. His associates perished without resistance; men whose names may be consigned to just oblivion, since they were distinguished by nothing memorable but their cruel and oppressive tyranny.

The prisoners set at liberty.

The measures of the conspirators were equally vigorous and prudent. Before alarming the city, they proceeded to the different prisons, which were crowded with the unfortunate victims of arbitrary

<sup>33</sup> Xenoph. p. 567. Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 470.

power.

power. Every door was open to Phyllidas. The captives, transported with joy and gratitude, increased the strength of their deliverers. They broke open the arsenals, and provided themselves with arms. The streets of Thebes now resounded with alarm and terror; every house and family were filled with confusion and uproar; the inhabitants were universally in motion; some providing lights, others running in wild disorder to the public places, and all anxiously wishing the return of day, that they might discover the unknown cause of this nocturnal tumult.

During a moment of dreadful silence, which interrupted the noise of sedition, a herald proclaimed, with a clear and loud voice, the death of the tyrants, and summoned to arms the friends of liberty and the republic. Among others who obeyed the welcome invitation was Epaminondas, the son of Polymnis, a youth of the most illustrious merit; who united the wisdom of the sage, and the magnanimity of the hero, with the practice of every mild and gentle virtue; unrivalled in knowledge and in eloquence; in birth, valour, and patriotism, not inferior to Pelopidas, with whom he had contracted an early friendship. The principles of the Pythagorean philosophy<sup>34</sup>, which he had diligently studied under Lysis of Tarentum, rendered Epaminondas averse to engage in the conspiracy, lest he might embroil his hands in civil blood<sup>35</sup>. But when the sword was once

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Epaminondas joins the insurgents.

<sup>34</sup> See Vol. II. p. 18—42.

<sup>35</sup> Plutarch. de Genio Socratis, p. 279, & passim.

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drawn, he appeared with ardour in defence of his friends and country; and his example was followed by many brave and generous youths who had reluctantly endured the double yoke of domestic and foreign tyranny.

The Theban democracy restored. Olymp. c. 3.  
A. C. 378.

The approach of morning had brought the Theban exiles, in arms, from the Thriasian plain. The partisans of the conspirators were continually increased by a confluence of new auxiliaries from every quarter of the city. Encompassed by such an invincible band of adherents, Pelopidas and his associates proceeded to the market-place; summoned a general assembly of the people; explained the necessity, the object, and the extent of the conspiracy; and, with the universal approbation of their fellow-citizens, restored the democratic form of government <sup>36</sup>.

The revolution communicated to the Athenians, who assist in expelling the Lacedæmonian garrison.

Exploits of valour and intrepidity may be discovered in the history of every nation. But the revolution of Thebes displayed not less wisdom of design, than enterprising gallantry in execution. Amidst the tumult of action, and ardour of victory, the conspirators possessed sufficient coolness and foresight to reflect that the Cadmæa, or citadel, which was held by a Lacedæmonian garrison of fifteen hundred men, would be reinforced, on the first intelligence of danger, by the resentful activity of Sparta. To anticipate this alarming event, which must have rendered the consequences of the conspiracy incomplete and precarious, they com-

<sup>36</sup> Xenoph. Diodor. & Plutarch. *ibid*.



manded the messenger, whom, immediately after the destruction of the tyrants, they had dispatched to their friends in the Thriasian plain, to proceed to Athens, in order to communicate the news of a revolution which could not fail to be highly agreeable to that state, and to solicit the immediate assistance of the Athenians, whose superior skill in attacking fortified places was acknowledged by Greeks and Barbarians. This message was attended with the most salutary effects. The acute discernment of the Athenians eagerly seized the precious opportunity of weakening Sparta<sup>37</sup>, which, if once neglected, might never return. Several thousand men were ordered to march; and no time was lost, either in the preparation, or in the journey, since they reached Thebes the day after Pelopidas had re-established the democracy.

The seasonable arrival of those auxiliaries, whose celerity exceeded the most sanguine hopes of the Thebans, increased the ardour of the latter to attack the citadel. The events of the siege are variously related<sup>38</sup>. According to the most probable account, the garrison made a very feeble resistance, being intimidated by the impetuous alacrity and enthusiasm, as well as the increasing numbers of the assailants, who already amounted to fourteen thousand men, and received continual accessions of strength from the neighbouring cities of Bœotia. Only a few days had elapsed, when the Lacedæ-

The Cad-  
mæa sur-  
renders.  
Olymp.  
C. 3.  
A. C. 378.

<sup>37</sup> Dinarch. Orat. contra Demosth. p. 100.

<sup>38</sup> Diodorus differs entirely from Xenophon and Plutarch, whom I have chiefly followed.

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monians desired to capitulate, on condition of being allowed to depart in safety with their arms. Their proposal was readily accepted; but they seem not to have demanded, or at least not to have obtained, any terms of advantage or security for those unfortunate Thebans, whose attachment to the Spartan interest strongly solicited their protection. At the first alarm of sedition, these unhappy men, with their wives and families, had taken refuge in the citadel. The greater part of them cruelly perished by the resentment of their countrymen; a remnant only was saved by the humane interposition of the Athenians<sup>39</sup>. So justly had Epaminondas suspected, that the revolution could not be accomplished without the effusion of civil blood,

<sup>39</sup> Xenoph. & Plutarch. *ibid.*

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*The Bœotian War.—Unsuccessful Attempt of Sphodrias against the Piræus.—Doubts concerning Xenophon's Account of that Transaction.—Agefilaus invades Bœotia.—Military Success of the Thebans.—Naval Success of the Athenians.—Congress for Peace under the Mediation of Artaxerxes.—Epaminondas, Deputy from Thebes.—Cleombrotus invades Bœotia.—Battle of Leuctra.—State of Greece.—Jason of Thessaly.—His Character and Views.—Assassinated in the midst of his Projects.*

THE emancipation of Thebes gave a deep wound to the pride and tyranny of Sparta; and the magistrates of the latter republic prepared to punish, with due severity, what they affected to term the unprovoked rebellion of their subjects. The Thebans firmly resolved to maintain the freedom which they had assumed; and these dispositions on both sides occasioned a memorable war, which, having lasted with little interruption during seven years, ended with the battle of Leuctra, which produced a total revolution in the affairs of Greece.

The ardent mind of Agefilaus had long inspired, or directed, the ambitious views of his country.



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He enjoyed the glory, but could not avoid the odium, attached to his exalted situation; and fearing to increase the latter, he allowed the conduct of the Theban war to be committed to the inexperience of his unequal colleague. In the heart of a severe winter, Cleombrotus, with a well-appointed army, entered Bœotia. His presence confirmed the obedience of Thespiæ, Plataea, and other inferior communities. He defeated some straggling parties of the Thebans, repelled their incursions, ravaged their territory, burned their villages, but attempted not to make any impression on the well-defended strength of their city. After a campaign of two months, he returned home, leaving a numerous garrison in Thespiæ, commanded by Sphodrias, a general of great enterprise, but little prudence.

Sphodrias  
left with a  
garrison in  
Thespiæ.

Stratagem  
of Thebes  
for widening  
the  
breach be-  
tween  
Athens  
and  
Sparta.

Meanwhile the Athenians, alarmed by the nearer view of danger, publicly disavowed the assistance which they had given to Thebes; and having disgraced, banished, or put to death<sup>1</sup>, the advisers of that daring measure, renewed their alliance with Sparta. The Thebans felt the full importance of this defection, and left nothing untried to prevent its fatal tendency, a design (could we believe tradition) in which they succeeded by a very singular stratagem. The light and rash character of Sphodrias was well known, we are told, to the Theban chiefs, who employed secret emissaries

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. p. 334. I have endeavoured to reconcile Xenophon and Dinarchus, cited above.

ries to persuade him, by arguments most flattering to his passions, to attack by surprise the imperfectly repaired harbour of Athens. These artful ministers of deceit represented to Sphodrias, that it was unworthy of his dignity, and of his valour, to employ the arms of Sparta in a predatory war, while an object of far more importance and glory naturally solicited the activity of his enterprising mind. "The Thebans, indeed, were vigilant in guard; and, being animated by the enthusiasm of newly-recovered freedom, were determined, rather than surrender, to bury themselves under the ruins of their country. But their secret and perfidious ally, whose assistance had recently enabled them to throw off the Spartan yoke, was lulled in security. The moment had arrived for crushing the implacable hatred of the Athenians, by surprising the Piræus, their principal ornament and defence; an action which would be celebrated by posterity above the kindred glory of Phœbidas, who, during the time also of an insidious peace, had seized the Theban citadel<sup>2</sup>."

The distance between Thebes and Thespiæ, which was not more than twenty miles, furnished an easy opportunity for carrying on these secret practices; but the distance, which exceeded forty miles, between Thebes and Athens, rendered the enterprise of Sphodrias abortive. He marched from Thespiæ with the flower of his garrison, early in the morning, expecting to reach the Piræus

Unsuccessful attempt of Sphodrias to seize the Piræus.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. p. 340. Diodorus, p. 471.

before

C H A P. before the dawn of the succeeding day. But he  
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 was surpris'd by the return of light in the Thri-  
 fian plain. The borough of Eleufis was alarmed;  
 the report flew to Athens, and the citizens, with  
 their ufual alacrity, feized their arms, and pre-  
 pared for a vigorous defence. The mad design,  
 and the ftill greater madnefs of Sphodrias, in ra-  
 vaging the country during his retreat, provoked  
 the fury of the Athenians. They immediately  
 feized the perfons of fuch Lacedæmonians as hap-  
 pened to refide in their city. They fent an em-  
 baffy to Sparta, complaining, in the moft indignant  
 terms, of the infult of Sphodrias. The Spartans  
 difavowed his conduct. He was recalled and tried,  
 but faved from death by the authority of Agefi-  
 laus. This powerful protection was obtained by  
 the interceffion of his fon Cleonymus, the beloved  
 companion of Archidamus, the fon and fucceffor  
 of the Spartan king. Archidamus pleaded, with  
 the modelt eloquence of tears, for the father of a  
 friend, his equal in years and valour, with whom  
 he had been long united in the moft tender affec-  
 tion. Cleonymus declared on this occafion, that  
 he fhould never difgrace the ardent attachment of  
 the royal youth: and illuftrious as Archidamus  
 afterwards became, Xenophon affirms, that his  
 early and unalterable love of Cleonymus forms not  
 the fhade, but rather the faireft light, of his ami-  
 able and exalted character<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. p. 570.



Such is the account of this transaction, given originally by Xenophon, and faithfully copied by other writers, ancient and modern. But there is some reason to suspect that Agesilaus was not totally unacquainted with the ambitious and unwarrantable design of Sphodrias; that the Spartans would have approved the measure, had it been crowned with success; and that even the philosophic Xenophon, a partial admirer of Agesilaus and the Lacedæmonians, has employed the persuasive simplicity of his inimitable style, to varnish a very unjustifiable transaction. Such, at least, it appeared to the Athenian assembly, who, offended by the crime, were still more indignant at the acquittal, of Sphodrias. From that time they began to prepare their fleet, to enlist sailors, to collect and to employ all the materials of war, with a resolution firmly to maintain the cause of Thebes and their own.

While they were busied in such preparations, Agesilaus repeatedly invaded Bœotia, without performing any thing worthy of his former renown. His army amounted to eighteen thousand foot, and fifteen hundred horse. The enemy were assisted by a considerable body of mercenaries, commanded by Chabrias the Athenian, who finally repelled the Spartan king from Thebes, by a stratagem not less simple than uncommon. The Theban army prepared to act on the defensive against a superior force, and occupied a rising ground in the neighbourhood of their city. Agesilaus detached a body of light-armed troops, to provoke

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Doubts concerning Xenophon's account of this transaction.

Agesilaus repeatedly invades Bœotia. Olymp. c. 4. A. C. 377, & Olymp. ci. 1. A. C. 376.

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voke them to quit this advantageous post; but the Thebans cautiously maintained their ground, and obliged the enemy to draw out their whole forces, in order to dislodge them. Chabrias, waiting their approach, commanded his troops to execute a new movement, which he had recently taught them for such an emergency. They supported their advanced bodies on their left knee, extended their shields and spears, and thus firmly maintained their ranks<sup>4</sup>. Alarmed at the determined boldness of an unusual array, which seemed to bid him defiance, Agesilaus withdrew his army from the capital, and contented himself with committing farther ravages on the country.

<sup>4</sup> The words of Nepos, in Chabria, are better explained by reading, “ Qui obnixo genu scuto, projectaque hasta, impetum excipere hostium docuit.” This agrees with the statue of Chabrias in the Villa Borghese, whose singular attitude has given so much trouble to antiquaries. Winkelmann conjectures this master-piece of art to be the most ancient statue in Rome, from the form of the letters in the name Agasias with which it is inscribed. He observes, that it is erroneously supposed to be a gladiator, since the Greeks never honoured gladiators with such monuments; and the style of the workmanship proves it more ancient than the introduction of that inhuman spectacle into Greece. The body of the statue is advanced, and rests on the left thigh; the right arm grasps a javelin, or spear; around the left is seen the leather thong, or handle of a shield. It seems, says Winkelmann, the particular attitude of a warrior on some dangerous emergency. What this emergency was, the learned and ingenious Lessing fortunately discovered, by the words of Cornelius Nepos. “ Hoc (the stratagem of Chabrias) usque eò tota Græcia famâ celebratum est, ut illo statu Chabrias sibi statum fieri voluerit, quæ publicè ei ab Atheniensibus in foro constituta est.”

In

In the skirmishes which happened after his retreat, the Thebans proved repeatedly victorious. He returned home, and continued at Sparta during the following year, to be cured of his wounds; where he suffered the mortifying reproaches of his adversary Antalcidas, “for teaching the Thebans to conquer.” The generals who succeeded him had not better success. Phœbidas, the original author of the war, who had been appointed governor of Thespiæ, was defeated and slain, with the greatest part of the garrison of that place. Pelopidas, with his own hand, killed the Spartan commander in the action at Tanagra; and in the pitched battle of Tegyra, the Lacedæmonians, though superior in number, were broken and put to flight; a disgrace which, they reflected with sorrow, had never befallen them in any former engagement.

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Success of  
the The-  
bans.  
Olymp.  
ci. 2.  
A. C. 375.

While the war was thus carried on by land, the Athenians put to sea, and gained the most distinguished advantages on their favourite element. The Lacedæmonian fleet, of sixty sail, commanded by Pollis, was shamefully defeated near the isle of Naxos, by the skilful bravery of Chabrias, who performed alternately, and with equal abilities, the duties of admiral and general<sup>5</sup>. But the principal scene of action was the Ionian sea, where Timotheus<sup>6</sup> and Iphicrates every where prevailed

Naval suc-  
cess of the  
Atheni-  
ans.  
Olymp.  
ci. 1.  
A. C. 376.

<sup>5</sup> Xenoph. p. 577. Diodor. l. xv. ad Olymp. ci. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Corn. Nep. in Vit. Timoth. & Dinarch. adv. Demosth.  
Such was the good fortune of Timotheus, that the satirical  
artists



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prevailed over the commanders who opposed them. The fleet of Sparta was totally ruined by the victors, who repeatedly ravaged the coasts of Laconia<sup>7</sup>, and laid under heavy contributions the islands of Corcyra, Zacinthus, Leucadia, and Cephalenia. Even the isles and cities more remote from the scene of this naval war, particularly the valuable island of Chios, and the important city of Byzantium, deserted their involuntary connection with the declining fortune of Sparta, and once more accepted the dangerous alliance of the Athenians<sup>8</sup>.

The  
Greeks  
assist Ar-  
taxerxes  
in the  
Egyptian  
war.

These hostile operations, which weakened, without subduing, the spirit of the vanquished, were interrupted by the solicitations and bribes of the king of Persia, who earnestly promoted the domestic tranquillity of Greece, that he might enjoy the assistance of its arms in crushing a new rebellion in Egypt. His emissaries met with equal success in Athens and Sparta, which were alike weary of the war, the former having little more to hope, and the latter having every thing to fear, from its continuance. Many of the inferior states, being implicitly governed by the resolves of these powerful republics, readily imitated their example. And so precarious and miserable was the condition of them all, in that disorderly period, that about twenty thousand men abandoned

artists of the times painted him asleep, covered with a net, in which the cities and islands entangled and caught themselves. Plutarch. de invid. & odio.

<sup>7</sup> Xenoph. p. 578. <sup>8</sup> Id. ibid.

their homes and families, and followed the standard of the Persians. The merit of Iphicrates justly entitled him to the command of his countrymen, which was unanimously conferred on him. But the expedition produced nothing worthy of such a general, who in a few months returned to Athens, disgusted with the ignorant pride, and slothful timidity, of the Persian commanders, who durst not undertake any important enterprise, without receiving the slow instructions of a distant court?

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Meanwhile the Thebans, who, elated by a flow of unwonted prosperity, had proudly disregarded the representations of Artaxerxes, profited of the temporary diversion made by the Egyptian war, to reduce several inferior cities of Bœotia. The walls of Thespiæ were rased to the ground; Plataea met with the same fate; and its inhabitants, after suffering the cruellest indignities, were driven into banishment. It might be expected that the unfortunate exiles should have sought refuge in Sparta, whose authority they had uniformly acknowledged, since the dishonourable peace of Antalcidas. But so dissimilar were the fluctuating politics of Greece to the regular transactions of modern times (governed by the lifeless but steady principle of interest), that the Plataeans had recourse to Athens, a city actually in alliance with the people by whom they had been so unjustly persecuted. Their eloquence, their tears, the memory of past services, and the promise of fu-

The The-  
bans rase  
Plataea.  
Olymp.  
ci. 3.  
A. C. 374.

9 Corn. Nepos in Iphicrat. Diodorus, l. xv. ad Olymp. c. iv.

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Congress  
for peace  
held un-  
der the  
mediation  
of Anta-  
xerxes.  
Olymp.  
cii. 1.  
A. C. 372.

ture gratitude, prevailed on the Athenian assembly, who kindly received them into the bosom of their republic, and expressed the warmest indignation against their insolent oppressors <sup>10</sup>.

This affecting transaction threatened to deprive the Thebans of an ally, to whom they were in a great measure indebted for their prosperity. Their subsequent conduct tended still farther to widen the breach. They marched troops into Phocis, with an intention to reduce that country. They heard with equal disdain, the remonstrances of their friends, and the threats of their enemies. Their unusual arrogance totally alienated the Athenians, who seemed finally disposed to conclude a lasting peace with Sparta, on the principles of the treaty of Antalcidas, that their respective garrisons should be withdrawn from foreign parts, and the communities, small as well as great, be permitted to enjoy the independent government of their own equitable laws. The interest of the king of Persia, who still needed fresh supplies to carry on the Egyptian war, induced him to employ his good offices for promoting this specious purpose; and a convention of all the states was summoned to Sparta, whither the Thebans deigned indeed to send a representative; but a representative, whose firmness and magnanimity were well fitted to sustain and elevate the aspiring pretensions of his republic.

<sup>10</sup> Diodor. l. xv. ad Olymp. & Isocrat. Orat. pro Plat.



In effecting this glorious revolution, which gave freedom to Thebes, as well as in the military operations, which immediately followed that important event, the youthful merit of Pelopidas had acquired the fame of patriotism, valour, and conduct. The nobility of his birth, and the generous use of his riches, increased the ascendant due to his illustrious services. Every external advantage, the manly grace of his person, the winning affability of his deportment, his superior excellence in the martial exercises so highly prized by the Greeks, and especially by the Thebans, gained him the admiration of the multitude; or, in other words, of the legislative assembly of his country. He had been successively elected, during six years, to the first dignity of the republic; nor had the Thebans ever found reason to repent their choice<sup>11</sup>. Yet in the present emergency, when they were required to appoint a deputy for the convention at Sparta (the most important charge with which any citizen could be entrusted), Pelopidas, with all his merit, was not the minister whom they thought proper to employ.

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Epami-  
nondas  
appears as  
deputy  
from  
Thebes.

Epaminondas, naturally his rival, but always his friend, had hitherto been contented with a subordinate station: yet every office which he exercised, whether in the civil or military department, derived new lustre from his personal dignity. His exterior accomplishments were not inferior to those of Pelopidas; but he had learned from the phi-

His cha-  
racter.

<sup>11</sup> Plut. in Pelopid.

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losofhy of Lysis the Pythagorean, to prefer the mind to the body, merit to fame, and the rewards of virtue to the gifts of fortune. He resisted the generous sollicitations of his friends to deliver him from the honourable poverty in which he was born; continuing poor from taste and choice, and justly delighting in a situation, which is more favourable, especially in a democratical republic, to that freedom and independence of mind which wisdom recommends as the greatest good. Nor was he more careless of money than avaricious of time, which he continually dedicated to the study of learning and philosophy, or employed in the exercise of public and private virtue. Yet to become useful he was not desirous to be great. The same solicitude which others felt to obtain, Epaminondas shewed to avoid, the dangerous honours of his country. His ambitious temper would have been better satisfied to direct, by a personal influence with the magistrates, the administration of government from the bosom of his beloved retirement<sup>12</sup>, when the unanimous voice of the citizens, and still more the urgency of the times, called him to public life; and such was his contempt for the glory of a name, that had he lived in a less turbulent period, his exalted qualities, however admired by select friends, would have probably remained unknown to his contemporaries and posterity.

<sup>12</sup> The conduct of Epaminondas coincides with, and confirms, the account above given of the Pythagorean philosophy.

Such was the man to whose abilities and eloquence the Thebans committed the defence of their most important interests in the general congress of the Grecian states. The Athenians sent Antocles and Callistratus; the first a subtle<sup>13</sup>, the second an affecting orator<sup>14</sup>. Agesilaus himself appeared on the part of Sparta. Matters were easily adjusted between those leading republics, who felt equal resentment at the unhappy fate of Thespiæ and Plataea. They lamented their mutual jealousy, and unfortunate ambition, which had occasioned so many bloody and destructive wars; and commemorated the short but glorious intervals of moderation and concord, which had tended so evidently to their own and the public felicity. Instructed by fatal experience, it was time for them to lay down their arms, and to allow that tranquillity to themselves and to their neighbours, which was necessary to heal the wounds of their common country. The peace could not be useful or permanent, unless it were established on the liberal principles of equality and freedom, to which all the Grecian communities were alike entitled by the treaty of Antalcidas. It was proposed, therefore, to renew that salutary contract, which was accepted by the unanimous consent of Athens, of Sparta, and of their respective confederates.

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Conference at  
Sparta.  
Olymp.  
cii. 1.  
A. C. 372.

<sup>13</sup> *Επιστοφης πρτωρ*. Xenoph. l. vi.

<sup>14</sup> The pathetic pleading of Callistratus, for the citizens of Oropus, first inspired Demosthenes with the ambition of eloquence. Plut. in Demosth.



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Demands  
of Epa-  
minondas.

Epaminondas<sup>15</sup> then stood up, offering to sign the treaty in the name of the Bœotians. "The Athenians," he took notice, "had signed for all the inhabitants of Attica; the Spartans had signed not only for the cities of Laconia, but for their numerous allies in all the provinces of the Peloponnesus. Thebes was entitled to the same prerogatives over her dependent cities, which had anciently acknowledged the power of her kings, and had recently submitted to the arms of her citizens." Agesilaus, instead of answering directly a demand which could neither be granted with honour, nor denied with justice, asked, in his turn, Whether it was the intention of the Thebans to admit, in terms of the treaty, the independence of Bœotia? Epaminondas demanded, Whether it was the intention of Sparta to admit the independence of Laconia? "Shall the Bœotians," said the king, with emotion, "be free?" "Whenever," replied Epaminondas with firmness, "you restore freedom to the Lacedæmonians, the Messenians, and the oppressed communities of Peloponnesus, whom, under the name of allies, you retain in an involuntary and rigorous servitude."

<sup>15</sup> The convention of Sparta is noticed by Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Cornelius Nepos. The first writer is silent with regard to Epaminondas. Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos furnish the hints which I have made use of in the text. It is not impossible that there were two conventions, at different times, respecting the same object. In that case, Xenophon must have totally omitted one of them.

Then

Then turning to the deputies of the allies, he represented to them the cruel mockery by which they were insulted. "Summoned to deliberate concerning the general freedom and independence, they were called to ratify a peace, which, instead of establishing these invaluable and sacred rights, confirmed the stern tyranny of an imperious master." That "the cities, small and great, should be free," was the verbal condition of the treaty; but its real drift and import was, that Thebes should give freedom to Bœotia, and thereby weaken her own strength, while Sparta kept in subjection the extensive territories of her confederates, in whose name she had signed that perfidious contract, and whose assistance she expected, and could demand, towards giving it immediate effect. If the allies persisted in their actual resolution, they consented to destroy the power of Thebes, which was the only bulwark to defend them against Spartan usurpation: they consented to continue the payment of those intolerable contributions with which they had long been oppressed; and to obey every idle summons to war, of which *they* chiefly suffered the fatigues and dangers, while the advantage and glory redounded to the Spartans alone. If they felt any respect for the glorious name of their ancestors; if they entertained any sense of their own most precious interests, they would be so little disposed to promote the reduction of Thebes, that they would imitate the auspicious example of that ancient and noble city, which had acquired the dignity of independent government.

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He addresses the deputies of the allies.

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Perma-  
nent effect  
of his re-  
presenta-  
tions.

vernment, not by *inscriptions*<sup>16</sup> and treaties, but by arms and valour.

The just remonstrances of Epaminondas made a deep impression on the deputies. Agefilas, alarmed at its effect, answered him in a strain very different from that despotic brevity<sup>17</sup> which the Spartans usually affected. His speech was long and eloquent. He reasoned, prayed, threatened. The deputies were awed into submission, less perhaps by the force of his eloquence, than by the terror of the Spartan armies ready to take the field. But the words of Epaminondas sunk deep into their hearts. They communicated, at their return, the powerful impression to their constituents; and its influence was visible in the field of Leuctra, and in the events which followed that memorable engagement.

Reflec-  
tions on  
his con-  
duct;

As the Grecian states were accustomed to grant more unreserved powers to their generals and ministers, than are allowed by the practice of modern times, we must be contented to doubt, whether, in this important negotiation, Epaminondas acted merely by the extemporary impulse of his own mind, or only executed, with boldness and dignity, the previous instructions of his republic. It is certain, that his refusal to acknowledge the freedom of Bœotia, not only excluded

<sup>16</sup> The public deeds and transactions of the Greeks were *inscribed* on pillars of marble. Thucyd. & Xenoph. passim.

<sup>17</sup> Epaminondas said, or more probably it was said for him, that he had compelled the Spartans to lengthen their monosyllables. Plut. in Agefil.



Thebes from the treaty, but exposed her to the immediate vengeance of the confederates; and according to the received principles of modern policy, there is reason to accuse both the prudence and the justice of the admired Theban; his prudence, in provoking the strength of a confederacy, with which the weakness of any single republic seemed totally unable to contend; and his justice, in denying to *several* communities of Bœotia their hereditary laws and government. Yet the conduct of Epaminondas has never been exposed to such odious reproaches. Success justified his audacity; and the Greeks, animated by an ambitious enthusiasm to aggrandise their respective cities, were taught to dignify by the names of patriotism and magnanimity, qualities which, in the sober judgment of posterity, would be degraded by very different appellations. There are reasons, however, not merely specious, by which Epaminondas might justify his conduct at an impartial bar. He could not be ignorant that Thebes, unassisted and alone, was unable to cope with the general confederacy of Greece: but he knew that this confederacy would never exist but in words, since the jealousy of several states, and particularly of Athens, would be disposed rather to commiserate, than to increase, the calamities of a people at variance with Sparta<sup>18</sup>. He perceived the effect of his spirited remonstrances on the most steadfast adherents of that republic; and contemplating the circumstances of

<sup>18</sup> Xenophon hints at this disposition, l. vi. p. 608.

CHAP. his country, and of the enemy, he found several  
 XXX. motives of encouragement to the seemingly unequal contest.

which is  
 justified  
 by the  
 state of  
 Sparta.

The Spartans had been weakened by the defection and loss of their dominions, and dejected by their unfortunate attempts to recover them. They had been deprived of their prescriptive honours, and had forsaken their hereditary maxims. Their ancient and venerable laws had in a great measure ceased to govern them; and the seeds of those corruptions were already sown, which have been censured by philosophers and statesmen with equal justice and severity<sup>19</sup>. Nor were they exposed to the *usual* misfortunes, only, of a degenerate people; the institutions of Lycurgus formed one consistent plan of legislation, which could not be partially observed and partially neglected. While the submissive disciples of that extraordinary law-giver remained satisfied with their simplicity of manners, their poverty, and their virtue, and had scarcely any other object in view, but to resist the solicitations of pleasure, and to repel the encroachments of enemies, the law, which discouraged a commercial intercourse with foreign nations, and which excluded strangers, whatever merit they might possess, from aspiring to the rank of citizens, was an establishment strictly conformable to the peculiar spirit of the Lacedæmonian constitution. But when Sparta abandoned the simplicity of her primitive maxims, became ambitious, wealthy,

<sup>19</sup> Aristot. Politic. l. ii. c. 9.

triumph-

triumphant, and almost continually engaged in war, not as the means of defence, but as the instrument of power and conquest, consistency required that she should have laid aside her pretensions to those exclusive honours which she no longer deserved. When she relinquished the virtuous pre-eminence of her ancestors, the warlike inhabitants of Peloponnesus were not unworthy to be ranked with her citizens; and by admitting them to this honour, she would have given them an interest in her victories, and rendered them willing partners of her danger. But, instead of adopting this generous policy, which possibly might have rendered her what Rome, with more wisdom indeed, but not with more virtue or more valour, afterwards became, the mistress of the world, she increased her pretensions in proportion to the decline of her merit; spurned the equality of a federal union, to which the Peloponnesians were entitled; deprived even the Lacedæmonians of their just share in the government, and concentrated all power and authority within the senate and assembly of Sparta. A long course of almost uninterrupted hostilities had deprived her of the best half of her citizens, whose numbers were continually diminishing, without the possibility of ever being repaired; nor could it be difficult to overthrow an empire which depended on the address and bravery of about four thousand warriors, the splendour of a great name, and the  
reluctant



C H A P. reluctant assistance of insulted allies and oppressed  
 XXX. subjects <sup>20</sup>.

The consideration of these circumstances, which could not fail to present themselves to the sagacity of Epaminondas, might have encouraged him to set the threats of his adversaries at defiance, especially when he reflected on the actual condition of Thebes, whose civil and military institutions had recently acquired new spirit and fresh vigour.

Compared with  
 that of  
 Thebes.

The Thebans, with their subjects or neighbours in Bœotia, had been long regarded as an unworthy and faithless race, with strong bodies but ignoble souls, and infamous among the Greeks, on account of their ancient alliance with Xerxes and the Barbarians. The divine genius of Pindar had not redeemed them from the character of a sluggish and heavy people, noted even to a proverb for stupidity <sup>21</sup>. From the age of that inimitable writer, they appear, indeed, to have been little addicted to the pursuit of mental excellence; but they uniformly continued to cultivate, with peculiar care, the gymnastic exercises, which gave the address and dexterity of art to the ponderous strength of their gigantic members. To acquire renown in

<sup>20</sup> The condition of Sparta, represented in the text, is taken from the history of the times in Xenophon and Diodorus, from Aristotle's *Politics*, l. ii. c. 9. the *Oration of Archidamus*, and the *Panathanæan Oration of Isocrates*. The last writer reduces the number of Spartan citizens to two thousand; a diminution principally occasioned by the battles of *Leuctra* and *Mantinæa*, which happened a considerable time before the composition of that discourse.

<sup>21</sup> Bœotum in crasso jurares aëre natum. Hor. *Epist.* i. l. xi.

war, such people only wanted that spark of ethereal fire which is kindled by a generous emulation. The tyranny of Sparta first animated their inactive languor. Having spurned an oppressive yoke, they boldly maintained their freedom; and, in the exercise of defensive war, gained many honourable trophies over enemies who had long despised them. Success enlivened their hopes, inflamed their ambition, and gave a certain elevation to their national character, which rendered them as ambitious of war and victory, as they had formerly been anxious for peace and preservation. They had introduced a severe system of military discipline; they had considerably improved the arms and exercise of cavalry; they had adopted various modes of arranging their forces in order of battle, superior to those practised by their neighbours. Emulation, ardour, mutual esteem, and that spirit of combination, which often prevails in turbulent and distracted times, had united a considerable number of their citizens in the closest engagements, and inspired them with the generous resolution of braving every danger in defence of each other. This association originally consisted of about three hundred men, in the prime of life, and of tried fidelity, and commanded by Pelopidas, the glorious restorer of his country's freedom. From the inviolable sanctity of their friendship, they were called the Sacred Band, and their valour was as permanent as their friendship. During a long succession of years, they proved victorious wherever they fought; and at length fell together, with immortal glory,

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C H A P. glory, in the field of Chæronæa, with the fall of  
 XXX. Thebes, of Athens, and of Greece. Such, in  
 general, were the circumstances and condition of  
 those rival republics<sup>22</sup>, when they were encouraged  
 by their respective chiefs to decide their pretensions  
 by the event of a battle.

Cleom-  
 brotus in-  
 vades  
 Bœotia.  
 Olymp.  
 cii. 2.  
 A. C. 371.

In the interval of several months, between the  
 congress at Sparta and the invasion of Bœotia,  
 Agesilaus and his son Archidamus collected the  
 domestic strength of their republic, and summoned  
 the tardy aid of their confederates. Sicknefs pre-  
 vented the Spartan king from taking the field in  
 person; but his advice prevailed with the Ephori  
 and senate, to command his colleague Cleom-  
 brotus (who, in the former year, had conducted a  
 considerable body of troops into Phocis, in order  
 to repel the Thebans from that country) to march  
 without delay into the hostile territory, with assur-  
 ance of being speedily joined by a powerful rein-  
 forcement. The rendezvous was appointed in the  
 plain of Leuctra, which surrounded an obscure  
 village of the same name, situate on the Bœotian  
 frontier, almost at the equal distance of ten miles  
 from the sea and from Plataea. The plain was en-  
 compassed on all sides by the lofty ridges of Heli-  
 con, Cithæron, and Cynocephalæ; and the vil-  
 lage was hitherto remarkable only for the tomb of  
 two Theban damsels, the daughters of Scedafus,  
 who had been violated by the brutality of three  
 Spartan youths. The dishonoured females had

The Spar-  
 tans and  
 their con-  
 federates  
 assemble  
 in the  
 plain of  
 Leuctra.

<sup>22</sup> Plut. in Pelopid. v. II. p. 355—366.



ended their disgrace by a voluntary death; and the afflicted father had imitated the example of their despair, after imploring vengeance in vain from gods and men <sup>23</sup>.

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The Spartans and their confederates joined forces in this neighbourhood, after repelling a few Theban detachments which guarded the defiles of Mount Helicon. Their army amounted to twenty-four thousand foot, and sixteen hundred horse. The Thebans could not muster half that strength, after assembling all their troops, which had been scattered over the frontier, in order to oppose the desultory irruptions of the enemy. Their cavalry, however, nearly equalled those of the Spartans in number, and far excelled them in discipline and in valour. Epaminondas exhorted them to march, and repel the invaders, if they would prevent the defection of Bœotia, and avoid the dangers and disgrace of a siege. They readily obeyed, and proceeded to the neighbouring mountains, on which having encamped, they obtained a commanding view of the forces in the plain.

The Thebans encamp on the neighbouring mountain.

Having heard an account of the superior numbers of the enemy, the Thebans still determined to give them battle. But as the eyes are the most timorous of the senses, they were seized with terror and consternation at beholding the massy extent of the Spartan camp. Several of the colleagues of Epaminondas (for he had no fewer than six) were averse to an engagement, strongly dissuading the

Proceedings of Epaminondas before the battle.

<sup>23</sup> Xenoph. p. 595.

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general from this dangerous measure, and artfully increasing the panic of the troops, by recounting many sinister omens and prodigies. The magnanimous chief opposed the dangerous torrent of superstitious terror, by a verse of Homer <sup>24</sup>, importing, that to men engaged in the pious duty of defending their country, no particular indication was necessary of the favourable will of Heaven, since they were immediately employed in a service peculiarly agreeable to the gods. At the same time, he counteracted the dejection of their imaginary fears, by encouragements equally chimerical. It was circulated, by his contrivance, that the Theban temples had opened of their own accord, in consequence of which the priestesses had announced a victory; that the armour of Hercules, repositied in the Cadmæa, had suddenly disappeared, as if that invincible hero in person had gone to battle in defence of his Theban countrymen; above all, an ancient oracle was carefully handed about, denouncing defeat and ruin to the Spartans near the indignant tomb of the daughters of Scedafus. These artifices gained the multitude, while arguments more rational prevailed with their leaders, of whom the majority at length ranged themselves on the side of the general.

His magnanimity  
seconded  
by fortune.

Before conducting them to battle, Epaminondas displayed his confidence of victory, by permitting all those to retire, who either disapproved his cause, or were averse to share his danger; a permission

<sup>24</sup> Εἰς αἰῶνος αἰῶνος ἀμνησθαι περὶ ταύτης. II. xii. v. 243.

which

which the Thespians first thought proper to embrace. The unwarlike crowd of attendants, whose services were useless in time of action, gradually seized the same opportunity to leave the camp. The swelling multitude appeared as a second army to the Spartans, who sent a powerful detachment to oppose them. The fear of being cut off by the enemy threw them back on the Thebans, whose hopes were enlivened by the unexpected return of such a considerable reinforcement. Thus encouraged, they determined unanimously to stand by their admired chief, and either to defend their country, or to perish in the attempt; and the ardour of the troops equalling the skill of the general, the union of such advantages rendered them invincible.

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Cleombrotus had disposed his forces in the form of a crescent, according to an ancient and favourite practice of the Spartans. His cavalry were posted in squadrons along the front of the right wing, where he commanded in person. The allies composed the left wing, conducted by Archidamus. The Theban general, perceiving this disposition, and sensible that the issue of the battle would chiefly depend on the domestic troops of Sparta, determined to charge vigorously with his left, in order to seize or destroy the person of Cleombrotus; thinking that should this design succeed, the Spartans must be discouraged and repelled; and that even the attempt must occasion great disorder in their ranks, as the bravest would hasten, from every

Disposition of the  
forces on  
both sides.



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every quarter, to defend the sacred person of their king. Having resolved, therefore, to commit the fortune of the day to the bravery of the left division of his forces, he strengthened it with the choice of his heavy-armed men, whom he drew up fifty deep. The cavalry were placed in the van, to oppose the Spartan horse, whom they excelled in experience and valour. Pelopidas, with the Sacred Band, flanked the whole on the left; and deeming no particular station worthy of their prowess, they were prepared to appear in every tumult of the field, whither they might be called, either by an opportunity of success, or by the prospect of distinguished danger. The principal inconvenience to which the Thebans were exposed, in advancing to the charge, was that of being surrounded by the wide-extended arms of the Spartan crescent. This danger the general foresaw; and in order to prevent it, he spread out his right wing, of which the files had only six men in depth, and the ranks proceeding in an oblique line, diverged the farther from the enemy, in proportion as they extended in length.

Battle of  
Leuctra.  
Olymp.  
cii. 2.  
A. C. 371.

The action began with the cavalry, which, on the Spartan side, consisted chiefly of such horses as were kept for pleasure by the richer citizens in time of peace; and which, proving an unequal match for the disciplined valour of the Thebans, were speedily broken, and thrown back on the infantry. Their repulse and rout occasioned considerable disorder in the Lacedæmonian ranks,  
which

which was greatly heightened by the impetuous onset of the Sacred Band. Epaminondas availed himself of this momentary confusion, to perform one of those rapid evolutions which commonly decide the fortune of battles. He formed his strongest, but least numerous division, into a compact wedge, with a sharp point and with spreading flanks; expecting that the Lacedæmonians, as soon as they had recovered their ranks, would attack the weaker and more extended part of his army, which, from the oblique arrangement in which it had been originally drawn up, seemed prepared for a retreat. The event answered his expectation. While the Lacedæmonians advanced against his right wing, where they found little or no resistance, he rushed forward with his left; and darting like the beak of a galley<sup>25</sup> on the flank of the enemy, bore down every thing before him, until he arrived near the post occupied by Cleombrotus. The urgency of the danger recalled to their ancient principles the degenerate disciples of Lycurgus. The bravest warriors flew from every quarter to the assistance of their prince, covered him with their shields, and defended him with their swords and lances. Their impetuous valour resisted the intrepid progress of the Thebans, till the Spartan horsemen, who attended the person of Cleombrotus, were totally cut off, and the king himself, pierced with many wounds, fell on the breathless

<sup>25</sup> Xenophon employs this expression on a similar occasion, in relating the battle of Mantinæa.

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or expiring bodies of his generous defenders. The fall of the chief gave new rage to the battle. Anger, resentment, and despair, by turns agitated the Spartans. According to the superstitious ideas of paganism, the death of their king appeared to them a slight misfortune, compared with the disgraceful impiety of committing his mangled remains to the insults of an enemy. To prevent this abomination, they exerted their utmost valour, and their strenuous efforts were successful. But they could not obtain any further advantage. Epaminondas was careful to fortify his ranks, and to maintain his order of battle; and the firmness and rapidity of his regular assault gained a complete and decisive victory over the desperate resistance of broken troops. The principal strength of the allies had hitherto remained inactive, unwilling rashly to engage in a battle, the motives of which they had never heartily approved. The defeat of the Lacedæmonians, and the death of Cleombrotus, decided their wavering irresolution. They determined, almost with one accord, to decline the engagement; their retreat was effected with the loss of about two thousand men; and the Thebans remained sole masters of the field<sup>26</sup>.


The Spartans  
crave permission  
to bury  
their dead.

The care of burying the dead, and the fear of reducing the enemy to despair, seem to have prevented Epaminondas from pursuing the vanquished to their camp; which, as it was strongly fortified, could not be taken without great slaughter of the

<sup>26</sup> Xenoph. p. 596, & seqq. & Plut. vol. ii. p. 366, & seqq.



assailants. When the Lacedæmonians had assembled within the defence of their ditch and rampart, their security from immediate danger allowed them time to reflect with astonishment and sorrow on the humiliating consequences of their recent disaster. Whether they considered the number of the slain, or reflected on the mortifying loss of national honour, it was easy for them to perceive, that, on no former occasion, the glory of their country had ever received such a fatal wound. Many Spartans declared their disgrace too heavy to be borne; that they never would permit their ancient laurels to be buried under a Theban trophy; and that, instead of craving their dead under the protection of a treaty (which would be acknowledging their defeat), they were determined to return into the field, and to recover them by force of arms. This manly, but dangerous resolution, was condemned in the council of war, by the officers of most experience and authority. They observed, that of seven hundred Spartans who fought in the engagement, four hundred had fallen; that the Lacedæmonians had lost one thousand, and the allies two thousand six hundred. Their army indeed still outnumbered that of the enemy; but their domestic forces formed scarcely the tenth part of their strength, nor could they repose any confidence in the forced assistance of their reluctant confederates, who, emboldened by the misfortunes of Sparta, declared their unwillingness to renew the battle, and scarcely concealed their satis-

CHAP. XXX.  faction at the humiliation and disgrace of that haughty and tyrannical republic. Yielding, therefore, to the necessity of this miserable juncture, the Spartans sent a herald to crave their dead, and to acknowledge the victory of the Thebans <sup>27</sup>.

News of  
the defeat  
at Leuctra  
brought to  
Sparta.

Before they found it convenient to return home, the fatal tidings had reached their capital; and, on this memorable occasion, the Spartans exhibited that striking peculiarity of behaviour, which naturally resulted from the institutions of Lycurgus. Availing himself of the extraordinary respect which uncultivated nations bestow on military courage, in preference to all other virtues and accomplishments, that legislator allowed to the man who had lost his defensive armour, or who had fled in the day of battle, but one melancholy alternative, more dreadful than death to a generous mind. The unfortunate soldier was either driven into perpetual banishment, and subjected to every indignity which, in a rude age, would naturally be inflicted by the resentment of neighbouring and hostile tribes; or, if he submitted to remain at home, he was excluded from the public assemblies, from every office of power or honour, from the protection of the laws, and almost from the society of men, without the shadow of a hope ever to amend his condition. The influence of this stern law, which seems to have been forgotten in the field of Leuctra, was illustrated in a very striking manner, after that unfortunate battle.

<sup>27</sup> Xenoph. p. 596, & seqq. & Plut. vol. ii. p. 366, & seqq.

The messenger of bad news arrived, while the Spartans, according to annual custom, were celebrating, in the month of July, gymnastic and musical entertainments, and invoking Heaven to preserve the fruits of the approaching autumn. Being introduced to the Ephori, he informed them of the public disaster. These magistrates commanded the festival to proceed; sending, however, to each family a list of the warriors whom it had lost, and enjoining the women to abstain from unavailing lamentations. Next day, the fathers and other relations of such as had perished in the field of battle, appeared in the public places, dressed in their gayest attire, saluting and congratulating each other on the bravery of their brethren or children. But the kinsmen of those who had saved themselves by a shameful flight, either remained at home, brooding in silence over their domestic affliction, or, if they ventured abroad, discovered every symptom of unutterable anguish and despair. Their persons were shamefully neglected, their garments rent, their arms folded, their eyes fixed immovably on the ground; expecting, in humble resignation, the sentence of eternal ignominy ready to be denounced by the magistrate against the unworthy causes of their sorrow<sup>23</sup>. But, on this critical emergency, the rigour of the Spartan discipline was mitigated by Agesilaus, whom the number and rank of the criminals deterred from inflicting on them the merited punishment. He

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Singular  
behaviour  
of the  
Spartans  
on that  
occasion.

<sup>23</sup> Xenoph. p. 596.



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Decision  
of Agefi-  
laus re-  
specting  
the van-  
quished in  
the field of  
Leuctra.

endeavoured to atone for abandoning the spirit of the laws, by what may appear a very puerile expedient; "Let us suppose," said he, "the sacred institutions of Lycurgus to have slept during one unfortunate day, but henceforth let them resume their wonted vigour and activity:" a sentence extravagantly praised by many writers, as preserving the authority of the laws, while it spared the lives of the citizens. But as, on the one hand, we cannot discover the admired sagacity of Agefilaus in dispensing this act of lenity; so, on the other, we cannot condemn as imprudent the act itself, which the present circumstances of his country rendered not only expedient, but necessary. If Sparta had been the populous capital of an extensive territory, the lives of three hundred citizens might, perhaps, have been usefully sacrificed to the honour of military discipline. But a community exceedingly small, and actually weakened by the loss of four hundred members, could scarcely have survived another blow equally destructive. No distant prospect of advantage, therefore, could have justified such an unseasonable severity.

State of  
Greece  
after the  
battle of  
Leuctra.  
Olymp.  
cii. 2.  
A. C. 371.

When the intelligence was diffused over Greece, that the Thebans, with the loss of only three hundred men, had raised an immortal trophy over the strength and renown of Sparta, the importance of this event became every-where conspicuous. The desire, and hope, of a revolution in public affairs, filled the Peloponnesus with agitation and tumult. Eleans, Arcadians, and Argives, every  
people

people who had been influenced by Spartan councils, or intimidated by Spartan power, openly aspired at independence. The less considerable states expected to remain thenceforth unmolested, no longer paying contributions, nor obeying every idle summons to war. The more powerful republics breathed hatred and revenge, and gloried in an opportunity of taking vengeance on the proud senators of Sparta, for the calamities which they had so often inflicted on their neighbours.

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But amidst this general ferment, and while every other people were guided rather by their passions and animosities, than by the principles of justice or sound policy, the Athenians exhibited an illustrious example of political moderation<sup>29</sup>. Immediately after the battle of Leuctra, a Theban herald, adorned with the emblems of peace and victory, had been dispatched to Athens, in order to relate the particulars of the engagement, and to invite the Athenians to an offensive alliance against a republic, which had ever proved the most dangerous, as well as the most inveterate enemy of their country. But the assembly of Athens, governed by the magnanimity, or rather by the prudence, of Timotheus and Iphicrates, determined to humble their rivals, not to destroy them.

Affected  
moderation  
of  
Athens.

The ancient and illustrious merit of the Spartans, their important services during the Persian war, and the fame of their laws and discipline, which still rendered them a respectable branch of the Gre-

Views of  
that re-  
public.

<sup>29</sup> Xenoph. p. 598.

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cian confederacy, might have a considerable influence in producing this resolution. But it chiefly proceeded from a jealousy of the growing power of Thebes, the situation of whose territories might soon render her a more formidable opponent to Athens, than even Sparta herself. This political consideration for once prevailed over a deep-rooted national antipathy. The Theban herald was not received with respect, nor even with decency. He was not entertained in public, according to the established hospitality of the Greeks; and although the senate of the Five Hundred (who usually answered foreign ambassadors) was then assembled in the citadel, he was allowed to return home without receiving the smallest satisfaction on the subject of his demand. But the Athenians, though unwilling to second the resentment, and promote the prosperity of Thebes, prepared to derive every possible advantage from the misfortunes and distress of Sparta. Convinced that the inhabitants of Peloponnesus would no longer be inclined to follow her standard, and share her danger and adversity, they eagerly seized the opportunity of delivering them for ever from her yoke; and, lest any other people might attain the rank which the Spartans once held, and raise their own importance on the ruins of public freedom, ambassadors were sent successively to the several cities, requiring their respective compliance with the treaty of Antalcidas. Against such as rejected this overture, war was denounced in the name of Athens and her allies; which was declaring to all Greece,



Greece, that the battle of Leuctra had put the balance of power in her hands, and that she had determined to check the ambition of every republic whose views were too aspiring <sup>30</sup>.

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
Disappointed of the assistance of Athens, the Thebans had recourse to an ally not less powerful. The extensive and fertile territory of Theffaly, which had been so long weakened by division, was fortunately united under the government of Jason of Pheræ, a man whose abilities and enterprising ambition seemed destined to change the face of the ancient world <sup>31</sup>. To the native virtues of hospitality and magnificence, which peculiarly distinguished his country, Jason added indefatigable labour and invincible courage, with a mind capable to conceive the loftiest designs, and a character ready to promote them by the meanest artifices <sup>32</sup>. His family descended from the ancient kings of the heroic ages, and formed the wealthiest house in Pheræ, which had already attained considerable pre-eminence over the neighbouring cities of Theffaly. By contrivances extremely unworthy of that greatness to which they frequently conduct, Jason deceived his brothers and kinsmen, and appropriated almost the sole use of his domestic opulence. With this he hired a well-appointed body of mercenaries, by whose assistance he acquired greater authority in Pheræ, than any former general or king had ever enjoyed <sup>33</sup>. But the go-

The Thebans court the alliance of Jason of Theffaly.

His character, and fortunes.

<sup>30</sup> Xenoph. p. 602.      <sup>31</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. i. & seqq.

<sup>32</sup> Polyæn. Stratagem,      <sup>33</sup> Plut. Polit. & fan. tuend.

CHAP. XXX.  vernment of a single city could not satisfy his aspiring mind. By stratagem, by surprise, or by force, he extended his dominion over the richest parts of Thessaly; and was ready to grasp the whole, when his designs were obstructed by the powerful opposition of Polydamas the Pharsalian <sup>34</sup>.

His ambition opposed by Polydamas.

Next to Pheræ and Larissa, Pharsalus was the largest and most flourishing city in that northern division of Greece. But the inhabitants, distracted by factions, exhausted their strength in civil discord and sedition, until a ray of wisdom illuminating both parties, they committed their differences, and themselves, to the probity and patriotism of Polydamas, which were equally respected at home and abroad. For several years Polydamas commanded the citadel, and administered justice and the finances with such diligence and fidelity, as might reasonably have entitled him to the glorious appellation of Father of his country. He firmly opposed and counteracted the secret practices, as well as the open designs, of Jason, who eagerly solicited his friendship by every motive that could actuate a mind of less determined integrity.

Conference between them.

- At a conference which was held between them at Pharsalus, where Jason had come alone and unattended, the better to gain the confidence of a generous adversary, the Pheræan displayed the

<sup>34</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. i. & seqq.

magnitude of his power and resources, which it seemed impossible for the weakness of Pharfalus to resist; and promised, that, on surrendering the citadel of that place, which must otherwise soon yield to force, Polydamas should enjoy in Thessaly the second rank after himself; that he would regard him as his friend and colleague; nor could there remain a doubt that their united labours might raise their common country to that station in Greece which it had been long entitled to hold. That the subjugation of the neighbouring states opened vaster prospects, which forced themselves irresistibly on his mind, when he considered the natural advantages of Thessaly, the fertility of the soil, the swiftness of the horses, the disciplined bravery and martial ardour of the inhabitants, with whom no nation in Europe, or in Asia, was able to contend.

Polydamas heard with pleasure the praises of his native land, and admired the magnanimity of Jason. But he observed, that his fellow-citizens had honoured him with a trust which it was impossible for him ever to betray; and that their community still enjoyed the alliance of Sparta, from which the neighbouring cities had revolted. That he was determined to demand the protection of that republic; and if the Lacedæmonians were willing and able to afford him any effectual assistance, he would defend to the last extremity the walls of Pharfalus. Jason commended his integrity and patriotism, which, he declared, inspired

Determined integrity of Polydamas.



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Jason de-  
clared  
leader of  
the Thes-  
salians.  
Olymp.  
cii. 3.  
A. C. 370.

spired him with the warmer desire to obtain the friendship of such an illustrious character.

Soon afterwards Polydamas went to Sparta, and proposed his demand in the council; exhorting the magistrates not only to undertake the expedition, but to undertake it with vigour; for if they expected to oppose the forces of Jason by their undisciplined peasants, or half-armed slaves, they would infallibly bring disgrace on themselves, and ruin on their confederates. The Lacedæmonians were deeply engaged in the Theban war, which had been hitherto carried on unsuccessfully. They prudently declined, therefore, the invitation of Polydamas; who, returning to Thessaly, held a second conference with Jason. He still refused to surrender the citadel, but promised to use his best endeavours for making the Pharsalians submit of their own accord; and offered his only son as a pledge of his fidelity. Jason accepted the offer, and, by the influence of Polydamas, was soon afterwards declared captain-general of Pharsalus and all Thessaly; a modest appellation, under which he enjoyed the full extent of royal power<sup>35</sup>.

His admi-  
rable dis-  
cipline;

He began his reign by adjusting, with equity and precision, the proportion of taxes, and the contingent of troops, to be raised by the several cities in his dominions. The new levies, added to his standing army of mercenaries, amounted to eight thousand horse, twenty thousand heavy-

<sup>35</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. 1, & seqq. & Diodor. Sicul. l. xv. p. 488.

armed foot, and such a body of targeteers, as no nation of antiquity could match <sup>36</sup>. But numbers formed the least advantageous distinction of the army of Jason. Every day he exercised his troops in person; dispensed rewards and punishments; cashiered the slothful and effeminate; honoured the brave and diligent with double, and sometimes treble pay, with large donatives in money, and with such other presents as peculiarly suited their respective tastes. By this judicious plan of military administration, the soldiers of Jason became alike attached to their duty, and to the person of their general, whose standard they were ready to follow into any part of the world <sup>37</sup>.

He began his military operations by subduing the Dryopes <sup>38</sup>, the Dolopians, and the other small but warlike tribes, inhabiting the long and intricate chain of mounts Oeta and Pindus, which form the southern frontier of Thessaly. Then turning northwards, he struck terror into Macedonia, and compelled Amyntas to become his ally, and most probably his tributary. Thus fortified on both sides, he retaliated the inroads of the Phocians, who had long profited of the divisions, and insulted the weakness, of his country; and by conquering the small and uncultivated district of Epirus, which then formed a barbarous princi-

and rapid  
success.

<sup>36</sup> Xenophon expresses it more strongly; πελταστικοί γὰρ μὴ ἴκοντο πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀντιταχθῆναι, p. 600.

<sup>37</sup> Xenoph. p. 600.

<sup>38</sup> Strabo, l. viii. p. 299.

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pality under Alcetas<sup>39</sup>, an ancestor of the renowned Pyrrhus, he extended the dominion of Thessaly from the Ægean to the Ionian sea, and encompassed, as with a belt, the utmost breadth of the Grecian republics.

His views  
on Greece.

It cannot be doubted that the subjugation, or at least the command, of those immortal commonwealths, was the aim of the Thessalian prince, who declared to his friends, that he expected, by the assistance of Greece, to imitate the glorious example of Cyrus and Agesilaus, and to effect, by the united strength of the confederacy, what these generals had nearly accomplished by a body of ten or twelve thousand soldiers<sup>40</sup>. While the Spartans, however, preserved their long-boasted pre-eminence, and regarded it as their hereditary and unalienable right to conduct their confederates to war, Jason could not hope to attain the principal command in an Asiatic expedition. As the natural enemy of that haughty people, he rejoiced in their unprosperous war against the Thebans; nor could he receive small satisfaction from beholding the southern states of Greece engaged in perpetual warfare, while he himself maintained a respected neutrality, and watched the first favour-

<sup>39</sup> In speaking of Arrybas (the son of Alcetas, and the grandfather of Pyrrhus), who received his education at Athens, Justin says, "Quanto doctior majoribus suis, tanto et gratior populo fuit. Primus itaque leges & senatum annuosque magistratus & reipublicæ formam composuit. Et ut a Pyrrho sedes, sic vita cultior populo ab Arryba statuta."

<sup>40</sup> Xenoph. p. 600.



able occasion of interfering, with decisive effect, in the final settlement of that country.

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His alliance with  
Thebes.

He seldom ventured indeed into the Peloponnesus; but, in order to examine matters more nearly, he undertook, upon very extraordinary pretences, several journeys to Athens and Thebes. From policy, and perhaps from inclination, he had formed an intimate connection with the most distinguished characters of those republics, and particularly with Pelopidas and Timotheus. The latter, after serving his country with equal glory and success, was, according to the usual fortune of Athenian commanders, exposed to a cruel persecution of his rivals and enemies, which endangered his honour and his life. On the day of trial the admirers and friends of that great man appeared in the Athenian assembly, in order to intercede with his judges; and among the rest Jason, habited in the robe of a suppliant, humbly soliciting the release of Timotheus, from a people who would not probably have denied a much greater favour to the simple recommendation of so powerful a prince <sup>41</sup>. In a visit to Thebes he endeavoured to gain or secure the attachment of Epaminondas, by large presents and promises; but the illustrious Theban, whose independent and honourable poverty had rejected the assistance of his friends and fellow-citizens, spurned with disdain the insolent generosity of a stranger <sup>42</sup>. Yet, by the intervention of Pelopidas, Jason contracted

<sup>41</sup> Demosthenes & Cornel. Nepos in Timoth.

<sup>42</sup> Plut. Apophtheg.

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an engagement of hospitality with the Thebans, in consequence of which he was invited to join their arms, after their memorable victory at Leuctra.

Rapidity  
of his  
move-  
ments.

The Theſſalian prince accepted the invitation, though his deſigns reſpecting Greece were not yet ripe for execution. He was actually engaged in war with the Phocians, of which, whatever might be the pretence, the real object was to obtain the ſuperintendence of the Delphic oracle, and the adminiſtration of the ſacred treaſure. To avoid marching through a hoſtile territory, he ordered his galleys to be equipped, as if he had intended to proceed by ſea to the coaſt of Bœotia. His naval preparations amused the attention of the Phocians, while Jaſon entered their country with a body of two thouſand light horſe, and advanced with ſuch rapidity that he was every where the firſt meſſenger of his own arrival.

His views  
in medi-  
ating a truce  
between  
Thebes  
and Spar-  
ta.

By this unuſual celerity, he joined, without encountering any obſtacle, the army of the Thebans, who were encamped in the neighbourhood of Leuctra, at no great diſtance from the enemy. Inſtead of an auxiliary, Jaſon thought it more ſuitable to his intereſt to act the part of a mediator. He exhorted the Thebans to reſt ſatiſfied with the advantages which they had already obtained, without driving their adverſaries to deſpair; that the recent hiſtory of their own republic and of Sparta, ſhould teach them to remember the viciffitudes of fortune. The Lacedæmonians, on the other hand, he reminded of the difference between a

victorious and vanquished army. That the present crisis seemed totally adverse to the re-establishment of their greatness; that they should yield to the fatality of circumstances, and watch a more favourable opportunity to restore the tarnished lustre of their arms. His arguments prevailed; hostilities were suspended; the terms of a peace were proposed and accepted: but it is remarkable, that the Spartans and their allies had so little confidence in this sudden negotiation, that they decamped the night following, and continued to march homeward, with the diligence of distrust and fear, until they got entirely beyond reach of the Thebans<sup>43</sup>.

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Jason had not, probably, more confidence in a treaty hastily concluded between enemies, whose resentments were irritated and inflamed by so many mutual injuries offered and retorted. Nothing could have been more contrary to his views than a sincere and lasting peace between these powerful republics; but as this was not to be apprehended, he wished to obtain the reputation of appeasing the dissensions of Greece; a circumstance of great importance to the accomplishment of his ambitious designs.

In his return home, he demolished the walls of Heraclea, a town situate near the straits of Thermopylæ; not fearing, says his historian<sup>44</sup>, that any of the Greek states should invade his dominions from that side, but unwilling to leave a

He is assassinated in the midst of his projects.  
Olymp. cii. 3.  
A. C. 370.

<sup>43</sup> Xenoph. p. 600.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. p. 599.



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place of such strength on his frontier, which, if seized by a powerful neighbour, might obstruct his passage into Greece. Thither he determined to return at the celebration of the Pythian games, at which he meant to claim the right of presiding, as an honour due both to his piety and to his power. He commanded, therefore, the cities and villages of Thessaly to fatten sheep, goats, swine, and oxen, and proposed honourable rewards to such districts as furnished the best victims for the altars of Apollo. Without any burthensome imposition on his subjects, he collected a thousand oxen, and, of smaller cattle, to the number of ten thousand. At the same time, he prepared the whole military strength of his kingdom, by whose assistance, still more effectually than by the merit of his sacrifices, he might maintain his pretensions to the superintendence of the games, the direction of the oracle, and the administration of the sacred treasure, which he regarded as so many previous steps to the conquest of Greece and Asia. But, amidst these lofty projects, Jason, while reviewing the Pheræan cavalry, was stabbed by seven youths, who approached him, on pretence of demanding justice against each other. Two of the assassins were dispatched by his guards. Five mounted fleet horses, which had been prepared for their use, and escaped to the Grecian republics, in which they were received with universal acclamations of joy, and honoured as the saviours of their country from the formidable power of a brave but ambitious

tious tyrant <sup>45</sup>. The projects and the empire of Jason perished with himself; Thessaly, as we shall have occasion to explain, relapsed into its former state of division and weakness: but it is the business of history to relate not only great actions, but great designs; and even the designs of Jason announce the approaching downfall of Grecian freedom.

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<sup>45</sup> Xenoph. & Diodor. *ibid.* & Valerius Maximus, l. ix.

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*Tumults in the Peloponnesus.—Invasion of Lacedæmonia.—Epaminondas rebuilds Messenê.—Foundation of Megalopolis.—Archidamus restores the Fortune of Sparta.—Affairs of Thessaly and Macedon.—Negociations for Peace.—The Pretensions of Thebes rejected.—Epaminondas invades the Peloponnesus.—Revolutions in Achaia.—Speech of Archidamus in the Spartan Council.—Designs of Thebes.—Disconcerted by Athens.—Pelopidas's Expedition in Thessaly.—The Arcadians seize the Olympic Treasure.—Battle of Mantinea.—Agesilaus's Expedition into Egypt.*

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History of  
the last  
stage of  
Grecian  
freedom.

THE death of Jason removed the terror of Greece; but of a country which owed its safety to the arm of an assassin, the condition may justly be regarded as extremely unstable and precarious. There elapsed, however, thirty-three years of discord and calamity, before the Greeks finally experienced, in Philip of Macedon, such ambition and abilities as enabled him fully to accomplish the lofty designs of the Thessalian. The history of this last stage of tumultuous liberty comprehends the bloody, but indecisive wars, which exhausted Greece during eleven years that intervened between the battle of Leuctra, and the accession of Philip to the Macedonian throne, together with the active reign of that prince; a memorable period of twenty-two years, illuminated by the

the



the success and glory of Macedon, and clouded by the disgrace and ruin of the Grecian republics. CHAP.  
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The unexpected issue of the battle of Leuctra was doubly prejudicial to the Spartans, by weakening their own confederacy, and strengthening that of their enemies. In less than two years after that important event, the alliance in Peloponnesus, over which Sparta had so long maintained an ascendant, was totally dissolved, and most cities had changed not only their foreign connections, but their domestic laws and government. During the same period, the confederacy, of which Thebes was the head, had, on the contrary, been very widely extended. Many communities of the Peloponnesus courted her protection; and, in the north of Greece, the Acarnanians, Locrians, Phocians, the whole breadth of the continent, from the Ionian to the Ægean sea, and even the isle of Eubœa, increased the power, and in some measure acknowledged the dominion of Thebes. The history of these revolutions is very imperfectly related by ancient writers; but their consequences were too remarkable not to be attended to and explained. The Peloponnesians, after being delivered from the oppression of the Spartan yoke, were subjected to the more destructive tyranny of their own ungovernable passions<sup>1</sup>. Every state and every city was torn by factions which frequently blazed forth into the most violent seditions. The exiles from several republics were nearly as numerous as those who

Tumults and seditions in the Peloponnesus after the battle of Leuctra. Olymp. cii. 3. A. C. 370.

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, l. xv. p. 371, & seqq. Isocrat. in Archidam. & de Pace.

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had expelled them. Fourteen hundred were banished from Tegea; two thousand<sup>2</sup> were slain in Argos; in many places the contending factions alternately prevailed; and those who, in the first encounter, had got possession of the government and the capital, were sometimes attacked<sup>3</sup> and conquered by the numerous fugitives, who formed a camp in the adjoining territory. The Mantinæans alone seem to have acted wisely. With one accord, and with equal diligence, they laboured to rebuild their walls, which the insolence of Sparta had demolished. The work was soon brought to a conclusion; and the Mantinæans, united in one democracy, fully determined thenceforth to preserve the strength of their city, which appeared necessary to maintain their political independence,

The exiles  
fly to  
Sparta.

Neither the Thebans nor the Spartans immediately interfered in this scene of disorder. The former found sufficient employment for their arms and negotiations in the northern parts of Greece; and the latter were so much humbled by their defeat at Leuctra, that they contented themselves with preparing to defend the banks of the Eurotas, and to repel the expected assault of their capital. For this purpose they had armed the aged and infirm, who were legally exempted from military

<sup>2</sup> This number is made out by comparing different authors, and uniting in one view the different scenes of the sedition, which is called the Scytalism by Diodorus (*ubi supra*), and Pausanias (Corinth), from the Greek word *σκυταλιν*, signifying a club, which, it seems, was the principal instrument of slaughter.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, l. xv. p. 371, & seqq.

service<sup>4</sup>. They had commanded into the field even those citizens who were employed in such sacred and civil offices as are deemed most useful in society; and, as their last resource, they talked of giving arms to the Helots. But the convulsions of Peloponnesus soon supplied them with less dangerous auxiliaries<sup>5</sup>. The incensed partisans of aristocracy, who had been expelled from Argolis, Achaia, and Arcadia, had recourse to the most ancient and distinguished patrons of their political principles. Encouraged by this seasonable reinforcement, the Spartans set at defiance the Theban invasion, by which they had been so long threatened, and sent a considerable detachment to recover their lost authority in Arcadia. But it was the fate of Sparta, to regain neither in that, nor in any other state of the Peloponnesus, the influence which she had lost in the field of Leuctra. Polytropos, who commanded her allies in this expedition, was defeated and slain in the first rencounter with the Arcadians and Lycomedes, their intrepid and magnanimous leader. Nor did Agesilaus perform any thing decisive against the enemy. He was contented with ravaging the villages and delightful fields of Arcadia, in which he met with little resistance from the inhabitants, who declined an engagement, until they should be joined by the Theban confederacy, whose assistance they had sent to solicit, and had just reason to expect<sup>6</sup>.

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That republic attempts in vain to recover her authority in Arcadia.

<sup>4</sup> Xenoph. l. vi. p. 597.

<sup>5</sup> Id. p. 603.

<sup>6</sup> Id. p. 605.



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The The-  
bans take  
the field  
at the  
head of  
their al-  
lies.  
Olymp.  
cii. 4.  
A. C. 369.

At length the far-renowned Thebans took the field, having carefully pondered their own strength, and collected into one body the flower and vigour of their numerous allies. They were accompanied by the warlike youth of the towns and villages of Bœotia, by the Acarnanians, Phocians, Locrians, and Eubœans, and by a promiscuous crowd of needy fugitives, who were attracted to their camp by the allurements of plunder. They had no sooner arrived on the frontier of Arcadia, than they were joined by the inhabitants of that country, as well as by the Elians and Argives. This united mass of war exceeded any numbers, that either before or afterwards ever assembled in Greece under one standard, amounting to fifty, some say to seventy thousand men<sup>7</sup>. The Thebans, and the rest of the Bœotians, were commanded by Epaminondas and Pelopidas, to whom the generous admiration of their colleagues had voluntarily resigned their authority. Apprised of the march of such a formidable army, conducted by generals of such unquestionable merit, Agesilaus prepared to evacuate Arcadia, a measure which he fortunately effected, before his soldiers beheld the fires kindled in the hostile camp, and thus avoided the disgrace of retiring before the enemy<sup>8</sup>. His unresisted devastation of the territory which he had invaded, as well as his successful retreat, gave fresh spirits to his followers, and made them return with better

The Spar-  
tans eva-  
cuate Ar-  
cadia.

<sup>7</sup> The numbers differ in Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. Pausan. Bœotic. Diodorus, l. xv. & Plut. in Pelopid.

<sup>8</sup> Xenoph. p. 606.

hopes to defend their own country, which was now threatened with invasion. CHAP.  
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The Thebans, though they had no longer any occasion to protect the Arcadians from insult, were determined<sup>9</sup>, by many powerful motives, to employ the vast preparations which they had collected. Their particular resentment against Sparta was heightened by the general voice of their allies, who exhorted them to embrace an opportunity which, perhaps, might never return, utterly to destroy a people who neither could enjoy tranquillity, nor allow their neighbours to enjoy it. The inhabitants of Carya, and of several other towns in Laconia, declared their resolution to revolt from Sparta, as soon as the enemy should enter their boundaries. In a council of war summoned by the Theban generals, it was therefore determined to march without farther delay into the Lacedæmonian territories, to lay waste the country, and, if possible, to take possession of the capital.

Invasion of  
Laconia.

That this resolution might be executed with the greater celerity and effect, the army was thrown into four divisions, destined, by separate roads, to break into the devoted province, to join forces at Sellasia, and thence to march in one body to Sparta. The Boeotians, Elians, and Argives penetrated, without opposition, by the particular

Brave defence of  
the district  
Sciritis,

<sup>9</sup> They at first opposed the eagerness of the Arcadians, Elians, and Argives, for invading Laconia, considering *ὅτι δυσμεγάλωτατη μὲν ἡ Λακωνικὴ ἐγγέλετο εἶναι, φηρέας δὲ καθίσταται ἐπὶ τοῖς εὐπερὶ σ-  
οδάτατοις.* “That it would be difficult to penetrate into a country defended by the natural strength of its frontier, or by vigilant garrisons.” Xenoph. p. 607.

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routes which had been assigned them. But when the Arcadians, who formed the fourth division of the army, attempted to traverse the district Sciritis, the brave Ischilas, who guarded that important pass, determined to repel them, or to perish. The example of Leonidas at Thermopylæ kindled a generous enthusiasm in the breast of this gallant Spartan. The number of the Arcadian levies so far exceeded his own, that death seemed the sure reward of his courage. Yet he exhorted all those to decline danger who were not ambitious to share it. He even *commanded* the youth to leave his camp before the engagement, deeming their lives too precious to be risked in so desperate an enterprise. He, with the old soldiers who followed him, chose the present opportunity to meet a glorious death in defence of their country. But their lives were sold dearly. The action was long doubtful: the loss of the Arcadians great; nor did the battle cease till the last of the Spartans had perished<sup>10</sup>.

Devasta-  
tion of  
Laconia.

The confederates having soon after assembled at Sellasia, the place of rendezvous, marched forward to Sparta, burning and destroying all before them. During five hundred years Laconia had not experienced a similar calamity. The guards who defended the city were thrown into consternation. The women were terrified by the smoke and tumult raised by the invaders; a spectacle, con-

<sup>10</sup> Xenoph. l. vi. p. 607. & Diodor. l. xv. p. 376. The former indeed adds, *εἰ μὴ τις ἀμφοτέρωθεν διεφύγε*. "Unless, perhaps, some one escaped unknown through the enemy."



cerning which it had been their usual boast, that they alone of all the Grecian females, had never beheld it in their native land. Alarmed by the danger which threatened them, and which they were sensible of their own inability to repel, the Spartans embraced the doubtful expedient of giving arms to their peasants and slaves, whom they commonly treated with such an excess of cruelty. Not less than six thousand of these unhappy men were engaged, by threats or promises, to undertake the reluctant defence of the proud tyrants, whom they detested. Their formidable numbers increased the general panic, which had seized the magistrates and citizens, and which did not finally cease until the arrival of a powerful body of men from Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, and Pallené; cities which, though they had ever opposed the *despotism*, were unwilling to permit the *destruction* of Sparta.

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This seasonable reinforcement not only removed the consternation of the Spartans, but made them pass with rapidity from the depths of despondency to the joys of success. The kings and magistrates could scarcely restrain their impetuosity from rushing into the field: and this martial enthusiasm, guided by the consummate prudence of Agesilaus, enabled them to repel the first assaults of the enemy, and to convince them that every succeeding attempt to get possession of the city, must be attended with such fatigue, and danger, and loss of men, as could not be compensated by the success of that enterprise. The conduct of Agesilaus, during this critical emergency, has been highly extolled by all writers,

Vigilant  
intrepidity of Agesilaus.

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writers <sup>11</sup>, and never beyond its merit. By a well-contrived ambush in the temple of the Tyndaridæ <sup>12</sup>, he defeated the designs of the assailants: by very uncommon presence of mind <sup>13</sup>, he quelled a dangerous insurrection; and while, by force or stratagem, he overcame the united efforts of domestic and foreign enemies, he negotiated the most powerful assistance for the relief of his country.

The Spartans and their allies negotiate at Athens a treaty of defence.

Immediately after the battle of Leuctra the Athenians had declared their resolution to renew and confirm the treaty of Antalcidas, which, though it diminished the grandeur, yet secured the tranquillity of Greece, and prevented the weakness of any one republic from falling a prey to the ambition of another. But notwithstanding this declaration, which was universally approved by their neighbours, they had, either from resentment or from policy, remained above two years spectators of the decline of the Lacedæmonian, and the growth of the Theban league. Whatever uneasiness might be occasioned by the increasing strength of their

<sup>11</sup> Xenoph. & Plut. in Agesilao. Diodorus, l. xv. & Pausanias Lacon.

<sup>12</sup> Castor and Pollux, so called from their mother Tyndaris, or Leda.

<sup>13</sup> The mutineers had entered into a conspiracy to seize an important post in the city. Agesilaus observed them as they marched thither, and immediately suspecting their design, called out, that they had mistaken his orders; adding his meaning to be, that they should separate into different divisions, and repair to the several posts which he named. The conspirators naturally concluded that he knew nothing of their purpose, and separating, as he commanded, could never afterwards find an opportunity to unite in such numbers as rendered them dangerous.

new rival, was sufficiently balanced by the decay and downfall of their ancient and inveterate enemy. But though, doubtless, they ardently desired the ruin of the Spartan power, they could not sincerely approve the cruel destruction of their persons, and of their city. When informed of the terrible devastation of Laconia, they naturally felt a return of compassion for a people whose exploits, on many memorable occasions, had done such signal honour to the Grecian name.

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The emissaries of Agesilaus, whose superior mind had assumed dictatorial power amidst the distress of his country, seized the favourable opportunity to urge, with the Athenians, many motives of action, which seldom operate amidst the cold lifeless politics of modern times. They took notice that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had often mutually assisted each other in seasons of distress, and that the most glorious æra of their story was that in which the two republics had united their councils and measures against a common enemy. That when the spirit of rivalry and ambition had unhappily divided Greece, and the Athenians were exposed to the calamities of a long and unfortunate war, they had been protected by the humanity of Sparta against the implacable rage of the Thebans, who wished to demolish the city of Athens, and to reduce its territory to the barren solitude of the Crissean plain. That by the moderation of Sparta, the Athenians had not only been saved from the vengeance of foreign enemies, but delivered from the yoke of domestic tyrants, and the cruel tyranny of

Argu-  
ments  
which  
they em-  
ployed for  
this pur-  
pose.



**CHAP.** of the Pisistratidæ. The merit of these services  
**XXXI.** deserved the reward of gratitude; the hereditary  
 renown of Athens urged her to protect the miserable; and justice demanded that she should assert, and maintain, the conditions of a recent treaty, which she herself had proposed, and which the Thebans, after accepting, had so manifestly violated.

How received by  
 the Athenians.

A loud and discordant murmur ran through the assembly. Some approved the demand, others observed that the Spartans changed their language with their fortune; that they had formerly, and probably would again, whenever they became powerful, assume a very different tone, and, instead of colouring by false disguises, display in its native force, their inveterate enmity to Athens. That the late treaty of peace could not entitle them to any assistance, since they themselves had begun the war by the invasion of Arcadia; a war undertaken from the unjust motive of supporting the tyrannical usurpation of the nobles of Tegea over the rights of their fellow-citizens.

Speech of  
 Cleiteles  
 the Corinthian.

Together with the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, had come those of Corinth and Phlius, cities eminently distinguished by an unshaken fidelity to their ancient confederate and protector. Cleiteles the Corinthian, observing what turn the debate was likely to take, stood up and said, "Were it a matter of doubt, Athenians! who are the aggressors, the melancholy experience of *our* state would remove the difficulty. Since the renovation of the peace of Antalcidas, the Corinthians, surely, have  
 not

not committed hostilities against any power in Greece. Yet the Thebans have entered our territory, cut down our trees, burned our houses, plundered our cattle and effects. How, then, can you refuse your assistance to those who have been so manifestly injured, in direct violation of the treaty, to which, at your express desire, they acceded and swore?" The assembly loudly approved the discourse of Cleiteles, which was supported and confirmed by the arguments and eloquence of Patrocles the Phliasian.

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"It is manifest, I think, to all of you, Athenians! that should Sparta be destroyed, Athens must be the next object of the hostility of Thebes, since that city alone would then stand in the way of her ambition. The cause of the Lacedæmonians therefore is, in fact, your own. You must embrace it with ardour, as the last opportunity which the gods perhaps will afford you, of defending the general freedom at the head of your allies, and of preventing the dangerous domination of the Thebans; the effects of which, you, who are their neighbours, would feel with peculiar severity. By taking this resolution, which is equally generous and salutary, you will acquire a fund of merit, not only with the Spartans, than whom none were ever more mindful of favours, or more ambitious of honest fame, but also with us their allies, who, since we have continued faithful to our friends in their adversity, cannot be suspected of ingratitude to our prosperous benefactors. I have heard with admiration how, in ancient times, the injured and

Of Patrocles the Phliasian.

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afflicted always had recourse to Athens, and were never disappointed of relief. I now no longer hear, but see, the Lacedæmonians, with their faithful allies, soliciting your protection against the Thebans, whose unrelenting cruelty could not persuade Sparta, in the height of her resentment and of her power, to desolate your country, and to reduce you into servitude. Your ancestors acquired just renown by saving the dead bodies of the Argives, to whom the impiety of Thebes denied the sacred rites of burial<sup>14</sup>. How much greater renown will redound to you, when the Lacedæmonians, by your generous assistance, shall be saved from death. It was deemed meritorious in *them* to have defended the children of Hercules against the unnatural persecution of Eurystheus; but it will be far more glorious for *you* to have defended not only the descendants of that hero, the hereditary kings of Lacedæmon, but, along with them, the senate, the magistrates, the people; in one word, to have delivered the whole nation from a danger dreadful in itself, and otherwise inevitable. During the prosperity of their empire, the Lacedæmonians prevented your destruction by a decree, which displayed their humanity, without exposing their safety. You are called to defend the Lacedæmonians, not by inactive decrees, but by arms and courage. Arm, then, in their behalf; and, forgetful of recent animosities, repay the important

<sup>14</sup> See vol. i. c. i. p. 26. The facts alluded to in the text are related in all the panegyrics of Athens, by Plato, Lyfias, Ifocrates, and Thucydides.



services which, in the Barbarian war, the valour of Sparta rendered to Athens and to all Greece.”

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The assembly was so deeply affected by the persuasive discourse of the Phliasian, that they refused to hear any thing in opposition to it, and determined, almost unanimously, to take the field. Iphicrates was named general; twelve thousand men were ordered to repair to his standard; the sacrifices were propitious; the troops took a short repast; and such was their ardour to meet the enemy, that many of them marched forth without waiting the orders of their commander<sup>15</sup>.

Iphi-  
crates,  
with  
twelve  
thousand  
men, sent  
to defend  
Laconia,

Epaminondas, meanwhile, had committed dreadful devastation in Laconia. His repulse from the capital had exasperated his hostilities against the country. He had desolated the fertile banks of the Eurotas, which were thick planted with houses, and abounding in all the conveniencies of life known to the austere simplicity of Sparta. He had assaulted Helos and Gythium; and, traversing the whole province, had destroyed the villages by fire, and the inhabitants by the sword. Even these terrible ravages did not satisfy his resentment; he determined, that the invasion of Laconia should not be a temporary evil, which the labour of years might repair; and for this purpose employed an expedient, which, even after he might evacuate their country, must leave the Lacedæmonians exposed to the rage of an implacable enemy.

Epami-  
nondas  
continues  
his ravages  
in that  
province.

We have had occasion to relate the various fortunes of the Messenians. About three centuries

Rebuilds  
Messénie.  
Olymp.  
cii. 2.

<sup>15</sup> This whole transaction is explained in Xenoph. p. 609—613. A. C. 369.

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before the period now under review, their city had been demolished by the Spartans; their territory had been seized, and divided among that people; the ancient inhabitants had been reduced into servitude, and compelled to cultivate their paternal fields for the benefit of cruel masters; or dispersed in miserable banishment, over Greece, Italy, and Sicily. After two centuries of humiliation and calamity, the humanity, or perhaps the policy of Athens, took compassion on this unfortunate race, and settled them in the territory of Naupactus, and the neighbouring island of Cephallenia. The Messenians displayed their gratitude by important services during the Peloponnesian war; but their most vigorous exertions could not long retard the declining fortune of Athens. The event of that war rendered Sparta the arbiter of Greece; and the Messenians were the first objects of her memorable tyranny, being universally enslaved, banished, or put to death. It is probable that the scattered remains of this miserable community would flock from every quarter to the standard of Epaminondas, rejoicing in an opportunity to retaliate the unrelenting persecution of a people, who now suffered the calamities which they had so often inflicted. But the general voice of history ascribes to Epaminondas the merit of assembling the Messenians<sup>16</sup>. It is certain, that he rebuilt their city, and put them in possession of their territory; an act of generous compassion which inflicted a most unex-

<sup>16</sup> Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. l. xv. p. 491. Pausan. Messen. p. 265.

pected and cruel punishment on the Spartans, who beheld the ashes of a nation, which they had twice endeavoured to extinguish, revive and flourish in their neighbourhood; continually increase by the accession of Spartan subjects and slaves; and, encouraged by a Theban garrison, and their own inveterate hostility, watch every favourable occasion to exert the full power of their vengeance<sup>17</sup>.

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Epaminondas had accomplished this extraordinary enterprise, when he received intelligence of the motions of the Athenian army commanded by Iphicrates. That illustrious general had allowed the ardour of his troops to evaporate, by pursuing a conduct which it is impossible, at this distance of time, to explain, but which the military historian<sup>18</sup> condemns, as highly unworthy of his former renown. When celerity was of the utmost importance, he wasted several precious days at Corinth, without any necessity, or even pretence, for this unseasonable delay. His soldiers loudly demanded to meet the enemy, or even to assault the walls of Argos, the strongest and most populous city in Peloponnesus, and not inferior to Thebes itself in active animosity against their common foe. Iphicrates, however, embraced none of those measures, but led his army towards Arcadia; expecting, perhaps, what actually happened, that the news of his arrival there would deliver Laconia from the hostile invader.

The Athenians take the field.

It cannot be imagined, indeed, that Epaminondas feared the issue of an engagement with the

The Thebans evacuate Laconia.

<sup>17</sup> Diodor. l. xv. c. 16.

<sup>18</sup> Xenoph. l. vi. versus finem.



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Athenians. But he was justly alarmed with the interest which even that people had taken in the danger of Sparta. The indignation and resentment which they, the rivals and enemies of the injured, discovered on this occasion, taught him what sentiments his conduct must excite in more impartial states, should he persist in his original plan, destroy the Lacedæmonian capital, and, as the orator Leptines expressed it, “pluck out an eye of Greece<sup>19</sup>.” Many concurring causes tended also to accelerate his departure. The Arcadians were called home to defend their houses and families. The Elians and Argives were anxious to secure their booty by an expeditious retreat. Even the Thebans were weary of an expedition which had consumed several winter months, a season in which they were not accustomed to keep the field. Provisions likewise grew scarce; and Epaminondas, pressed by difficulties on every side, prepared to evacuate the Lacedæmonian territories; but not (in the words of Xenophon) until “every thing of value had been consumed or plundered, poured out, or burned down<sup>20</sup>.”

The Thebans and Athenians respectively accuse their commanders.

At the same time that the Thebans left Laconia, Iphicrates withdrew the Athenians from the country which they had invaded. The two armies filed off, as by mutual consent, and returned to their respective cities by separate roads, without any attempt to interrupt the progress of each other. Iphicrates was blamed for allowing an enemy, heavy with plunder, and exhausted by the fatigue

<sup>19</sup> Aristot. Rhetor. l. iii. c. 10.

<sup>20</sup> Xenoph. p. 612.

of a winter's campaign, to pass unmolested through the Isthmus of Corinth. Pelopidas and Epaminondas were accused and tried before the Theban assembly, for protracting the term of their command beyond the time limited by law. The former discovered less courage than might have been expected from his impetuous and daring character. He, who had never feared the sword of an enemy, trembled at the angry voice of his insolent accusers. But Epaminondas displayed, on this occasion, the superiority of philosophical firmness, seated in the mind, to that constitutional courage which is the result of blood and spirits. The latter is sufficient for a day of battle; but the former alone can yield support in every vicissitude of fortune.

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Instead of observing the formality of a regular defence, the illustrious Theban undertook the invidious task of pronouncing his own panegyric<sup>21</sup>. After relating his exploits, without amplification, and without diminution, he concluded by observing, "that he could submit to death without reluctance, secure of immortal fame, earned in the service of his country." The seditious demagogues were awed by his magnanimity; the anger of the assembly against himself and his colleague dissolved in admiration; and Epaminondas was conducted from the tribunal with as much glory as from the field of Leuctra,

Epami-  
nondas  
defends  
his con-  
duct.

<sup>21</sup> Plutarch. de sui Laude, p. 540.

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Intricacy  
of the sub-  
sequent  
events.

From the invasion of Laconia to the general engagement at Mantinæa, there elapsed six years of indecisive war and tumultuous activity; battles lost and gained, conquests made and abandoned, alliances concluded and broken; treaties of peace proposed, accepted, and violated, by those who felt the unhappy effects of dissensions which their rancorous animosity was unwilling to terminate. In examining the history of this period, we may perceive the same confusion in the relation, which appears at first sight to have been in the events themselves. It is necessary, however, to reduce them into the form of a regular narrative. In important concerns, numerous bodies of men, however they may act without effect, cannot be suppose to act *entirely* without design: their motives, unsteady and capricious as they often are, form the invisible chain which it is the business of the historian to investigate and to follow; since it is otherwise impossible that the transactions which he describes, should afford either real instruction, or any rational entertainment.

The alliance between Athens and Sparta confirmed and extended. Olymp. ciii. 1.

A. C. 368.

Early in the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians, with the few allies who still adhered to their cause, dispatched an embassy to Athens, in order to strengthen the bands of amity and union with that republic. In the conference held for that purpose, it appeared that the Spartans were either very deeply affected by the recent obligations conferred on them, or that they very earnestly desired the continuance of similar favours. They acknowledged that the experience, the bravery, the naval victories and fortune



fortune of Athens, justly entitled her to the sovereignty of the Grecian seas; and when this concession, which had hitherto been withheld with such disdain, could not satisfy the more patriotic, or rather the less generous, members of the assembly, they condescended to grant another acknowledgment still more inconsistent with the pride of their hereditary pretensions; that in such military expeditions as were undertaken by the joint forces of both republics, the command should be equal and alternate; so that an army of Lacedæmonians (a thing hitherto unexampled) would be commanded during half the campaign by Athenian generals. Patrocles the Phliasian, whose eloquence and address had been distinguished in the former negociation, was not less active in the present; chiefly by *his* intervention, matters were finally adjusted; an alliance of the most intimate kind was concluded between the two republics; and, by the assistance of the generous Phliasian, the Spartans obtained this important advantage, without the disgrace of many ineffectual overtures, or the mortification of long supplicatory speeches, which they deemed of all things the most grievous<sup>22</sup>.

The Spartan negociations, so fortunate in Athens, were equally successful with Dionysius tyrant of Sicily, and Artaxerxes king of Persia. The former, himself a Dorian, naturally lamented the humiliation and distress of a people, who, during seven hundred years, had formed the

The Spartans negotiate treaties with Dionysius and Artaxerxes.

<sup>22</sup> Xenoph. p. 613—616.

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principal ornament and defence of the Dorian race; and the latter pursued his ordinary system of politics, of assisting the weaker party, in order to balance the contending powers, and to perpetuate the hostilities of Greece.

Military  
opera-  
tions.

While the Lacedæmonians gained strength by these important alliances, their enemies took the field. The Arcadians began the campaign by entering the territory of Pallené, an Achæan republic, which still remained faithful to Sparta. The country was laid waste, the villages burned, the city taken by storm, and the garrison, consisting of three hundred men, partly Lacedæmonians, put to the sword. Soon after this success, the Arcadians were joined by the Elians and Argives. Epaminondas likewise marched southward at the head of the Thebans, their foot amounting to seven thousand, and their cavalry to five hundred. Before he reached the Isthmus, the Lacedæmonians had been reinforced by a body of two thousand Sicilian troops, agreeably to their treaty with Dionysius; and the Athenians had taken the field, under the command of Chabrias, actually the most respected, or at least the most popular, of their generals. It was naturally the object of the Spartan and Athenian commanders, to prevent the junction of Epaminondas with his southern allies. For this purpose they strongly guarded, and even fortified the Isthmus; an expedient which had not been put in practice since the expedition of Xerxes. The Thebans, however, broke through, took Sicyon, and assaulted Corinth.

But

But Chabrias, who happened at this time to enjoy the alternate command, repulsed them with such loss, that Epaminondas judged proper to retire homeward; on which account he was blamed and disgraced by his countrymen, who, insolent with prosperity, thought themselves entitled always to conquer.

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Retreat  
of the  
Thebans.

The unexpected retreat of the Thebans, of which it is not easy to conjecture the real cause<sup>23</sup>, occasioned much dissatisfaction among their confederates, particularly the Arcadians. This simple, but warlike people, had obtained distinguished honour in several recent expeditions. They were usually conducted by the Mantinæan Lycomedes, a man gallant in enterprise and persevering in execution; rich, noble, eloquent, generous, and affable. Under a commander equally respected and beloved, the Arcadians found nothing too arduous for their courage. In regular engagements, they commonly proved victorious wherever they fought. But their principal merit was displayed in ambushes and surprise, and all the dangerous stratagems of desultory war. When a favourable occasion summoned their activity, neither length of way, nor difficult mountains, nor storms, nor darkness, could interrupt their course, or prevent their unexpected assault<sup>24</sup>. Unassisted and alone, they had often defeated superior strength

Pretension of the  
Arcadians.

<sup>23</sup> The Theban demagogues, as we learn from Diodorus and Plutarch, accused Epaminondas of treacherous correspondence with the enemy, or at least of secretly favouring their cause; but this is altogether improbable.

<sup>24</sup> Vid. Xenoph. 618, & seqq.



CHAP. and numbers; and when, together with their Pe-  
 XXXI. loponnesian allies, they served under the Theban  
 standard, their prowess had been acknowledged  
 and admired by the united army.

Encou-  
 raged by  
 Lycome-  
 des.

The repulse and retreat of Epaminondas gave relief and splendour to the recent glory of Arcadia, and inspired Lycomedes with an ambition which he easily communicated to his countrymen. He told them, "That they were the most ancient, the most populous, and surely not the least warlike community, in Peloponnesus; but that they had hitherto neglected to profit of the advantages which they possessed. In the memorable war of twenty-seven years, they had joined with the Lacedæmonians, whom they had raised to an authority, of which the Arcadians, as well as the rest of Greece, felt the intolerable oppression. That of late years they had acted with the Thebans, who, by *their* assistance chiefly, had attained a very alarming degree of power, which they occasionally exerted or remitted, as suited their own convenience, without the smallest regard to the interest of their confederates. If this power should be increased, might not the yoke of Thebes become as grievous as that of Sparta? It was time for the Arcadians to know their own worth; to disdain following the standard of any foreign state; and not only to vindicate their freedom, but to claim their just pre-eminence." The assembly applauded the manly<sup>25</sup> resolution of Lycomedes;

<sup>25</sup> Xenophon's expression is lively; *καὶ μόνον ἀνδρὰ ἡγούμενος*  
 "thinking him the only man." L. vii. p. 618.

and,

and, in order to render it effectual, determined to keep possession of such places as they had taken from the Lacedæmonians or their allies in Elis and Achaia, and to complete their conquests in these and the neighbouring provinces of Peloponnesus.

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For several months they met with little interruption in this design, the Spartans, after the departure of their auxiliaries, not venturing to take the field until the beginning of the ensuing year, when they received a new supply of troops from Dionysius, and both troops<sup>26</sup> and money from Artaxerxes. The Theban arms were actually employed in Theffaly and Macedon, as we shall have occasion hereafter to relate; so that every circumstance conspired to hasten the march of Agefilaus and the Lacedæmonians. But the infirmities incident to old age made him decline the command, which was entrusted to his son Archidamus; his colleague Agesipolis not possessing great abilities either for war or government.

The Spartans take the field to oppose the designs of the Arcadians. Olymp. ciii. 2. A. C. 367.

The rapid success of Archidamus, who seemed destined to restore the declining fortune of Sparta, justified the prudent choice of the magistrates and people. He expelled the hostile garrisons from the inferior cities of Laconia, stormed Caryæ, and put the rebellious inhabitants to the sword. From thence he hastened to Arcadia, laid waste the southern frontier of that province, and prepared to attack the populous city of Parrhasia, when the united strength of the Arcadians, com-

Glorious campaign of the Spartans under Archidamus.

<sup>26</sup> These were not Persians, but ξειρκαι, "Greek mercenaries." Xenoph. l. vii. p. 619.

manded

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manded by Lycomedes, and reinforced by the Argives, approached to its relief. Their arrival made Archidamus withdraw to the hills that overhang the obscure village of Midea. While he encamped there, Cissidas, who commanded the Sicilians, declared that the time limited for his absence was expired, and, without waiting an answer, ordered his forces to prepare their baggage, and to march towards Laconia. But the nearest passage into that country had been seized by the Messenians. In this difficulty Cissidas applied to Archidamus, who hastened to his defence. The Arcadians and Argives at the same time decamped. The hostile armies encountered near the joining of the two roads which led towards Sparta from Midea and Eutresios. As soon as Archidamus beheld the enemy prepared for an engagement, he commanded the Spartans to form, and when they were ready to advance, addressed them as follows: "Fellow-citizens and friends! if we are still brave, we may look forward with confidence; we may yet retrieve our affairs, and deliver down the republic to posterity as we received it from our ancestors. Let us strive, then, by one glorious effort, to recover our hereditary renown; and let us cease being the reproach (instead of what the Spartans once were, the ornament and defence) of our friends, our parents, our families, and our country."

Battle of  
Midea  
won by  
the Spar-  
tans with-

While he yet spoke, it thundered on the right, though the day was clear and serene. The soldiers, roused by the noise, looked towards the direction from



from which it came, and beheld, in a consecrated grove at no great distance, an altar and statue of Hercules, the great progenitor of Archidamus and the Spartan kings. Animated by the wonderful concurrence of such auspicious circumstances, they were transported with an enthusiasm of valour, and impetuously rushed against their opponents, in full confidence of victory. The enemy, who thought that they had to do with a vanquished and spiritless people, were astonished at their mien and aspect as they advanced to the attack. The few who waited their approach, were totally destroyed; many thousands perished in the pursuit; it is said by ancient historians<sup>27</sup>, that the Spartans lost not a man. Archidamus erected a trophy, and dispatched a messenger to Sparta. The people were assembled, when he communicated his extraordinary intelligence. The aged Agefilaus shed tears of joy. The Ephori and senators sympathised with the emotions of their king. The patriotic weakness was communicated from breast to breast; the amiable contagion spread; the sternest members of this numerous assembly dissolved in softness, and melted in sensibility<sup>28</sup>.

The Spartans were prevented from reaping the full fruits of this victory, by a considerable reinforcement which the Arcadians soon afterwards received from Thebes. By the assistance of these troops, the Menalians and Parrhasians, who, from

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out the  
loss of a  
man.

Founda-  
tion of  
Megalo-  
polis.

<sup>27</sup> Xenoph. l. vii. p. 620. Diodor. & Plat. ubi supra.

<sup>28</sup> Xenoph. *ibid.* He observes, ὅτω κοινὸν τὶ ἀγαθὸν χαρὰ καὶ λυγρὴ, δακρυὰ εἰσι. "So common are tears to joy and sorrow."

their

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their situation on the southern frontier of Arcadia, were most exposed to the incursions of the enemy, found means to execute a design said to have been formerly suggested by Epaminondas. They abandoned twenty straggling and defenceless villages; and choosing an advantageous situation in the centre of their territory, erected a fortress there, which they surrounded with a strong wall. The benefit of security attracted new inhabitants; the walls were extended; the place acquired the magnificent name of Megalopolis<sup>29</sup>, the last city built by the Greeks, while they preserved the dignity of independent government<sup>30</sup>.

Revolu-  
tions in  
Thessaly.

The temporary success of the Spartans under Archidamus, which is generally ascribed to the valour of that commander, was principally occasioned by the withdrawing from Peloponnesus, at a very critical juncture, the numerous army of Thebes, which was at that time called northward, in order to take an important and honourable part in the affairs of Macedon and Thessaly. Since the atrocious murder of the heroic Jason, the latter kingdom had been afflicted by a continued train of crimes and disorders. Just gratitude and respect towards the memory of their generous and warlike chief, engaged the Thessalians to perpetuate the honours of his family. He was succeeded by his brothers Polydore and Polyphron; of whom the latter, not being

<sup>29</sup> "The great city."

<sup>30</sup> I have melted together Pausanias in *Bœotic.* and Diodorus, l. xv. p. 384. but followed the chronology of the latter.

able to endure the restraint of a limited, much less of a divided rule, attained, by the assassination of his colleague, the sole dominion of Thessaly. His stern despotism was abolished by the hand of Alexander, who avenged the blood of his kinsman<sup>31</sup> Polydore, the only meritorious action of his life. For Alexander (as his character is represented to us) exceeded the cruelties of Polyphron, and of all the detested tyrants that have ever been condemned to the infamy of history. The Thessalians were delivered from such a monster by the domestic conspiracy of his wife Thebé, the daughter of Jason, and her brothers Tisiphonus, Pitholaus, and Lycophron; who governed with precarious sway, till the power and address of Philip destroyed their usurpation, and rendered their distracted country, which seemed incapable of freedom, a province of Macedonia. Such, in few words, were the revolutions of Thessaly; but the bloody reign of Alexander demands more particular attention, being connected with the general revolutions of Greece.

A cautious reader will always receive, with some distrust, the accounts transmitted by ancient republicans of the lives and actions of tyrants<sup>32</sup>.

Tyranny  
of Alex-  
ander.

<sup>31</sup> His brother, uncle, or father, according to different authors.

<sup>32</sup> The acceptance of the word tyrant in Greek history is well known. The Greeks called τυραννοι, "tyrants," those who had acquired sovereignty in states formerly republican. Thessaly, Sicily, Corinth, &c. were governed, not by βασιλεις, but τυραννοι, "not by kings, but tyrants;" whereas Macedonia, which had never been subject to any species of popular government, was ruled, not by τυραννοι, but βασιλεις, "not by tyrants, but kings."

The



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The popular histories of Alexander remind us of the fanciful descriptions of Busris or Pygmalion. Yet it cannot be doubted that the tyrant of Thesfaly was cruel to his subjects, perfidious to his allies, implacable to his enemies, a robber by land, and a pirate at sea<sup>33</sup>: but that it was his usual diversion to bury men alive, to inclose them in the skins of wild beasts, as a prey to ravenous dogs, to mutilate and torture children in the presence of their parents<sup>34</sup>, can scarcely be reconciled with his shedding tears for the imaginary sufferings of Hecuba and Andromaché, during the representation of the Troades<sup>35</sup>. It is true, that he is said to have been ashamed of this weakness, and to have left the theatre with confusion; but what could have engaged a monster, such as Alexander is described, to listen to the pathetic strains of the tender Euripides? What pleasure, or what pain, could a tyger, thirsting for human blood, receive from such an entertainment? Although we abstract from his story many incredible fictions, Alexander might well deserve the resentment of the Thessalians. His injured subjects took arms, and solicited the protection of Thebes, whose justice or ambition readily embraced their cause. As Epaminondas still continued under the displeasure of his country, the Theban army was conducted by Pelopidas and Ismenias. Their arrival struck terror into the conscious breast of the tyrant, who,

The affairs  
of Thes-  
faly settled  
by Pelopi-  
das.

<sup>33</sup> These are the words of Xenophon, p. 601.

<sup>34</sup> Plut. in Pelopid.

<sup>35</sup> Id. de Fort. Alexand.

without daring to trust his defence to the numerous guards and mercenaries by whom his usurpation was supported, implored the clemency of the Theban generals, submitting to the most humiliating conditions which their wisdom might judge proper to exact for the future security of his subjects <sup>36</sup>.

This transaction was scarcely ended, when the Thebans, whose reputation and success rendered them the most proper mediators in the affairs of their neighbours, were invited into Macedon, which, since the death of Amyntas II. had been a prey, during six years, to all the calamities of a disputed succession. Amyntas left three legitimate sons, Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, and a natural son, Ptolemy, whose intrigues chiefly occasioned the disorders of the kingdom. He could not prevent the accession of Alexander to the throne, as that prince had attained the age of manhood at the time of his father's death. But he embittered and shortened his reign, which lasted only one year; after which Ptolemy assumed the reins of government, as guardian of the minority of Perdiccas, and protector of Macedon. It soon appeared, however, that his ambition would not rest satisfied with the borrowed power of a regent. He gained a considerable party to his interest, baffled the opposition of Perdiccas's partisans, and boldly usurped the sovereignty. The friends of that unfortunate prince had recourse to the justice

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Pelopidas  
establishes  
Perdiccas  
on the  
throne of  
Macedon,  
and re-  
ceives  
Philip  
as an  
hostage.  
Olymp.  
ciii. 2.  
A. C. 367.

<sup>36</sup> Diodor. l. xv. c. xvii. & Plut. in Pelopid.

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and power of Thebes. Pelopidas entered Macedon at the head of his army; restored the numerous exiles whom Ptolemy had banished; asserted the just rights of Perdiccas to the throne; and, after receiving hostages from the contending factions, among whom was Philip, the younger brother of Perdiccas, afterwards king of Macedon, and conqueror of Greece, returned towards Thessaly, having finally re-established the tranquillity of the neighbouring kingdom<sup>37</sup>.

Istreacherously seized and imprisoned by Alexander, in his journey through Thessaly. Olymp. ciii. 2.  
A. C. 367.

In his journey through a country where he had so lately acted the part of a judge and master, it seemed as if little danger could reasonably be apprehended. Pelopidas had sent before him a considerable detachment of his army, to conduct the Macedonian hostages towards Thebes. With the remainder he marched securely through the territory of his Thessalian confederates, when he was informed that Alexander had come to meet him at the head of his mercenaries. Even this suspicious circumstance could not undeceive the sanguine credulity of the Theban chief. He imagined that the tyrant had taken this measure in order to shew him respect, and to justify himself against some recent complaints of his injured subjects. With an imprudence which all historians agree to condemn<sup>38</sup>, both Pelopidas and Ismenias threw them-

<sup>37</sup> Diodor. l. xv. c. xvii. & Plut. in Pelopid.

<sup>38</sup> Besides Diodorus and Plutarch, the sage Polybius severely arraigns the imprudent confidence of Pelopidas. Polyb. Casaub. t. ii. p. 98. Polybius in that passage speaks of the expedition as an embassy. I have carefully compared the different writers, and adopted the account that seemed most probable and consistent.



ſelves into the hands of a traitor, who gloried in deſpiſing laws human and divine. They were inſtantly ſeized by his order, carried to Pheræ, bound, imprifoned, and expoſed to the inſulting eyes of an invidious multitude.

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It might be expected that the Theban ſoldiers ſhould have been animated with indignation and rage at the unexampled treatment of their beloved chiefs. But their numbers were too ſmall to contend with the Theſſalian mercenaries; and when a powerful reinforcement arrived from Bœotia, they fatally experienced, in the firſt encounters with the enemy, the abſence of Pelopidas, and the degradation of his magnanimous friend. The army was reduced to the utmoſt difficulties, encompassed on every ſide, unwilling to fight, and unable to fly. The troops juſtly accuſed the inexperience of their commanders, remembering their glorious campaigns in the Peloponneſus, where they contended with far more formidable enemies. Epaminondas, who had commanded them on thoſe memorable occaſions, actually ſerved in the ranks. The ſoldiers with one accord ſaluted him general. The ſingular abilities of this extraordinary man ſoon changed the poſture of affairs; the tyrant was defeated in his turn, and compelled to retire. Epaminondas, inſtead of pushing him to extremity, which might have turned his deſperate fury againſt the valuable lives of the Theban priſoners, hovered round with a victorious army, oſtentatiously diſplayed the advantages of military ſkill and conduct; and while he kept Alexander in continual

Delivered  
by Epa-  
minondas.

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respect and fear, yet left him sufficient time for repentance and submission. This judicious plan of operations was attended with success. The tyrant implored peace; but he only received a truce of thirty days, on condition of restoring the persons of Pelopidas and Ismenias<sup>39</sup>.

Interview  
of Pelopi-  
das, dur-  
ing his  
confinement,  
with  
Thebé  
queen of  
Thessaly.

Those who love to find in history events extraordinary and romantic, would not easily excuse my omitting to mention the interview of Pelopidas, during his imprisonment, with the Thessalian queen. The daughter of the heroic Jason united the beauty of the one sex with the courage of the other, and was beloved by her husband with such love as a tyrant can feel, which is always corrupted by suspicion. At her earnest and repeated entreaties, Thebé was permitted to see, and converse with, the Theban general, whose merit and fame she had long admired. But his appearance did not answer her expectation. At beholding his neglected and squalid figure, she was seized with an emotion of pity, and exclaimed, "How much, Pelopidas, do I lament your wife and family." "You, Thebé! are more to be lamented," replied the Theban hero, "who, without being a prisoner, continue the voluntary slave of a perfidious and cruel tyrant." The expression is said to have sunk deep into the heart of the queen, who remembered the reproach of Pelopidas, when, ten years afterwards, she supported the courage, and urged the hand, of the assassins of Alexander<sup>40</sup>.

<sup>39</sup> Plut. in Pelopid. & Diodorus, *ibid*.

<sup>40</sup> Xenoph. p. 601.

But this moral narrative, however strongly authenticated, cannot be attentively read without occasioning some degree of scepticism concerning the history of Alexander. Had he been the monster which resentment or credulity have taken pleasure to delineate, who never entered the apartment of his wife without an armed attendant, who slept in a lofty inaccessible tower, to which he mounted by a ladder, and which was guarded by a fierce dog<sup>41</sup>, it is incredible that he should have permitted an interview between a secret and open enemy.

Nor will it be easy to reconcile with the fierceness of the Thessalian, another anecdote, which has probably been invented to display the magnanimity of Pelopidas, but which displays still more strongly the patience of Alexander. During the confinement of the former at Pheræ, the latter is said to have exceeded his usual cruelties towards the inhabitants of that city. Pelopidas consoled their affliction, and encouraged them to hope for vengeance. He even sent to reproach the absurdity of the tyrant, in destroying daily so many innocent men, from whom he had nothing to fear, while he allowed an enemy to live, who would employ the first moment of freedom to punish his manifold enormities. “And is Pelopidas so desirous to die?” was the answer of the Thessalian. “Yes,” replied the prisoner, “that *you* may the

Anecdote  
of Pelopidas and  
Alexander.

<sup>41</sup> Cicero de Offic. l. 2. Plut. in Pelopid. But the story, as related by Xenophon, is divested of such improbable fictions; and Xenophon seems hardly to believe all that he relates. He says, λεγέται ὑπο τινος,—and repeats that it was a hearsay, a few sentences below.



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sooner perish, having rendered yourself still more obnoxious to gods and men <sup>42</sup>." The resentment of Pelopidas, if ever it was expressed, proved an empty boast; for immediately after his deliverance, the Theban army was, for very urgent reasons, withdrawn from Thessaly.

Congress  
of Grecian  
deputies  
in Persia.  
Olymp.  
ciii. 2.  
A. C. 367.

The Theban expedition in the north had allowed the Spartans, in some degree, to recover their influence in the south of Greece. Archidamus had obtained a complete victory over the Arcadians, the bravest and most powerful of the confederates. The crafty <sup>43</sup> Antalcidas, with Euthycles <sup>44</sup>, a Spartan of abilities and intrigue, had been sent as ambassadors to Persia, in order to hasten the supplies of troops, or money, expected from that country. It was time for Thebes to assert her interest in the Peloponnesus, and to counteract the dangerous negotiations of her enemies with Artaxerxes. Epaminondas, whose recent and illustrious merit had silenced the unjust clamours of faction, was confirmed in his military command; and Pelopidas, whose unfortunate adventure in Thessaly was ascribed less to his own imprudence than to the treachery of Alexander, was dispatched to the East, as the person best qualified to conduct a negotiation with the ministers of the great king. He was accompanied by the ambassadors of Elis, Argos, and Arcadia; those of Athens followed soon afterwards; so that there appeared, for the first time, a general congress of the Grecian states, to settle

<sup>42</sup> Plutarch. in Pelopid.

<sup>43</sup> Plut. in Artaxerx.

<sup>44</sup> Xenoph. Hellen.

and adjust their interests at the court of a foreign prince. It might be expected, that a scene so new and interesting should have excited the attention of historians; yet they have left us ignorant in what city of his dominions Artaxerxes received the Greeks. At their arrival, the king treated Antalcidas with that partial kindness due to an ancient guest and favourite; but at their public audience, the appearance, the fame, and the eloquence of Pelopidas, more majestic than that of Athens, more nervous than that of Sparta<sup>45</sup>, entitled him to a just preference, which the king, whose rank and temper alike disdained restraint, was at no pains to conceal.

The Theban represented, that in the battle of Plataea, fought above a century ago, and ever since that memorable engagement, his countrymen had uniformly adhered to the interest of Persia, at the risk of losing whatever men hold most precious. That the dangerous war in which they were actually engaged, had been occasioned by their open and steady opposition to the measures of the Spartans, previous to their destructive invasions of Asia. The imperious pride of Agesilaus could never forget the affront offered him at Aulis, when, in imitation of Agamemnon, he intended to offer sacrifice before his embarkation. He had begun hostilities without justice, and carried them on without success. The field of Leuctra had been alike fatal to the strength and glory of Sparta; nor would that ambitious republic have reason to

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Representations of Pelopidas to the Persian monarch.

<sup>45</sup> Plut. in Pelopid.

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Behaviour  
of the  
other de-  
puties.

boast of its recent success in Arcadia, if, at that unfortunate juncture, the Thebans had not been prevented, by reasons equally important and honourable, from assisting their Peloponnesian confederates. Timagoras the Athenian, guided by motives which ancient<sup>46</sup> history has not condescended to explain, seconded, with vigour and address, the arguments of the illustrious Theban. In vain did Leon, the colleague of Timagoras, remonstrate against his perfidy. The other deputies were confounded by his impudence; and before they had time to express their astonishment and indignation, the king desired Pelopidas to ex-

<sup>46</sup> The extraordinary behaviour of Timagoras deserves attention. He co-operated with the enemy of his country, and the ambassador of a state actually at war with it. We may guess his motives by his reward. He received from the king of Persia, at his departure, gold and silver, and other valuable presents, particularly a bed of curious construction, with Persian slaves to make it, the Greeks being little acquainted with that operation; and he was carried in a sedan to the sea-shore at the king's expence. Yet this man had the effrontery to return to Athens, and to appear in the public assembly. He knew the force of eloquence and intrigue over the capricious minds of his countrymen; he knew that the practice of receiving bribes was so usual, that the Athenians had lost the proper sense of its baseness. He perhaps remembered the pleasant proposal of Epicrates, that instead of nine Archons, the Athenians should annually elect nine ambassadors, chosen from the poorest citizens, who might return rich from Persia. Epicrates had acquired a very undue proportion of wealth by this infamous means, as we learn from an oration of Lyfias. Yet the Athenians were less indignant at his guilt, than delighted with his humour. Timagoras, however, was not so fortunate; he was accused by his colleague Leon, and condemned to death, not, if we may credit Plutarch, because he had betrayed his trust, and accepted bribes, but because the Athenians were extremely displeased that Pelopidas had effected the object of his commission at the Persian court. Plut. in Pelopid.

plain



plain the object of his commission, and the demand of his countrymen. The Theban replied, that he had been sent to propose and ratify a treaty between his republic and Persia, on conditions equally advantageous to both, since the carrying of them into execution would destroy the power of those states which had hitherto occasioned so much disturbance and danger to all their neighbours. His proposals were, that the Athenians should be commanded to lay up their fleet, and that the fertile country of Messenia should be declared totally independent of Sparta. If any opposition to the treaty were made by these powers, that war should be levied against them by Persia, Thebes, and their allies; and if the inferior cities of Greece declined to engage in so just a cause, that their obstinacy should be punished with an exemplary severity. The king approved these articles, which were immediately consigned to writing, confirmed by the royal seal, and read aloud to the ambassadors. On hearing the clause which related to Athens, Leon exclaimed, with the freedom peculiar to his country, "The Athenians, it seems, must look out for some other ally, instead of the king of Persia." After this daring threat, the ambassadors took leave, and returned to Greece with all possible expedition <sup>47</sup>.

Pelopidas was accompanied by a Persian of distinction, intrusted with the instrument containing the treaty. On his arrival in Thebes, the people were immediately assembled, and being ac-

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Overtures  
of the Per-  
sians and  
Thebans  
rejected in  
a conven-

<sup>47</sup> Xenoph. p. 621, & seqq.

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Grecian  
states ;

quainted with the happy fruits of his embassy, they commended his diligence and dexterity. Without losing a day, messengers were dispatched to demand the attendance of representatives from the Grecian states, whose interests were all alike concerned in the late important negociation. It does not appear that either Athens or Sparta condescended to obey the summons. The convention, however, was very numerous. The Persian read the treaty, shewed the king's seal, and, in the name of his master, required the agreement to be ratified with the formality of oaths usually employed on such occasions. The representatives almost unanimously declared that they had been sent to hear, not to swear ; and that before the treaty could be ratified by general consent, its conditions must be previously discussed in the particular assembly of each independent republic. Such was the firm, but moderate answer of the other deputies ; but the high-spirited Lycomedes went farther than his colleagues. His friend and countryman, Antiochus, who had lately acted as the ambassador of Arcadia at the Persian court, returned disgusted by the contempt shewn towards his country by the great king, who hesitated not to prefer Elis to Arcadia. In giving an account of his embassy to the Ten thousand (the name usually bestowed on the Arcadians since the re-union of their tribes in Mantinæa and Megalopolis), he indulged himself in many contumelious expressions against Artaxerxes and his subjects, which were greedily listened to by the resentment and envy of his hearers. “ Neither

the

the wealth nor the power of the great king were so great in reality as flattery and falsehood represented them. The golden plane-tree, which had often been so ostentatiously described, could scarce afford shade to a grasshopper. He himself had been an attentive observer; yet all he could find in Persia was the idle retinue of vice and luxury, bakers, butlers, and cooks, a useless and servile train; but men fit to contend with the Greeks, he neither himself saw, nor thought it possible for others to discover." The proud disdain of Antiochus had been communicated entire to the breast of Lycomedes. He declared, that Arcadia needed not any alliance with the great king; and that were such a matter in agitation, Thebes would not be the proper place to determine it, since every convention tending to a general peace ought to be held in that country which had been the principal scene of war.

The Theban magistrates discovered the mingled symptoms of disappointment, indignation, grief, and rage. They accused Lycomedes as a traitor to Thebes, and an enemy to his country; but he despised their empty clamours, and, without deigning an answer, walked from the assembly, and was followed by all the deputies of Arcadia. Notwithstanding this severe mortification, the Thebans did not abandon the ambitious project at which they had long aimed. Nothing favourable, they perceived, could be expected in the general congress of the states, so that they allowed the assembly to break up without insisting farther on their demands.

and by  
each re-  
public in  
particu-  
lar.



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mands. But at the distance of a short time, they renewed the same proposal to the several republics, beginning with Corinth, one of the weakest, yet most wealthy, in hopes that whatever opposition the overtures of the king of Persia, and their own, had found in the united strength and confidence of the assembled confederacy, few single states at least would venture to provoke the indignation of such powerful adversaries. But in this, too, they were disappointed. The Corinthians declined entering into any alliance with the king of Persia, and set his power at defiance. The magnanimous example was imitated by their neighbours; the secret practices of the Thebans were equally fruitless with their open declarations and demands.

Epami-  
nondas in-  
vades the  
Pelopon-  
nesus.  
Olymp.  
ciii. 3.  
A. C. 366.

Epaminondas encouraged his countrymen to acquire, by arms, that pre-eminence which they had vainly expected to obtain by negociation. His renown, justly increased by the recent transactions in Thessaly, rendered his influence irresistible. He was again intrusted with the command of a powerful army, with which, for the third time, he invaded the Peloponnesus. The Elians and Arcadians, though hostile to each other, were alike disposed for rebellion against Thebes; but instead of marching into their territories, a measure which might have engaged them to settle their private differences, and to unite against the common enemy, Epaminondas endeavoured to quash their disaffection by the rapid conquest of Achaia, which, stretching along the Corinthian gulph, skirted the northern frontiers of Elis and Arcadia.

From

From the nature of their government the Achæans usually enjoyed more tranquillity than their neighbours. They possessed not any great town, whose needy and turbulent inhabitants, seduced by popular demagogues, could rouse the whole province to arms and ambition. Towards the east and the isthmus of Corinth, the cities of Sicyon and Phlius had long been regarded as separate republics, unconnected with the general body of the Achæan nation. Ægium enjoyed the prerogative of constituting the usual place of convention for the states of Achaia; but Dymé, Tirtæa, and Pellené, scarcely yielded to Ægium in populousness and power, and seem, with several places of inferior note, to have formed so many separate and independent communities, all alike subject to the same equitable system of Achæan laws. Immediately before the Theban invasion the aristocracy had acquired an undue weight in the constitution of Achaia, so that the principal nobles and magistrates were no sooner informed of the approach of an enemy, than they flocked from all quarters of the province to meet Epaminondas, soliciting his favour and friendship, and little anxious about the independence of their country, provided they might preserve their personal privileges and private fortunes. The people perceiving themselves betrayed by those who ought to have been their protectors, abandoned all thoughts of resistance. Epaminondas accepted the submission of the magistrates, and received pledges of their engagement, that Achaia should thenceforth adhere to the interest

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Compels  
the  
Achæans  
to accept  
the The-  
ban al-  
liance.

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Revolu-  
tions in  
Achaia.

This conquest, which was effected without striking a blow, and without producing any internal revolution of government, was destructive and bloody in its consequences. Epaminondas, for reasons not sufficiently explained, returned with his army to Thebes; but before he arrived there, various complaints against his conduct had been made in the Theban assembly. The Arcadians and Argives complained that a people, who knew by their own recent experience the inconveniencies of aristocracy, should have confirmed that severe form of government in a dependent province. The democratic faction in Achaia secretly sent emissaries to second the complaint. The enemies of Epaminondas seized the favourable opportunity of accusing and calumniating that illustrious commander, and the capricious multitude were persuaded to condemn his proceedings, and to send commissioners into Achaia, who, with the assistance of the populace, as well as of a considerable body of mercenaries, dissolved the aristocracy, banished or put to death the nobles, and instituted a democratic form of policy. The foreign troops had scarcely left that country, when the exiles, who were extremely numerous and powerful, returned with common consent, and, after a bloody and desperate struggle, recovered their ancient influence in their respective cities. The leaders of the populace were now, in their turn, put to death or ex-

<sup>48</sup> Xenoph. p. 621.



pelled; the aristocracy was re-established; and the magistrates, knowing that it was dangerous to depend on the unsteady politics of Thebes, craved the protection of Sparta, which was readily granted them. The Achæans approved their gratitude by ravaging the northern, while the Lacedæmonians infested the southern frontier of Arcadia; and that unhappy province felt and regretted the inconvenience of its situation between two implacable enemies <sup>49</sup>.

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Sicyon, though governed by the Achæan laws, did not follow, on this occasion, the example of its neighbours. That unfortunate city, which had long been the seat of luxury and the arts, was reserved for peculiar calamities. Euphron, a bold, crafty, and ambitious demagogue, having already acquired great credit with the Lacedæmonians, was desirous of obtaining equal consideration among the enemies of that people, hoping, by so many foreign connexions, to render himself absolute master of his little republic. For this purpose he secretly reminded the Arcadians and Argives, that "Sicyon, having the same laws and government, would naturally embrace the same alliance with the neighbouring cities; but the danger of this event he would undertake to remove, with very slender assistance from Argos and Arcadia." The admonition was not lost; a body of armed men arrived at Sicyon; Euphron assembled the people; the government was changed; new magistrates were appointed, and Euphron was entrusted with the command of the national force, consisting chiefly

Euphron  
usurps the  
government of  
Sicyon.  
Olymp.  
ciii. 3.  
A. C. 366.

<sup>49</sup> Xenoph. p. 623.

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of mercenaries. Having obtained this, he obtained all. By careffes, bribes, and flattery, the troops were gained over to his party, and became attached to his person. His colleagues in the government were removed by secret treachery or open violence. His private enemies were held the enemies of the state, accused, condemned, and banished; and their confiscated estates augmented the wealth of Euphron, whose rapacity knew no bounds, sparing neither the property of individuals nor the public treasury, nor the consecrated gold and silver which adorned the temples of Sicyon. The sums amassed by such impious means enabled him to confirm his usurpation. He augmented the number of his mercenary guards, who, while they oppressed the republic, were useful auxiliaries to the Argives and Arcadians. Whatever these nations thought proper to command, the soldiers of Euphron were ready to obey; and partly by this alacrity in their service, partly by bribing<sup>50</sup> the principal men in Argos and Arcadia, the crafty tyrant expected to prevent those neighbouring communities from interfering in the domestic affairs of Sicyon.

His usurpation overturned by Æneas, the Stymphalian.

Such was the venality and corruption of the Greeks, that this detestable policy was attended with success, until Æneas, the Stymphalian, obtained the command of the Arcadians. This man, availing himself of the vicinity of Sicyon to Stymphalus, the place of his birth and residence, had formed a connexion with the oppressed citizens

<sup>50</sup> Τα μὲν τοὶ καὶ χρημασί διπράττετο. Xenoph. p. 624.

of the former. Æneas, perhaps, had not sufficiently shared the largesses of Euphron; perhaps the humanity of his nature<sup>51</sup> lamented the sufferings of the Sicyonians. Whatever was his motive, it is certain that he endeavoured to expel their tyrant, and to restore their liberty.

Euphron, however, had the dexterity to engage successively in his favour the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Thebans. He spared neither pains, nor promises, nor bribes. He was commonly his own ambassador; and his activity and abilities must have risen far above the ordinary pitch, to engage the principal states of Greece, one after another, to support, in direct opposition to their principles, the tyranny of a single man. Insurrections at home, and hostilities from abroad, at length occasioned his downfall. He escaped to Thebes with the greatest part of his treasure. His enemies sent proper persons to counteract his intrigues there. The money, however, and the address of Euphron, prevailed with the Theban magistrates, and he expected to be restored in triumph by the Thebans, as he had already been by the Athenians. But the Sicyonians, who followed him to Thebes, perceiving his familiarity<sup>52</sup> with the principal men of that city, had recourse to the only expedient that seemed capable of frustrating his designs, and assassinated Euphron in the Cadmæa, while the Theban archons and

Euphron  
is assassi-  
nated at  
Thebes.

<sup>51</sup> Xenophon seems to approve this reason. He says Æneas, the Stymphalian, νομισας οτι ανεκτως εχουσιν τα εν Σικυωνι. "Thinking the grievances of the Sicyonians intolerable."

<sup>52</sup> Ως, δε ευρων αυτον οικειως τοις αρχουσι συνοντα. Xenoph. p. 630.



C H A P. senators were assembled within the walls of that  
XXXI. edifice <sup>53</sup>.

This action publicly justified.

The murderers were seized, and the atrocity, as well as the indignity of their crime, was strongly represented to the senate by one of the archons, who probably regretted the death of Euphron, as the loss of a wealthy client. The criminals denied the fact, till one, bolder than the rest, not only avowed but justified the assassination as equally lawful, advantageous, and honourable. And so little horror do men feel at crimes which prevail in their own age, and with which their fancies are familiar, that the assassins were unanimously acquitted by the Theban senate, whose award was approved by the assembly <sup>54</sup>.

The allies of Sparta ask permission of that republic to negotiate a peace with Thebes. Olymp. ciii. 3.  
A. C. 366.

Meanwhile the war languished on both sides, and the hostile confederacies were on the point of being dissolved. The Athenians and Arcadians, equally disgusted with their respective allies, concluded a treaty of peace and mutual defence, by the intervention of Lycomedes the Mantinæan, who was slain in his return from Athens by a party of Arcadian exiles. This negotiation gave general alarm; the Arcadians, who had entered into treaty with Athens, were the allies of Thebes; and the united strength of these three republics was at that time sufficient to subdue and enslave the rest of Greece. The terror was increased when it appeared that the Athenians had little inclination to evacuate several places in the Corinthian territory which they had undertaken to defend against the

<sup>53</sup> Xenoph. l. vii. p. 630.

<sup>54</sup> Id. *ibid.* p. 631, & seqq.

Arcadians and Thebans. By seasonable vigilance the Corinthians anticipated a design, too unjust to be publicly avowed; they cautiously dissembled their fears; graciously thanked Chares, who had arrived with an Athenian fleet on pretence of offering them his service, but took care not to admit him within their harbours; and by extreme kindness and condescension, accompanied with warm professions of gratitude for the protection hitherto afforded them, they got rid of the foreign garrisons, without coming to an open rupture with the Athenians. But the narrow escape which they had made, and the dread of being exposed in future to any similar danger, made them extremely solicitous to promote a general peace on the terms proposed by Artaxerxes and the Thebans. Motives of the same kind influenced the cities of Achaia, and the little republic of Phlius, which, together with Corinth, were the only allies that remained faithful to Sparta. A similarity of interests occasioned a close communication of views and measures among all those communities; who agreed, by common consent, to dispatch an embassy to Sparta, requesting that she would accept the conditions of peace lately offered by Thebes, or if she thought it inconsistent with honour to cede her just pretensions to Messenê, that she would allow her faithful but helpless allies to enter into a separate negotiation with the Theban republic.

The reasonableness, and even modesty, of this request must have been apparent to the Spartans, when

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when they reflected on the useful services of the allies, and considered how much they had already suffered in their cause. The Phliasians, in particular, had, during five years, given such illustrious proofs of their unshaken adherence to Sparta, as stand unrivalled in the history of national honour and fidelity. Situated in the midst of enemies, they had continually, since the battle of Leuctra, suffered the invasions and assaults of the Thebans, Arcadians, and Argives. Their territory was totally wasted; their city closely besieged; their citadel, more than once, surprised and taken; their wealth, public and private, was exhausted, and they subsisted precariously on provisions brought from Corinth, for the payment of which they had pledged their beasts of burden and instruments of agriculture. Yet, under the pressure of these multiplied calamities, they had preserved their fidelity inviolate; they had disdained to accept the peace which the Thebans offered them on condition of their forsaking Sparta; even, at last, they were determined to negotiate with Thebes for neutrality alone; nor had they humbly solicited permission to embrace this measure, until Corinth, the only source of their subsistence, seemed ready to forsake them<sup>55</sup>.

The Spartans deliberate on that subject.

The strength of such arguments urged by the eloquence of Patrocles the Phliasian, might have softened, if any thing could have softened, the inflexible temper of the Spartan senate, and dis-

<sup>55</sup> Xenoph. 624. & 634.



posed that assembly to prefer the interest of their allies, and their own immediate safety, to the insisting on a fruitless claim to Messenë, which, unaided and alone, they could never expect to maintain. But the pretensions of this extraordinary people seem to have become more lofty, in proportion to their inability to support them; and, on that particular occasion, the proud obstinacy, natural to the Spartans, was increased by an animated speech of Archidamus, full of the most confident hopes, and glowing with all the warmth of his age and character.

He spoke with contempt concerning the defection of the confederates, “The Phliasians, the inhabitants of Corinth and Achaia, may, without exciting surprise, express an anxiety for peace; safety, not glory, is their aim. But the Spartans have a character to sustain, which it would be infamous to relinquish. They expect not barely to exist, but to enjoy fame and honour, the true sweeteners of existence; and, if that be impossible, they must perish! Yet is not their situation desperate: a nation cannot be reduced to any condition of distress, in which a warlike genius, and a well-regulated government, may not afford relief. But in military experience and abilities, we are still unrivalled; and such a system of policy as we enjoy, no other people can boast. We enjoy, besides, temperate and laborious habits, the contempt of pleasure and wealth, an ardour for martial glory, and an ambition of honest fame. These are powerful auxiliaries, when protected by the

Speech of  
Archida-  
mus.

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immortal gods, whose oracles anciently approved our just conquest of Messéné. Nor, though the Corinthians and Achæans forsake us, shall we be destitute of warlike allies. The Athenians, ever jealous of Thebes, their most formidable neighbour, will again take arms in our cause. Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily, gives us hope of farther assistance; the king of Egypt, and many princes of Asia, declared enemies of Artaxerxes, are all naturally our friends. We possess, besides, though not the persons and actual service, the hearts and affections at least, of whatever is most eminent in Greece. In all the republics, whoever is distinguished by his fame, his wealth, or his virtues, though he may not accompany our standard, secretly wishes success to our arms. I am of opinion, too, that the crowd<sup>56</sup> of Peloponnesus, that mob on which we at first too vainly relied, will at length return to their duty. They have obtained none of those advantages, the vain prospect of which urged them to revolt. Instead of acquiring the independent government of their own laws, they have fallen a prey to lawless anarchy, or been subjected to the inhuman cruelty of tyrants. The bloody seditions, of which they once knew the nature by report only, they have long experienced; and there are actually more exiles from particular cities, than were formerly from all Peloponnesus. But even banishment is happiness to those who,

<sup>56</sup> Οχλος. Isocrát. in Archid. He means the Arcadians, Elians, &c. formerly allies of Sparta,

while.

while they remained at home, butchered each other at the altars; and who, instead of that peaceful abundance which they enjoyed under the Spartan government, perished for want of bread. Such is the condition of the Peloponnesians, whose lands have been laid waste, their cities desolated, and that constitution and those laws, under which they once lived the happiest of men, overturned from the foundation. We might subdue them by force; but *that* is not necessary; they will voluntarily return to their allegiance, and solicit our protection, as alone capable to alleviate their misery, and prevent their total ruin.

“ But had we nothing of this kind to expect, and were the one half of Greece not more disposed to injure us, than the other to abet their injustice, I have still one resolution to propose, harsh indeed and severe, but becoming those sentiments which have ever animated the Spartans. Prosperity, that conceals the infamy of cowardice, robs fortitude of half its glory. It is adversity alone that can display the full lustre of a firm and manly character. I propose, therefore, that rather than cede a territory, which your ancestors acquired by the blood and labour of twenty victorious campaigns, you should remove from Sparta your wives, children, and parents, who will be received with kindness in Italy, Sicily, Cyrené, and many parts of Asia. Those who are fit to bear arms must also leave the city, and carry nothing from thence that may not easily be transported. They must, then, fix on some post well fortified by nature, and which art



**C H A P.** may render secure against every hostile assault.  
**XXXI.** This, thenceforth, must be their city and country;  
 and from this, as a centre, they must on all sides  
 infect the enemy, until either the Thebans re-  
 mit their arrogance, or the last of the Spartans  
 perish <sup>57</sup>."

The Spar-  
 tans de-  
 termine to  
 persevere  
 in the war.

The speech of Archidamus expressed the ge-  
 neral sense of his country. The allies were dis-  
 missed with permission to act as best suited their  
 convenience, but with assurance that Sparta would  
 never listen to any terms of accommodation while  
 deprived of Messenê. With this answer the am-  
 bassadors returned to their respective cities. Soon  
 afterwards they were dispatched to Thebes, where,  
 having proposed their demands, they were offered  
 admission into the Theban confederacy. They  
 answered, that this was not peace, but only a change  
 of the war; and at length, after various propo-  
 sitions and reasonings, they obtained the much-de-  
 sired neutrality <sup>58</sup>.

Ambi-  
 tious  
 views of  
 Epami-  
 nondas  
 and the  
 Thebans.  
 Olymp.  
 civ. I.  
 A. C. 364.

The Spartans, thus deserted on every side,  
 would probably have been the victims of their  
 pride and obstinacy, if circumstances, unforeseen  
 by Archidamus, had not prevented the Thebans  
 and Arcadians from carrying on the war with their  
 usual animosity. Projects of glory and ambition  
 had disarmed the resentment of Epaminondas.  
 That active and enterprising leader, who thought  
 that nothing was done, while any thing was neg-  
 lected, had set himself to render Thebes mistress

<sup>57</sup> Isocrat. in Archidam.

<sup>58</sup> Xenoph. ubi supra.

of the sea. The attention and labour of the republic was directed to this important object; preparations were made at Aulis with silence and celerity; and when the design seemed ripe for execution, Epaminondas sailed to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, to concert measures with those maritime states, which had already begun to feel the severe yoke of the Athenians, and become eager to shake it off. But the vigilance of the latter, who had sent out a strong fleet under Laches, a commander of reputation and ability, prevented the dangerous consequences of this defection; and the Theban arms were, at the same time, summoned to a service which more immediately concerned their interest and honour.

Disconcerted by the activity of Athens,

Alexander, the tyrant of Pheræ, began once more to display the resources of his fertile genius, and the inhuman cruelty of his temper. His numerous mercenaries, whom he collected and kept together with singular address, and the secret assistance of Athens, enabled him to overrun the whole territory, and to gain possession of all the principal cities, of Thessaly<sup>59</sup>. The oppressed Thessalians had recourse to Thebes, whose powerful protection they had so happily experienced on former occasions, and whose standard they had uniformly followed, with an alacrity which afforded a sufficient pledge of their gratitude. The Thebans decreed to assist them with ten thousand men, and the command was en-

Last expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly. Olymp. civ. 1. A. C. 364.

<sup>59</sup> Plutarch. in Pelopid.

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trusted to Pelopidas, the personal enemy of Alexander. But the day appointed for the march was darkened by an eclipse of the sun, which greatly diminished the army, as Pelopidas was unwilling to exact the reluctant services of men dispirited by the imaginary terrors of superstition. Such only as, despising vain omens, desired to follow their beloved general, were conducted into Theſſaly; and being joined by their allies in that country near the town of Pharfalus, they encamped at the foot of the mountains of Cynoscephalæ.

He is slain  
in the bat-  
tle of Cy-  
noscephalæ.

The tyrant approached with an army twenty thousand strong, boldly offering them battle. Nor did Pelopidas decline the engagement, though his foot were, in number, inferior to the enemy. The action began with the cavalry, and was favourable to the Thebans; but the mercenaries of Alexander having gained the advantage of the ground, pressed with vigour the Theban and Theſſalian infantry. In this emergency, Pelopidas rode up, and encouraging the retiring troops with his voice and action, gave them such fresh spirits, that Alexander did not doubt their having received a considerable reinforcement. The mercenaries were pressed in their turn, and thrown into disorder, Pelopidas darting his eye through their broken ranks, espied Alexander in the right wing rallying his men, and preparing to advance with his usual intrepidity. At this sight the Theban was no longer master of his passion. Naturally a foe to tyrants, he beheld a personal foe in the tyrant Alexander. Accompanied by a few horsemen, he impe-



impetuously rushed forward, calling aloud to his adversary, and challenging him to single combat. Alexander, fearing to meet the man whom he had injured, retired behind his guards, who received, first with a shower of javelins, and then with their spears, the little band of Pelopidas; who, after producing such carnage<sup>60</sup> as Homer ascribes to the rage of Diomed or Achilles, fell a victim to the blindness of his own ungovernable fury. Meanwhile, his troops advancing to the relief of their general, the guards of the tyrant were repelled; the Thebans, with their allies, proved victorious in every part of the battle; the enemy were dispersed in flight, and pursued with the loss of three thousand men.

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But the death of Pelopidas threw a gloom over the victory. He was lamented by the Thebans and Thessalians with immoderate demonstrations of sorrow. Accompanied by an innumerable crowd of real mourners, his body was carried in procession to Thebes. The Thessalians, in whose service he had fallen, requested the honour of supplying the expences of his funeral, which was celebrated with every circumstance of sad magnificence. The multitude recollected the eclipse which preceded his departure, and which, as they believed, announced his misfortune; and, in allusion

Honours  
paid to his  
memory.

<sup>60</sup> Diodorus says, that the bodies of those whom he slew covered a long tract of ground. Plutarch is equally hyperbolic. The battles of Homer rendered the marvellous in military description too familiar to the Greek historians, I mean, Diodorus, Plutarch, Pausanias; Thucydides and Xenophon knew their duty better,

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The tyrant stripped of all his conquests.

The Thebans demolished Orchomenus.

to that fatal omen, exclaimed, "that the sun of Thebes was set, and her glory departed for ever." The Thebans appointed Malcitas and Diogeiton to the command in Thessaly. The tyrant was again defeated, and stripped of all his conquests. But what appears extraordinary, he was allowed to live and reign in Pheræ<sup>61</sup>, while the neighbouring cities entered into a close alliance with Thebes.

The foreign expeditions which have been described, were not the only causes that diverted the attention of the Thebans from the affairs of Peloponnesus. While Epaminondas was employed abroad in the fleet, and Pelopidas in Thessaly, the government of Thebes was on the point of being overturned by an aristocratical faction. The inhabitants of Orchomenus, the second city in Bœotia, and anciently the rival of Thebes<sup>62</sup>, entered into this conspiracy, which was to be executed at the annual review of the Orchomenian troops. But the plot was discovered by the fears or the repentance of some accomplices, who became informers. The cavalry of Orchomenus, to the number of three hundred, were surrounded and cut to pieces in the Theban market-place. Nor did this vengeance satisfy the enraged multitude, who marched in a body to Orchomenus, besieged and took the city, rased it to the ground, put the men of full age to the sword, and dragged their wives and children into captivity<sup>63</sup>.

<sup>61</sup> Diodor. l. xv. c. 20.

<sup>62</sup> Pausanias Bœotic.

<sup>63</sup> Diodor. l. xv. c. 20.

While

While operations, destructive or fruitless, employed the activity of Thebes, her allies in Arcadia were occupied with designs still more blameable. Their own strength and numbers, together with a confidence in Athens, their new confederate, encouraged the Arcadians to give full scope to their ambition, by which they had been long animated. To pave the way for the total conquest of the Peloponnesus, in which they had already obtained a dangerous ascendant, they began by wresting several places from the Elians, the least warlike, and most wealthy, of their neighbours. The Elians, worsted in every encounter with the enemy, craved the assistance of Sparta, which being reinforced by the Achæans (notwithstanding the neutrality so recently stipulated), made several vigorous, but unsuccessful efforts, for the defence of the Elian territory. The Arcadians still pushed their conquests in that country, gaining one town after another, and at length Olympia itself, the most precious jewel of the Elians, and the greatest ornament of the Peloponnesus. As possessors of the sacred city, and by virtue of a pretended right derived from the inhabitants of Pisa, an ancient but decayed place in the neighbourhood of Olympia, the Arcadians prepared to celebrate the hundred and fourth Olympiad, the time of which was at hand. At the approach of this august solemnity, the concourse, as usual, was great from every part of Greece; hostilities were suspended; and all parties united in common amusements, and common ceremonies of religion.

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The Arcadians seize Olympia, and prepare to celebrate the games. Olymp. civ. I. A. C. 364.

The



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XX XI.Which are  
interrupt-  
ed by the  
arrival of  
the Elians  
in arms.

The prayers and sacrifices were performed, and the military games had begun, when the performers and spectators were alarmed by the sudden clashing of armour, and the sight of a *real* battle. The Elians had marched forth with their whole forces, and surprised the Arcadians, who, with two thousand Argives, and a body of Athenian cavalry amounting to four hundred, guarded the sacred groves and temples of Olympia. The vigour of their unexpected assault successively repelled these intruders, who fled in disorder through the streets, and were pursued by the Elians with an *inspired* valour, “since,” says Xenophon, “Heaven alone can do, in one day, what no other power can accomplish but in great length of time; make cowards courageous<sup>64</sup>.” The Arcadians, however, recovering from their consternation, began to rally. The assailants were resisted with obstinacy; but did not retire, till having lost Stratolas their commander, with other brave men, they retreated in good order, after giving a conspicuous proof of their courage and intrepidity to those who had long despised the softness of their unwarlike character. The Arcadians renewed the guard with double vigilance; fortified the avenues that led to the Stadium and Hippodrome; and having taken these necessary precautions against a second surprise, proceeded with the remaining ceremonies of the festival, which, though brought to an undisturbed

<sup>64</sup> Τῶντοις γυμνασίοις οὕτως τὴν ἀρετὴν θεὸς μὲν αἱ ἐμπνεύσας δύναται καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἀποδείξαι· ἀνθρώποις οὐδε αἱ ἐν πολλῇ χρόνῳ τῆς μὴ οὕτως ἀλκιμῶς ποιήσεσθαι. P. 639.

conclusion, was never acknowledged in the records of the Elians <sup>65</sup>.

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After celebrating the Olympic games, the mixed concourse of people returned to their respective homes, and the Arcadians found themselves sole masters of the city and temple of Jupiter, containing the collected treasures of many centuries, the rich gifts of vanity and superstition. Opportunity, joined to want, is naturally the mother of injustice. The Arcadians, who, to promote their ambitious designs, had raised a body of standing troops called Eparittoi, laid hold of the sacred treasure, in order to pay those mercenaries, whose demands they were otherwise incapable of satisfying, without great inconvenience. The Mantinæans first protested against this unwarrantable rapacity. Instead of accepting their proportion of the plunder, they imposed, for the payment of the mercenaries, a tax on themselves, of which they transmitted the produce to the archons, or magistrates, appointed by the Ten Thousand to administer the general concerns of the Arcadian nation. The archons, who had themselves freely handled the sacred money, represented to their constituents the affected delicacy of the Mantinæans as an obstinacy extremely dangerous to the states of Arcadia, and insinuated that this unseasonable regard for justice and piety most probably concealed some very criminal design.

The Arcadians seize the Olympic treasure.

The Mantinæans protest against this impiety.

<sup>65</sup> Xenoph. l. vii. p. 638, & seqq. & Diodorus, l. xv. c. 21.

The

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The  
States-  
General of  
Arcadia  
approve  
the resolu-  
tion of the  
Manti-  
næans;

The Ten Thousand, or, as we should say, the States-General, listened to this insidious accusation; and summoned the municipal magistrates of Mantinæa to appear and answer for their conduct. They refused to obey; a detachment of the Eparittoi was sent to bring them by force; the Mantinæans shut their gates. This firmness roused the attention of the States; and many members of weight in that assembly began to suspect that the Mantinæans must possess some secret ground of confidence, that encouraged them to set at defiance an authority which they were bound to revere. They reflected first on the alarming consequences to which Arcadia might be exposed by plundering the shrines of Jupiter; and then on the injustice and impiety of the deed itself. These sentiments, enforced by the superstition of the age, spread with rapidity in the assembly; it was determined thenceforth to abstain from a consecrated fund, the violation of which might prove dangerous to themselves, and entail a curse on their posterity; and, to prevent the bad consequences of the desertion of the Eparittoi, whose pay must thereby be diminished, many wealthy Arcadians, who could subsist on their private incomes, enrolled themselves in their stead.

and re-  
store  
Olympia  
to the  
Elians.

These measures, though approved by the States, gave great uneasiness to the archons, to the mercenaries, and to all who had shared the Olympic spoil, lest they might be called to account for their rapacity, and compelled to refund the sums which they



they had embezzled. To prevent this danger, they had recourse to the Thebans, from whom they requested immediate assistance, on pretence that the States of Arcadia were ready to revolt to Sparta. The States, on the other hand, sent an embassy requesting the Thebans not to pass the Isthmus, until they should receive farther invitation. Nor were they satisfied with barely counteracting the negociations of their enemies. Having determined not to derive any benefit from the wealth of Olympia, they thought proper to restore that city, as well as the direction of the games, to those who had, from time immemorial, enjoyed both, and to conclude a peace with the Elians, who solicited it with much earnestness, as a measure highly conducive to the general interest of the Peloponnesus.

The congress, assembled for this beneficial purpose, was held at Tegea, and consisted of deputies from Elis, and from many cities of Arcadia. When matters were seemingly adjusted to the satisfaction of all parties, entertainments, as usual, were prepared; and the deputies, except those of Mantinæa, most of whom were invited home by the vicinity of their city, remained at Tegea to celebrate the feast of peace. While they were employed in drinking and merriment, the archons, and such others as dreaded the consequences of this hasty accommodation, addressed themselves to a Theban general, who commanded a considerable body of Bœotian troops that had long garrisoned Tegea, in order to secure the fidelity of that place and the adjacent territory. The Theban had him-

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Those who had embezzled the Olympic treasure seize their opponents by assistance of the Thebans.

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self made free with the sacred treasure, and was therefore easily prevailed on to embrace any measure that might prevent an inquiry into that enormous crime. Nothing appeared so proper for this purpose as to seize and detain the unsuspecting deputies, who consisted of the leading men from most cities of Arcadia. This scheme was no sooner proposed, than carried into execution. The gates of Tegea were secured; a body of armed men surrounded the place of entertainment; the deputies, who had prolonged to a late hour the joys of festivity, were taken unprepared, and conducted to various places of confinement, their number being too great for one prison to contain<sup>66</sup>.

The prisoners set at liberty.

Next day, the Mantinæans, being apprised of this unexpected event, dispatched messengers, demanding some few of their citizens who happened to remain at Tegea, after the departure of their companions; and at the same time acquainting the magistrates of that place, the archons, and the Theban general, that no Arcadian could be put to death without a fair and open trial. They likewise, without loss of time, dispatched an embassy to the several cities of Arcadia, rousing them to arms in their own defence, and exhorting them to rescue their imprisoned citizens, and to avenge the insult offered to the general body of their nation. When those who had committed the outrage, and especially the Theban general, were acquainted with the vigour of these proceedings, they began

<sup>66</sup> Xenoph. p. 640.

to be more alarmed than before. As they had seized but few Mantinæans, they could derive little advantage from the hostages of that city, whose resentment they had most reason to fear. They were sensible of deserving the indignation of Arcadia; and that the general voice of Greece must condemn the irregularity and violence of their measures. Intimidated by such reflections, the Theban commander at once set the prisoners at liberty; and, appearing next day before an assembly as numerous as could be collected in such troublesome times, endeavoured to excuse his conduct, by saying, that he had heard of the march of the Lacedæmonian army towards the frontier, and that several of the deputies, whom he had seized, were prepared to betray Tegea to the public enemy. The Arcadians were not the dupes of this shallow artifice; yet they abstained from punishing their own wrongs, and sent ambassadors to Thebes, who might describe the injury that had been committed, and impeach the criminals<sup>67</sup>.

Upon hearing the accusation, Epaminondas, who was then general of the Bœotians, declared, that his countrymen had done better in seizing, than in discharging the Arcadians, whose conduct was highly blameable in making peace without the advice of their confederates. "Be assured," continued he to the ambassadors, "that the Thebans will march into Arcadia, and support their friends in that province." This resolution, which ex-

Epami-  
nondas  
prepares  
to march  
into the  
Pelopon-  
nesus, at  
the head  
of the  
Bœotians  
and their  
confede-  
rates.  
Olymp.  
civ. 2.  
A. C. 363.

<sup>67</sup> Xenoph. p. 641.



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pressed the general sense of the republic, was heard with great indignation by the Arcadian states, and their allies of Elis and Achaia. They observed, that the Thebans could not have felt, much less have expressed, any displeasure at the peace of Peloponnesus, if they had not deemed it their interest to perpetuate the divisions and hostilities of a country which they wished to weaken and to subdue. They entered into a stricter alliance with each other, and prepared for a vigorous defence; sending ambassadors to Athens and Sparta, that the former might be ready to thwart the measures of a neighbouring and rival state, and that the latter might take arms to maintain the independence of that portion of Greece, of which the valour of Sparta had long formed the strength and bulwark.

His last expedition into that country. Olymp. civ. 2. A. C. 363.

During these hostile preparations, Epaminondas took the field with *all* the Bœotians, with the Eubœans, and with a strong body of Thessalians, partly supplied by Alexander, and partly raised by the cities which Pelopidas had recently delivered from the yoke of that cruel tyrant. Upon his arrival in the Peloponnesus, he expected to be joined by the Argives, the Messenians, and several communities of Arcadia, particularly the inhabitants of Tegea and Megalopolis. With these hopes, he proceeded southward to Nemea, an ancient city in the Argive territory, distinguished by the games celebrated in honour of Hercules. There he encamped for several days, with an intention to intercept the Athenians, whose nearest route into

Pelo-

Peloponnesus lay through the district of Nemea ; convinced that nothing could more contribute, than an advantage over that people in the beginning of the campaign, to animate the courage, as well as to increase the number of the Theban partisans in every part of Greece. But this scheme was defeated by the prudence of the Athenians, who, instead of marching through the Isthmus, failed to the coast of Laconia, and proceeded from thence to join their confederates at Mantinæa. Apprised of this design, Epaminondas moved his camp, and marched forward to Tegea, which being strongly fortified, and enjoying a lofty and central situation, was judiciously chosen as the place of rendezvous for his Peloponnesian confederates. Having continued several weeks at Tegea, he was much disappointed that none of the neighbouring towns sent to offer their submission, and to solicit the protection of the Theban arms. This waste of time gave him the more uneasiness, as his command was limited to a short term. The strength of the enemy at Mantinæa was continually increasing. Agesilaus had already conducted the Lacedæmonians to the frontier of Arcadia. If *they* likewise should join, the combined forces would prove superior to the army of Epaminondas, which amounted to thirty thousand in number, and of which the cavalry alone exceeded three thousand. Considering these circumstances, he suddenly determined on an enterprize, which, if crowned with success, would render the present

CH A P. hitherto fruitless expedition not unworthy of his  
 XXXI. former fame.

Fails in  
 his at-  
 tempt  
 surprise  
 Sparta;

Having decamped with his whole army in the night, he performed a hasty march of thirty miles, in order to surprise Sparta; and had not the extraordinary swiftness of a Cretan deserter apprised Agesilaus of the danger, that city would have been taken unprepared, and totally incapable of defence<sup>68</sup>. The bulk of the Lacedæmonian army had proceeded too far on the road to Mantinæa, to anticipate the design of the enemy; but the aged king, with his son Archidamus, returned, with a small but valiant band, to the defence of Sparta. The engagement which followed, as related by Xenophon, appears one of the most extraordinary that history records. Epaminondas had employed every precaution which his peculiar sagacity could suggest; he did not approach Sparta by those narrow roads, where a superiority of numbers would afford him small advantage; he did not draw up his forces in the plain, in which, while entering the town, they might have been annoyed with missile weapons; nor did he allow an opportunity of surprising him by stratagem or ambuscade, in the management of which the Spartans were at all times so dexterous. Seizing an eminence which commanded the town, he determined to descend into it with every advantage on

<sup>68</sup> Xenophon says, ὥσπερ νεότητι πανταπασιν ἐρημον τῶν ἀμυν-  
 μένων. Xenophon, p. 644. "As a nest quite destitute of its  
 defenders."



his side, and without the seeming possibility of being exposed to any inconvenience. But the issue of so well-concerted an enterprise, the historian hesitates whether to refer to a particular providence of the gods, or to ascribe to the invincible courage of men actuated by despair. Archidamus, with scarcely an hundred men, opposed the progress of the enemy, cut down the first ranks, and advanced to assault the remainder. Then, strange to relate! those Thebans, says Xenophon, who breathed fire, who had so often conquered, who were far superior in number, and who possessed the advantage of the ground, shamefully gave way. The Spartans pursued them with impetuosity, but were soon repelled with loss; for the divinity, whose assistance had produced this extraordinary victory, seems also to have prescribed the limits beyond which it was not to extend <sup>69</sup>.

Epaminondas, foiled in an attempt which promised such a fair prospect of success, did not sink under his disappointment. As he had reason to believe that the whole forces at Mantinæa would be withdrawn from that place to the defence of Sparta, he immediately sounded a retreat, returned

and in  
that a-  
gainst  
Manti-  
næa;

<sup>69</sup> Plutarch tells a story on this occasion, of a young Spartan named Isadas, who stripped naked, anointed himself with oil, sallied forth with a spear in one hand, and a sword in the other, and traced his path in blood through the thickest of the enemy. He returned unhurt, was crowned for his valour, but fined for fighting without his shield. Plut. in Agesil. To a modern reader, Xenophon's account of the battle will appear a pompous description of the effect of panic terror with which the Thebans were inspired, by finding, instead of *ποταμὸν ἔσπερον*, "a defenceless nest," the vigorous opposition of men in arms.

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which is  
saved by  
the Athe-  
nian ca-  
valry.

to Tegea with the utmost expedition, and allowing his infantry to take time for rest and refreshment, he, with admirable presence of mind, ordered the horse to advance forward to Mantinæa (which was distant only twelve miles), and to maintain their ground until his arrival with the rest of the army. He expected to find the Mantinæans totally unprepared for such a visit; and as it was then autumn, he doubted not that most of the townsmen would be employed in the country, in reaping and bringing in the corn. His plan was wise, and well executed. The situation of the Mantinæans corresponded to his hopes. But it seemed as if fortune had delighted to baffle his sagacity. Before the Theban forces arrived at Mantinæa, a numerous and powerful squadron of Athenian cavalry entered that place, commanded by Hegelochus, who then first learned the departure of the allies to protect the Lacedæmonian capital. He had scarcely received this intelligence, when the Thebans appeared, and, advancing with great rapidity, prepared to effect the purpose of their expedition. The Athenians had not time to refresh themselves; they had eat nothing that day; they were inferior in number; they knew the bravery of the Theban and Thessalian cavalry, with whom they must contend; yet, regardless of every consideration but the safety of their allies, they rushed into the field, stopped the progress of the assailants, and, after a fierce and bloody engagement, which displayed great courage on both sides, obtained an acknowledged victory. The enemy craved the bodies of  
their

their dead; the victors erected a trophy of their useful valour, which had saved the corn, cattle, slaves, women, and children <sup>70</sup> of Mantinæa from falling a prey to the invaders.

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The repeated misfortunes, which would have broken the spirit of an ordinary commander, only determined Epaminondas to a general engagement, in which he might either wipe off the memory of his late disgrace, or obtain an honourable death, fighting to render his country the sovereign of Greece. The confederates had re-assembled at Mantinæa, strengthened by considerable reinforcements. Fresh succours had likewise arrived to the Thebans. Never had such numerous armies <sup>71</sup> taken the field during the perpetual wars in which those unhappy republics were engaged. But battles become really interesting, not so much by the number of the troops, as by the conduct of the generals. It is worth while, says the military historian <sup>72</sup>, to observe the operations of Epaminondas on this memorable occasion. Having ranged his men in battalions, he led them, not along the plain, which was the nearest road to Mantinæa, but turning to the left, conducted them by a chain of hills which joined that city and Tegea, and skirted the eastern extremity of both. The enemy, apprised of his march, drew up their forces before the walls of Mantinæa; the Lacedæmonians, and such Arcadians as had embraced the more honourable cause, in the right wing, the

Epami-  
nondas  
deter-  
mines to  
risk a ge-  
neral en-  
gagement.

His move-  
ments  
preceding  
the battle  
of Manti-  
næa.

<sup>70</sup> Xenophon, l. vii. p. 644.

<sup>71</sup> Diodorus, l. xv. c. 21.

<sup>72</sup> Xenoph. p. 645.



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Athenians in the left, the Achæans and Elians forming the main body. Meanwhile Epaminondas marched slowly along, extending his circuit, as if he wished to decline the engagement. Having approached that part of the mountain which faced the hostile army, he ordered his men to halt, and to lay down their arms. His former movements had occasioned great doubt and perplexity; but now it seemed evident that he had laid aside all thoughts of fighting that day, and was preparing to encamp. This opinion, too lightly conceived, proved fatal to the enemy. They abandoned their arms and their ranks, dispersed in their tents, and lost not only that external arrangement, but that inward preparation<sup>73</sup>, that martial ardour of mind, which ought to animate soldiers at the near prospect of an engagement. Epaminondas seized the decisive moment of attack. Facing to the right, he converted the column of march into an order of battle. His troops were thus disposed instantaneously in the same order in which he meant to fight. At the head of his left wing, which consisted of the flower of the Bœotians, and which, as at the battle of Leuctra, he formed into a firm wedge, with a sharp point, and with spreading flanks, he advanced against the Spartans and Mantinæans; and trusting the event of the battle to the rapid impulse of this unexpected onset, he commanded the centre and right wing, in which

<sup>73</sup> Ελυσε μὲν τῶν πολεμίων τὴν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς τὴν μάχην παρασκευὴν· ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσιν. Xenoph. p. 645.

he placed less confidence, to proceed with a slow  
 pace, that they might not come up and grapple  
 with the opposing divisions of the enemy, until  
 the victory of his left wing had taught them to  
 conquer.

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This judicious design was crowned with merited  
 success. The enemy, perceiving the dreadful  
 shock to which they were exposed, flew to their  
 arms, put on their bucklers and helmets, bridled  
 their horses, and suddenly resumed their ranks;  
 but these different operations were performed with  
 the trepidation of surprise and haste, rather than  
 with the ardour of hope and courage; and the  
 whole army had the appearance of men prepared  
 rather to suffer, than to inflict, any thing cruel or  
 terrible<sup>74</sup>. The Spartans and Mantinæans, drawn  
 up in firm order, sternly waited the first brunt of  
 the assailants. The battle was fierce and bloody,  
 and after their spears were broken, both parties  
 had recourse to their swords. The wedge of Epa-  
 minondas at length penetrated the Spartan line,  
 and this advantage encouraged his centre and right  
 wing to attack and repel the corresponding divisions  
 of the enemy. The Theban and Theffalian ca-  
 valry were equally successful. In the intervals of  
 their ranks Epaminondas had placed a body of  
 light infantry, whose missile weapons greatly an-  
 noyed the enemy's horse, who were drawn up too  
 deep. He had likewise taken the precaution to

Battle of  
 Manti-  
 næa.  
 Olymp.  
 civ. 2.  
 A. C. 363.

<sup>74</sup> Παντες δε πιστομενοις τι μαλλον η ποιησθαι ιηκισαν. Xenoph-  
 p. 646.

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occupy a rising ground on his right with a considerable detachment, which might take the Athenians in flank and rear, should they advance from their post. These prudent dispositions produced a victory, which Epaminondas did not live to complete or improve. In the heat of the battle he received a mortal wound<sup>75</sup>, and was carried to an eminence, which was afterwards called the Watch-tower<sup>76</sup>, probably that he might the better observe the subsequent operations of the field. But with the departure of their leader was withdrawn the spirit which animated the Theban army. Having impetuously broke through the hostile ranks, they knew not how to profit of this advantage. The enemy rallied in different parts of the field, and prevailed in several partial encounters. All was confusion and terror. The light infantry, which

<sup>75</sup> Pausanias, in *Arcad.* says, that Epaminondas was killed by Gryllus, the son of Xenophon the Athenian; and, as a proof of this assertion, mentions a beautiful picture of the battle of Mantinæa, in the Ceramicus of Athens, as well as the monument of Gryllus, erected by the Mantinæans on the field of battle; both subsisting in the time of Pausanias, and both ascribing to this Athenian the honour of killing Epaminondas. Plutarch, in *Agefilao*, says, that Anticrates, a Spartan, killed Epaminondas with a sword; that his posterity were thence called Machairionides; and that, as late as the days of Plutarch, they enjoyed certain immunities and honours as a recompence for the merit of their ancestor Anticrates in destroying the worst enemy of Sparta. Gryllus the son of Xenophon fell in the battle of Mantinæa; and the words, or rather the silence of his father, is very remarkable concerning the death of Epaminondas: "The Theban column broke the Spartans, *but when Epaminondas fell*, the rest knew not how to use the victory." What sublimity in this passage, if Gryllus really slew Epaminondas!

<sup>76</sup> Pausan. ubi supra.

had



had been posted amidst the Theban and Theſſalian horſe, being left behind in the purſuit, were received and cut to pieces by the Athenian cavalry, commanded by Hegelochus. Elated with this ſucceſs, the Athenians turned their arms againſt the detachment placed on the heights, conſiſting chiefly of Eubœans, whom they routed and put to flight, after a terrible ſlaughter. With ſuch alternations of victory and defeat ended this memorable engagement. Both armies, as conquerors, erected a trophy; both craved their dead, as conquered<sup>77</sup>; and this battle, which being certainly the greateſt, was expected to have proved the moſt deciſive, ever fought among the Greeks, produced no other conſequence but that general languor and debility long remarkable in the ſubſequent operations of thoſe hoſtile republics.

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When the tumult of the action ceaſed, the moſt diſtinguiſhed Thebans aſſembled around their dying general. His body had been pierced with a javelin; and the ſurgeons declared, that it was impoſſible for him to ſurvive the extraction of the weapon. He aſked whether his ſhield was ſafe? which being preſented to him, he viewed it with a languid ſmile of melancholy joy. He then demanded, whether the Thebans had obtained the victory? Being answered in the affirmative (for the Lacedæmonians indeed had firſt ſent to demand the bodies of their ſlain), he declared himſelf ready to quit life without regret, ſince he left his

Death of  
Epami-  
nondas.

<sup>77</sup> Xenoph. l. vii. ad fin.

country

CHAP. country triumphant. The spectators lamented, XXXI. among other objects of sorrow, that he should die without children, who might inherit the glory of his name, and the fame of his virtues. "You mistake," said he with a cheerful presence of mind, "I leave two fair daughters, the battles of Leuctra and Mantinæa, who will transmit my renown to the latest ages." So saying, he ordered the weapon to be extracted, and immediately expired. The awful solemnity of his death corresponded with the dignified splendour of an active and useful life. He is usually described as a perfect character<sup>78</sup>; nor does the truth of history oblige us to detract any thing from this description, except that in some instances, and particularly in his last fatal invasion of the Peloponnesus, he allowed the blaze of patriotism to eclipse the mild light of justice and benevolence. He was buried in the field of battle, where his monument still existed, after four centuries, in the time of Pausanias, with an inscription in elegiac verse, enumerating his exploits. Hadrian, then master of the Roman world, added a second column, with a new inscription<sup>79</sup>, in honour of a character, whom that unsteady emperor had genius to admire, but wanted firmness to imitate.

An elegant Roman writer gives a brief but comprehensive panegyric of Epaminondas, that during

<sup>78</sup> Cicero Acad. Quæst. l. i. & passim. Plutarch. Corn. Nepos, Pausan.

<sup>79</sup> Vid. Pausan. in Arcad. & Boeotic.

his lifetime Thebes was the arbiter of Greece; whereas both before and afterwards, that republic continually languished in servitude or dependence<sup>80</sup>. But this observation betrays the inaccurate partiality of a biographer, who often exalts the glory of a favourite hero, at the expence of historic truth. By the death of Epaminondas, Thebes was deprived of her principal ornament and defence, the source of her confidence, and the spring of her activity; and her councils were thenceforth less ambitious, and her arms less enterprising<sup>81</sup>. But six years after that event, she controuled the decisions of the Amphictyonic council, and, instead of being reduced to a condition of dependence, her power was still formidable to the most warlike of her neighbours.

Soon after the battle of Mantinæa, a general peace was proposed under the mediation of Artaxerxes, who wanted Grecian auxiliaries to check the insurrections in Egypt and Lesser Asia, which disturbed the two last years of his reign. The only condition annexed to this treaty was, that each republic should retain its respective possessions. The Spartans determined to reject every accommodation until they had recovered Messenia; and as Artaxerxes had uniformly opposed this demand, they transported forces into Egypt, to foment the

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Age-  
laus's ex-  
pedition  
into E-  
gypt.  
Olymp.  
civ. 3.  
A. C. 362.

<sup>80</sup> Hujus de virtutibus vitæque satis erit dictum, si hoc unum adjunxero, *quod nemo eat inficiat*; Thebas & ante Epaminondam natum, & post ejus interitum, perpetuo alieno paruisse imperio; contra ea, quamdiu ille præfuerit reipublicæ, caput fuisse totius Græciæ. Corn. Nepos, in Epam.

<sup>81</sup> Vid. Polyb. Hist. l. vi. c. xli.

defection.



CHAPTER. defection of that province. At the head of a  
 XXXI. thousand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians, and ten  
 thousand mercenaries, Agesilaus supported one  
 rebel after another, having successively set on the  
 throne Taches and Nectanebus<sup>82</sup>. In this dishonourable war he amassed considerable wealth, by  
 means of which he probably expected to retrieve  
 the affairs of his country. But returning home  
 by Cyrenaica, he died on that coast, in the eighty-  
 fourth year of his age, and forty-first of his reign<sup>83</sup>.  
 His character has been sufficiently illustrated in the  
 course of this work. He was the greatest, and  
 the most unfortunate of the Spartan kings. He  
 had seen the highest grandeur of Sparta, and he  
 beheld her fall. During the time that he governed  
 the republic, his country suffered more calamities  
 and disgrace than in seven centuries preceding his  
 reign. His ambition and his obstinacy, doubtless,  
 contributed to her disasters; yet so natural were  
 the principles from which he acted, so probable his  
 hopes of success, and so firm and manly his struggles  
 for victory, that a contemporary writer, who  
 could see through the cloud of fortune, ventured  
 to bestow on Agesilaus a panegyric<sup>84</sup>, which exalts  
 him beyond the renown of his most illustrious predecessors.

His death.  
 Olymp.  
 civ. 4.  
 A. C. 361.

<sup>82</sup> Plut. in Agesilao. Diodorus, l. xv. c. xxii.

<sup>83</sup> Diodor. l. xv. c. xxii.

<sup>84</sup> Ὁ λόγος εἰς Ἀγισίλαον, by Xenophon.

## C H A P. XXXII.

*State of Greece after the Battle of Mantinæa.—*

*The Amphictyonic Council.—Returning Prosperity of Athens.—Vices resulting from its Government.—Abuses of the judiciary Power.—Of the Theatre.—Degeneracy of Grecian Music.—Extrême Profligacy of the Athenians.—The Vices of Chares render him the Idol of the Multitude.—The Social War —Banishment of Timotheus and Iphicrates.—Disgraceful Issue of the War.—Philosophy.—Statuary. Praxiteles. The Cnidian Venus.—Painting. Pamphilus, Nicias, Zeuxis.—Literature. Xenophon. His Military Expeditions. Religious and Literary Retreat. Lysias. Isocrates. Plato. His Travels. He settles in the Academy. His great Views. Theology. Cosmogony. Doctrine of Ideas. Of the Human Understanding. The Passions. Virtues. State of Retribution. Genius, and Character.*

**W**ITH the battle of Mantinæa ended<sup>1</sup> the bloody struggle for dominion, which had long exhausted Thebes and Sparta. In that, or in the preceding engagements, they had lost their ablest

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State of  
Greece  
after the  
battle of  
Manti-  
næa.

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon's Greek history likewise ends with that battle. Henceforth we follow Plutarch and Diodorus, from whom we learn the principal circumstances of great events, which the

C H A P. ablest generals, and the flower of their troops. No  
 XXXII. Theban arose to emulate the magnanimity of Epaminondas, and to complete the designs of that illustrious patriot. Archidamus, who succeeded to the Spartan throne, imperfectly justified the high opinion conceived of his early wisdom and valour. Weakened by their wounds, and fatigued by exertions long and fruitless, those republics sunk into such weakness, as encouraged pretensions of their neighbours that had long lain dormant.

The Amphictyonic council resumes its ancient authority. Olymp. civ. 4. A. C. 361. During the *superiority*, or, in the language of ancient writers, during the *empire* of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, the majesty of the Amphictyonic council had degenerated into an empty pageant. Its deliberations were confined to matters of mere form; it regulated some ceremonies of superstition; it superintended games and spectacles; it preserved peace and good order among the crowd of strangers who assembled, at stated times, to consult the oracle of Apollo. But for more than a century past, the public measures of the Greeks had been directed by councils held, not at Delphi, the residence of the Amphictyons, but in Athens, Sparta, or Thebes, in one or other of which the allies convened on every important emergency, acknowledging, by their presence there, the respective authority of those capitals which were regarded as the heads of their several confederacies. But when first the Peloponnesian, then the Bœotian

orators Isocrates and Demosthenes, Aristotle's Treatise of Politics, and Xenophon's Discourses on the Revenues and Government of Athens, will enable us more fully to explain.

war,



war, and last of all the battle of Mantinæa, had levelled the greatness, and overthrown the proud tyranny of those domineering republics, the Amphictyonic council once more emerged from obscurity; and the general states of Greece having assembled according to their national and hereditary forms, spurned the imperious dictates of any single community.

While this event strengthened the fœderal union, and tended to restore the primitive equality of the Grecian states, various circumstances concurred to revive the aspiring ambition of Athens. During the Bœotian war, the Athenians had acted as auxiliaries only; without making such efforts as enfeebled their strength, their arms had acquired great lustre. Their powerful rivals were humbled and exhausted: experience had taught them the danger of attempting to subdue, and the impossibility of keeping in subjection, the territories of their warlike neighbours: but the numerous islands of the Ægean and Ionian seas, the remote coasts of Thrace and Asia, invited the activity of their fleet, which they might now employ in foreign conquests, fearless of domestic envy. It appears, that soon after the death of Epaminondas, Eubœa again acknowledged the authority<sup>2</sup> of Athens; an event

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The Athenians recover many of their maritime possessions. Olymp. cv. 1.—  
cv. 2.  
A. C. 360—358.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Diodor. l. xvi p. 513. & Demosthenes de Chersoneso, sub fine, & Æschines in Ctesiphont. It appears, however, from these authors that the Thebans soon afterwards endeavoured to recover Eubœa. The Athenians again rescued it from their power, at the exhortation of Timotheus, whose pithy speech is commended by Demosthenes: "What, my countrymen, the

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event facilitated by the destruction of the Theban partisans, belonging to that place, in the battle of Mantinæa. From the Thracian Bosphorus to Rhodes, several places along both shores submitted to the arms of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates; men, who having survived Agesilaus and Epaminondas, were far superior, in abilities and in virtue, to the contemporary generals of other republics. The Cyclades and Corcyra courted the friendship of a people capable to interrupt their navigation and to destroy their commerce. Byzantium had become their ally, and there was reason to hope that Amphipolis would soon be rendered their subject. Such multiplied advantages revived the ancient grandeur of Athens, which once more commanded the sea, with a fleet of near three hundred sail, and employed the best half of her citizens and subjects in ships of war or commerce<sup>3</sup>.

The vices ascribed to the supposed degeneracy of the Athenians, resulted from the

This tide of prosperity, which flowed with most apparent force immediately after the battle of Mantinæa<sup>4</sup>, has been supposed productive of very important consequences. While Epaminondas lived, the Athenians, it is said, were kept vigilant in duty through jealousy and fear; but after the

Thebans in the island, and you still deliberating! Why not already in the harbour? why not embarked? why is not the sea covered with your navy?" Demosthen. ubi supra.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. l. vii. p. 615. Diodorus, l. xv. c. xi. Isocrat. Panegy. & de Pace.

<sup>4</sup> Justin. l. vi. c. ix. first made this observation, which has been so frequently repeated.

death

death of this formidable enemy, they sunk into those vices which occasioned their ruin. This specious remark is not founded in truth. Two centuries before the birth of Epaminondas, the injustice, the avarice, the total corruption of the Athenians, is forcibly described by one of the most respectable of their countrymen<sup>5</sup>, who composed a system of wise laws in order to ascertain their rights, and to reform their manners. But it was difficult to correct abuses that seem inherent in the nature of democracy, which, even as regulated by Solon, but still more as new-modelled by Pericles, left the citizens tyrants in one capacity, and slaves in another. The division of the executive power of government among the archons, the senate, assembly, and even various committees of the assembly, rendered it impossible to perceive, or prevent, the hand of oppression. Men knew not from what quarter their safety might be assailed; and being called to authority in their turn, they, instead of making united opposition to the injustice of their magistrates, contented themselves with inflicting the same injuries which they had either previously suffered, or still apprehended, from the malice of their enemies. Nor is this inconvenience peculiar to the Greek republics. While human nature remains unchanged, and the passions

C H A P.  
XXXII.nature of  
their go-  
vernment.

<sup>5</sup> See above, vol ii. c. xiii. p. 107. and the elegiac verses of Solon preserved in Demosthenes Orat. περὶ παραπρεσβείας; a title that can only be translated by a paraphrase, "the misconduct of Æschines in his embassy."



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of men run in their ordinary channel, the right to exercise power will commonly be attended with a strong inclination to abuse it. Unless power, therefore, be counteracted by liberty; unless an impervious line of separation be drawn between prerogative and privilege, and that part of the constitution which sustains its political life, be kept separate and distinct from that which tends to corruption, it is of little consequence whether a country be governed by one tyrant or a thousand; in both cases alike the condition of man is precarious, and force prevails over law.

This subject illustrated;

This radical defect in the Grecian policies produced many ruinous consequences in affairs foreign and domestic, which were commonly directed by the selfish passions of a few, or the fluctuating caprices of the multitude, rather than by the rational and permanent interest of the community. But as diseases and other accidents often bring to light the latent weakness and imperfections of the body, so the vices of the Athenian government first appeared in their full magnitude after the unfortunate war of Peloponnesus; and, although the excess of the malady sometimes checked itself, and returns of ease and prosperity sometimes concealed its virulence, yet the deep-rooted evil still maintained its destructive progress, till it wrought the ruin of the constitution.

in the abuses of the judiciary power;

In the tumultuary governments of Greece, where the judiciary power frequently prevailed over the legislative, the sources of dissension were

innu-

innumerable ; while the feeble restraint of laws, ill administered, was unable to counteract their force. Although hereditary distinctions were little known or regarded, the poor and rich formed two distinct parties, which had their particular views and separate interests. In some republics the higher ranks bound themselves, by oath, to neglect no opportunity of hurting their inferiors <sup>6</sup>. The populace of Athens commonly treated the rich as if they had entered into an engagement not less atrocious <sup>7</sup>. During the intervals of party rage, private quarrels kept the state in perpetual fermentation. Beside the ordinary disputes concerning property, the competitions for civil offices, for military command, for obtaining public honours, or eluding punishments or burthens, opened an ever-flowing source of bitter animosity. Among this litigious people, neighbours were continually at variance. Every man was regarded as a rival and enemy, who had not proved himself a friend <sup>8</sup>. Hereditary resentments were perpetuated from one generation to another ; and the seeds of discord being sown in such abundance, yielded a never-failing crop of libels, invectives, and legal prosecutions. The usual employment of six thousand Athenians consisted in deciding law-suits, the profits of which afforded the principal resource of the poorer citizens. Their legal fees amounted annually to an hundred and fifty talents ; the bribes

<sup>6</sup> Aristot. Polit. Isocrat. & Lyfias, passim.

<sup>7</sup> Xenoph. de Rep. Athen.

<sup>8</sup> See Lyfias passim, & Xenoph. Memorab. l. ii. p. 748, & seqq.

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which they received, sometimes exceeded that sum; and, both united, formed a sixth part of the Athenian revenues<sup>9</sup>, even in the most flourishing times. As the most numerous but most worthless class of the people commonly prevailed in the assembly, so they had totally ingrossed the tribunals; and it was to be expected that such judges would always be more swayed by favour and prejudice than by law and reason. The law punished with death the man guilty of giving bribes; but “we,” say the Athenian writers<sup>10</sup>, “advance him to the command of our armies; and the more criminal he becomes in this respect, with the higher and more lucrative honours is he invested.” Those who courted popular favour, lavished not only their own, but the public wealth, to flatter the passions of their adherents; an abuse which began during the splendid administration of Pericles<sup>11</sup>, extended more widely under his unworthy successors; and, though interrupted during the calamities of the republic, revived with new force on the first dawn of returning prosperity<sup>12</sup>.

and in  
those of  
the thea-  
tre.

In the licence of democratic freedom, the citizens, poor and rich, thought themselves alike entitled to enjoy every species of festivity. Pericles introduced the practice of exhibiting not only tragedies, but comedies, at the public expence, and of paying for the admission of the populace. At the period of which we write, a considerable por-

<sup>9</sup> Aristoph. Vesp.

<sup>10</sup> Isocrates de Pace, & Demosthenes, passim.

<sup>11</sup> Thucydides, p. 108, & seqq.

<sup>12</sup> Plut. in Pericle.



tion of the revenue was appropriated to the theatre; and some years afterwards <sup>13</sup>, a law was proposed by the demagogue Eubulus, and enacted by the senate and people, rendering it capital to divert, or even to propose diverting, the *theatrical* money to any other end or object <sup>14</sup>.

Of all amusements known in polished society, the Grecian theatre was, doubtless, the most elegant and ingenious; yet several circumstances rendered it peculiarly liable to abuse. The great extent of the edifices in which plays were represented, naturally introduced masques, the better to distinguish the different *persons* <sup>15</sup>, or characters, of the drama; since the variations of passion, with the correspondent changes of countenance, which form the capital merit of modern performers, could scarcely have been observed by an immense crowd of people, many of whom must have been placed at a great distance from the scene. The same causes, together with the inimitable harmony of the Greek language, gave rise to musical declamation <sup>16</sup>, which might sometimes fortify passion, but always rendered speech more slow and

Circumstances which rendered the Grecian theatre peculiarly liable to abuse.

<sup>13</sup> Before Christ 349, according to S. Petitus, de Leg. Attic. p. 385.

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch. in Pericle, & Demosthen. Oration. passim.

<sup>15</sup> It is well known that the word *persona* originally signified a masque, from *personare*, because the ancient masques, both Greek and Roman, were so made as to increase and invigorate sound.

<sup>16</sup> Notwithstanding the assertions of Casaubon, Gravina, &c. the Greeks in ancient times seem not to have been acquainted with the absurd practice of dividing the acting and speaking between two persons. This is mentioned by Livy, as the invention of Titus Andronicus, who flourished 240 years before Christ.

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articulate, and therefore more easily heard by the remote part of the audience. In combining the different parts of a tragic fable, the poet naturally rejects such incidents as are improper for representation. These, if necessary for carrying on the action of the piece, are supposed to be transacted elsewhere, and barely related on the theatre. The time required for such events, when they are not simultaneous with those exhibited on the stage, necessarily interrupts the representation, and leaves room for the choral songs, which being incorporated with the tragedy, heightens its effect, and increases the spectator's delight; consequences extremely different from those attending the act tunes and detached airs of modern plays and operas, universally condemned by good judges, as suspending the action, and destroying the interest of the drama, and only affording opportunities to effeminate throats to shine in trills and divisions, at the expence of poetry and good sense. But in ancient, as well as modern times, the corrupt taste of the licentious vulgar was ever at variance with the discerning judgment of the wise and virtuous. The form and arrangement of the Grecian tragedy was exactly imitated in the extravagant pieces of Aristophanes, and his profligate contemporaries, and successors<sup>17</sup>. These pernicious productions formed the favourite entertainment of the populace. The masque, disguising the countenance of the performer, allowed him to

<sup>17</sup> See above, vol. ii. c. xiii. p. 146.

indulge in the most unblushing licence of voice and gesture; the declamation was effeminate and vicious; above all, the music became glaring, tawdry, voluptuous, and dissolute in the highest degree, and suited only that perverse debauchery of soul from which it originally sprung, and which it served afterwards to inflame and nourish<sup>18</sup>.

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A mysterious cloud hangs over the Grecian music, to which effects are ascribed far transcending the actual power of that art. Yet we cannot refuse our assent to the concurring testimony of ancient writers, who refer to this principle the extreme degeneracy and corruption which almost universally infected the Athenians at the period now under review. Causes which operate on the many, are not easily mistaken; but should we still doubt the cause, the effect at least cannot be denied. The Athenian youth are said to have dissipated their fortunes, and melted the vigour of mind and body, in wanton and expensive dalliance with the

Extreme  
profligacy  
of the A-  
thenians.

<sup>18</sup> Aristotle, l. viii. de Republ. says ironically, "Every kind of music is good for something; that of the theatres is necessary for the amusement of the mob; being well suited to the perversion of their minds and manners, and let them enjoy it." Plato, Aristoxenus, and Plutarch, bitterly complain of the corruption of music, as the main source of vice and immorality. That art, which had anciently been used as the vehicle of religious and moral instruction, was employed in the theatres to excite every voluptuous and dissolute passion. Plato de Legibus, l. iii. Aristoxenus, quoted by Athenæus, l. xiv. & Plutarch. de Musica. In speaking of the vices of London, a writer, who had the spirit of an ancient legislator, says, "That were a man permitted to make all the ballads of a nation, he needed not care who should make its laws." Fletcher of Saltoun's Works, p. 266.



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female performers on the theatre <sup>19</sup>. Weary and fastidious with excess of criminal indulgence, they lost all capacity or relish for solid and manly occupations; and at once deserted the exercises of war, and the schools of philosophers. To fill up the vacuities of their listless lives, they, as well as persons more advanced in years, loitered in the shops of musicians, and other artists <sup>20</sup>; or fauntered in the forum and public places, idly enquiring after news, in which they took little interest, unless some danger alarmed the insipid uniformity of their pleasures <sup>21</sup>. Dice, and other games of chance, were carried to a ruinous excess; and are so keenly stigmatised by the moral writers of the age, that it should seem they had begun but recently to prevail, and prove fatal <sup>22</sup>. The people at large were peculiarly addicted to the sensual gratifications of the table; and, might we believe a poet quoted by Athenæus, had lately bestowed the freedom of their city (once deemed an honour by princes and kings <sup>23</sup>) on the sons of Chærephilus, on account of the uncommon merit of their father in the art of cookery <sup>24</sup>.

Their  
idleness,  
poverty,  
and igno-  
rance.

Idleness, indulgence, and dissipation, had reduced the greater part of the Athenian citizens to

<sup>19</sup> Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534. who gives a general description of Athenian profligacy.

<sup>20</sup> Isocrat. in Areopag. and Lyfias's defence of a poor man accused before the senate, translated in the Life of Lyfias, p. 114.

<sup>21</sup> Demosthen. Philipp. passim.

<sup>22</sup> Athenæus, l. xii. Lyfias in Alcibiad.

<sup>23</sup> Demosthen. de Republic. ordinand.

<sup>24</sup> Athenæus, l. iii. p. 119.

extreme

extreme indigence. Although landed property was more equally divided in Greece than in any modern country, we are told that about one fourth of the Athenians were totally destitute of *immoveable* possessions<sup>25</sup>. Their dress was frequently so mean and dirty, that it was difficult, by their external appearance, to distinguish them from slaves; a circumstance which arose not from slovenliness, but from poverty, since we are assured that such as could afford the expence spared no pains to adorn their persons; and that many who danced during summer in embroidered robes, spent the winter in places too shameful to be named<sup>26</sup>. And how is it possible (to use the words of their own authors<sup>27</sup>) that wretches, destitute of the first necessities of life, should administer public affairs with wisdom? We find accordingly, that they were extremely ill qualified for executing those offices with which they were intrusted. As the lower ranks had in a great measure ingrossed the administration of justice, it was not uncommon to

<sup>25</sup> See the Discourse of Lyfias upon a proposal for dissolving the ancient government of Athens. Lyfias's orations were chiefly written in the space of twenty years, between 404 and 384 before Christ. They afford an uniform picture of the poverty, misery, and vices of his contemporaries; which the reader will find abridged in the introduction to my translation of that writer. The Athenian affairs became more flourishing after the fall of Thebes and Sparta. Their resources were again exhausted by the war with their allies. The revenues were greatly raised by the conquests of Timotheus, Phocion, &c. and the good management of Lycurgus and Demosthenes. Plut. in Lycurg. in lib. de Dec. Orator.

<sup>26</sup> Isocrates on reforming the government of Athens.

<sup>27</sup> Isocrat. & Xenoph. de Repub. Athen.

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bribe the clerks employed in transcribing the laws of Solon, to abridge, interpolate, and corrupt them. What is still more extraordinary, such a gross artifice frequently succeeded; nor was the deceit discovered until litigant parties produced in court contradictory laws<sup>28</sup>. When their negligence could not be surpris'd, their avarice might be bribed; justice was sold; riches, virtue, eminence of rank or abilities, always expos'd to danger, and often ended in disgrace<sup>29</sup>. For those needy Athenians, who formed the most numerous class in the republic, endeavour'd to alleviate their misery by a very criminal consolation; persecuting their superiors, banishing them their country, confiscating their estates, and treating them on the slightest provocation, and often without any provocation at all, with the utmost injustice and cruelty<sup>30</sup>. Though occasionally directed by the equity of an Aristides, or the magnanimity of a Cimon, they, for the most part, listened to men of an opposite character. He who could best flatter and deceive them obtained most of their confidence. With such qualifications, the turbulent, licentious, and dissolute, in a word, the orator who most resembled his audience, commonly prevail'd in the assembly; and specious or hurtful talents carried off the rewards due to real merit. Isocrates<sup>31</sup> assures us of the fact; and Xenophon<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Life of Lyfias, prefixed to his Orations, p. 116.

<sup>29</sup> See Lyfias's pleadings throughout.

<sup>30</sup> Isocrates de Pace; and the numerous examples of that kind, which have already occurred in this history.

<sup>31</sup> In his oration on reforming the government of Athens.

<sup>32</sup> In his treatise de Republic. Athen.

affirms,



affirms, that it is perfectly conformable to the nature and principles of the Athenian form of government.

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With such principles and manners, the Athenians required only a daring and profligate leader, to involve them in designs the most extravagant and pernicious. Such a personage presented himself in Chares, whose soldier-like appearance, blunt address, and bold impetuous valour, masked his selfish ambition, and rendered him the idol of the populace. His person was gigantic and robust, his voice commanding, his manners haughty; he asserted positively, and promised boldly; and his presumption was so excessive, that it concealed his incapacity not only from others, but from himself. Though an enterprising and successful partisan, he was unacquainted with the great duties of a general; and his defects appear the more striking and palpable, when compared with the abilities of Iphicrates and Timotheus, his contemporaries, who prevailed as often by address as by force, and whose conquests were secured to the republic by the moderation, justice, and humanity, with which they had been obtained, and with which they continued to be governed. Chares proposed a very different mode of administration; he exhorted his countrymen to supply the defects of their treasury, and to acquire the materials of those pleasures, which they regarded as essential to their happiness, by plundering the wealth of their allies and colonies. This counsel was too faithfully obeyed; the vexations, anciently exercised against the tributary

The vices  
of Chares  
render  
him the  
favourite  
of the  
multi-  
tude.

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butary and dependent states, were renewed and exceeded<sup>33</sup>. The weaker communities complained, and remonstrated, against this intolerable rapacity and oppression; while the islands of Chios, Coos, Rhodes, as well as the city of Byzantium, prepared openly to revolt, and engaged with each other to repel force by force, until they should obtain peace and independence<sup>34</sup>.

The social  
war.  
Olymp.  
cv. 3.  
A. C. 358.

Chares, probably the chief instrument, as well as the adviser, of the arbitrary measures which had occasioned the revolt, was sent out with a powerful fleet and army, to quash at once the hopes of the insurgents. He sailed towards Chios, with an intention to seize the capital of that island, which was supposed to be the centre and prime mover of rebellion. The confederates, informed of his motions, had already drawn thither the greatest part of their force. The city of Chios was besieged by sea and land. The islanders defended themselves with vigour. Chares found it difficult to repulse their sallies. His fleet attempted to enter their harbour without success; the ship of Chabrias alone penetrated thus far; and that able commander, whose valour and integrity merited a better fortune, though deserted by the fleet, yet forsook not the ship intrusted to him by the republic. His companions threw away their shields, and saved themselves by swimming to the Athenian squadron, which was still within their reach.

<sup>33</sup> Diodor. l. xvi. & Isoerat. de Pace.

<sup>34</sup> Diodor. l. xvi. pp. 413. 423.

But Chabrias, fighting bravely, fell by the darts of the Chians, preferring an honourable death to a disgraceful life <sup>35</sup>. C H A P.  
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Encouraged by advantages over an enemy who had at first affected to despise them, the insurgents augmented their fleet, and ravaged the isles of Lemnos and Samos. The Athenians, indignant that the territories of their faithful allies should fall a prey to the depredations of rebels, fitted out, early in the next year, a new armament under the command of Mnestheus, the son of Iphicrates, and son-in-law of Timotheus, expecting that the new commander would respectfully listen to the advice of those great men, who perhaps declined acting as principals in an expedition where Chares possessed any share of authority. That general had raised the siege of Chios, and now cruised in the Hellespont; where, being joined by Mnestheus, the united squadrons amounted to an hundred and twenty sail. It was immediately determined to cause a diversion of the enemy's forces from Samos and Lemnos, by laying siege to Byzantium. The design succeeded; the allies withdrew from these islands, collected their whole naval strength, and prepared vigorously for defending the principal city in their confederacy.

The hostile armaments approached each other, with a resolution to join battle, when a sudden and violent storm arose, which rendered it impossible for the Athenians to bear up to the enemy, or even to keep the sea, without being exposed to

Chares accuses Timotheus and Iphicrates.

<sup>35</sup> Nepos in Chabr. & Diodor. l. xvi. p. 423, & seqq.



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shipwreck. Chares alone confidently insisted on commencing the attack, while the other commanders, more cautious and experienced, perceived the disadvantage, and declined the unequal danger <sup>36</sup>. His impetuosity, thus over-ruled by the prudence of his colleagues, was converted into resentment and fury; he called the soldiers and sailors to witness their opposition, which he branded with every odious epithet of reproach; and, with the first opportunity, dispatched proper messengers to Athens, to accuse them of incapacity, cowardice, and total neglect of duty. The accusation was supported by venal orators in the pay of Chares.

Their  
trial;

Timotheus and Iphicrates were tried capitally. The former trusted to his innocence and eloquence; the latter used a very extraordinary expedient to sway the judges, conformable, however, to the spirit of that age, when courts of justice were frequently instruments of oppression, governed by every species of undue influence, easily corrupted and easily intimidated. The targeteers, or light infantry, who had been armed, disciplined, and long commanded, by Iphicrates, enjoyed the same reputation in Greece, which the *Fabian* soldiers afterwards did in Italy. They were called the *Iphicratenſian* troops, from the name of their commander, to whom they owed their merit and their fame, and to whose person (notwithstanding the strictness of his discipline) they were strongly at-

<sup>36</sup> We are not informed by Diodorus or Nepos, why the disadvantage and danger were on the side of the Athenians; probably, being better sailors, they expected to profit of their skill in *manœuvre*, which the storm rendered useless and unavailing.

tached by the ties of gratitude and esteem. The youngest and bravest of this celebrated band readily obeyed the injunctions of their admired general; surrounded, on the day of trial, the benches of the magistrates; and took care seasonably to display the points of their daggers<sup>37</sup>.

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It was the law of Athens, that, after preliminaries had been adjusted, and the judges assembled, the parties should be heard, and the trial begun and ended on the same day; nor could any person be twice tried for the same offence. The rapidity of this mode of procedure favoured the views of Iphicrates. The magistrates were overawed by the imminence of a danger, which they had neither strength to resist nor time to elude. They were compelled to an immediate decision; but, instead of the sentence of death, which was expected, they imposed a fine<sup>38</sup> on the delinquents, which no Athenian citizen in that age was in a condition to pay. This severity drove into banishment those able and illustrious commanders. Timotheus sailed to Chalcis in Eubœa, and afterwards to the isle of Lesbos, both which places his valour and abilities had recovered for the republic, and which, being chosen as his residence in disgrace, sufficiently evince the mildness of his government, and his

and banishment.

<sup>37</sup> It was probably during this trial, that Iphicrates being reproached with betraying the interests of his country, asked his accuser, "Would you, on a like occasion, have been guilty of that crime?" "By no means," replied the other. "And can you then imagine," replied the hero, "that Iphicrates should be guilty?" Quintilian. l. v. c. xii.

<sup>38</sup> One hundred talents, about twenty thousand pounds.

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moderation in prosperity. Iphicrates travelled into Thrace, where he had long resided. He had formerly married the daughter of Cotys, the most considerable of the Thracian princes; yet he lived and died in obscurity<sup>39</sup>; nor did either he or Timotheus thenceforth take any share in the affairs of their ungrateful country<sup>40</sup>. Thus did the social war destroy or remove Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus, the best generals whom Greece could boast; and, the brave and honest Phocion excepted, the last venerable remains of Athenian virtue<sup>41</sup>.

Chares entrusted with the sole conduct of the war; Olymp. cv. 4. A. C. 357.

By the removal of those great men, Chares was left to conduct, uncontrouled, the war against the allies; and to display the full extent of his worthlessness and incapacity. His insatiable avarice rendered him intolerable to the friends of Athens; his weakness and negligence exposed him to the contempt of the insurgents. He indulged his officers and himself in a total neglect of discipline; the reduction of the rebels was the least matter of his concern; he was attended by an effeminate crowd of singers, dancers, and harlots<sup>42</sup>, whose

<sup>39</sup> Diodorus only says, that he was dead before the battle of Chæronæa, which happened twenty years after his banishment.

<sup>40</sup> Nepos says, that after the death of Timotheus, the Athenians remitted nine parts of his fine; but obliged his son Conon to pay the remaining tenth, for repairing the walls of the Piræus, which his grandfather had rebuilt from the spoils of the enemy.

<sup>41</sup> *Military* virtue. Hæc extrema fuit ætas imperatorum Atheniensium, Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheus; neque post illorum obitum quisquam dux in illa urbe fuit dignus memoria. Nepos in Timoth. The biographer forgets Phocion.

<sup>42</sup> Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534.



luxury exhausted the scanty supplies raised by the Athenians for the service of the war<sup>43</sup>. In order to satisfy the clamorous demands of the soldiers, Chares, regardless of the treaties subsisting between Athens and Persia, hired himself and his forces to Artabazus, the wealthy satrap of Ionia, who had revolted from his master Artaxerxes Ochus, the most cruel and detestable tyrant that ever disgraced the throne of Cyrus. The arms of the Greeks saved Artabazus from the implacable resentment of a monster incapable to pity or forgive; and their meritorious services were amply rewarded by the lavish gratitude of the satrap.

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This transaction, how extraordinary soever it may appear to the modern reader, neither surprised nor displeased the Athenians. They were accustomed to allow their commanders in foreign parts to act without instructions or controul; and the creatures of Chares loudly extolled his good management in paying the Grecian troops with Persian money. But the triumph of false joy was of short duration. Ochus sent an embassy to remonstrate with the Athenians on their unprovoked infraction of the peace; and threatened, that unless they immediately withdrew their forces from Asia, he would assist the rebels with a fleet of three hundred sail. This just menace, want of success against the confederates, together with a reason still more important, which will soon come to be fully explained, obliged the Athenians to recal

which  
ends dis-  
gracefully  
for the  
Athe-  
nians.  
Olymp.  
cvi. i.  
A. C. 356.

<sup>43</sup> Demosthen. Philipp. i.

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their armament from the East, and to terminate the social war, without obtaining any of the purposes for which it had been undertaken. The confederates made good the claims which their boldness had urged; regained complete freedom and independence<sup>44</sup>; and lived twenty years exempt from the legal oppression of subsidies and contingents, till they submitted, with the rest of Greece, to the arms and intrigues of Philip, and the irresistible fortune of the Macedonians.

State of  
philosophy.

Notwithstanding the decay of martial spirit, the extravagance of public councils, and the general corruption of manners, which prevailed in Athens, and in other cities of Greece, the arts and sciences were still cultivated with ardour and success. During the period now under review, the scholars of Hippocrates and Democritus enriched natural philosophy with many important discoveries<sup>45</sup>. The different branches of mathematics, mechanics, and astronomy, received great improvements from Eudoxus<sup>46</sup> of Cnidus, Timæus<sup>47</sup> of Locri, Archytas of Tarentum, and Meton of Athens<sup>48</sup>. The Megaric school flourished under Stilpo, the most learned and acute of that disputatious sect, which, from its continual wranglings, merited the epithet of contentious<sup>49</sup>. The doctrines of Aristippus were maintained by his daughter Areté,

<sup>44</sup> Diodor. p. 424.

<sup>45</sup> Galenus de Natur. Facultat. & Hippocrat. Περὶ ἀρχῶν, &c.

<sup>46</sup> Laert. l. viii. sect. 86. & Suid. in Eudox.

<sup>47</sup> Jambl. de Pythagor.

<sup>48</sup> Censorin. de Die natal.

<sup>49</sup> Εἰσιγεν. Laert. l. vi. sect. 107.

and improved by Hegeſias and Anneceris, who paved the way for Epicurus<sup>50</sup>. The ſevere philoſophy of Antiſthenes had fewer followers<sup>51</sup>. But Diogenes alone was equal to a ſect<sup>52</sup>.

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Statuary was cultivated by Polycletus and Canachus of Sicyon, by Naucydes of Argos, and by innumerable artiſts in other cities of Greece, Italy, and Ionia. The works of Polycletus were the moſt admired. His greateſt work was the coloffal ſtatue of Argive Juno, compoſed of gold and ivory. Bronze and marble, however, ſtill furniſhed the uſual materials for ſculpture. The Grecian temples, particularly thoſe of Delphi and Olympia, were enriched with innumerable productions of this kind, during the period to which our preſent obſervations relate. One figure of Polycletus acquired peculiar fame. From the exactneſs of the proportions<sup>53</sup>, it was called the rule, or ſtandard. Even Lyſippus, the contem-

Of the  
fine arts.  
Statuary.

<sup>50</sup> Laertius & Suidas.

<sup>51</sup> Ælian. Var. Hiſtor. l. x. c. xvi.

<sup>52</sup> We ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more fully of Diogenes hereafter.

<sup>53</sup> Winckelmann, p. 653. and his tranſlator Mr. Huber, vol. iii. p. 34. differ from Pliny, l. 35. c. 19. They confound the ſtatue, called the Rule, or Canon, with another called the Doryphorus, becauſe grasping a ſpear. Pliny's words are, "Polycletus Sicyonius Diadumenum fecit molliter juvenem, centum talentis nobilitatum; idem et Doryphorum viriliter puerum. Fecit et quem canona artiſces vocant, lineamenta artis ex eo petentes, velut a lege quadam; ſolusque hominum artem ipſe (forſe ipſam) feciſſe, artis opere judicatur." They have followed Cicero de Clar. Orator. c. 86.—yet Cicero, ſpeaking incidentally on the ſubject, might more naturally miſtake than Pliny, writing expreſſly on ſculpture.



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The  
works of  
Praxi-  
teles.  
Olymp.  
cv. 1.  
A. C. 460.

porary and favourite of Alexander, regarded it as a model of excellence, from which it was imprudent to depart.

Between Polycletus and Lysippus flourished Praxiteles, whose works formed the intermediate shade between the sublime style, which prevailed in the age of Pericles, and the beautiful, which attained perfection under Lysippus and Apelles, in the age of Alexander. The statues of Praxiteles bore a similar relation to those of Phidias, which the paintings of Guido and Correggio bear to those of Julio Romano and Raphael. The works of the earlier artists are more grand and more sublime, those of the later more graceful and more alluring; the first class being addressed to the imagination, the second to the senses. The works of Praxiteles were in the Ceramicus of Athens; but neither in the Ceramicus, nor in any part of the world, was a statue to be seen equal to his celebrated Venus, which long attracted spectators from all parts to Cnidus. Praxiteles made two statues of the goddess at the same time, the one clothed, the other naked. The decent modesty of the Coans preferred the former; the latter was purchased by the Cnidians, and long regarded as the most valuable possession of their community. The voluptuous Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, languished after this statue; to purchase such unrivalled charms he offered to pay the debts of Cnidus, which were immense; but the Cnidians determined not to part with an ornament from which their republic derived so much celebrity. “ Having considered,”  
says

says an ancient author<sup>54</sup>, “ the beautiful avenues leading to the temple, we at length entered the sacred dome. In the middle stands the statue of the goddess, in marble of Paros. A sweet smile sits on her lips; no garment hides her charms; the hand only, as by an instinctive impulse, conceals those parts which modesty permits not to name. The art of Praxiteles has given to the stone the softness and sensibility of flesh. O Mars, the most fortunate of the gods !” But it is impossible to translate his too faithful description into the decency of modern language; a description more animated and voluptuous than even the chisel of Praxiteles.

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The Cnidian Venus.

The honour which Polycletus and Praxiteles acquired in sculpture, was, during the same age, attained in painting by Eupompus and Pamphilus of Sicyon, by Euphranor of Corinth, by Apollodorus and Nicias of Athens; above all by Zeuxis and Timanthes<sup>55</sup>. The works of Eupompus

The state of painting.

<sup>54</sup> Lucian. Amor.

<sup>55</sup> Pliny, in his 35th book. I have paid little attention to his pretended Epochs of Art, when inconsistent with the information of more ancient authors. The Greek historians, from whom he copied this part of his work, found it convenient, at every pause in their narrative, to give some account of men who had distinguished themselves in the arts and sciences, of whom they had no opportunity to make mention in relating public transactions, and describing wars and negotiations. The æra of every peace furnished a proper resting-place to the historian; from which he looked back, and collected the names worthy to be handed down to posterity. Every such æra, therefore, Pliny, and after him Winckelmann, have considered as an epoch of art; not reflecting, that arts do not suddenly arise and flourish,  
and

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pompus are now unknown, but in his own times his merit and celebrity occasioned a new division of the schools, which were formerly the Grecian and the Asiatic; but after Eupompus, the Grecian school was subdivided into the Athenian and Sicyonian. Pamphilus, and his scholar Apelles, gave fresh lustre to the latter school, which seems to have flourished longer than any other in Greece, since the paintings exhibited at the celebrated procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus were all the productions of Sicyonian masters<sup>56</sup>.

Works of  
Pamphilus.

Few works of Pamphilus are described by ancient authors. His picture of the Heraclidæ, carrying branches of olive, and imploring the assistance of the Athenians, has not, however, escaped the vigilant eye of national vanity<sup>57</sup>. He was by birth a Macedonian, but well versed in literature and science, which he thought indispensably necessary to a painter. He received about two hundred pounds from each of his scholars, and seems to have been the first who put a high price on his works. He lived to enjoy his fame, and rendered his profession so fashionable, that it became customary in Sicyon, and afterwards in other parts of Greece, to instruct the sons of wealthy families in the arts of design. This liberal profession was forbidden to slaves; nor, during the

and when once they flourish, do not suddenly decay; since the mind long retains the impulse which it has received; and the active powers of man, when once directed to their proper objects, are not easily lulled to repose.

<sup>56</sup> Athen. Deipn. l. v. p. 196.

<sup>57</sup> Aristoph. Plut. v. 385.  
existence.



existence of Grecian freedom, did any celebrated CH A P.  
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production in sculpture or painting come from }  
servile hands <sup>58</sup>.

Euphranor the Corinthian excelled both in painting and statuary. The dignity of his heroes was admired. He painted the twelve gods. He said that *his* Theseus had fed on flesh, that of Parrhasius on roses. He wrote on colours and symmetry. Apollodorus the Athenian was deemed the first Of Eu-  
phranor.  
  
Apollodo-  
rus.  
  
Nicias. who knew the force of light and shade <sup>59</sup>. His priest in prayer, and his Ajax struck with lightning, were held in high estimation. Nicias, his fellow-citizen, excelled in female figures, and in all the magic of colouring. His Calypso, Iö, and Andromeda, claimed just fame; but his greatest composition was the Necromanteia of Homer <sup>60</sup>.

<sup>58</sup> Plin. l. xxxv. c. xxxvi. sect. 8.

<sup>59</sup> This is the commendation of Plutarch. Pliny speaks more highly of Apollodorus. "Festinus ad lumina artis, in quibus primus refulsit Apollodorus Atheniensis . . . neque ante eum tabula ullius ostenditur, quæ teneat oculos." Pliny's praises often clash with each other. He frequently calls different persons the first in the art, and even in the same branch of it. The warmth of his fancy leaves him no time for calculating the weight of his expressions. His credulity, love of wonder, and inaccuracy, cannot be defended. Yet his judgments on pictures and statues are not without their merit; since the perfection of those works of art consists in making a deep impression, in transporting and elevating the affections, and in raising that glow of sentiment, which Pliny is so happy in communicating to his readers.

<sup>60</sup> Long before all the celebrated works of art, Homer had viewed nature with a picturesque eye. For the innumerable pictures copied from him, see Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. l. ii. c. vi. p. 345. Homer gave the idea of what is grand and pathetic in intellect, which painters and statuaries translated into what is touching and awful to the eye.

Attalus

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Attalus king of Pergamus (for Nicias lived to a great age) offered twelve thousand pounds for this picture; but the artist, who was extremely wealthy, gave it in a present to his native country. Praxiteles, when asked which of his statues he most valued, answered, "Those of which the models were retouched by Nicias."

Zeuxis.

Zeuxis is said to have been born at Heraclæa, but it is uncertain in which of the cities known by that name. He acquired great wealth by his works; at length he refused money, boasting that no price could pay them. The modesty of his Penelopé was equal to a lesson of morality. He painted Hercules strangling the serpents in the presence of the astonished Amphitryon and Alcmena. His picture dedicated in the temple of Juno Lucina, at Agrigentum, has been often mentioned. Being allowed to view the naked beauty of that populous city, it is known that he chose as models five virgins, whose united charms were expressed in this celebrated piece. His greatest work was Jupiter sitting on his throne, and surrounded by the gods<sup>61</sup>.

Timanthes

<sup>61</sup> Valerius Maximus, l. iii. c. vii. speaks of his Helena painted for the city of Crotona. On his naked Helen Zeuxis inscribed the following lines of Homer:

Οὐ νεμεσις, Τρώας καὶ εὐκρημίδας Ἀχαιῶς

Τοιῇ δ' ἄμφι γυμνικὴ πόλυν χρόνον ἀλγέα πασχέειν

Αἰνῶς ἀθανάτησι θεῇς εἰσώπα εἰσέειν.

Il. iii. v. 154.

"They cry'd, No wonder such celestial charms  
For nine long years have set the world in arms:  
What winning graces! what majestic mien!  
She moves a goddess, and she looks a queen."

POPE.

Pope

Timanthes reached the highest perfection of his art; but his genius surpassed the art itself. In his sacrifice of Iphigenia, a gradation of sorrow was seen in the faces of the spectators. It was carried to the utmost height, consistent with beauty, in the countenance of her uncle Menelaus. But Agamemnon, who was still more deeply afflicted with the unhappy fate of his daughter, veiled his face with his robe. In several others of his pieces,

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thes.

Pope has paraphrased the last line, "For she is wonderfully like to the immortal gods." This must have sounded nobly to the Greeks, who would doubtless have considered "looking a queen," as a sinking in poetry. But I have cited the lines, to shew by what different means poetry and painting attain the same end. Both Homer and Zeuxis convey an high idea of Helen's beauty; but Homer does it by the effects of this beauty, which could animate the cold age of Priam, Panthoos, &c. whom he has just inimitably described:

Γηραιὴ δὴ πολέμοιο πεπταυμένοι, ἀλλ' ἀγορήται  
Εσθλοὶ, τεττιγεσσι ἰοικέτες ὅτι καθ' ὕλην  
Δειδρῶν ἐφ' ἱομένοι οὔτα λειριόεσσαν ἰοίσι.

When the Greek monk, Constantinus Manasses (Chron. p. 20.) describes the beauty of Helen,

Ἦν ἡ γυνὴ περικαλλὴς εὐφρύς εὐχρηστάτη  
Εὐπαρεῖος εὐπρόσωπος βωοπὶς χιονόχρως;

and so on, through a dozen of lines, the imagination of the reader cannot follow him; each epithet of beauty drives the preceding from the memory; and we fancy that we see a man laboriously rolling stones up one side of a hill, which immediately roll down the other. Ariosto's description of the beauty of Alcina (cant. viii.) is in the same bad taste. How different is Virgil's "Pulcherrima Dido." Virgil knew the difference between poetical and picturesque images. Our English romances abound with examples of this species of bad taste, arising from mistaking the boundaries of distinct, though kindred, arts. See above, vol. ii. c. xiv. p. 178.

Timanthes



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Timanthes discovered the power of transporting the mind beyond the picture. He painted to the fancy rather than to the eye. In his works, as in the descriptions of Homer and Milton, more was understood than expressed.

Expres-  
sion of  
Greek  
painting.

The power of expression was carried to a degree of perfection which it is not easy to believe, and scarcely possible to comprehend. The civil and military arrangements of the Greeks gave, doubtless, great advantages to their artists in this respect. Aristides, a Theban painter, represented the sack-  
ing of a town; among other scenes of horror, a child was painted clinging to the breast of its wounded mother, who "*felt and feared*"<sup>62</sup>, that after she was dead the child should suck blood instead of milk." Parrhasius of Ephesus, in an earlier age, personified the people of Athens, in a figure that characterised them as at once cruel and compassionate, proud and humble, brave and cowardly, elevated and mean. Such discriminations, as well as such complications of passion, are unquestionably beyond the reach of modern art, and will therefore, by many, be pronounced impossible. It is worthy of remark, that the same Parrhasius, who seems to have united the excellencies of Dominichino, Raphael, and Correggio, was distinguished by the gliding motion of his outline, and the sweetness with which it melted into the ground<sup>63</sup>.

Ideal

<sup>62</sup> These are the words of Pliny.

<sup>63</sup> Pliny considers this as the perfection of art. "*Hæc est in pictura summa sublimitas. Corpora enim pingere et media rerum,*

Ideal beauty, just proportion, natural and noble attitudes, an uniform greatness of style, are acknowledged to have equally belonged to the ancient painters and statuaries. But the vanity or envy of modern times is unwilling to allow any merit to the former, which the remains of the latter do not justify and confirm. The Greek painters, therefore, have been supposed deficient in colouring; and this supposition has been supported by the words of Pliny: "With four colours only, Apelles, Echion, Melanthius, and Nicomachus produced those immortal works, which were singly purchased by the common wealth of cities and republics." The colours were white, red, yellow, and black. It has been often said that with these only on his palette, a painter cannot colour like nature, far less attain the magic of the *clair obscure*. Yet a great artist of our own country thinks that four colours are sufficient for every combination required. "The fewer the colours, the cleaner, he observes, will be their effect. Two

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Colour-  
ing.

rerum, est quidem magni operis; sed in quo multi gloriam tulerint. Extrema corporum facere, & desinentis picturæ modum includere, rarum in successu artis invenitur. Ambire enim debet se extremitas ipsa, & sic desinere, ut promittat alia post se; ostentatque etiam quæ occultat." Ibid. c. xxxvi. sect. 5. Mr. Falconet, in his observations on this passage, is of a different opinion. He thinks it more difficult to paint the middle parts, than the shades and tones which round the extremities of objects; because the former, though exposed to the light, must have their form, relief, depth, and all the tints of nature. He instances the heads painted by Rubens and Vandyck seen in front. Pliny, had he lived in later times, might have instanced, in his turn, the sweet outlines and inimitable softness of Correggio.

colours

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colours mixed together will not preserve the brightness of either of them single, nor will three be as bright as two<sup>64</sup>." Pliny says, that Apelles spread over his pictures, when finished, a transparent liquid like ink, which increased the clearness and brilliancy of the whole, while it softened the glare of too florid colours. This, according to the same excellent painter, is a true and artist-like description of scrambling or glazing, as practised by the Venetian school, and by Correggio, in whose works, as well as those mentioned by Pliny, it was perceptible only to such as closely examined the picture. He very reasonably concludes, therefore, that if the master-pieces of ancient painting remained, we should probably find them as correctly drawn as the Laocoon, and as admirably coloured as the glowing productions of Titian.

Clair ob-  
scure.

That the Greeks were acquainted with the effect of the *clair obscure*, or the distribution of all the tones of light and shade relatively to the different plans of the picture, has been denied by those who allow them the highest excellence in colouring single figures. They might excel, it has been said, in a solo, but were incapable of producing a full piece for a concert of different instruments. Whether this observation be well founded can only be discovered by carefully examining ancient authors, from whom it would appear that even

<sup>64</sup> See Sir Joshua Reynolds's notes on Mr. Mason's translation of Fresnoy's *Art of Painting*.



in this branch the Greek painters were not deficient <sup>65</sup>.

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Of all the arts cultivated during the period now under review, none attained higher proficiency than composition in prose. The history of Thucydides was continued by Xenophon; but we should form a very imperfect notion of this amiable writer were we to judge him by his Grecian history, to which he seems not to have put the last hand. Yet in this, as well as in his more finished works, we see the scholar of Socrates; and, of all others, the scholar who most resembled his master in his sentiment and expression <sup>66</sup>, in the excellencies as well as in the respectable weaknesses <sup>67</sup> of

Literary  
composition.

Xeno-  
phon.

His cha-  
racter.

<sup>65</sup> In speaking of Nicias, Pliny says, "Lumen et umbras custodivit, atque ut eminenter à tabulis picturæ maxime custodivit." Unless the *clair obscure* be meant, the second member of this sentence is a pleonasm. Another passage is highly to the purpose, l. xxxv. c. xi. "Tandem se ars ipsa distinxit, et invenit lumen atque umbras, differentia colorum alterna via sese excitante. Deinde adjectus est splendor, alius hic quam lumen: quem, quia inter hoc & umbram esset, appellaverunt tonon; commissuras verò colorum et transitus, harmogen." *Clair obscure* in painting is something like counterpoint in music; and if the ancients cultivated neither of them, perhaps the more substantial parts of the arts lost nothing by the neglect. In melody and design, effect and expression, they probably excelled the most boasted productions of later ages.

<sup>66</sup> See the description which Alcibiades gives of Socrates's eloquence, in Plato's Symposium.

<sup>67</sup> It is remarkable that the superstitious belief of Xenophon in celestial warnings, of which see innumerable examples, particularly Anabaf. l. iii. c. i. l. v. c. viii. and l. vi. c. i. never encouraged him to any thing imprudent or hurtful, and never restrained him from any thing useful or virtuous. The admonitions likewise of Socrates's dæmon were always the same with the dictates of right reason.

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his character. The same undeviating virtue, the same indefatigable spirit, the same erect probity, the same diffusive benevolence, the same credulity, the same enthusiasm, together with that unaffected propriety of thought and diction, whose native graces outshine all ornaments of art.

His mili-  
tary expe-  
ditions.

This admirable personage, who, had he lived before the Athenians were grown too conceited to learn, and too corrupt to mend, might have proved the saviour of his country, reached his fiftieth year in a happy obscurity, enjoying the confidential society of Socrates and a few select friends. Of these Proxenus, an illustrious Theban exile, who well knew the worth of Xenophon, invited him to Sardis, from a desire to introduce him to Cyrus, the brother of Artaxerxes, and governor of Lower Asia, whose friendship he himself had found more valuable than the precarious honours of his capricious and ungrateful republic. Xenophon communicated the proposal to Socrates, who, suspecting that the Athenians might not relish his friend's design, because the Persians were then allied with Sparta, desired him to consult the oracle of Delphi<sup>68</sup>. This counsel was but partially followed; for Xenophon, who seems to have been fond of the journey, asked not the oracle whether it ought to be undertaken, but only by virtue of what prayers and sacrifices it might be rendered successful. Socrates approved not this precipitation; yet as the god had answered, he thought it

<sup>68</sup> Anabaf. l. v. p. 356, & seqq.

necessary for Xenophon to obey. The important consequences of this resolution to the Ten thousand Greeks who followed the standard of Cyrus, have been related in a former part of this work. After his glorious retreat from Upper Asia, Xenophon remained several years on the western coast, and shared the victories of his admired Agesilaus, with whom he returned to Greece, and conquered in the battle of Coronæa.

Meanwhile a decree of banishment passed against him in Athens. But having acquired considerable riches in his Asiatic expedition, he had deposited them at Ephesus with the Sacristan of Diana's temple, with this injunction, that if he perished in battle, his wealth should be employed in honour of the goddess. Having survived the bloody engagement of Coronæa, which he afterwards so affectingly described in his *Hellenica*, he settled in the town of Scilluns, a new establishment formed by the Lacedæmonians, scarce three miles distant from Olympia. Megabyzus, the Sacrist of Diana, came to behold the games, and faithfully restored his deposit, with which Xenophon, as enjoined by an oracle, purchased in that neighbourhood a beautiful spot of ground, watered by the Sellenus, a name which coincided with that of the river near Ephesus. On the banks of Elia Sellenus, Xenophon erected a temple, incomparably smaller indeed, yet similar in form to the great temple of Diana. His image of the goddess resembled that at Ephesus, as much as a figure in cypress could resemble a statue of gold. The banks of the river

His religious and literary retreat.



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were planted with fruit trees. The surrounding plains and meadows afforded excellent pasture. The adjoining forests and mountains abounded in wild boar, red deer, and other species of game. There Xenophon's sons often hunted with the youth of the neighbouring towns and villages; and the whole inhabitants of the country round were invited and entertained by him at an annual festival sacred to Diana. A modest inscription on a marble column, erected near the temple, testified the holiness of the place. "This spot is dedicated to Diana. Let him, whoever shall possess it, employ the tenth of its annual produce in sacrifice, and the remainder in keeping in repair, and in adorning the temple. His neglect will not be overlooked by the goddesses<sup>69</sup>." By this inscription, wherein Xenophon ventures not to mention the name of the founder, his mind seems to forebode the calamities which at last befel him. In the war between the Lacedæmonians and Elians, the town of Scilluns, together with the circumjacent territory, was seized by Elian troops; and the amiable philosopher and historian, who had, in this delightful retreat, composed those invaluable works, which will inspire the last ages of the world with the love of virtue, was compelled, in the decline of life, to seek refuge in the corrupt and licentious city of Corinth.

His works.

His Expedition, his Grecian History, his description of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian govern-

<sup>69</sup> Xenoph. Anabaf. l. v. p. 356, & seqq.


ments,

ments, have been noticed in their proper place. C H A P.  
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 The *Cyropædeia*, or institutions of the elder Cyrus, is a philosophical romance, intended to exemplify the doctrines taught by Socrates in the *Memorabilia*, and to prove the success which naturally attends the practice of wisdom and virtue in the great affairs of war and government. The highest panegyric of this work is, that many learned men have mistaken it for a true history, and, deceived by the inimitable *naïveté* and persuasiveness of the narrative, have believed it possible that, during the various stages of a long life, Cyrus should have invariably followed the dictates of the sublimest philosophy. In his *Oeconomics*, Xenophon undertakes the humbler but not less useful task, of regulating the duties of domestic life. The dialogue, intituled *Hiero*, paints the misery of tyrants contrasted with the happiness of virtuous princes, in colours so lively, and in lines so expressive, that an admirer of the ancients might challenge the ingenuity of modern ages to add a single stroke to the picture. In speaking of the works of Xenophon, we must not forget his treatise on the Revenues of Athens. It was written long after his banishment. Instead of resenting the obdurate cruelty of his countrymen, he gave them most judicious and seasonable advice concerning the improvement of the public revenues, which, there is reason to believe, was in part adopted.

The orators *Lyfias* and *Isocrates* flourished in the period now under review. The former was distinguished by the refined subtilty of his plead-

The orators  
*Lyfias* and  
*Isocrates*.

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ings; the latter by the polished elegance of his moral and political orations <sup>70</sup>. Isocrates ventured not to speak in public, neither his constitution nor his voice admitting the great exertions necessary for that purpose. His school of oratory and composition was frequented by the noblest youths of Athens, of the neighbouring republics, and even by foreign princes; and as his maxims were borrowed from the Socratic school, his long and honourable labours tended to keep alive some sparks of virtue among his degenerate countrymen <sup>71</sup>.

Plato.  
His birth  
and edu-  
cation.

But the man of learning in that age, whose abilities, if properly directed, might have most benefited his contemporaries, was the celebrated Plato, a man justly admired, yet more extraordinary than admirable. The same memorable year which produced the Peloponnesian war gave birth to Plato. He was descended from the Codridæ, the most illustrious as well as the most opulent family in Athens. His education was worthy of his birth. The gymnastic formed and invigorated his body; his mind was enlarged and enlightened by the studies of poetry <sup>72</sup> and geometry, from which he derived that acuteness of judgment, and that warmth of fancy, which, being both carried to excess, render him at once the most subtle and the most flowery writer of antiquity <sup>73</sup>. In his twentieth year

<sup>70</sup> See the lives of Lyfias and Isocrates, prefixed to my translation of their works. <sup>71</sup> Idem, *ibid.* <sup>72</sup> Diogen. Laert. l. ii.

<sup>73</sup> Plato's Dialogues are so different from each other, in point of thought and expression, that, if we knew not the versatility of



year he became acquainted with Socrates; and having compared his own poetical productions with those of his immortal predecessors in this walk of literature, he committed the former to the flames, and totally addicted himself to philosophy. During eight years he continued an assiduous hearer of Socrates; an occasional <sup>74</sup> indisposition prevented him from assisting at the last conversations of the sage, before he drank the fatal hemlock. Yet these conversations, as related to him by persons who were present, Plato has delivered down to the admiration of posterity; and the affecting sensibility with which he minutely describes the inimitable behaviour of Socrates, on this trying occasion, proves how deeply the author was interested in his subject.

Fear or disgust removed the scholar of Socrates from the murderers of his master. Having spent some time in Thebes, Elis, and Megara, where he enjoyed the conversation of several of his fellow-disciples, the love of knowledge carried him

His  
travels.

of his genius, it would be difficult to believe them the works of one man. He is over-refined, wire-drawn, and trifling, in the *Cratylus*, *Parmenides*, *Meno*, *Theætetus*, and *Sophistes*. He is flowery, pompous, and tumid, in his *Timæus*, *Panegyric*, *Symposium*, and *Phædrus*. But in those invaluable writings, the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Alcibiades*, *Gorgias*, *Phædo*, and the greater part of his books of laws, in which he adheres to the doctrines of Socrates, and indulges, without art or affectation, the natural bent of his own genius, his style is inimitably sweet and attractive, always elegant, and often sublime. His *Republic*, which is generally considered as his greatest work, abounds in all the beauties, and in all the deformities, for which he is remarkable. See *Dionys. Halicarn. de Platon*.

<sup>74</sup> Πλάτων δε (σικαν) ποθεν. *Phædo*, 2.

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to Magna Græcia; from thence he sailed to Cyrené, attracted by the fame of the mathematician Theodorus; Egypt next deserved his curiosity, as the country to which the science of Theodorus owed its birth, and from which the Pythagoreans in Magna Græcia derived several tenets of their philosophy.

He settles  
in the  
academy.

At his return to Athens, Plato could have little inclination to engage in public life. The days were past when the virtues of a Solon, or of a Lycurgus, could reform the manners of their countrymen. In early periods of society, the example and influence of one able and disinterested man may produce a happy revolution in the community of which he is a member. But in the age of Plato, the Athenians had fallen into dotage and imbecility. His luxuriant fancy compares them sometimes to old men, who have outlived their senses, and with whom it is vain to reason; sometimes to wild beasts, whom it is dangerous to approach; sometimes to an unfruitful soil, that choaks every useful plant, and produces weeds only<sup>75</sup>. He prudently withdrew himself from a scene, which presented nothing but danger or disgust, and purchased a small villa in the suburbs near the academy, or gymnasium, that had been so elegantly adorned by Cimon<sup>76</sup>. To this retirement, his fame attracted the most illustrious characters in his age: the noblest youths of Athens daily frequented the school of Plato; and here he

<sup>75</sup> Republic, I. vi. p. 38.

<sup>76</sup> See above, vol. ii. p. 73.

continued

continued above forty years, with little interruption except from his voyages into Sicily, instructing his disciples, and composing his Dialogues, to which the most distinguished philosophers in ancient and modern times are greatly indebted, without excepting those who reject his doctrines, and affect to treat them as visionary.

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The capacious mind of Plato embraced the whole circle of science. The objects of human thought had, previously to his age, been reduced, by the Pythagoreans, to certain classes or genera<sup>77</sup>; the nature of truth had been investigated; and men had distinguished the relations<sup>78</sup>, which the predicate of any proposition can bear to its subject. The sciences had already been divided into the natural and moral; or, in the language of Plato, into the knowledge of divine and human things. The frivolous art of syllogism was not as yet in-

General  
character  
of his  
philosophy.

<sup>77</sup> Many less perfect divisions had probably been made before Archytas of Tarentum distinguished the ten Categories. Simplicius & Jamblichus apud Fr. Patricium, *Discuss. Peripatet.* t. ii. p. 182. This division, the most perfect of any that philosophers have yet been able to discover, Plato learned from Archytas. It consisted in substances and modes. The former are either primary, as all individual substances, which neither are in any other subject, nor can be predicated of it; or secondary, which subsist in the first, and can be predicated of them, to wit, the genera and species of substances. Of modes there are nine kinds, quantity, quality, relation, habit, time, place, having, doing, and suffering. Aristot. *de Categor.*

<sup>78</sup> These are called by logicians the five Predicables, or more properly, the five classes of Predicates. They are the genus, species, specific difference, property, and accident. The use of these distinctions is universal in every subject requiring definition and division; yet if meant to comprehend whatever may be affirmed of any subject, the enumeration is doubtless incomplete.  
vented;



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vented; and the logic of Plato<sup>79</sup> was confined to the more useful subjects of definition and division, by means of which he attempted to fix and ascertain not only the practical doctrines of morals and politics, but the abstruse and shadowy speculations of mystical theology. It is much to be regretted that this great and original genius should have mistaken the proper objects as well as the natural limits of the human understanding, and that most of the enquiries of Plato and his successors should appear extremely remote from the public transactions of the times in which they lived. Yet the speculations in which they were engaged, how little soever they may be connected with the political revolutions of Greece, seem too interesting in themselves to be entirely omitted in this historical work, especially when it is considered that the philosophy of Plato and his disciples has been very widely diffused among all the civilized nations of the world; that during many centuries, it governed with uncontrouled sway the opinions of the speculative part of mankind; and that the same philosophy still influences the reasonings, and divides the sentiments, of the learned in modern Europe.

Difficulty  
of explaining  
and abridging  
his doctrines.

The lively, but immethodical, manner in which the opinions of Plato are explained by himself, renders it difficult to collect and abridge them. The great number of interlocutors in his dia-

<sup>79</sup> The science properly called Logic was invented by Aristotle; the division of the sciences into Logic, Physics, and Ethics, was first given by his contemporary Xenocrates. Vid. Brucker. de Aristot. & Xenocrat. Of Aristotle more hereafter.

logues,

logues, the irony of Socrates, and the continual intermixture of Plato's own sentiments with those of his master, heighten the difficulty, and make it impossible, from particular passages, to judge of the scope and tendency of the whole. The works of Xenophon, however, may enable a diligent student to separate the pure ore of Socrates from the adventitious matter with which it is combined in the rich vein of Platonism; and by carefully comparing the different parts of the latter, he may with certainty determine the principal designs of its author.

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From this view of the subject, it would appear that Plato aimed at nothing less, than to reconcile the appearances of the natural and moral world with the wise government of a self-existent unchangeable cause; to explain the nature and origin of the human mind, as well as of its various powers of perception, volition, and intellect; and, on principles resulting from these discoveries, to build a system of ethics, which, in proportion as it were followed by mankind, would promote not only their independence and security in the present world, but their happiness and perfection in a future state of existence.

The great  
views of  
that philo-  
sopher.

Let us look where we will around us, we shall every-where, said Plato, perceive a passing procession<sup>80</sup>; the objects which compose the material

His theo-  
logy.

<sup>80</sup> This was borrowed from Heraclitus, who expressed the same idea, by saying, that all corporeal things were in a perpetual flux. Vid. Platon, in Theætet. p. 83. & in Sophist. p. 108.

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world, arise, change, perish, and are succeeded by others, which undergo the same revolutions<sup>81</sup>. One body moves another, which impels a third, and so forwards in succession; but the first cause of motion resides not in any of them. This cause acts not fortuitously; the regular motions of the heavenly bodies<sup>82</sup>, the beautiful order of the seasons, the admirable structure of plants and animals, announce an intelligent Author<sup>83</sup>. It is difficult by searching to find out the nature of the Divinity, and impossible by words to describe it; yet the works which he has done, attest his power, his wisdom, and his goodness, to be greater than human imagination can conceive<sup>84</sup>. In the self-existent cause, these attributes must unite. He is therefore unchangeable<sup>85</sup>, since no alteration can increase his perfections, and it would be absurd to suppose him ever inclined to diminish them<sup>86</sup>.

Cosmo-  
gony.

Impelled by his goodness, the Deity, viewing in his own intellect the ideas or archetypes of all possible existence, formed the beautiful arrangement of the universe from that rude indigested matter, which, existing from all eternity, had been for ever animated by an irregular principle of

<sup>81</sup> Timæus, sub initio.

<sup>82</sup> By these he meant the fixed stars; the motions of the planets he ascribed to another cause, as will appear below.

<sup>83</sup> Plato de Legibus, l. x. p. 609.

<sup>84</sup> Timæus, p. 477. & de Repub. l. ii. p. 144.

<sup>85</sup> For the immutability of the Deity, Plato, contrary to his general custom, condescends to use an argument from induction: "Even of material things, the most perfect least feel the effects of time, and remain longest unaltered." De Repub. p. 150.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. p. 150.

motion.



motion<sup>87</sup>. This principle, which Plato calls the irrational soul of the world, he thought sufficiently attested, in the innumerable deviations from the established laws of nature, in the extravagant passions of men, and in the physical and moral evil, which, in consequence of these deviations and passions, so visibly prevail in the world. Without admitting a certain stubborn intractability, and disorderly wildness, essential to matter, and therefore incapable of being entirely eradicated or subdued, it seemed impossible to explain the origin of evil under the government of Deity<sup>88</sup>.

From these rude materials, God, according to the fanciful doctrine of Plato, formed the four elements, and built the beautiful structure of the heavens and the earth, after the model of those eternal exemplars<sup>89</sup>, or patterns, which subsist in the

Plato's  
doctrine  
of ideas.

<sup>87</sup> Politic. p. 120, & seqq. & Timæus, passim.

<sup>88</sup> De Legibus, l. x. p. 608. Philem. p. 160.

<sup>89</sup> These exemplars, or παραδειγματα, are the *ideas* of Plato, which were so much misrepresented by many of the later Platonists, or Eclectics. He names them, indifferently, *ideas*, *ειδη*, *εικονας*, τα κατὰ ταυτα, & ὁσωντος εχοντα. The two last expressions are used to distinguish them from the fleeting and perishable forms of matter. Plato represents these ideas as existing in the divine intellect, as beings entirely mental, not objects of any of the senses, and not circumscribed by place or time. By the first universal Cause, these ideas were infused into the various species of created beings, in whom (according to Ammonius, in Porphyry. Introduct. p. 29.) they existed, as the impression of a seal exists in the wax to which it has been applied. In its pre-existent state, the human mind viewed these *intelligible* forms in their original seat, the field of truth. But since men were imprisoned in the body, they receive these ideas from external objects, as explained in the text. Such is the doctrine of Plato. But many of the later Platonists, and even several writers

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the divine Intelligence<sup>90</sup>. Considering that beings possessed of mental powers were far preferable to those destitute of such faculties, God infused into the corporeal world a rational soul, which, as it could not be immediately combined with body, he united to the active, but irrational principle, essentially inherent in matter<sup>91</sup>. Having thus formed and animated the earth, the sun, the moon, and the other visible divinities, the great Father of spirits proceeded to create the invisible gods and dæmons<sup>92</sup>, whose nature and history Plato describes with a respectful reverence for the religion

writers of the present age, have imagined that he ascribed to ideas a separate and independent existence. Vid. Brucker. *Histor. Philosoph.* p. 695, & seqq. Gedike *Histor. Philosoph.* ex Ciceron. *Collect.* p. 183, & seqq. Monboddo, *Origin of Language*, vol. i. c. ix. Of all the absurdities embraced by philosophers, this doubtless would be the greatest, to believe eternal unchangeable patterns of the various genera and species of things existing apart, and independent of the mind by which these abstract notions are conceived. It is not extraordinary, therefore, that many writers of the Alexandrian school, whose extravagant fancies could fix and embody metaphysical abstractions, and realise intellectual ideas, should animate and personify the λογος τῆς θεᾶς, the divine intellect, in which, according to Plato, these ideas resided, and from which they were communicated to other intelligences. The same visionary fanatics who discovered, in the λογος of Plato, the second person of the Trinity, recognised the Holy Spirit in his Soul of the World; but as this irrational principle of motion ill corresponded to the third person of the Godhead, they invented an hyper-cosmian soul, concerning which Plato is altogether silent. See the *Encyclopédie*, article *Ecclésiastique*. Brucker, *Hist. Philosoph.* vol. i. p. 712, & seqq. & Meiner's *Beytrag zur geschichte der denkart der ersten Jahrhunderte nach Christi geburt in einigen betrachtungen über die neu Platonische Philosophie*.

<sup>90</sup> Timæus, *Polit.* l. vi.<sup>91</sup> *Ib.* p. 477, & seqq.<sup>92</sup> Timæus, p. 480.

of his country <sup>93</sup>. After finishing this great work, the God of gods, again contemplating the ideal forms in his own mind, perceived there the exemplars of three species of beings, which he realised in the mortal inhabitants of the earth, air, and water. The task of forming these sensible, but irrational beings, he committed to the inferior divinities; because, had this last work likewise proceeded from his own hands, it must have been immortal like the gods <sup>94</sup>. The souls of men, on the other hand, he himself formed from the remainder of the rational soul of the world. They first existed in the state of dæmons, only invested with a thin æthereal body. Having offended God by neglecting their duty, they were condemned to unite with the gross corporeal mass, by which their divine faculties are so much clogged and encumbered <sup>95</sup>.

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It was necessary briefly to explain the metaphysical theology of Plato, how visionary soever it may appear, because the doctrine of ideal forms, together with that of the pre-existent state of the human mind, are the main pillars of his philosophy. Before their incarceration in the body, the souls of men enjoyed the presence of their Maker, and contemplated the unchangeable ideas and essences of things in the field of truth. In viewing and examining these eternal archetypes of order, beauty, and virtue, consisted the noblest energy, and highest perfection of celestial spirits <sup>96</sup>, which,

Plato's  
morals.

<sup>93</sup> Apolog. Socratis.

<sup>94</sup> Timæus, p. 480, & 481.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Repub. l. vi. Phædrus, Philebus, &c.

being



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being emanations of the Deity, can never rest satisfied with objects and occupations unworthy their divine original. But in their actual state, men can perceive with their corporeal senses, only the fleeting images and imperfect representations of these immutable essences of things, in the fluctuating objects of the material world, which are so little steady and permanent, that they often change their nature and properties, even while we view and examine them<sup>97</sup>. Beside this, our senses themselves are liable to innumerable disorders; and unless we are constantly on the watch, never fail to deceive us<sup>98</sup>. Hence the continual errors in our judgments of men and things; hence the improper ends we pursue; hence the very inadequate means by which we seek to attain them; hence, in one word, all the errors and misery of life. Yet even in this degraded state, to which men were condemned for past offences, their happiness ceases not to be an object of care to the Deity. As none can rise so high, none can sink so low, as to escape the eye and arm of the Almighty<sup>99</sup>. The divine Providence observes and regulates the meanest, as well as the greatest, of its productions. But the good of the part being subordinate to that of the whole, it is necessary that each individual should be rewarded or punished, in proportion as he fulfils the task assigned him. It is by the performance of his duty alone, that man can regain the favour of his Maker<sup>100</sup>; for

<sup>97</sup> Phædo, Timæus, &c.

<sup>99</sup> De Legibus.

<sup>98</sup> Phædo, p. 31. & Repub. l. v.

<sup>100</sup> Eutyphron.

it is ridiculous to think that this inestimable benefit can be purchased by rich presents and expensive sacrifices. Religion cannot be a traffic of interest <sup>101</sup>.

What can we offer to the gods, which they have not first bestowed on us? Will they thank us for restoring their own gifts? It is absurd to think it. To please the Divinity, we must obey his will concerning us; nor can we comply with the purpose of our creation, and fulfil our destiny, without aspiring at those noble powers with which we were originally endowed <sup>102</sup>; and which, even in our present degenerate state, it is still possible, by proper diligence, to recover <sup>103</sup>.

Our senses give us information of external objects, which are stored up in the memory, and variously combined by the imagination <sup>104</sup>. But it is remarkable that those ideas, thus acquired and retained, have the power of suggesting others far more accurate and perfect than themselves, and which, though excited by material objects, cannot be derived from them, unless (which is impossible) the effect were more beautiful and perfect than the cause. That we possessed, in a pre-existent state, those ideas which modern philosophers refer by an easy solution to the powers of generalization and abstraction <sup>105</sup>, Plato thought evident from the facility

His account of the origin of human knowledge.

<sup>101</sup> Repub. l. ii. p. 100, & seqq.

<sup>102</sup> Minos, p. 510. Timæus, p. 500,

<sup>103</sup> Repub. l. v.

<sup>104</sup> Theatet. p. 85, & seqq. & Philem. 184, & seqq.

<sup>105</sup> The ancients were not ignorant of this philosophy. Simplicius, speaking of the origin of intelligible forms, or ideas, in Vol. III. L 1

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facility with which we recalled them <sup>106</sup>. Of this he gave an example in Meno's slave, who, when properly questioned by Socrates, easily recollected and explained many properties of numbers and figures, although he had never learned the sciences of arithmetic and geometry <sup>107</sup>. According to Plato, therefore, all science consisted in reminiscence, in recalling the nature, proportions, and relations of those uniform and unchangeable essences, about which the human mind had originally been conversant, and after the model of which all created things were made <sup>108</sup>. These intellectual forms, comprehending the true essences of things, were the only proper objects of solid and permanent science <sup>109</sup>; their fluctuating representatives

the human mind, says, *ἡμεῖς ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέροις; ἐννοίαις κατὰ ἑαυτὰ ὑπεστήσαμεν*: "We ourselves, abstracting them in our thoughts, have, by this abstraction, given them an existence in themselves." Simp. in Præd. p. 17.

<sup>106</sup> Menon. p. 344.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Repub. l. vi.

<sup>109</sup> *Επιστήμη*, science, in opposition to *δόξα*, opinion. The material world he called *το δοξαστον*, that of which the knowledge admitted of probability only. Repub. l. v. The *ideas* of Plato, which, according to that philosopher, formed the sole objects of real and certain knowledge, were powerfully combated by his scholar and rival Aristotle. Yet the latter, who was so sharp-sighted to the faults of Plato, never accuses him of maintaining the separate and independent existence of intellectual forms. The obscure passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, p. 201, which has been construed into such an accusation, means nothing more, than that Socrates regarded the *τα καθ' ὅλην*, general ideas, as differing in no respect from our notions of the genera and species of things; whereas Plato made a distinction between them, asserting



tatives in the material world, the actions and virtues of men, the order and beauty visible in the universe, were only so far real and substantial as they corresponded to their divine archetypes<sup>110</sup>; but as this correspondence never became complete, the examination of the perishing objects of sense could only afford us unsteady and uncertain notions, fleeting and fugitive like themselves<sup>111</sup>. From these observations, Plato thought it evident, that

Of the powers of perception and intellect.

ing these ideas to have existed in the divine intellect before the creation, &c. as explained in the text. Aristotle discusses the doctrine of ideas more perspicuously in his *Ethics to Nicomachus*, l. i. c. vi. He regards them as mere fictions of the fancy, and the knowledge founded on them as altogether visionary. "The idea of good," he observed, "might be applied to substances, as the Deity, the mind of man; to qualities, as the virtues; to quantity, as mediocrity; to time, as the juncture or nick of time; in short, through all the categories. There is not, therefore, any one general idea of good common to all these. Were there one idea, the same in all, there could be but one science respecting it. But there are many, physic, gymnastic, the military art, &c. which all have some good in view. Things are good in themselves, or good as means to an end. But even those things which are ultimately good, as wisdom, honour, pleasure, are not comprehended under any one definition of good, though distinguished by the same epithet from some analogy or resemblance, as the understanding is called the eye of the mind. If there is any such general idea, it is surely incapable of being applied to any practical use; not as a model, otherwise the arts and sciences, all of which have some good in view, would continually have this model before them. Yet they all neglect it, and justly; for what benefit could they derive from this abstract idea? A physician, for instance, contemplates not health in that general manner, but the health of man, or rather of a particular man, who happens to be his patient; for with individuals only his art is concerned."

<sup>110</sup> *Parmen.* p. 149.

<sup>111</sup> *Repub.* l. vii.

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the duty and happiness of men consisted in withdrawing themselves from the material, and approaching the intellectual world<sup>112</sup>, to which their own natures were more congenial. To promote this purpose was the great aim of his philosophy. If we were deceived by the senses, he observed, that we were still more fatally endangered by the passions, those flimsy sails of the mind, which were expanded and agitated by every varying gust of imagined good or evil<sup>113</sup>. The pains and pleasures of the body were all of a mixed kind, and nearly allied to each other. The God who arranged the world, desirous to unite and incorporate these seemingly opposite natures, had at least joined their summits; for pleasure was nothing else but a rapid cessation of pain; and the liveliest of our bodily enjoyments were preceded by uneasiness, and followed by languor<sup>114</sup>. To illustrate the necessity of governing with a strong hand the appetites and passions, Plato compared the soul to a little republic, composed of different faculties or orders<sup>115</sup>. The judging or reasoning faculty, justly entitled to the supremacy, was seated, as in a firm citadel, in the head; the senses were its guards and servants; the various desires and affections were bound to pay it obedience.

Of the  
passions.

Of these desires, which were all of them the natural subjects of the ruling faculty, Plato distin-

<sup>112</sup> Repub. p. 134. & Phæd. p. 26.

<sup>113</sup> Phædrus.

<sup>114</sup> Phæd. Philem. & Repub. l. ii. p. 262, & seqq.

<sup>115</sup> Repub. l. iv.

guished

guished two orders, ever ready to rebel against their master. The first consisted of those passions which are founded in pride and resentment, or in what the schoolmen called the irascible part of the soul<sup>116</sup>; and were seated in the breast. The second consisted of those passions which are founded in the love of pleasure, or in what the schoolmen called the concupiscible<sup>117</sup> part of the soul, and were seated in the belly, and inferior parts of the body. These different orders, though commonly at variance with each other, were alike dangerous to the public interest, and unless restrained by the wisdom and authority of their sovereign, must inevitably plunge the little republic of man into the utmost disorder and misery<sup>118</sup>.

Yet, according to Plato, both these sets of passions were, in the present state of things, necessary parts of our constitution; and, when properly regulated, became very useful subjects. The irascible asserted our rank and dignity, defended us against injuries, and when duly informed and tempered by reason, taught us with becoming fortitude to despise dangers and death, in pursuit of what is honourable and virtuous. The concupiscible provided for the support and necessities of the body; and, when reduced to such submission as to reject every gratification not approved by reason, gave rise to the virtue of temperance. Justice

Of the virtues; and wisdom the greatest virtue.

<sup>116</sup> The *To θυμοειδης* of Plato.

<sup>117</sup> The *To επιθυμητικον* of Plato. Both are included under what Plato and Aristotle call the *ορεκτικον*, the seat of the desires and passions.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.* p. 254.



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took place, according to Plato, when reason directed and passion obeyed, and when each passion performed its proper office, and acknowledged due respect towards its superior. In the strength, acuteness, and perfection of the ruling faculty, consisted the virtue of prudence, the great source and principle of all other virtues, without which temperance, fortitude, and even justice itself, were nothing but empty shadows, that deluded the ignorant vulgar. In the exercise of prudence or wisdom, man resembled his Maker, and contemplated those intellectual forms, which taught him to discern with certainty the ends proper to be pursued, and the means necessary to attain them. The wise man compares the mind with the body, eternity with time, virtue with pleasure. He thus learns to despise the inferior parts of his nature, to defy its pains, to disdain its pleasures. Without attaining this true elevation of mind, he never can be virtuous or happy, since whoever depends on the body, must consider death as an evil, the fear of which can only be overcome by some greater terror; so that in him who is not truly wise, fortitude itself must be the effect of timidity<sup>119</sup>. In the same manner, his pretended moderation and temperance will spring from the impure source of the opposite vices. He will deny himself some pleasures, to attain others which he regards as more valuable, and will submit to small pains to avoid the greater<sup>120</sup>. He thus continues through life,

<sup>119</sup> Repub. l. vi.

<sup>120</sup> Phædo, p. 26, & seqq.

exchanging one trifle for another; a traffic which never can enrich him, while he rejects wisdom, the only precious merchandise.

But the temple of wisdom is, according to Plato, situate on a rock, which few men have the strength to ascend<sup>121</sup>. This difference of ability proceeds from various causes: 1. At their creation, all minds were not alike excellent and perfect<sup>122</sup>. 2. They were not alike criminal during their pre-existent state<sup>123</sup>. 3. The gross bodies which they now inhabit are variously moulded, some being too strong, others too weak, and very few in just harmony with the divine principle by which they are animated<sup>124</sup>. 4. Early institution and example occasion great differences among them. Such, indeed, is the power of education and habit, that the errors and crimes of men are less chargeable on those who commit them, than on their parents, guardians, and instructors<sup>125</sup>; and it seems hardly possible for those who have the misfortune to be born in a licentious age and country, to attain wisdom and virtue. Even when the most favourite circumstances unite, the mind must still, however, have a tendency to degenerate, while united with matter<sup>126</sup>. The body, therefore, must be continually exercised and subdued by the gymnastic, the soul must be purified and ennobled by philosophy. Without such attention, men can neither reach the perfection of

Causes of  
the diver-  
sity of  
moral cha-  
racter.

<sup>121</sup> Repub. l. vi. p. 74.

<sup>122</sup> Phædrus.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Timæus,

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid. p. 484. & Repub. passim.

their

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their nature, or, when they have reached it, maintain that elevated post, from which they look down with compassion on the errors and misery of their fellow-creatures <sup>127</sup>.

Plato's  
sage.

In the description of his imaginary sage, Plato employs the colours which were afterwards borrowed by the Stoics and Epicureans. But neither of these sects, as will appear hereafter, were so well entitled as the Platonists, to boast their philosophical happiness, and to assert their superiority to the vicissitudes of time and fortune. Plato was the first philosopher who supported the doctrine of a future state, by arguments that seemed capable to convince intelligent and thinking men. From the properties of mind, he inferred the simplicity and indestructibility of the substance in which they reside <sup>128</sup>. He described the mental powers with an eloquence that Cicero <sup>129</sup> and Buffon <sup>130</sup> have not been able to surpass. And since he regarded the soul as the principle of life and motion, he thought it absurd to suppose that the diseases and death of the body should take from this principle such qualities as it essentially possessed in itself, and accidentally communicated to matter <sup>131</sup>. It was his firm persuasion, that according to the employment of its rational and moral powers, the soul, after its separation from the body, would be raised

Immor-  
tality of  
the soul.

State of  
retribu-  
tion.

<sup>127</sup> Timæus, p. 484. & Repub. passim.

<sup>128</sup> Phædo, p. 25, & seqq.

<sup>129</sup> See Cicero, de Offic. l. i. & passim

<sup>130</sup> Buffon sur l'Homme,

<sup>131</sup> Phædo,



to a higher, or depressed to a lower state of existence <sup>132</sup>.

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This belief, which raised his hopes to a higher scene, gave him not, however, that contempt, affected by a very different class of philosophers, for the perishing affairs <sup>133</sup> of the present world. Like some others of the scholars of Socrates, he traced the plan of a perfect commonwealth; though his work, known by that title, as has been justly observed by a great genius <sup>134</sup>, is rather a treatise of education than a system of policy. The real republic of Plato is contained in his books of laws, in which he explains, with no less acuteness than elegance, the origin and revolutions of civil society, and traces the plan of a republic nearly resembling the Spartan model.

His re-  
public.

His practical morality, which he borrowed from Socrates, is profusely scattered through his dialogues; and in his own times, Plato was not considered as that visionary speculatist which he has appeared to later ages. His scholars, Aristonymus, Phormio, and Eudoxus, were successively sent by him to regulate the republics of the Arcadians, Elians, and Cnidians <sup>135</sup>, at the earnest request of those communities. From Xenocrates, another of his disciples, Alexander desired rules for good government <sup>136</sup>. The fame of Aristotle

Genius  
and cha-  
racter of  
Plato.

<sup>132</sup> Phædrus, & Phædo, passim.

<sup>133</sup> The Epicureans.

“ Non res humanæ, perituraque regna.” GEORG.

Of this more below.

<sup>134</sup> Rousseau in his Emile.

<sup>135</sup> Plutarch. advers. Colot. Epicur.

<sup>136</sup> Idem, ibid.

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is well known; and it will afterwards appear how much he was indebted to a master, whose opinions he often combated with seeming reluctance, and real satisfaction. Plato was no less capable to distinguish ideas than to combine images. He united warmth of fancy and acuteness of understanding, in a greater degree than perhaps has fallen to the share of any other man. Yet when compared with his master Socrates, his genius will appear more subtle than sagacious. He wanted that patient spirit of observation which distinguished the illustrious sage, who in all his reasonings kept facts ever in his view, and at every step he made, looked back with wary circumspection on experience. Accompanied by this faithful guide, Socrates trod securely the paths of truth and nature; but his adventurous disciple, trusting to the wings of fancy, often expatiates in imaginary worlds of his own creation,

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

# ERRATA.

- Page 22, line 3, Note, for *εὐγχαῖαι*, read *εὐγχαῖαι*,  
24. — 3, Note, for *δυναμῆς*, read *δυναμῆς*.  
393. — 3, Note, for *εὐεγστο*, read *εὐεγστο*.















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